A History of the Roman World (31 page)

In Spain, where the war had started, the tide of war first rolled back on the Carthaginians. This country, where large armies starve and small armies get beaten, has always imposed similar difficulties and restrictions on invading armies. Only a small part was directly involved in the Hannibalic war, namely, the Mediterranean littoral with its hinterland; more particularly, the Ebro valley in the north and the rich valley of the Baetis (Guadalquivir) in the south, where lay the seat of Carthaginian power. These two valleys were linked by a coast road which passed through the two key towns of Saguntum and New Carthage (Cartagena), the latter being the Carthaginian war base. To an army invading Spain from the north-east three factors are necessary: control of the coast road, an adequate base and command of the sea. Thus Pompey’s first plan of attack against Sertorius failed because he lacked the last two, while centuries later in different circumstances Wellington, entrenched at Torres Vedras with the command of the sea, threw into relief the vain attempt of Sir John Moore to advance inland without an adequate base. The three Scipios who fought in Spain realized the conditions of warfare which the country imposed, and thus succeeded where Napoleon failed; ultimately, to adapt Napoleon’s vain hope, they were able ‘to carry their victorious eagles to the Pillars of Hercules and drive the “Punic” leopard into the sea’.

The supreme importance of holding the enemy at bay in Spain was realized by P. Scipio, who despatched thither his brother Gnaeus in 218 and joined him the following year. Reinforcements from a country so rich in natural wealth and manpower must at all costs be prevented from reaching Hannibal. But events were to show that the Scipios, the two Thunderbolts of War (
duo fulmina belli
), aimed not merely at a defensive campaign of holding the line of the Ebro but at an offensive to break the enemy’s power in the Peninsula.

In the late summer of 218 Cn. Scipio landed with two legions at Emporiae (Ampurias), from which base he marched south. His passage was uncontested till he reached Cissa, the enemy’s base in northern Spain, where he defeated the commander Hanno. Cissa was taken, and Scipio advanced his fleet to Tarraco (Tarragona). Here the Roman naval camp was attacked by Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian commander of southern Spain, who arrived on the scene too late to help Hanno. Hasdrubal was repulsed and withdrew to his base at New Carthage. Thus in his first campaign Scipio prevented reinforcements reaching Hannibal, won a base and commenced the conquest of
the district north of the Ebro. The next year, 217, was critical in Spain. Would Hasdrubal break through before the arrival of Roman reinforcements? With all his land forces and fleet he approached the mouth of the Ebro. Notwithstanding the smallness of his fleet Scipio decided to give battle, not only to avoid having his flank turned, but also because command of the sea was essential for further advance southwards, not to mention for precluding the shipping of help to Hannibal. Further, Scipio was reinforced by the Massilians, whose naval prowess was well known and who were eager to safeguard their trade with Spain by checking the power of Carthage at sea. So the Romans sailed forth and engaged and defeated the enemy’s fleet off the mouth of the Ebro. This victory, besides enabling them to cross the Ebro in safety, affected the whole war and Hannibal’s hopes of success. After a feeble demonstration off Italy in the same year, the Carthaginians abandoned any large-scale naval operations, so that Hannibal was left in Italy with Rome as mistress of the seas.
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When the proconsul Publius Scipio had joined his brother in Spain with reinforcements of 20 warships and 8,000 men, they advanced in the autumn across the Ebro and encamped near Saguntum. After this demonstration to impress the Spanish tribes they withdrew to winter-quarters north of the Ebro, having won and garrisoned Intibili and Iliturgi.
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During the next year the war was at a standstill; the Romans consolidated in the north, while Hasdrubal suppressed a serious rising of the Turdetani in the south. But in 215 Hasdrubal, who had received reinforcements, advanced to try his chances. He met the Roman army near Ibera on the Ebro. The situation was critical. A Roman defeat would involve the loss of Spain and allow Hasdrubal to join Hannibal in Italy. Hasdrubal used the same tactics as his brother had at Cannae, but his weak centre of Spanish troops crumpled before his wings could outflank and surround the enemy. The Roman victory was crushing, since Hasdrubal’s best African troops suffered most. The Scipios had won the first victory of the war in pitched battle; an achievement which might well hearten the home government in the gloom caused by Cannae. It strengthened Rome’s prestige in Italy and still more in Spain, where other native tribes revolted from the Carthaginians.

