A History of China (62 page)

At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the Qing was vulnerable. Corruption, misadministration, banditry, squandering of sometimes inadequate tax revenues, rebellion, and gentry and merchant aggrandizement hobbled the government. The dynasty’s own exploitation of peasants added to its disarray, as the disgruntled joined with diverse other groups in violent acts against the Qing. The much-weakened dynasty now began to face Western pressure to alter its commercial and diplomatic relationships – structures that the Qing had mandated and enforced.

Concerned about the increasing number of Western merchants arriving in China and fearing that the court could not control them, Qianlong had imposed restrictions on this trade. Around 1760, he demanded that Western traders land their ships only in Canton (modern-day Guangzhou). Setting aside a special quarter or island within the city for the merchants, he required them to trade only with the Cohong, thirteen merchant firms specifically licensed to deal with foreigners. In turn, a government official whom the Westerners referred to as the Hoppo extracted fees from the Cohong members and ensured that foreigners kept within the boundaries imposed upon them. Because some of this revenue went to the court, the Hoppos were under pressure to provide ever more funds to the imperial coffers. They also sought to pocket any additional income they could extract from the Cohong. This was still additional evidence of the corruption that was plaguing the dynasty by the late eighteenth century.

The British East India Company, the dominant trader by that time, accepted the court’s restrictions because it profited from the trade. Its leaders were not upset that the Qing had separated this so-called Canton system it had established from any intergovernmental connections; the system was merely a commercial connection. They also did not mind that they had no access to the court in Beijing, nor did they object to the Qing demand that they not bring wives to China. One concern was their position in Britain. However, in the late eighteenth century, Adam Smith’s
The Wealth of Nations
(published in 1776) and other classical economists’ writings challenged the mercantilist system that had supported monopolies. The ascendancy of liberal economics then reached the political arena. In 1813, the British Parliament abolished the East India Company’s monopoly on the China trade but gave the firm twenty years to divest itself of its control of this market.

The subsequent opening of the China market to a variety of British firms created demands for a change in commercial and diplomatic relations. Their greatest concern was the unfavorable balance of trade with the Cohong. They could find few goods the Chinese coveted and often had to pay for goods in silver, an increasingly expensive arrangement that led to a diminution of the British supply of the metal. In addition, the proliferation of British firms in the China trade meant that they faced stiff competition when they returned to Europe with Chinese products. Thus, confronting reductions in their profit margins and animated by their liberal economic belief in free trade, they chafed under Qing government restrictions and sought greater price competition in China, which would mean either abolition of the Cohong’s monopoly or permission to trade with any merchants they chose. They began to lobby the British government to press China for such changes. As they became more involved in commerce, they wanted, in addition, more ports open for trade and a steady and regular, rather than capricious, system of customs levies. Although they did not emphasize changes in diplomacy, they surely would benefit if China and Britain could establish regular relations.

By this time, the British and other foreigners had other concerns as well. In 1784, a gunner on the British ship
Lady Hughes
had issued a gun salute for distinguished Chinese guests who had dined aboard and had accidentally caused the deaths of two Chinese citizens. The Qing, asserting legal jurisdiction over events in China, had demanded that he be turned over for trial. After considerable hesitation, the captain handed the unfortunate sailor over to the Qing authorities, who accused him of murder and had him summarily executed without allowing appeals and without allowing Westerners to attend the proceedings. Appalled by what they perceived to be cruel and barbarous actions, the foreigners wanted to gain control over legal cases concerning their own citizens, which would undermine China’s legal sovereignty. When they had the opportunity, they would infringe upon China’s sovereignty in order to protect their own citizens.

