The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (9 page)

11
     That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil.
[14a]
For defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being an evil, and the mean, which is a good, is equally the contrary of the one and of the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good.
(5)

In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one
exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there will be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white,
(10)
there will be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual at the same time, both these contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.

It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects which belong to the same species or genus.
(15)
Disease and health require as their subject the body of an animal; white and black require a body, without further qualification; justice and injustice require as their subject the human soul.

Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be themselves genera.
(20)
White and black belong to the same genus, colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good and evil do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual genera,
(25)
with terms under them.

12
     There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be ‘prior’ to another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time: in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the expressions ‘older’ and ‘more ancient’ imply greater length of time.

Secondly, one thing is said to be ‘prior’ to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed.
(30)
In this sense ‘one’ is ‘prior’ to ‘two’. For if ‘two’ exists, it follows directly that ‘one’ must exist, but if ‘one’ exists, it does not follow necessarily that ‘two’ exists: thus the sequence subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed,
(35)
then that one on which the other depends is called ‘prior’ to that other.

In the third place, the term ‘prior’ is used with reference to any order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences which use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet are prior to the syllables.
[14b]
Similarly, in the case of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the narrative.

Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority.
(5)
In common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love
as ‘coming first’ with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most far-fetched.

Such, then, are the different senses in which the term ‘prior’ is used.

Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another.
(10)
For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature ‘prior’ to the effect. It is plain that there are instances of this. The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is,
(15)
the proposition wherein we allege that he is is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man’s being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition,
(20)
for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man’s being or not being.

Thus the word ‘prior’ may be used in five senses.

13
     The term ‘simultaneous’ is primarily and most appropriately applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the other.
(25)
Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are ‘simultaneous’ in point of nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the cause of the other’s being. This is the case with regard to the double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double, there is also a half,
(30)
and if there is a half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the other.

Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of division.
(35)
Thus the ‘winged’ species is simultaneous with the ‘terrestrial’ and the ‘water’ species. These are distinguished within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the genus ‘animal’ has the ‘winged’, the ‘terrestrial’, and the ‘water’ species, and no one of these is prior or posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature.
[15a]
Each of these also, the terrestrial, the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into sub-species. Those species, then, also will be ‘simultaneous’ in point of
nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of differentiation.

But genera are prior to species,
(5)
for the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. If there is the species ‘water-animal’, there will be the genus ‘animal’, but granted the being of the genus ‘animal’, it does not follow necessarily that there will be the species ‘water-animal’.

Those things, therefore, are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is in any way the cause of the other’s being; those species,
(10)
also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover, are ‘simultaneous’ in the unqualified sense of the word which come into being at the same time.

14
     There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place.

It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement are distinct each from each.
(15)
Generation is distinct from destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so on. But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the process necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion.
(20)
This is not true, for we may say that all affections, or nearly all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other sorts of motion, for that which is affected need not suffer either increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of motion; for,
(25)
if it were not, the thing altered would not only be altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter of fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration also. But there are some things which undergo increase but yet not alteration. The square,
(30)
for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is with all other figures of this sort. Alteration and increase, therefore, are distinct.

[15b]
Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the different forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase, rest in a place, of change of place. As for this last, change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly its contrary;
thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa.
(5)

In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the contrary here also either as ‘rest in its quality’ or as ‘change in the direction of the contrary quality’,
(10)
just as we defined the contrary of change of place either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction. For a thing is altered when change of quality takes place; therefore either rest in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary quality may be called the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there is alteration in the contrary direction,
(15)
since a change of a qualitative nature takes place.

15
     The term ‘to have’ is used in various senses. In the first place it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality, for we are said to ‘have’ a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for instance,
(20)
in the case of a man’s height; for he is said to ‘have’ a height of three cubits or four cubits. It is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to ‘have’ a coat or tunic; or in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves, as a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a part of us, as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to ‘have’ wine, and a corn-measure wheat.
(25)
The expression in such cases has reference to content. Or it refers to that which has been acquired; we are said to ‘have’ a house or a field. A man is also said to ‘have’ a wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears to be the most remote meaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean simply that the husband lives with the wife.
(30)

Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary ones have all been enumerated.

¹
1
^a
24.

²
1
^a
6.

³
2
^a
11—
^b
22.

   
CHAPTER

  
1.
   (1)   The spoken word is a symbol of thought.

        (2)   Isolated thoughts or expressions are neither true nor false.

        (3)   Truth and falsehood are only attributable to certain combinations of thoughts or of words.

  
2.
   (1)   Definition of a noun.

        (2)   Simple and composite nouns.

        (3)   Indefinite nouns.

        (4)   Cases of a noun.

  
3.
   (1)   Definition of a verb.

        (2)   Indefinite verbs.

        (3)   Tenses of a verb.

        (4)   Verbal nouns and adjectives.

  
4.
   Definition of a sentence.

  
5.
   Simple and compound propositions.

  
6.
   Contradictory propositions.

  
7.
   (1)   Universal, indefinite, and particular affirmations and denials.

        (2)   Contrary as opposed to contradictory propositions.

        (3)   In contrary propositions, of which the subject is universal or particular, the truth of the one proposition implies the falsity of the other, but this is not the case in indefinite propositions.

  
8.
   Definition of single propositions.

  
9.
   Propositions which refer to present or past time must be either true or false: propositions which refer to future time must be either true or false, but it is not determined which must be true and which false.

10.
   (1)   Diagrammatic arrangement of pairs of affirmations and denials, (
a
) without the complement of the verb ‘to be’, (
b
) with the complement of the verb ‘to be’, (
c
) with an indefinite noun for subject.

        (2)   The right position of the negative.

        (3)   Contraries can never both be true, but subcontraries may both be true.

        (4)   In particular propositions, if the affirmative is false, the contrary is true; in universal propositions, if the affirmative is false, the contradictory is true.

        (5)   Propositions consisting of an indefinite noun and an indefinite verb are not denials.

        (6)   The relation to other propositions of those which have an indefinite noun as subject.

        (7)   The transposition of nouns and verbs makes no difference to the sense of the proposition.

11.
   (1)   Some seemingly simple propositions are really compound.

        (2)   Similarly some dialectical questions are really compound.

        (3)   The nature of a dialectical question.

        (4)   When two simple propositions having the same subject are true, it is not necessarily the case that the proposition resulting from the combination of the predicates is true.

        (5)   A plurality of predicates which individually belong to the same subject can only be combined to form a simple proposition when they are essentially predicable of the subject, and when one is not implicit in another.

        (6)   A compound predicate cannot be resolved into simple predicates when the compound predicate has within it a contradiction in terms, or when one of the predicates is used in a secondary sense.

12.
   (1)   Propositions concerning possibility, impossibility, contingency, and necessity.

        (2)   Determination of the proper contradictories of such propositions.

13.
   (1)   Scheme to show the relation subsisting between such propositions.

        (2)   Illogical character of this scheme proved.

        (3)   Revised scheme.

        (4)   That which is said to be possible may be (
a
) always actual, (
b
) sometimes actual and sometimes not, (
c
) never actual.

14.
   Discussion as to whether a contrary affirmation or a denial is the proper contrary of an affirmation, either universal or particular.