A History of Korea (28 page)

That King Injong succumbed to this line of reasoning cannot be explained simply by dismissing him as a dupe, for the baseline of belief tying geomantic principles directly to the health of the country, as noted above, had an extensive history. Furthermore,
Pyongyang had long enjoyed a centrality in Korean civilization, reflected in the fact that, since the early Kory
period, it was deemed the Western Capital (
S
gy
ng
), the second most important city. And, as noted in
Chapter 1
, Pyongyang had served as the admin- istrative center of the Lelang Chinese commandery and the capital city of the Kogury
kingdom. Furthermore, according to the conventional understanding of Korean origins codified in the Kory
era, this city represented the place of origin for Korean civilization itself. So said the myths of Tan’gun, the founder of the Korean people who established his court there, and of Kija, the Chinese official who transmitted higher civilization to the peninsula and ruled from Pyongyang. From Myoch’
ng’s perspective, and likely that of many elites from the northwest, the transfer of Kory
’s capital to Pyongyang represented simply the return of this city to its rightful standing, which would in turn lead to better fortunes for a country besieged by both external and internal threats.

The capital region, in fact, was still recovering from the biggest domestic challenge to the dynasty hitherto, the rebellion in 1126 led by Yi Chagy
m. The powerful scion of a royal consort family and the monarch’s father-in-law, Yi attempted a personal takeover of the throne before his uprising was suppressed with tremendous bloodshed. The capital officials, in short, were extremely wary of brewing trouble. These sensitivities were put on high alert when, soon after the Yi Chagy
m incident, King Injong began to show signs of having fallen under the sway of the mysterious monk from Pyongyang. Injong made frequent visits to Pyongyang and eventually ordered the construction of a royal palace there. The capital elites, fearing a major shift in power to the northwestern region, responded by imploring the monarch to examine the countervailing evidence: the greater attention shown to Pyongyang, including the construction of the royal palace, not only failed to eliminate the Jurchen menace, but also failed to halt a series of natural calamities that beset this region. The monarch became convinced by these arguments and put a stop to his plans for moving the capital city to Pyongyang. Prompted by an official, Cho Kwang, and other cohorts from Pyongyang, Myongch’
ng’s response to this royal turnabout was simple: rebellion.

In the first month of 1135 Myoch’
ng, Cho Kwang, and the other leaders orchestrated a swift takeover of most of the administrative centers of P’y
ngan province, incarcerating officials sent from the capital and cutting off the major pass that connected this region to the south. They proclaimed their new realm the Empire of Taewi (“Great Purpose”). King Injong, meanwhile, appointed Kim Pusik, a high official, to lead the government armies as Supreme Commander for the Pacification of P’y
ngan Province. Kim’s forces entered the breakaway region and issued ultimatums to local leaders, who for the most part quickly capitulated, and soon surrounded the rebels in Pyongyang. In fear and hope for clemency, Cho Kwang, who by now was acting as the true ringleader of the uprising, beheaded Myoch’
ng and the other rebel leaders and sent the heads to Kim Pusik as a sign of surrender. But Kim would have none of it, and Cho Kwang in turn decided to fight to the end, which came after many more months of bloodletting—including the killing of government negotiators by Cho. Eventually, Cho’s troops, holed up in their fortress, ran out of provisions under the government siege. The defeat of the rebels came in the second month of 1136, more than a year after the eruption. It would take much longer for the region to return to normalcy, and for Pyongyang, the city would never be the same.