1916 (46 page)

The count revealed to His Holiness the plans of the leaders of the insurrection, and the pope was deeply moved when told that the date had been fixed.’ Readers were informed that Count Plunkett had ‘pledged the Irish Republic to fidelity to the Holy See and the interests of religion. Thereupon His Holiness … conferred His Apostolic Benediction on the men who were facing death – for Ireland’s liberty.

The
Press
carried an editorial on the same day entitled ‘Benediction’, which spoke of Ireland learning ‘for the first time one of the most moving and glorious stories in connection with the Easter Week’. It felt that the disclosure would

bring warmth and gratitude to all Irish hearts. It is wonderful to learn that when the men of Easter Week went out they knew that across the continent of Europe the head of Catholicism was aware of their bravery and had blessed it. Those leaders of the Rising who in their lives had shown so deep and practical a Christianity had that secret thought to treasure at the hour of their execution when they must have felt their isolation even at home complete. In the turmoil on the continent, across the bloody lines of war, was the man who held the most exalted office in the world, caring for the liberty of a little nation and sending to its republican soldiers the approval of his benediction – that surely was sweetness amongst such darkness and suffering.

On Saturday 27 May, the following drawing appeared on the front page of the
Press
,
beside a lead story reporting de Valera’s own papal audience and his being conferred with the order of chavalier of the grand cross of Pius IX:

Eoin MacNeill was quick to counter. Writing in the
Press
on 28 May, he said tersely: ‘The statement which appears in the
Irish Press
of May 26, that the executive of the Irish Volunteers at any time before Easter 1916 formed a provisional government, or took any action as a provisional government, is not true in any sense.’

MacNeill was obliged to return to the fray when the widow of Éamonn Ceannt, Áine, wrote in the same newspaper on 31 May, noting that Mac-Neill had neither confirmed nor contradicted Plunkett’s assertion that the letter of credence which the count bore to the Vatican was signed by Mac-Neill. She observed that MacNeill had merely denied that the Volunteer executive had ever formed a provisional government: ‘In that perhaps he is
right, but the shadow cabinet had been considered and certain portfolios suggested. The only post which I remember definitely was that which my husband told me had been allocated to himself, viz. minister for war.’ She challenged MacNeill to state unequivocally whether he had ever signed a letter of credence to the Vatican, the name of the envoy not having been inserted? On 1 June, MacNeill replied in clear and unequivocal terms: ‘I signed no such letter, and if any sort of letter of credence to the Vatican purporting to be signed by me ever existed it was a forgery.’ He had ‘no cognizance of any such acts, considerations or suggestions. If there has been any attempt to equivocate, it has not been on my part.’ Further, he repeated his denial that the national executive of the Irish Volunteers had ever formed a provisional government and had taken action in that capacity. He also denied that portfolios had been allocated or even brought forward for consideration. The suggestion had ‘no truth whatever’.

On 2 June Count Plunkett re-published his original statement in the
Irish Press
on the letters page, pointing out, in addition, that the 1916 Proclamation had been signed by seven officers of the Volunteers and Citizen Army on behalf of the Provisional Government, the first intimation of whose existence appeared therein. He wrote a further letter to the same newspaper on 19 June 1933, in answer to the
Irish Independent
which, he claimed, had tried to ‘discredit the agent of those heroic men, when he reports that they sent him on a mission to the pope before the Rising, and that they were blessed by His Holiness as they faced death for the liberty of Ireland’. He further stated:

That the coming Irish Republic should have been pledged to fidelity to ‘the prisoner of the Vatican’ and His successors is an offence to the hypocrites who would destroy the cause of these leaders – our cause today – by the brutality of the Safety (!) Act, and the poison of defamation.

His letter concluded: ‘When the leaders surrendered to save the people of Dublin by his message to the archbishop of Armagh, Pope Benedict XV showed His continued affectionate sympathy for the insurgents, then exposed to English savagery.’

This correspondence, conducted seventeen years after the event, shows that the count continued to believe that he had gone to Rome with instructions from the highest authority within the Irish Volunteers.
⁵⁵
He could
hardly have presented himself to Benedict XV as the spokesperson for the Supreme Council of the oath-bound, anti-clerical, IRB. MacNeill’s denial is
authoritative and unequivocal. That showed that he was deceived yet again
by a number of those who planned the Rising.

I will now return to the narrative. After the papal audience Count Plunkett visited the Irish College at St Agatha’s.
⁵⁶
There are no details in his daughter’s memoir of who he met there. He told O’Riordan and Hagan that the Rising was going to occur on Easter Sunday. Curran received a note from the vice rector which he had mislaid when compiling his account of the events surrounding 1916. According to his recollection, Hagan’s note said something like the following: ‘“The visitor, who will call on you, was seen by me. He had an audience with the pope.” That was the gist of it.’ Hagan also gave Curran verbal confirmation of this either at the time or subsequently when he took over as vice rector when Hagan became rector in 1920.
⁵⁷

Plunkett arrived back in Dublin on either Holy Thursday or Good Friday. He mentioned the latter date in the
Irish Press
on 26 May 1933. He filed a report on his trip with his superiors, which included his son, Joe, but not Eoin MacNeill. Instead of going directly to request a meeting with Archbishop Walsh, as the pope had urged, the count set out for the country where he met about five members of the hierarchy, so worried was he about ‘what the bishops might do’.
⁵⁸
No names are given in the Plunkett-Dillon memoir. It is likely that the count’s authoritative account of his audience with Benedict XV was recounted to each in turn. According to his daughter’s account Count Plunkett ‘warned them that if there was trouble in the immediate future they should not take any action and asked them to refrain from condemning what they did not understand’. The memoir recounts that he was so tired he did not remember the names of the bishops he had spoken to at the time but ‘he thought none of the bishops he interviewed condemned the Rising’.
⁵⁹

