The King's Cardinal: The Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey (Pimlico) (46 page)

Furthermore, it is clear that the pope was extremely suspicious of Wolsey’s activities at Calais, even after he knew of the Anglo-Imperial alliance. The fact is that because of the pope’s desire for immediate military success against the French in Italy and Wolsey’s plans for future military success in France, papal and English policies were not close. Leo
X
dreaded Wolsey’s desire for a truce and late in September suggested to the Imperial ambassador in Rome that someone ought to speak to the king of England and show him what sort of person Wolsey was.
⁷⁶
Wolsey, for his part, must have been pleased that the pope had sided with the emperor just because it increased the new alliance’s chances against the French, but he was in no sense led by him. In late October, he warned the emperor ‘not to regard matters of Italy and the pope so greatly as to damage the rest of his dominions’.
⁷⁷
On 20 November he made his views even clearer. After discussing the forthcoming inclusion of the papacy in the Anglo-Imperial alliance with the Imperial delegation, he went on to say that neither Henry nor Charles should be led by the pope, but rather they should lead him.

In 1521 Wolsey did rather well out of the pope: greatly extended legatine powers both in scope and length of tenure, and the title of
Defensor Fidei
for Henry, though it might be said that the king had earned this himself with his famous book against Luther – the
Assertio Septem Sacramentorum
, In return, he gave very little. The explanation is that on the whole Leo
X
was more anxious for his help than Wolsey was for Leo’s. But the real point that is being made here is that as regards foreign affairs Wolsey considered the papacy just as he did any other foreign power – something to be manipulated for his master’s benefit. There was no ‘special relationship’, and therefore it cannot provide the key to what went on at Calais and Bruges.

Another explanation of what went on there concentrates on Henry’s dynastic problems: a marriage between Mary and Charles was the best solution to the increasingly worrying fact that Catherine of Aragon had failed to provide Henry with a male heir.
⁷⁸
It does not seem very convincing. The marriage would not come
into effect for at least seven years, and a costly war against France appears to be a high price for something that was so uncertain. Be that as it may, the chief defect of this thesis is that it is impossible to find any evidence for it. There was some discussion of the marriage terms, but nothing to suggest that this was anything more than the usual haggling. Certainly, if it was the central purpose of English foreign policy in 1521, Wolsey and Henry kept surprisingly quiet about it.

Perhaps the best explanation is provided by Wolsey himself. On his return from the successful negotiations at Bruges, he sent Henry an assessment of the young emperor. It was a favourable one, particularly so because Charles had made it clear that, just as Henry had done, so he intended to place the burden of affairs on Wolsey’s shoulders.

Wherefore, Sir, you have cause to give thanks to Almighty God, which have given your grace so to order and convene your affairs, that you be not only the ruler of this your realm, which is an angle of the world; but also by your wisdom and counsel, Spain, Italy, Almaine [Germany] and these Low Countries, which is the greatest part of Christendom, shall be ruled and governed. And as for France, this knot now being assuredly knit, shall not fail to do as your grace shall command. What honour this is to your highness, I doubt not but that your grace, of your high wisdom can right well consider
.
⁷⁹

This letter should not, of course, be taken at its face value – if there is one thing that all Wolsey’s subsequent actions make clear it is that he did not trust Charles an inch – but it does contain an essential truth. Henry’s honour is the explanation for Wolsey’s foreign policy.
⁸⁰
As has been shown, Wolsey was far too astute not to appreciate that particular policies had particular drawbacks, and this applied as much to the conduct of war as to the search for peace. The important thing was to dominate affairs, and by this means bring honour and glory to his master – and, of course, to himself. Not that I would want to end this chapter on a cynical note. At the end of his life, Wolsey realized that a choice had always had to be made between serving the king and serving God. He had chosen to serve the king, but in doing this he made the same choice as almost every other politically conscious man did in the sixteenth century.
⁸¹
He devoted his considerable talents and energies to his chosen task, and, as far as the negotiations at Calais and Bruges were concerned, his monarch was extremely grateful.
⁸²

¹
This chapter follows very closely my article ‘Wolsey’s foreign policy’,
HJ
, 23.

²
See pp.97 ff.

³
Scarisbrick,
Henry
VIII
, p.49 and more generally, pp.41-240. Scarisbrick’s treatment of Wolsey’s foreign policy is entirely responsible for my interest in Wolsey and thus the
fons et origo
of this book! Despite my many disagreements with his interpretation, I would like to express my great admiration for the skill with which it is presented. For other accounts of Wolsey’s concern for peace, see Mattingly,
Journal of Modern History
, x, and Russell,
BIHR
, xliv.

⁴
Dumont, iv, pp.224-5; see also pp.80-81, 86-7 above.

