Mithridates the Great (9 page)

There seemed little doubt, therefore, that the intended recipients of this military build-up were Rome and her allies in Asia Minor, and it came at the worst possible time for Rome. It was not just Rome’s possessions in the East which suffered from Roman arrogance and corruption. Even Rome’s allies in Italy had felt the force of senatorial misgovernment. The anger of the allies was all the fiercer because the Italians lived in close proximity to Roman citizens who enjoyed considerable legal protection from abuse of power by Roman officials. Furthermore, these same Roman citizens had the vote with which to punish those who offended them, and election to high office was fervently sought by the Roman elite. Yet the obvious solution to tensions in Italy –
Roman citizenship for the Italians – was blocked by self-interested parties in Rome. When the Roman who had done most to support their cause was murdered, Italian fury boiled over. At the end of 91 BC, the Italian cities banded together and went to war. It was, in fact, the opposite of a war of independence. If they could not become Romans, then the Italians would destroy Rome. Since the Italians had fought alongside the Roman legions and had the same discipline, weapons and tactics, the danger to Rome was in many ways even greater than the near-mortal peril of the German invasion. Mithridates took the opportunity to once more boot Ariobarzanes out of Cappadocia and re-install his own son, but with their backs to the wall, the Romans hardly noticed.

So extreme was the danger that the Romans did something almost unthinkable for that iron-willed nation. They gave way. It was conceded that the Italians had emphatically made their point, and any city that stopped fighting against the Romans could have the citizenship. This was classic Roman divide and rule tactics, which split those fighting for the citizenship from those, like the Samnites, who would settle for nothing less than turning Rome into smoking cinders.

By the end of 90 BC, their enemies were far from crushed, but the Romans could see light at the end of the tunnel. Foreign policy specialists turned their attention back to Asia Minor, and were far from impressed by the conduct of Mithridates. It is probable that Mithridates himself was feeling some embarrassment. He probably had not expected the Romans to recover as swiftly as they had, nor had he expected the recovery to be so complete. An Italy divided into hostile camps, preferably with an uneasy peace between them, would have meant that neither side could commit the kind of resources needed to separate Mithridates from his new acquisitions.

As it was, Mithridates could just about cover himself in the shreds of a legal defence. Armenian generals had once again led the Cappadocian invasion, and Socrates had no formal ties with Pontus. True, Paphlagonia had probably been occupied by Pontic forces again, but with so minor a kingdom, surely a modest bribe disguised as a ‘fine’ might cover any inconvenience? Especially if Pontus withdrew, apologised, and promised never to do it again?

Mithridates was about to find out. The Romans sent a commission to sort out matters in Asia Minor, and the man leading the commission was Manius Aquillius. At first sight, Aquillius would have been a welcome choice for Mithridates. This was not the first Manius Aquillius to grace the shores of Asia Minor, for the father of the present commissioner, the consul of 129 BC, had
left on friendly terms with the father of Mithridates. Aquillius senior had been sent to finish off the war against Aristonicus which had followed the transfer of Pergamum to Roman control. Mithridates V had contributed to the Roman war effort as an ally, and had paid in solid cash for the award of Phrygia which he received for his efforts.

Sadly, despite his military achievements, the road-building and his constitutional efforts on behalf of the Pergamese, this ungrateful people had protested about Aquillius senior’s corruption so bitterly that he was hauled before the courts in Rome. Fortunately, the courts were no less corrupt than Aquillius himself and he got off, despite widespread acknowledgement that the charges against him were totally accurate. The bad news for Pontus was that, as a result of the scandal, the settlement of Phrygia was never ratified by the senate, despite Pontic protestations that the place had been fairly brought and paid for.

Now the son was on his way and showing signs of the same refreshing venality which had made his father so congenial to do business with. Aquillius minor had been consul in 101 BC, and had crushed a slave revolt in Sicily soon afterwards. He had helped himself to the spoils of victory so liberally that he was prosecuted for it, but, like his father, had been found innocent despite some convincing evidence to the contrary. So far, from the Pontic point of view, so good. Rome could not possibly want a war in Asia Minor with Italy so unsettled, and the man who was coming out to settle matters seemed to be someone with whom Mithridates could do business.

