500 Days (78 page)

“What we know is that he has this material,” Blair said. “We know there is something like three hundred and fifty tons of chemical warfare agent. We know that there is something like thirty thousand special munitions for the delivery of chemical and biological weapons.”

What’s more, Saddam was engaged in a deadly game of hide-and-seek,
moving his illegal weaponry to different parts of the country in an elaborate scheme of concealment.

With the U.N. weapons inspectors playing such a critical role in the decision for military action, Frost asked, would the British government need, require, or prefer a second resolution on Iraq?

“Of course we want a second resolution,” Blair replied. Without one, he said, Britain would take military action only under two conditions.

“That is the circumstance where the U.N. inspectors say he’s not cooperating and he’s in breach of the resolution that was passed in November,” Blair said, followed by a U.N. failure to act “because someone, say, unreasonably exercises their veto and blocks the resolution.”

•  •  •  

As he spoke, the prime minister was engaged in a complex balancing act—or, more accurately, was deceiving the world. For just ten days earlier, Blair had received an analysis from his attorney general declaring that the very policy he was now advancing was, in fact, illegal.

In the confidential memo, the attorney general, Peter Goldsmith, wrote that Britain was very limited in what actions it could legally take regarding Iraq. Unless the U.N. adopted a second resolution to authorize a military campaign, Britain could deploy troops only for self-defense or as a humanitarian intervention—and neither condition applied here. He was, Goldsmith wrote, “ruling out the use of force without a further decision of the Council.”

Some members of the Blair government had suggested the U.N. could be ignored if one of the permanent members of the Council “unreasonably” vetoed a second resolution. But, Goldsmith wrote, the international organization’s charter did not support that supposition.

“In these circumstances, I do not believe there is room for arguing that a condition of reasonableness can be implied as a precondition for the lawful exercise of a veto,” Goldsmith wrote.

The attorney general’s analysis was a bitter secret, one Blair was unwilling to share even with Bush. How could he tell the president that, despite their months of planning, Britain might not join the United States in a war against Iraq?

•  •  •  

The next day in Manhattan, the Security Council chamber was packed with delegates, reporters, and other observers. The anticipation was almost palpable as the crowd awaited the latest report from the Iraqi weapons inspectors.

Representatives from the fifteen state members of the Council found their seats at the horseshoe-shaped mahogany table. Blix and ElBaradei from the International Atomic Energy Agency were at the side of the room, waiting to be invited to make their presentations.

Blix spoke first. “Iraq has not come to a genuine acceptance—not even today—of the disarmament which has been demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace,” he said.

Iraq had cooperated on the process of the undertaking, Blix said, granting access to all sites the inspectors wanted to see. Even so, problems remained—the Iraqis refused to guarantee the safety of a U-2 plane that the inspectors wanted to use for aerial imagery and surveillance, for example. And there had been instances where inspectors were harassed.

Substance was another matter, Blix said. Iraq was not providing active assistance but simply allowing the inspectors to look around. “It is not enough to open doors,” he said. “Inspection is not a game of ‘catch as catch can.’ ”

There was evidence that the Iraqis possessed a weaponized version of a toxic nerve agent known as VX. Also, records indicated that Iraq had produced more anthrax than it had disclosed, and officials provided no convincing proof that the biological agent had been destroyed. There was more: Baghdad maintained that its missiles could fly no farther than the 150-kilometer limit imposed by its disarmament agreements, but the inspectors were skeptical.

“Our Iraqi counterparts are fond of saying that there are no proscribed items and if no evidence is presented to the contrary, they should have the benefit of the doubt, be presumed innocent,” Blix said. “Presumptions do not solve the problem.”

Then, ElBaradei. His take on Iraq’s nuclear capabilities was far more upbeat.

“We have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program since the elimination of that program in the 1990s,” he said.

The lack of substantiation, of course, wasn’t enough to give Iraq a clean bill of health. But, with the verification system that had just been put in place, a final verdict would be possible.