⁵
For Imperial policy at this time, see
inter alia LP
, iii, 1106, 1446.

⁶
Elton,
Reform and Reformation
, p.84 for such scepticism; otherwise Russell,
Field of Cloth of Gold
.

⁷
LP
, iii, 689;
Ven. Cal
., ii, 1259. 1298; iii, 60, 184.

⁸
LP
, iii, 1212, 1257, 1283.

⁹
LP
, iii, 936.

¹⁰
LP
, iii, 1213; the recall is
LP
, iii, 1214.

¹¹
LP
, iii, 936.

¹²
LP
, iii, 1044, 1098, 1149, 1162, 1213.

¹³
Pastor, viii, pp.1-36.

¹⁴
‘For remembering the good amity that is betwixt us and France and our daughter honourably bestowed there, considering also that we be in peace with all Christian princes, what need have we to care for further amities, alliances or intelligence with the pope or the emperor than we have already.’ (
LP
, iii, 1150).

¹⁵
Ibid.

¹⁶
LP
, iii, 1257, 1258, 1283 for English efforts to thwart these moves.

¹⁷
LP
, iii, 1213.

¹⁸
LP
, iii, 1270, 1362, 1367, 1371, 1383, 1395, 1488.

¹⁹
LP
, iii, 1271, 1283.

²⁰
LP
, iii, 1304, 1315.

²¹
LP
, iii, 1303, 1304, 1310, 1315, 1331.

²²
St. P
, vi, p.72 (
LP
, iii, 1352).

²³
LP
, iii, 1362, 1371.

²⁴
St. P
, i, p.17 (
LP
, iii, 1383) also
LP
, iii, 1415, 1419.

²⁵
He was quite good at changing them himself!

²⁶
LP
, iii, 1446 for Gattinara’s assessment of the Imperial position.

²⁷
Gattinara’s comments at the Imperial Council meeting in August show that he was aware of Wolsey’s worries on this score, while in November they were used by Charles to bring pressure on England; see
LP
, iii, 1507, 1770.

²⁸
Neither of these meetings is well documented. During 1521 reference was usually made to the ‘Treaty of Canterbury’. What has survived is a treaty made at Calais, so presumably the terms were discussed at Canterbury and confirmed at Calais; see
LP
, iii, 908.

²⁹
LP
, iii, 1326, 1357.

³⁰
Giustinian’s praise of Wolsey in September 1518; see
LP
, ii, 4453.

³¹
LP
1370.

³²
LP
, iii, 1371.

³³
See the assessment to this effect of England’s ambassador in the Low Countries, Sir Thomas Spinelly, writing to Wolsey on 21 July. (
LP
, iii, 1428).

³⁴
He was certainly very eager to see him, insisting on a meeting as soon as he arrived, despite the resident Imperial ambassador’s view that this was inconvenient; see
LP
, iii, 1381.

³⁵
See
Sp. Cal
., ii, 337 for the assessment of the Imperial ambassador at Rome to this effect.

³⁶
It is the uncertainty about the terms, and the sense in which all was still to play for, that provides the answer to the question posed by Scarisbrick: why, if all he wanted was an Imperial alliance, did not Wolsey just send over ambassadors? See his
Henry
VIII
, p.84.

³⁷
BL, Galba B,vii, fos.288-90 (
LP
, iii, 2333).

³⁸
In particular, pt.4 suggests that, after a marriage alliance, there should be a two-year truce to allow England time to prepare for war, and for Charles to return to Spain. But Charles’s return was decided at Bruges, and when the Treaty of Windsor was signed he was already on his way. What first suggested to me that the document was misplaced was the assumption made throughout that France was still in possession of the duchy of Milan, which after November 1521 was not the case.

³⁹
This may suggest a date close to Haneton’s mission in very early July. At that date Navarre had not been rcovered by the Spanish, so that this provision would have restored it to them. After November 1521 it would require the restoration of Milan to France, not a very likely way of gaining an Imperial alliance.

⁴⁰
Three of the six points specifically mention this.

⁴¹
St. P
, i, p.27 (
LP
, iii, 1462).

⁴²
LP
, iii, 1479-81.

⁴³
LP
, iii, 1480.

⁴⁴
LP
, iii, 1480;
Sp. Cal
., ii, 355, pts 7, 8. The Imperial ambassadors argued that the amount of money settled on Mary should be one-tenth of the marriage portion she brought with her. They therefore objected to Wolsey’s demand for 20,000 marks a year, since the portion was only 100,000 marks. The figure reached at Bruges was less favourable to Mary but still above the Imperialists’ assessment of the going rate; by my calculation the figure had dropped from £13,000 a year to £10,000.

⁴⁵
LP
, iii, 1479.

⁴⁶
LP
, 1802.

⁴⁷
LP
, iii, 2292.