Manius Aquillius was not the only player with whom Mithridates had to contend. There was also Cassius in Pergamum, a competent administrator and, unusually for a Roman, almost honest. There was a further Roman official called Oppius, who seems to have been appointed as a result of the incipient crisis with Pontus. This allowed one official to concentrate upon the military situation, particularly in Cappadocia, whilst the other got on with the manifold administrative responsibilities of provincial government. Also with Aquillius were two other commissioners, though these were apparently so lacking in influence that History has neglected to make proper note of their names.

What is not known, but is of vast significance, is what briefing Aquillius had received from the senate. That he was instructed to restore Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes IV is beyond question, but had he also received instructions that the wings of Mithridates were to be clipped? Was the intention simply to restore the kings that Mithridates had usurped, or was it intended that there should also be some form of demonstration that the Romans took a very dim
view of the attempt to kick them whilst they were down?
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It was also interesting that Manius was very much a creature of Marius. He had served under Marius in the German war, and it was primarily the influence of Marius that had saved him from being convicted for corruption. Marius had not had a good war during the Italian revolt. Feeling that his efforts were unappreciated after a few mediocre wins against the enemy, Marius had virtually withdrawn from the fray, bitterly indignant at the plaudits being heaped on the achievements of Sulla. Could Marius, even at this early stage, have been looking at a war in Asia to redeem his reputation?

Whatever their motivation, the commissioners took a solidly uncompromising line with Mithridates. Nicomedes IV and Ariobarzanes were to be restored, immediately and without quibbling, and Pontus was to get out of Phrygia forthwith. The Romans had never stripped Pontus of the title of ‘friend and ally of Rome’, and now, in a neat diplomatic twist, they ordered their ‘friend’ to provide the troops to make these expulsions possible. It was a moment of acute political tension, and Mithridates was the first to blink. With surly reluctance, and prodded by troops the Romans had raised from Galatia and among the Phrygians, he withdrew his puppets from Cappadocia and his army from Phrygia. Socrates was assassinated, which meant that Nicomedes IV became king by default, without Mithridates needing to back down in Bithynia.

Once more Rome had enforced its will in Asia Minor. But Aquillius wanted more than this. Time and again Mithridates had defied Rome through his proxies. He was due a measure of his own medicine, and a dose which, not coincidentally, would prove highly profitable to Aquillius and his colleagues.
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Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes were ordered to mount plundering raids on Pontus. Ariobarzanes, already a hardened survivor of regional geopolitics, excused himself from the enterprise, probably informing his Roman sponsors that there were easier ways to commit suicide. Nicomedes had no such option. He was deeply in debt to the Romans who had bailed him out financially whilst he was in exile, and his closer proximity to the Roman province made it possible for his assistance to be requested more forcefully. Accordingly, late in 90 BC, Bithynian forces made an armed incursion into Pontus, plundering maritime Paphlagonia almost as far as Amisus. Nor was economic warfare neglected, as the Hellespont was closed to Pontic shipping.

Though the Pontic army was more than capable of wiping out the invaders, Mithridates held back whilst he tried to establish exactly what was happening. He sent an ambassador called Pelopidas to the Romans, and played the same card that Aquillius had earlier. As Rome’s ‘friend and ally’, Mithridates
claimed the protection of the Romans, and the return of the spoils looted from his territory. If the Romans were not prepared to intervene, then Mithridates would be content also with that, so long as they stood aside whilst he and Nicomedes fought it out, king to king. Much as it embarrassed Aquillius and the Romans to acknowledge it, Mithridates had a valid point. In their own defence, the Bithynians pointed out that Mithridates had hardly acted in good faith in the past, and that his vast army was hardly compatible with peaceful intentions. Pelopidas countered that what Mithridates had done in the past he had answered for, and his intentions were open to discussion. What was not in dispute was that Pontus had been blatantly wronged, and reparations were due.

