A World at Arms (200 page)

309
Kurusu (Berlin) to Tokyo No. 119 of 14 Feb. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 9817–21.

310
The quotation is from Hilary Conroy, “Nomura Kichisaburo: The Diplomacy of Drama and Desperation,” in Burns and Bennett,
Diplomats in Crisis
, p. 311.

311
Ike,
Japans Decision for War
, pp. 76–77.

312
Kido Diary
, 7 Aug. 1941; Butow,
Tojo
, PP.236–38.

313
Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor
, pp. 253–54. The Japanese military attache in Washington was equally cautious; see his report 159 of 9 Aug. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRA 17353–55.

314
Ike, pp. 93–110; Butow,
John Doe Associates
, pp. 224–25; Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 236–38.

315
Tokyo to Japanese naval attache Washington, 15 July 1941, NA, RG 457, SRNA 99.

316
Ruth R. Harris, “The ‘Magic’ Leak of 1941 and Japanese-American Relations,”
Pacific Historical Review
50 (1981), 90. See also
FDR Letters
, 2: 1173–74.

317
Butow,
John Doe Associates
, pp. 228–38, 249; Prange,
At Dawn
, pp. 167–9;
Kido Diary
, 31 July 1941, pp. 296–97.

318
Note Matsuoka to Washington No. 495 of 28 Sep. 1940, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 7043.

319
Utley, “Foggy Bottom,” pp. 23–28; Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor
, pp. 48–49; Heinrichs,
Threshold
, pp. 133–36, 141–42, 177–78, 246–47 n 68; Morgenthau Presidential Diary, 18 July 1941, FDRL, Vol. 4, f. 946–48; Barnhart,
Japan Prepares
, pp. 225–42.

320
Roosevelt to Hopkins (in London), 26 July 1941, FDRL, PSF Box 152, Hopkins; FDR Letters, 2: 1189–90; Butow,
John Doe Associates
, pp. 249–56.

321
Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor
, pp. 165–88; Pogue,
Marshall
, 2: 201–3.

322
On this project, which wa s aborted as it became clear that the Japanese were not about to abandon their move south, see Butow,
John Doe Associates
, chap. 19; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 242–46; Ike,
Japan’s Decision for War
, pp. 124–29; Heinrichs,
Threshold
, pp. 185ff;
Kido Diary
, 5 Aug. 1941, pp. 298–99.

323
The Soviets blew up a huge Japanese fuel and ammunition dump at Tatutzuchuan in eastern Manchuria. See John Erickson, “Reflections on Securing the Soviet Far Eastern Frontier: 1932-1945,”
Interplay
3 (1969), 57.

324
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 106–13; Ike, pp. 112–18; Uchiba Diary, 8 Aug. 1941, quoted in Prange,
At Dawn
, p. 177; Butow,
Tojo
, p. 246; Meskill,
Hitler and Japan
, pp. 284–85.

325
KTB Skl A 25, 27 Sep. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/28, f. 455–56; KTB Skl A 26, 4 Oct. 1941, RM 7/29, f. 66; Admiral Groos, “Unterredung mit Vizeadmiral Nomura am 6.8.1941,” RM 7/94, f. 407–12; Nomura (Washington) to Tokyo No. 894 of 3 Oct. 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, 12: 52, and Tokyo to Berlin No. 969 of 21 Nov. 1941, ibid., p. 165; Ott to Berlin No 1974 of 4 Oct. 1941, in Meskill, p. 296, and also pp. 301–2, 304; David J. Dallin,
Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy 1939–1942
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1942), pp. 350–51.

326
The original pledge was made by Moscow on Aug. 13, 1941, and the Japanese asked for a repetition at the time of the American landing on Attu in the Aleutians; see Sato (Kuibyshev) to Tokyo No. 556 of 17 May 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 36685–86; George A. Lensen,
The Strange Neutrality: Soviet-Japanese Relations During the Second World War
1941–1945 (Tallahassee, Fla.: Diplomatic Press, 1972), pp. 35–37.

327
Ike,
Japan’s Decision for War
, pp. 129–63; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 246–59; Prange,
At Dawn
, pp. 208–12;
Kido Diary
, 6 Sep. 1941, p. 304. Until he had obtained the decision for war, Konoe refused to see American Ambassador Grew (unlike Roosevelt who repeatedly met Nomura). Now he invited Grew to dinner (Butow,
John Doe Associates
, p. 428 n 268).

