Magnificent Delusions (58 page)

IN THE AFTERMATH
of the US operation against bin Laden I made several attempts to bridge the gulf between the American and Pakistani understanding of each other's positions. But there was little willingness in Islamabad to accept that there was anything wrong on our end that needed to be fixed. The Abbottabad raid had caused Americans to see Pakistan negatively, and the average American now saw it as Osama bin Laden's sanctuary. I reported to the Pakistan government testy conversations with congressmen in which they said that voting for aid for Pakistan was becoming difficult because their constituents were not willing to support a country they saw as an “enemy.” Senator Mark Kirk, a Republican from Illinois, told me frankly that he and many of his colleagues saw Pasha as a “bold-faced liar.” But Pakistani officials rejected every US criticism or suggestion as manifesting “American arrogance.”

Then in September, Admiral Mullen decided to publicly voice his vexation with the Pakistan army's unwillingness to be honest in its dealings with America. He had spent four years cultivating a friendship with Kayani, meeting the Pakistani general twenty-six times.

In congressional testimony Mullen described the Afghan Haqqani terrorist network as “a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency.” He said support for extremist groups, including the Haqqani network and anti-Indian terror organization Lashkar-e-Taiba, was part of the Pakistani government's policy and served Islamabad's interests. “The support of terrorism is part of their national strategy,” Mullen observed.
²⁰
For Kayani and other Pakistani generals, Mullen's statement should have served as a warning that anger toward Pakistan was not limited to US politicians; the US military, which had traditionally cultivated close ties with Pakistan, was also now losing patience. But there was no change in the generals' attitude either, probably because of their belief that the United States needed Pakistan for its dis
engagement from Afghanistan and would, therefore, continue to tolerate its support for some militant groups.

By November 2011 I myself had become a victim of the mistrust and misunderstanding between the two nations. A US businessman of Pakistani origin, now residing in Monaco, claimed in an article that I had asked him to deliver a secret memo to Mullen, seeking US help in thwarting a military coup right after the US operation that killed bin Laden. Kayani and Pasha claimed that their inquiries supported my accuser's claim. The Pakistani media dubbed the affair “Memogate.” To prove my fidelity to Pakistan, I returned to Islamabad and resigned from my position as ambassador.

Pakistan's Supreme Court, without regard to legal or constitutional niceties, intervened directly. Without any trial, it created a Commission of Inquiry and barred me from leaving Pakistan. For two months I remained holed up, first in the Presidential Palace and later in the prime minister's house. I had not been charged with any crime but was nonetheless being portrayed as a traitor who sought foreign help against my own country's army. I feared that a terrorist would kill me if I went out. Eventually the court relented and allowed me to leave Pakistan.

Several months later the Commission of Inquiry alleged that I had acted against Pakistan's interests and had authorized the controversial memo. Pakistani hard-liners claimed I was an American agent of influence, with access in Washington's power corridors. Were that true, there would have been no reason for me to seek help—certainly not from a disreputable businessman—to deliver a message to the US government. To date, more than a year later, I have not been charged or tried. However, the Commission's report could lead to charges of treason, a conviction that carries the death penalty.

My sincere efforts to transcend the parallel narratives that have shaped US-Pakistani relations were not always appreciated in Pakistan, where conspiracy theories and hatred for the United States have become a daily staple of the national discourse. My detractors in Pakistan's security services and among pro-Jihadi groups have long accused me of being pro-American; they failed to see that advocating a different vision for my troubled nation was actually pro-Pakistan.

The expectation that Washington should simply do whatever the Pakistani hypernationalists desired remains unrealistic, as it has since 1947. My countrymen will someday have to come to terms with global realities. Pakistan cannot become a regional leader in South Asia while it supports terrorism. To think that the United States would indefinitely provide economic and military assistance in return for partial support of US objectives is delusional.

Americans must also overcome their fantasy that aid always translates into leverage and that personal relations with foreign officials can change what those officials consider to be their national priorities. If the Pakistanis have been reticent in their cooperation, Americans have resorted only to halfhearted sanctions. Successive administrations have waited until their last few months in office to deliver the toughest messages. By then, however, it is usually too late for threats to be effective. The history of constant misunderstandings confirms that Pakistan and the United States have few shared interests and very different political needs. Just because they don't get along does not mean they must be antagonists, however; they should just lower their expectations of one another, inject a cautious wariness in their future plans, and recognize that their electorates are fatigued by the other. Pakistan cannot pursue its dreams of being India's military equal by seeking American aid. If $40 billion in US aid has not won Pakistani hearts and minds, billions more will not do the trick. Unless Pakistanis define their national interest differently from how their leaders have for over six decades, the US-Pakistan alliance is only a mirage. The relationship needs redefinition, based on a recognition of divergent interests and an acknowledgement of mutual mistrust. Only then will Pakistan and the United States share the same reality.

Notes

Chapter One: False Start

1
. “Pakistan: ‘Better Off in a Home',”
Time
, August 25, 1947, 33.

2
. Margaret Bourke-White,
Halfway to Freedom: A Report on the New India in the Words and Photographs of Margaret Bourke-White
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949), 91–93.

3
. Secret Telegram from George R. Merrell, Charge de Áffaires US Embassy New Delhi to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, May 2, 1947,
Foreign Relations of the United States
(hereafter
FRUS
) 3 (1947): 154–155.

4
. Bourke-White,
Halfway to Freedom
, 91–93,

5
. William Phillips,
Ventures in Diplomacy
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), 359.