The diplomatic solution would have been for Nicomedes to pay an insultingly small sum in damages, and for the delegates to discreetly make it plain that further misbehaviour by Pontus would see more harassment indirectly sponsored by Rome. But Aquillius seems to have felt doing even that amounted to a concession which would cause Rome to lose face in Asia Minor. Consequently, Pelopidas was fobbed off with a vague statement that ‘Rome wished no harm to come to either the king of Bithynia or the king of Pontus’.
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In other words, Mithridates was to take his punishment, and part of that punishment was the humiliation of his kingdom before the peoples and cities of Asia Minor. The Romans seem not to have realized, or not to have cared, that their actions put them publicly in the wrong. Mithridatic propaganda could now argue that the Romans were starting a war out of pure greed for plunder, and argue their case so convincingly that even Roman historians such as Appian were inclined to agree.

The next move lay with Mithridates. He did not declare war on Bithynia, which would have been tantamount to declaring war on Rome. Instead he reoccupied Cappadocia, and blandly informed the Romans that if they would sort out Nicomedes, he would reciprocate by helping them with their troubles in Italy – a none-too-subtle hint that Rome hardly needed to add to its current problems by starting a major war in Asia Minor. From the point of view of Aquillius the question did not arise – by reoccupying Cappadocia in defiance of Roman orders, Pontus had effectively declared war.

At the very least, Mithridates must have been aware that it was probable that Aquillius would react in this way. So why did he decide to challenge what was already the most formidable military power the world had ever known? To answer this question, we must consider the Rome of 89 BC, not what Rome was to become. What Mithridates saw was a state which had grown like a weed across the Mediterranean basin, and which now, like a weed which has
outgrown its strength, was toppling under its own weight. Besides the heavy weather that Rome had made against Jugurtha, Rome was also struggling in Spain where the natives were busily handing out painful lessons in guerrilla warfare. Mithridates could always hope that peoples such as the Germanic tribes would make another assault across the Alps, and in any case, Rome was heartily loathed in Greece, Asia Minor, and, as the natives were even now making clear, in Italy. A series of oracular ‘visions’ were circulating in the East at this time, prophesying the fall of Rome. There could be no doubt that many of the cities of the Greek West were waiting only for leadership before they threw their weight behind making these visions a reality. Mithridates could convince himself and his allies that he was the new Alexander, and as Alexander had pushed aside the vast, yet decadent and corrupt Persian empire, so the cleansing fury of Pontus would light a fire which would annihilate Roman power east of the Adriatic Sea, and after that, who knows? As events were to show, this was a flawed yet far from unrealistic vision.

On the other side of the coin, if Rome was so vulnerable, why choose 90 BC as the time to take on so well-prepared and competent an enemy? Even aside from the Italian war, which was still in full swing, Aquillius must have known that Rome was already over-committed in Spain, whilst in Africa, northern Italy and Macedonia the legions were urgently needed to hold down Rome’s bad-tempered and rebellious subjects. It was because he knew this weakness that Mithridates had been prepared to push as hard as he had, and this was why, when the Romans challenged him, he was quite prepared to show that he was not bluffing.

The origin for the first war with Mithridates almost certainly lies in Rome’s deep preoccupation with the still intensely dangerous war in Italy. Because of this they allowed a dispute about the restoration of two petty kings in Asia Minor to escalate to a full-blown war without their considering the consequences of each step their representatives were taking. It is repeatedly alleged that Rome’s men on the ground in Asia Minor did not consult the senate before they committed their nation to war, but Rome certainly had plenty of time to reign in her representatives during the long build-up before the actual campaigning kicked off.
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Greed may have played a part, for Pontus was very wealthy, but arrogance is at least as likely. It is certain that, despite comprehensive Bithynian warnings, the strength of Pontus was underestimated. Aquillius might have considered this a matter well within his competence to handle, and perhaps the senate took him at his word. Certainly there would have been considerable irritation with Mithridates in Rome. In
Asia Minor, the will of Rome had repeatedly been defied. Therefore, those defying Rome would pay. After all, they were only Asiatics.