328
Ike, pp. 179–84; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 262–85.

329
Ike, pp. 184–239; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 314–27;
Kido Diary
, 4 Nov. 1941, p. 317. The reluctance to reopen a question once settled in the endless talks in Tokyo - regardless of what had been settled and how - is very much emphasized in Krebs,
Japans Deutschlandpolitik
.

330
Ike, pp. 239–49; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 327–30; Japanese Foreign Ministry Circular 2319 to Hong Kong of 14 Nov. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 104736–37.

331
Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 399–401; Butow,
John Doe Associates
, pp. 197–98; Barnhart,
Japan Prepares
, pp. 260–61; Ike, pp. 249–53. It should be noted that the relevant reports from and instructions to the Japanese embassy in Washington were being read by the Americans so that the Japanese insistence on war was understood there.

332
Ike, pp. 253–60; Butow,
John Doe Associates
, pp. 301–2; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 334–35, 34448; German naval attache Rome “1884/41, Politische Lage JapanlVereinigten Staaten,” 3 Dec. 1941, BA/MA, Case 17/3, PG 45172; Masao Maruyama,
Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics
, Ivan Morris ed. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 8889. The Emperor had his doubts to the end, but the government was unanimous (see Ike, pp. 262–83; Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 337–43, 358–63). The navy wanted to start war without any warning but the Emperor and others wanted one, so there was supposed to be a 20minute interval between the final note - which contained neither a declaration of war nor an announcement of a break of relations - and the attack. It all meant nothing. The delay in the delivery of the final appeal of President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito was a matter of routine and not aimed at this particular document (Butow,
Tojo
, pp. 371–97).

333
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, pp. 277–82.

334
Prange,
At Dawn
, p. 81.

335
Morley,
Fateful Choice,
p. 260.

336
Ibid., pp. 292–95; Butow,
Tojo
,
P.204 n 43; Takushiro Hattori, “Japans Operationsplan für den Beginn des Pazifischen Krieges,”
Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau
7 (1957), 257.

337
Richard Storry,
The Double Patriots: A Study ofJapanese Nationalism
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 285 n 3. On the army war games of early October, see Hattori, p. 261; see also Japanese military attache Bangkok to Japanese General Staff, No. 289 of 18 Oct. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRA 17313–14.

338
Morley,
Fateful Choice
, p. 274. The reference is to October 1940. Yamamoto had turned to an anti-U.S. stance in September 1940 because of the American naval construction program (Chapman,
Price of Admiralty
, p. 264).

339
Prange,
At Dawn
, p. 14.

340
Ibid., p. 15.

341
Ibid., pp. 16–17, 21, chap. 3.

342
Ibid., pp. 285, 296–99, 301–2; Toshikazu Ohmae, “Die strategischen Konzeptionen cler Japanischen marine im Zweiten Weltkrieg,"
Marine-Rundschau
53 (1956) 188. Because of the intervening international date line, Dec. 7 in the U.S. was Dec. 8 in Tokyo.

343
Prange, p. 261.

344
Ibid., p. 35.

345
Ibid., p. 229. Cf. ibid., pp. 133–34; Hattori, “Japans Operationsplan,” p. 261.

346
Prange, p. 323.

347
One of the scholars who shares this perspective is Raymond G. O’Connor,
War, Diplomacy and History
(Washington: Univ. Press of America, 1979), pp. 45, 75. See also H.P. Willmott,
Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 134–41.

348
John J. Stephan,
Hawaii under the Rising Sun: Japan’s Plans for Conquest after Pearl Harbor
(Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1984), chap. 5.

349
Quoted in Borg and Okamoto,
Pearl Harbor
, p. 259. In the published version of the diary, Chihaya Masataka (trans.),
Fading Victory
:
The Diary ofAdmiral Matome Ugaki
1941–1945 (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), this entry is summarized on pp. 40–41.

350
Borg and Okamoto, pp. 252–58.

351
Cole,
Roosevelt and Isolationists
, p. 479;
ADAP
, 0, 13, No. 541; Reichspropagandaamt Berlin, “Presse-Rundschreiben Nr. 11/132/41,” 9 Dec. 1941, BA, Nadler, ZSg. 115/20, f. 114; OKW, WFSt., Abt. L (Warlimont), “Uberblick über die Bedeutung des Kriegseintritts der U.S.A. undJapan," 14 Dec. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/258, f. 133–64, also f. 11920; James C. Gaston,
Planning the American Air War: Four Men and Nine Days in 1941
(Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 96–100. I have not been able to locate any reference to Japanese reactions to this most dramatic leak from the U.S.. government in World War II.