“We should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programs,” ElBaradei said. “These few months would be a valuable investment in peace because they could help us to avoid a war.”

Time. All they needed was more time.

•  •  •  

“The start date for the military campaign is penciled in for March 10,” Bush said. “That’s when we’re planning to get going with the bombing.”

It was five days later, January 31. Bush and Blair were meeting in the Oval Office for another review of the strategy for Iraq. Joining Bush in the American contingent were Andy Card, Condoleezza Rice, and Dan Fried, one of her senior assistants. Blair was aided by Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff; David Manning, his foreign policy advisor; and Matthew Rycroft, his private secretary.

Blair was, once again, urging Bush to join him in pushing for a second U.N. resolution. He was trying not to sound desperate, but couldn’t bring himself to reveal the terrible truth that if America chose to attack without U.N. support, the British might have to stay on the sidelines.

Bush wasn’t buying that the U.N. was important. “We’re going to put everything we can into getting a new resolution,” he said. “We’ll twist some arms and even threaten if we have to. But, I’ve got to say, if we fail, we’re going to take military action anyway.”

The air campaign would probably last four days, Bush said, demolishing as many as 1,500 targets. “We’re going to be very careful to avoid hitting innocent civilians,” he said. “But I don’t think there’s going to be much danger for them for too long. The bombing is going to ensure a quick collapse of Saddam’s regime. It’s going to destroy his ‘command and control’ very quickly. The army’s going to fold.”

The military timetable was tight, Bush said, so they could give the Security Council only a short time for a second resolution.

Blair nodded. “It’s essential for us both to lobby for the second resolution,” he said. “It would give us an insurance policy against the unexpected.”

And they had to recognize that there were plenty of unknowns. “If anything went wrong with the military campaign,” Blair said, “or if Saddam increased the stakes by burning oil wells, or killing children, or fomenting internal divisions within Iraq, a second resolution would give us international cover, especially with the Arabs.”

It was important, though, for the wording of the resolution to be tough. “I think we should make it clear that it amounts to Saddam’s last opportunity to comply,” he said. “We have been very patient. Now we should be saying that the crisis must be resolved in weeks, not months.”

“I agree,” Bush responded. “I’m not itching to go to war, but we can’t let Saddam keep playing with us.”

The “last chance” approach might give them the ability to force the Iraqi dictator out without firing a shot, Bush said. “Probably after passing the second resolution, assuming we get it, we should warn Saddam that he has a week to leave,” he said. “We should notify the media, too. Then we’d have a clear field if he refused to go.”

Of course, the recent reports from the weapons inspectors weren’t helping persuade holdouts on the Security Council, Blair said. They suggested that Iraq was engaged in some cat-and-mouse games but didn’t explicitly accuse Saddam of violating the terms of the November resolution. Bush agreed—getting the resolution through would be easier if Blix actually found prohibited weapons, or, failing that, at least took a harder line against Saddam’s mischief.

They had been considering a few options to deal with that, Bush said. If Blix couldn’t handle the job, maybe they should just provoke Saddam into a confrontation.

“Blix mentioned at the U.N. that Saddam wouldn’t guarantee the safety for a U-2 reconnaissance flight,” Bush said. “So we were thinking of flying one over Iraq with fighter cover, but paint it with U.N. colors. Then, if Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach.”

That would undoubtedly persuade every member of the Security Council to support a second resolution—or might even justify immediate military action against the Iraqi dictator.

“We’ve also been thinking about bringing out a defector, and having him give a public presentation about Saddam’s WMD,” Bush said.

Then there was one last option under consideration: assassinating Saddam Hussein. The lawyers at the Office of Legal Counsel had reviewed that alternative and concluded that Bush had the authority at a time of war to give an order for Saddam—or any other enemy he designated—to be killed.

•  •  •  

At that same time, other Blair aides were in the office of Dan Bartlett, a close advisor to the president. The topic of discussion: the political nightmare enveloping the prime minister.