6
. Tom Treanor, “The Home Front,”
Los Angeles Times
, March 23, 1943.

7
. Abdul Sattar,
Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947–2005
(Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2007), 11.

8
. Sartaj Aziz,
Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan's History
(Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2009), 28.

9
. Stanley Wolpert,
Jinnah of Pakistan
(Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1984), vii.

10
. Telegram from Consul General [India] Macdonald to the Secretary of State, March 8, 1947,
FRUS
3 (1947): 149–150.

11
. Fortnightly Report to the Viceroy by Sir Evan Jenkins, Governor of Punjab, February 1947, British India Library, Records of the Political and Secret Department, L/P & J/5/250, 3/79.

12
. Entries in Mr. Casey's Diary, dated September 1 and September 11, 1945, documents 84 and 103 in
The Transfer of Power 1942–7
, vol. VI, ed. Nicholas Mansergh (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), 194–195, 246–247.

13
. Letter from Sir B. Glancy to Viceroy Field Marshal Viscount Wavell, August 16, 1946, L/P & J/5/248: ff 50–1, document 29, in Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, 71–72.

14
. Dennis Kux,
The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 7. See also Ayesha Jalal,
The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

15
. Speech at a Lunch Given by Dr. Ziauddin Ahmed, Aligarh, India, March 8, 1944, cited in
Sayings of Quaid e Azam M. A. Jinnah
, ed. Rizwan Ahmed (Karachi, Pakistan: Pakistan Movement Research Center, 1970), 14.

16
. Interview with the Associated Press, July 1942, cited in Ahmed,
Sayings
, 28.

17
. M. Rafique Afzal,
Pakistan: History and Politics, 1947–1971
(Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2001), 99.

18
. Aslam Siddiqui,
Pakistan Seeks Security
(Karachi, Pakistan: Longmans Green, 1960), 89.

19
. “Emergency in Pakistan,” editorial,
New York Times
, August 29, 1948.

20
. “Reuters Report of Jinnah's Meeting in Cairo,” in
Quaid e Azam and the Muslim World: Selected Documents
, ed. Atique Z. Sheikh and M. R. Malik (Karachi, Pakistan: Royal Book Co., 1978), 168.

21
. The Parliamentary Debates [Hansard], fifth Series, vol. CL, July 10, 1947, col. 2445 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947).

22
. Ibid., July 16, 1947, col. 809.

23
. “Reuters Report of Jinnah's Meeting in Cairo.”

24
. Bourke-White,
Halfway to Freedom
, 93–94.

25
. Ibid.

26
.
Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah's Speeches as Governor-general of Pakistan, 1947–48
(Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1964).

27
. “That Man,”
Time
, September 20, 1948, 38.

28
. Liaquat Ali Khan,
Pakistan: The Heart of Asia
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 16.

29
. “Mr. Nehru Again,” editorial,
Dawn
, June 1 1949.

30
. Sri Prakasa,
Pakistan: Birth and Early Days
(Meerut, India: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1965), 83.

31
. Vazira Zamindar,
The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 176–177.

32
. Abdus Sattar, “Fifty Years of the Kashmir Dispute: The Diplomatic Aspect,”
in
Fifty Years of the Kashmir Dispute
, ed. Suroosh Irfani (Muzaffarabad, Pakistan: University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 1997), 11–12.

33
. “Mr. Nehru Again.”

34
. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Speech at Aligarh University in March 1948,” in
Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches, Volume 1: September 1946–May 1949
(New Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, undated), 337–338.

35
. Memorandum of Conversation between Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs and Others with Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 2, 1948,
FRUS
5 (1948): 501–506.

36
. Nehru,
Speeches, vol. 1
, 338.

37
. “Liaquat Asks Army for Social Service and Sacrifices,”
Dawn
, April 10, 1948.

38
. Record of the Interview between Lord Ismay and Jinnah, India Office Records, Mountbatten papers, Miscellaneous Manuscripts Section, Eur F.200/191, April 9, 1947.

39
. Telegram from John Winant, Ambassador to the United Kingdom, to Secretary of State on Discussion with Sir Paul J. Patrick, Assistant Under Secretary of State, India Office, February 21, 1946,
FRUS
5 (1946): 79–80.

40
. Z. H. Zaidi, ed.,
M. A. Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence, 1936–48
(Karachi, Pakistan: Forward Publications Trust, 1975), 503.

41
. Memo from US Ambassador to India Grady to the Secretary of State, July 2, 1947,
FRUS
3 (1947): 158.

42
. Memo of Conversation by Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs, December 26, 1947,
FRUS
3 (1947): 175–179.

43
. US Embassy New Delhi Cable to State Department, July 11, 1947,
FRUS
3 (1947): 161–162.

44
. Memo of Conversation by Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs, December 26, 1947,
FRUS
3 (1947): 175–179.

45
. George McGhee,
Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy
(New York: Harper & Row, 1983), 91.

46
. US Consulate Karachi Cable to State Department, June 21, 1947, 845.000/6–2147, Department of State Records, National Archives.

47
. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, September 9, 1947, 67/CF/47, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

48
. US Embassy Karachi Cable to State Department, September 2, 1947, 845F.00/9–247, Department of State Records, National Archives.

49
. Memorandum from Ambassador Alling to Secretary of State Marshall, the Ambassador in Karachi [Paul Alling] to the Secretary of State [Marshall], March 22, 1948, 845F.00/3–2248, Department of State Records, National Archives.