352
See Butow,
Tojo
, p. 336.

353
Pogue,
Marshall
, 2: 221–22.

354
Hull to FDR, 17 June 1942, FDRL, PSF Box 13, Confidential File, State Department 1941–42. The collection was published in two volumes in 1943:
FRUS, Japan
, 1931–1941.

355
There is an excellent account of the issues in Gordon Prange,
Pearl Harbor: The Verdict ofHistory
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1986). This should now be supplemented by George H. Lobell, “Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark," in William B. Cogar (ed.),
New Interpretations in Naval History
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989), pp. 247–62, and David Kahn, “Pearl Harbor and the Inadequacy of Cryptanalysis,"
Cryptologia
25, NO.4 (Oct. 1991), 273–94 (see n 56 on the nonsense about Churchill knowing ahead of time).

356
Comments on Admiral Dankwerts for the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Halifax to London No. 1697 of 17 Apr. 1941, A 4782/384/45, PRO, FO 371/26220.

357
On the salvage of most ships “sunk” at Pearl Harbor, see Homer N. Wallin,
Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal
(Washington: GPO, 1968).

358
On Japanese interest in cooperating with Italian intelligence, see Rome to Tokyo No. 419 of 26 Nov. 1941, NA, RG 457, SRA 3062.

359
Rome to Tokyo No. 985 of 3 Dec. 1941,
Pearl Harbor Attack
, 12: 228–29.

360
ADAP
, D, 13, No. 527, cf. No. 543. An important study based on extensive work in the Italian (as well as United States) archives is Peter Herde,
Italien, Deutschland und der Weg in den Krieg im Pazifik
(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983).

361
A detailed account in Weinberg,
World in the Balance
, pp. 75–95. On May 8, 1941 Hitler had told Goebbels that the United States could not produce as much war material as Germany since the latter had all of Europe to draw on (Fröhlich,
Goebbels Tagebucher, 4:631
).

362
KTB Skl A 28, 9 Dec. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/31, f. 135–36; Oshima No 1437 of 8 Dec. 1941,
Pearl Harbor Attack
, 12; 253. Countries included were Uruguay, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic.

363
Speech in Domarus,
Hitler
, 2: 1794–1811.

364
ADAP
, D, 13, No. 572.

365
The idea had originated with the Japanese, see Weizsacker to Ribbentrop, 7 Nov. 1941, AA, St.S., “USA,” Bd. 9, fr. 422316; Ike,
Japan’s Decision for War
, pp. 260–62. As early as Nov. 21, 1941, von Ribbentrop had assured the Japanese that Germany would not make a separate peace with the United States in any war, however it started
ADAP
, D, 13, No. 487). The treaties themselves were signed after Pearl Harbor.

366
FDR Letters
, 2: 1257, 1282;
FRUS
, 1942, 2: 833–42, cf. ibid., 1: 916; Miller,
Bulgaria
, pp.68–70.

5: THE EASTERN FRONT AND A CHANGING WAR

1
Von Hardesty,
Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet Air Power, 1941–1945
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1982), pp. 11–15;
DRuZW
, 4: 652–56. Horst Boog, the author of the latter piece, points out that the mass destruction of Soviet planes on the ground meant that many of the crew members survived to take part in the rebuilding of the Red air force. The German air force expected that the whole campaign in the East would last two months so that the Luftwaffe could then concentrate on England (Goebbels’ Diary of 29 Sept. 1942, cited in
DRuZW
, 4: 317). The effort of Bryan I. Fugate,
Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941
(Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1984), to put a new interpretation on the early fighting is effectively refuted in Barry D. Watts and Williamson Murray, “Inventing History: Soviet Military Genius Revealed,”
Air University Review
36, NO.3 (Mar/Apr 1985), 102–1

2
KTB Halder
, 3: 38.

3
Halder to Louise von Benda [Jodl], 3 July 1941, provided to Anton Hoch at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte by Louise JodI. I am grateful to Professor Harold Deutsch for sending me a copy. There is a quotation from this letter in Louise JodI’s memoirs,
Jenseits des Endes: Leben und Sterben des Generalobersten Alfred JodI
(Vienna: Fritz Moldau, 1976), p. 55.

4
DRuZW
, 4: 269–70.

5
Ibid., p. 317.

6
Though very early Hitler learned that the Soviets had a heavy tank the Germans could not match, see his letter to Mussolini ofJune 30, 1941 (
ADAP
, D, 13 No. 50). That did not keep him from ordering on July 13 that no new tanks were to be sent to the Eastern Front; they were to be retained in Germany for the equipment of new formations destined for the follow-up campaign into the Middle East (
DRuZW
, 4: 975).