Some 70 percent of British citizens opposed joining the United States in a military operation, said Alastair Campbell, a senior Blair aide. Without a second U.N. resolution, the prime minister’s government could be forced to sit out the war if it could not win wider public support.

“We’ve really got our balls in a vise here,” Campbell said.

Not a problem in the United States, Bartlett said. “We believe that both politically and legally we can go without a second resolution.”

Minutes later, the group joined their bosses in the Oval Office to offer advice on the message they should convey at a press conference that was about to begin.

“I’m up for the idea of saying that I’m open for a second resolution,” Bush said.

“That’s a good way to frame it,” Rice said.

Ari Fleischer, the White House press secretary, broke in. “I strongly disagree,” he said. “If we say that, it will be seen as a shift in U.S. policy. A better way to say it is that we’re hopeful that the U.N. will approve the second resolution, but we are prepared to move forward either way.”

“Wait a minute,” Campbell said. “After everything Tony has said in press interviews, that’s going to end up with a ‘split’ story.” The president and the prime minister would be portrayed as being in disagreement.

Blair and Bush listened impassively as their aides debated how to portray the meeting to the press. After several minutes, no agreement had been reached, and Bush grew tired of the discussion. He stood.

“Let’s just do it,” he said.

•  •  •  

Shortly after 4:10, Bush and Blair strode together down Cross Hall toward the East Room, where the press corps waited. Both men dispensed with opening statements. Bush called on Ron Fournier from the Associated Press.

“Thank you, sir,” Fournier said. “First, quickly to the prime minister, did you ask President Bush to secure a second U.N. resolution and give the weapons inspectors more time?”

Blair began his answer by saying that the U.N.’s November Resolution 1441 had been Saddam’s final chance to disarm and that Blix had subsequently established that the Iraqi leader was failing to meet his obligations.

“What is important is that the international community come together and make it absolutely clear that this is unacceptable,” he said. “So this is a test for the international community.”

Standing nearby, some of Blair’s aides winced. He had bobbed and weaved, and hadn’t answered the question—did he ask Bush to get a second resolution and give the weapons inspectors more time? But Blair couldn’t give a straight response; he didn’t know what Bush was going to say and it was imperative that
they show unanimity in their plans. Above all else, they had to avoid creating the impression that Bush was waving off pleas from Blair.

Second question, from Andrew Marr of the BBC. About seeking a new resolution, what was the status of that, and was it worth the effort?

Uneasiness flashed across Bush’s face. His body language exuded discomfort.

“This needs to be resolved quickly,” he said. “Should the United Nations decide to pass a second resolution, it would be welcomed if it is yet another signal that we’re intent upon disarming Saddam Hussein. But 1441 gives us the authority to move without any second resolution.”

The answer virtually threw Tony Blair under a bus.
Welcomed.
Not “needed” or “encouraged” or even “hopeful to have.” If a second resolution showed up, well, that would be fine. But Bush didn’t much care—the United States could legally invade Iraq under the first resolution. He still didn’t know that Britain’s attorney general disagreed.

As the short press conference ended, Campbell glanced at Sally Morgan, Blair’s director of political and government relations. She grimaced. Holding the press conference without proper preparation had been a mistake.

•  •  •  

Major Nick Lovelace from the military’s Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence sent an e-mail that week asking for more information on SERE techniques.

His request went to Joseph Witsch, who had formerly conducted training at the Army’s SERE school. Witsch had known for months that the harsh methods employed in SERE training had been used at Guantanamo, which in his mind was a prelude to fiasco. He had warned his superiors against the idea, saying that the tactics might be usesful for toughening up American soldiers, but there was no evidence that they would work in a real interrogation. His objections had been ignored.

Now the e-mail from Lovelace suggested that the Pentagon was pushing for an escalation of SERE tactics at Guantanamo. A working group on interrogation had just contacted him for additional details on how SERE worked, Lovelace said. Witsch replied that he had already provided that information to the Defense Intelligence Agency. Not enough, Lovelace said—the Pentagon needed more detail.