News of the count’s audience with the pope may have spread quite quickly amongst the other bishops. Time was short to spread the news if it was as late as Good Friday that he visited the bishops. But they had at least twenty four hours to communicate the extraordinary news that he had brought to them. The pope did not bless the Rising. Count Plunkett, in his retelling of the events in 1933, had the imagination to embellish and embroider. Naïve he might have been, but he was sincere and very devout. His report was readily believed and of great importance to Catholics who felt a great sense of unease about the revolutionary course upon which they were about to embark.

The pace of events had quickened during Count Plunkett’s absence from the country. The 1916 leaders feared that Dublin Castle might move against the Irish Volunteers before there was an opportunity to strike. In the weeks leading up to Easter Sunday the drilling and manoeuvres continued throughout the country. Whereas Eoin MacNeill regarded this as nothing more than business as usual, Pearse was preparing the men for the Rising whether they were aware of that fact or not. Drilling and manoeuvres had become so ritualised, however, that there may not have been a widespread awareness that the Irish Volunteers were about to take part in the real thing. Because of the danger of imminent repression by British forces, there was a growing anxiety among the radicals that the Rising might be stopped. Those anxieties had grounds in reality.

The Plunkett-Dillon memoir casts new light on the development of events. It reveals that the IRB had a spy in Dublin Castle. Eugene Smith, a civil servant, had got sight of a document which detailed British plans to round up the Irish Volunteers and confiscate their arms. When he had the opportunity Smith memorised sections of the document and wrote them out later in safety. Having almost completed his task of copying he felt he had come under suspicion so he passed what he had on to his IRB contact. It was then put in code and given to Joe Plunkett, who deciphered it and brought it to the Military Council. The document outlined details of measures that were to be taken against the Volunteers on receipt of an order from the chief secretary’s office. There were lists of all the organisations and the members to be arrested. There were arrangements for confining citizens to their houses and for the occupation of houses, including those of MacNeill and Count Plunkett. Volunteer headquarters were to be occupied, as was Archbishop Walsh’s house, which was listed as ‘Ara Coeli’ (Cardinal Logue’s house in Armagh) in the version of the text smuggled out by Smith.

Joe Plunkett and others took the decision to publish the document. The type-setting was done in Larkfield, the Plunkett family home. It was then circulated to the newspapers but all refused to publish it.

On 8 April 1916 Curran records that Séamus O’Kelly called to see him, and was very anxious about information received regarding the intentions of the government to disarm the Volunteers: ‘He said the evidence was incontrovertible and would be available next Saturday.’ He wanted the
influence of ‘neutral personages to intervene to prevent bloodshed, asserting that the Volunteers were not pro-German’. Assistant Commissioner Quinn was ‘on tenterhooks’, according to Curran, who also noted that the Volunteers had become very evident of late, holding nightly meetings, and marching through the streets of Dublin, a hundred strong, with rifles on shoulders.

On Sunday 9 April Seán T. O’Kelly called to see Curran. He had the same story as the other O’Kelly about a Castle document. It had been seen piecemeal by a clerk in Dublin Castle who had reported its contents to the Volunteers. They would not have the complete document until the following Saturday. But Seán T. was convinced of its authenticity, and that ‘immediate military action against the Volunteers was intended’. Curran decided not to tell Archbishop Walsh until he had the text.
⁶⁰
But on 16 April he wrote to Hagan:

Peace negotiations seem to be in the air especially since Asquith’s visit to you [in Rome] … We had 5 German U boats in the Irish sea last week. The mails were interrupted for a day or two. The
Lady Master
[?] and another was sunk. According to underground talk, things are very serious here and heading for an outburst. The talk is that govt is to disarm the Sinn Féiners and the latter say they will resist … The police made a foolish attack on the Citizen Army at Liberty Hall, but it was like the naval attack on the Dardanelles. They didn’t come prepared only warned the ‘Citizens’, who forthwith fortified themselves and summoned reinforcements. The govt is stupid … How in the world a conflict is to be avoided for long I cannot see. You may have heard more about it before this letter reaches you.
⁶¹

Seán T. O’Kelly visited Curran again on 18 April 1916, the Tuesday of Holy Week, saying ‘that there was little or nothing new but that the situation was very serious. Looks as if the document was not intended for immediate use but drawn up in case of invasion’. Although Curran had his suspicions, he was not certain that O’Kelly was a member of the IRB. In fact, as he was to learn later, his friend was part of the inner circle that had been entrusted with a mission in 1915 to tell John Devoy in America of the decision to stage a rising. Prudence dictated that he should not confide in his clerical friend, who would have been duty-bound to report the matter to the archbishop.

On 19 April Alderman J.J. Kelly read the ‘Castle document’ on to the record of Dublin corporation. By that time it had already appeared in Patrick Little’s paper,
New Ireland
.
Once it was part of the official record
of the corporation, however, the dailies had no alternative but to report it. The news shocked many and increased a sense of public indignation despite the official denials as to its authenticity by Dublin Castle.
⁶²
Curran wrote again to Hagan on 19 April with news of the document: