Living Silence in Burma (3 page)

Before going any farther, it should be made clear that while it is possible to talk about ‘the military’ and ‘the people’ as separate categories, in fact the reality is much more complicated. Many families have members in both the military and the pro-democracy movement. A significant percentage of soldiers do not approve of military rule even though they continue to carry out their superiors’ commands. And a number of students who became pro-democracy activists in 1988 originally intended to become military officers. Most adults in Burma are members of the pro-regime Union Solidarity Development Association, whether willingly or not. At a deeper level, the military’s propaganda and ways of operating have profoundly shaped even those opposed to military rule.

Nevertheless, it is not without irony that I have selected
Living Silence in Burma
as the title of this book. Burma is such a vibrant and lively place, yet many subjects are off limits, or talked about only in whispers, behind closed doors. People in Burma are reluctant to speak up because they are never sure who is listening. To protect themselves and their families, Burmese participate in creating the silence that constrains many aspects of their lives.

The first five chapters of this book offer an overview of Burma’s modern history, with a focus on the political resistance movements that have emerged.
Chapters 6
to
12
consider the stresses people in Burma face, the accommodations they have made, and the forms that individual acts of defiance have taken in people’s daily lives. How has the military regime created techniques of control that lead people to act in ways that foster continued military rule? What kinds of resistance have emerged and in what spaces? By looking into households and communities, prisons, schools, barracks and religious centres, the penetration of military rule into all facets of people’s lives becomes clear. But in all of these settings, there are also people who have tried to live by different rules and, in doing so, reaffirm their commitment to bringing about political change.

Since 1988, international players have had a growing role in Burma’s political conflicts. The impacts of their policies and actions are considered in
Chapter 13
, as are the consequences of Burma’s policies for its neighbouring countries. The final chapter looks at how Burma’s political conflicts might be resolved in the future.

Throughout the book, I have used Burma rather than Myanmar, as the military regime unilaterally changed the English name of the country to Myanmar in 1989 without consulting the country’s citizens. In Burmese, ‘Bama’ and ‘Myanma’ are used interchangeably for the name of the country.

In preparing this edition, some sections from the first edition were cut and other sections were reworked. Sections have been added throughout the book to bring it up to date and to further clarify how military rule has lasted so long. In the eight years since the first edition was published, little has changed in terms of the regime’s desire to maintain power, its brutal treatment of dissidents and its inability to take care of its citizens. What has changed, however, is the greater level of international involvement in Burma’s affairs and the expansion of private business and independent organizations. In addition, more and more Burmese have travelled out of the country for education or work, and small but significant numbers of people now have access to the Internet. Many now know how far their country lags behind other countries, and they do not accept the regime’s claims that military rule is necessary. At the same time, a growing number of Burmese realize that all modern governments have certain responsibilities to provide basic services to their populations, and that the regime has failed to meet these. A variety of civil society organizations have emerged to try to tackle the country’s social welfare problems themselves, albeit generally in small-scale ways.

I first came to know about Burma’s political struggles through meeting members of the resistance movement on the Thai–Burma border. While conducting anthropological research with the Karen ethnic minority group in Thailand in 1992–93, I visited Manerplaw, the headquarters of the Karen National Union’s resistance army, which had been fighting for political autonomy since 1949. This was also a coordinating centre for other ethnic nationalist groups as well as the Burmese students and elected politicians who had fled central Burma between 1988 and 1991. I was struck by the fact that they were risking their lives for demands that I took for granted: democracy, human rights and freedom of expression. But why had the struggle gone on for so long, and what kind of a role should the international community be playing? I looked for a job that would help me learn more.

From mid-1995 until 1997, I worked for the Open Society Institute’s Burma Project, running an online newspaper called
The BurmaNet News
and meeting with the Burma Project’s grantees. Spending much of my time on the Thai–Burma border, I also travelled into Burma and along Burma’s other borders. With the support of an Open Society Institute fellowship, I left my job at the end of 1997 to devote a year to carrying out more extensive interviews with Burmese from all walks of life. Most of the interviews were conducted in Burma’s neighbouring countries as well as in Australia and the United States.

While the military regime carefully watches foreigners’ activities in Burma, at any one time there are more than one million Burmese abroad, including undocumented migrant workers, traders and businessmen who regularly go back and forth. Not only farmers but also civil servants have ended up seeking work in other countries as they have found it impossible to support their families in Burma. There are also students and members of religious orders who travel outside the country, refugees and political activists living on Burma’s borders, and thousands of Burmese who have settled abroad to escape military repression or simply to live a more comfortable life.

For the first edition, I interviewed over 150 people, including students, farmers, soldiers, teachers, doctors, lawyers, politicians, civil servants, writers, artists, musicians, monks and priests. This updated edition is based on dozens more interviews and conversations with Burmese from a wide variety of backgrounds. The interview dates are not given in the endnotes although other references are. The names of all except prominent public figures have been changed in order to protect their identities.

I found it much easier to conduct interviews outside Burma, even with some of the people I had previously met inside the country, because in general none of us was worried that the conversation was being overheard by an informer. Many were eager to tell their stories, to revel in moments of triumph and to pour out feelings that had been held inside for so long.
But for some, the telling was painful, as it brought up difficult moral questions and feelings of despair.

What is a life well lived under military rule? Survival depends on submitting to those in power. Truth is often irrelevant. And people have to face choices that are hardly imaginable in a free society. Should you take the high road and refuse to cooperate with the authorities’ demands or should you go along with them, like everyone else seems to be doing? Should you raise your children to accept military rule as normal or should you encourage them to resist and risk years of imprisonment? Is seizing a Burmese embassy abroad justified if the world seems to be ignoring your people’s call for help?