The British government had tried at least twice to develop proper and equitable relations with China. Unlike the British East India Company, it could not accept an inferior position to the Qing court. Capitalizing on the celebration of Qianlong’s eightieth birthday, the British sent George Macartney (1737–1806) to lead an official embassy to seek changes in the Sino–British relationship. In 1793, Macartney arrived in China, having received instructions to demand diplomatic parity with China and thus the establishment of permanent embassies in both countries; to expect proper treatment as an envoy of the British king; to resist any demeaning demands; and to request improvements for Sino–British commerce. The most telling consequence of these instructions was that Macartney would be obliged to object to performing the kowtow (three kneelings and nine prostrations) as humiliating and intolerable in relations between two sovereign states. The Qing would then inevitably perceive such a response as a barbaric challenge to two thousand years of foreign relations in which China treated foreign states as tributaries rather than as equals. Macartney’s instructions were thus guaranteed to undermine his mission.

Indeed, the mission did not achieve any of its objectives. First, Macartney informed court officials that he would not abide by their regulations ­regarding the kowtow, which caused considerable consternation. The court demanded a show of obeisance as part of the traditional rituals. After complicated negotiations, Macartney compromised by bending on one knee, the European custom in audiences with monarchs. This contretemps did not augur well for the remainder of the mission. Claiming that it did not require more goods, the court rejected demands for additional ports to be opened. It could not ­conceive of diplomatic parity between the Middle Kingdom (the Chinese name for China) and any other state. It also saw no need for an official British representative or ambassador in Beijing. Rebuffed at every turn, Macartney returned to Britain with as much information about China and as many Chinese works as he could. Despite the mission’s failure, he received a substantial pension.

The British did not follow up on Macartney’s embassy, although the country’s concerns about China grew. The Napoleonic Wars diverted British attention from Asia for the next two decades. Yet the groups propelling efforts to alter the Sino–British commercial and diplomatic relationships gained force. Liberalism, with its emphasis on free trade, lack of government interference in the economy, and the dismantling of monopolies, dominated Britain’s political and economic life. Within a year of Napoleon’s defeat, therefore, the British government dispatched William Pitt, Lord Amherst (1773–1857), to China, providing him with a similar set of instructions to Macartney’s. Yet again, ritual disputes between Lord Amherst and the Qing authorities beset the mission, which concluded with no concessions from either side. In fact, the British envoy was not permitted to go to Beijing because he refused to perform the kowtow.

The stage was set for a clash between two world orders, two economic philosophies and structures, and two legal systems. The British Empire could not accept a status as a Qing tributary nor could its king be portrayed as a vassal of the Qing emperor. British merchants and companies, with their laissez-faire ­philosophy, continuously challenged the Qing state’s intrusiveness in the economy, the monopolies with which they were compelled to deal, and the constant drain on their silver supply caused by the unfavorable balance of trade. British law could not accept the Qing legal system’s perceived indifference to individual rights and to proper treatment of the accused. As relations ­deteriorated, one or the other would have to alter its views and policies. The British had the greater incentive to compel such changes because of their less advantageous position in commerce. Having failed to secure changes through diplomacy, they had the option of adopting a more belligerent policy.

On the other hand, almost no dynasties in China had faced a country with such highly developed and almost completely different conceptions of international relations, commerce, and law. China had managed to maintain its tribute system of foreign relations for about two thousand years. It had modified the system when necessary, especially at times of weakness. However, it had never fundamentally abandoned the principles that China was a superior civilization and that the emperor, as the Son of Heaven, was the central ruler of the world. Even when foreign dynasties conquered China, they generally adopted this worldview. The British and the Westerners in general had their own conceptions of international relations between sovereign states, a system that collided with the empire–tributary structure of traditional China. One of these systems would have to best the other.

Commerce would precipitate change. The volume of tea, silk, and porcelain imported by Britain and the Western nations was much higher than the volume of goods imported by the Chinese. The Westerners could find few commodities, other than cotton from India, that had a market in China. They had to provide silver to cover the costs of the Chinese products they wished to buy. This draining of the West’s silver supply was not sustainable. The British, in particular, needed to find a commodity that the Chinese wanted.