While this book deals with the specifics of life under military rule in Burma, it raises questions about the human condition in general. Repression is not unique to Burma. And at various times, people everywhere have participated in uncomfortable silences with regard to political and social issues, when speaking up was a very difficult thing to do. Yet momentous changes do occur, often catching us by surprise. Burma, then, has a place in a broader history of people’s struggles for political systems that can guarantee both prosperity and justice.

1 | Historical legacies

    The problems in Burma have not been brought on by the military alone. Everyone is responsible. (A Burmese professor)

Burma is inhabited by a mix of people whose past historical relations were often contentious. In the pre-colonial days, Burman kings routinely conquered other peoples, and in three periods consolidated their rule over a number of neighbouring kingdoms and principalities. The successes of such expansionist campaigns brought pride to the victors, but in some cases involved terrible massacres. Under British colonial rule, ethnic minority groups – including Chinese and Indian immigrants as well as indigenous groups – were often privileged politically and economically over the Burman majority. Later, successive Burmese military regimes attempted to erase the humiliation of colonialism and shore up their own legitimacy by linking their political and religious activities to the accomplishments of great Burmese kings in the past. The legacies of both the pre-colonial and colonial periods have partially shaped the way that politics and ethnic relations are understood by people in Burma today.

Pre-colonial principalities and kingdoms

Burma consists of a flat heartland encircled by mountain ranges to the north, east and west. The country is dissected by the Irrawaddy, Salween and Chindwin rivers, and the Irrawaddy delta in the lower part of Burma offers particularly rich soil and bountiful rice harvests. To the south lies the sea. The largest population groups on the plains are the Burmans, Karens, Mons and Arakanese (or Rakhines). It should be noted that ‘Burman’ refers to the ethnic group, while ‘Burmese’ refers to the language that Burman people speak, as well as to all citizens of Burma. ‘Burmese’ is, however, often used interchangeably by outsiders and native speakers to refer to ethnic Burmans and all people living in Burma.

Burma’s great kingdoms evolved in the lowlands, where much wealth was put into the construction of great Buddhist monasteries and pagodas, many of which are still standing. Most people survived as farmers and fishermen, and Buddhism, mixed with spirit worship, was the dominant religion. The Shans, living primarily in the north-eastern hills, are also
predominantly Buddhist and developed principalities centred around prosperous rice-growing valleys. They were often linked in tributary relations to Burman rulers on the plains, but Burman officials never directly administered their territory.

A number of different peoples also live in the mountains, including the Chins, Kachins, Karennis (also known as Kayah), Nagas, Pa’os, Palaungs and Was, as well as many smaller groups. Hundreds of thousands of Karens can also be found in the eastern mountains along the Thai–Burma border. Because of the difficulties of food production in the hills, upland communities have tended to be small and scattered and only loosely connected to larger political centres. Today members of some upland minority groups practise Christianity, while others are Buddhists or continue to worship ancestral and territorial spirits.

In pre-colonial times, there were numerous kingdoms in the territory now known as Burma. Burman kings were periodically able to build empires stretching across much of modern-day Burma, but at other times, Mon and Arakanese rulers presided over flourishing kingdoms of their own in what is now lower Burma. The size of the kingdoms fluctuated dramatically, depending on the number of tributary relations kings could establish and maintain. When kings were weak, appointed princes, pretenders and tributaries often revolted and sought the throne for themselves or looked for alliances with other rising powers.

One of the primary strategic concerns for rulers throughout mainland South-East Asia was acquiring more manpower to till the land, expand the army, and build temples, palaces and irrigation works.
¹
In many war campaigns, the victorious army returned not only with loot but also with thousands of captives who were compelled to join the local workforce.
²
As a result, there was a tremendous mixing of people, particularly around the capitals.

Unlike neighbouring India, Burma never had a fixed class structure. Social and political relationships were, however, ordered by status considerations. Older people were considered higher in status to younger people, monks to lay people, and kings’ appointees to commoners. In each case, the senior person in the relationship expected to be heeded by the junior person. Much of political life operated according to a patron–client model with inferiors providing goods and services to superiors in return for protection.

Rulers of lowland kingdoms often claimed suzerainty over surrounding mountainous regions, and in some cases patron–client relationships were established, with local chiefs and princes sending tribute to the kings.
But kings typically exerted little effort in trying to bring these sparsely inhabited areas under their control. Some mountainous areas were seen as buffer zones between lowland kingdoms and were generally traversed only in times of war.
³

Burmese kingdoms were characterized by great social mobility, permitting people of ability to move from humble origins to high positions without much difficulty. Downward mobility was also common, however, because there was no permanent bureaucracy. The power of kings was absolute, and they could remove or even execute their officials at any time, for the slightest offence.
⁴
Upon the death or dethronement of a king, his officials often lost their jobs too. In such a fluid political environment, elites at every level watched carefully for the emergence of rivals who could threaten their precarious control.

Resulting feelings of fear, jealousy and suspicion come across vividly in the legends of the thirty-seven
nats
, spirits who were propitiated in the pre-colonial period and continue to be cultivated by many Burmese today. Most of the
nats
were talented individuals who were killed by kings because they or one of their relatives had slighted the king or appeared to be a potential threat. After becoming
nats
, they were understood to be powerful but capricious beings who could influence human affairs.