Opium, which the Qing court had banned in the early eighteenth century, proved to be that product. The British knew that land in northern India was ideally suited for cultivation of opium. Having occupied much of India, they could develop a triangular trade with China, providing the Middle Kingdom with Indian opium and cotton in return for Chinese tea, silk, and porcelain. The new commerce overturned China’s previously favorable balance of trade. The Chinese now had to pay silver for opium, diminishing their supply of ­precious metals at a rapid clip. From about 1800 to 1832, there was a five-fold increase in the British delivery of opium into China. Alarmed by the evidence of growing addiction, the court first banned importation of opium and later prohibited opium smoking. It proved unable to enforce these edicts, as ­avaricious British and Chinese merchants, in collusion with corrupt local ­officials, avoided the restrictions.

The 1830s witnessed a rapid increase in the illegal opium trade. As the East India Company’s monopoly on the China trade ended, more firms sent ships to China for commerce, and many offered opium for sale to Chinese adventurers and merchants. The government was unable to squash this illegal trade, leading to court discussions about future policies. One faction advocated the growing of opium in China, so as to eliminate the power of criminals over the trade. Another faction supported simple legalization of opium, without necessarily giving an impetus to domestic growth of the drug. This option too would drive criminals out of the trade. A final group opted for banning opium and a more concerted effort to crush this illegal trade. After a heated debate, the court decided on the most difficult policy: total eradication of opium and the opium trade.

In 1839, the court dispatched an experienced official named Lin Zexu (1785–1850) to enforce this demanding directive. Arriving in Canton, he used persuasion and pressure on Chinese officials and merchants to combat the opium trade. He jailed some smugglers, tried to educate young Chinese about the dangers of opium addiction, and confiscated supplies of the drug. He demanded that the British turn over their cache of opium. When Charles Elliot (1801–1875), the British superintendent of trade with Chinese merchants, refused, Lin compelled the Chinese support staff in the British enclave to withdraw. This mini-blockade forced the British to relent. Having collected approximately twenty-one thousand chests of opium from British merchants, Elliot gave them to Lin, who destroyed the entire quantity. Lin wrote a letter to Queen Victoria, pressing her to prevent her merchants and navy from illegally importing the noxious substance into China. He noted that the products the British received from China, tea and rhubarb, were vital to their health and vitality while opium, the illegal substance the British smuggled into China, was deleterious to the Chinese people’s health and wealth by addicting them and by draining away their silver supplies. This part of his letter concluded with a threat: if the queen did not restrain her subjects, China would prevent them from obtaining tea and rhubarb and, without those salubrious products, how could Britain prosper?

The British response, not long in coming, was predictably negative. British firms, outraged by the blockade, demanded that the government adopt a harsher policy in China to protect their economic interests. The British court itself was upset by what it perceived to be mistreatment of Elliot. On an even grander scale, it resented the Qing court’s portrait of the British monarch as a vassal and the British government as a tributary. Lin’s seizure of opium from Elliot offered a pretext for challenging the whole Qing system. In June of 1839, Elliot would not turn over several British sailors who, in a drunken state, had killed a Chinese, and this heightened Sino–British tensions.

After minor incidents, the Qing ended trade with the British in December of 1839, prompting a British declaration of war the very next month. The Chinese ships were outmatched. The British navy, the world’s most powerful such force, either blockaded or attacked Canton and Tianjin and other sites along the coast. The Qing court, trying to relinquish as little as possible, appointed Qishan (1786–1854), a Manchu governor-general who was regarded as an able diplomat, to negotiate peace with the British. In January of 1841, after delays and considerable stalling, Qishan and Elliot concluded an agreement by which the British received Hong Kong, a monetary indemnity, and diplomatic equality and attained a guarantee that Canton would be reopened for trade. Neither government approved of the agreement, and both dismissed the two negotiators. Frustrated by the slow pace of the negotiations after a war they thought they had won, the British resumed attacks along the coast. Starting from Canton, they captured Xiamen and Fuzhou and then headed north to Shanghai, which they seized. Having failed to secure the Qing’s surrender, the British moved, via the Yangzi River, into the interior; the conflict culminated in the occupation in 1842 of Nanjing, a populous center and a capital city for the first Ming emperor. Shocked by the fall of Nanjing, the Qing acquiesced and agreed to the Treaty of Nanjing.