To counteract this defeat the Carthaginians diverted to Spain an army under Hannibal’s brother Mago, which had been destined for Italy. Native risings in North Africa under Syphax, however, involved the temporary recall of Hasdrubal, but by 212 the Carthaginians were able to maintain three armies in Spain under Mago, Hasdrubal Barca and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo. Meanwhile the Scipios had rested on their oars (215–213), because their strength was temporarily exhausted and further advance involved securing a new base and the coast road, while the further south they marched the deeper they penetrated into pro-Carthaginian territory, where to win native support by
force would alienate their allies, while to neglect it would endanger their communications. But by 212 their gradual advance was crowned with success, for they won the urgently needed base by capturing Saguntum.
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They could now plan an offensive further south, although the superior forces of the enemy rendered it risky and further penetration would increase the distance from the centre of supplies. But to revert to a defensive policy would involve the sacrifice of their previous conquests and of their new Spanish allies. Trusting these, in 211 they advanced in two divisions against the enemy. This division was probably a mistake, as the united force might have crushed Hasdrubal Barca. They divided to put less strain on the natives of the districts from which they derived supplies. But Gnaeus was the first to learn the fickleness of their Spanish allies, who deserted when he advanced with one-third of the army against Hasdrubal. Forced to retire, he was harassed by the Carthaginian cavalry until the infantry came up and destroyed his forces at Ilorci (modern Lorqui), in a desolate plain surrounded by bleak and arid mountains in the hinterland of New Carthage. Meantime his brother Publius, penetrating probably to the upper courses of the Baetis, was cut off and his army was destroyed in an attempt to break away. Only a remnant under Fonteius at length reached the Ebro, where the soldiers elected as commander a Roman Knight, L. Marcius Septimus.

So fell the Scipios. But they had accomplished much. They had prevented reinforcements reaching Hannibal from Spain; they had inflicted two severe defeats on the enemy, by sea off the Ebro, by land at Ibera; then taking the offensive they had captured Saguntum, and advancing further south had won from Carthage a considerable part of her Spanish empire. But their last gallant attempt overstrained their inadequate resources. The Carthaginians, however, lamentably failed to drive home their victory, for each of the three generals wished to exploit the success for himself and would not co-operate with his colleagues. This saved Rome. Carthage lost a unique chance of sending help to Hannibal. The way was soon to be barred by the arrival of Nero and then barred still more firmly by the future conqueror of Spain.

The Carthaginians also sought to embarrass Rome in Sardinia and Macedon. In 215 a force was despatched under Hasdrubal the Bald to Sardinia, where the natives were already restive under Roman rule, especially as the governor was ill. Rome energetically sent out a legion under T. Manlius Torquatus, who knew the island well. Landing at Cagliari he defeated the rebels before the arrival of Hasdrubal, who had been delayed by a storm. He then forced Hasdrubal’s army to fight and won a decisive victory. Thus the Carthaginian attempt miscarried, and they made no further efforts to regain the island.

The extension of the war to Greece, known as the First Macedonian War, was little more than a side-show. Its ramifications belong rather to the history of the Greek world and its importance derives largely from the fact that it drew Rome closer to that world. For if Hannibal hoped that it would seriously distract Rome’s attention, he miscalculated. Philip of Macedon, long suspicious of Rome’s intervention in Illyria, was watching Hannibal’s progress in Italy with keen self-interest. When he received news of Trasimene, he hastily terminated the war he was waging in Greece so as to have his hands free; at Naupactus he concluded a peace with the Aetolians, many of whom viewed with apprehension ‘the cloud rising in the west’. Driven on by dreams of conquest and by the advice of the pirate chief Demetrius, he built a fleet of light cutters which he launched in the Adriatic in 216 in order to obtain a naval base there and to reinstate Demetrius at Pharos. The approach of a Roman fleet caused his hasty withdrawal; but he had shown his hand. When it was clear that Cannae would not end the war Philip took the decisive step of forming an alliance with Hannibal; it was to be offensive during the war and defensive afterwards, when Hannibal would deal with Italy while Philip and Demetrius could assert their claims to Rome’s Illyrian possessions and Corcyra.
¹⁵

News of the alliance reached Rome through the capture of Philip’s envoys and despatches. To meet the new danger on her flank, she ordered M. Valerius Laevinus, a praetor in command at Tarentum, to watch Philip and if necessary to cross to Illyria with 50 warships. In 214 Philip attacked the naval bases of Illyria, but Laevinus quickly recaptured Oricus, relieved Apollonia, forced Philip to burn his boats and retire to Macedon, and established himself on the Illyrian coast. Philip could only hope to dislodge him with the help of the Carthaginian fleet, for which he waited in vain, though he regained access to the Adriatic by capturing Lissus (213?). Laevinus, who feared the possible advent of a Carthaginian fleet, turned to a diplomatic offensive against Philip by stirring up war against him in Greece. In 211 he concluded an alliance with the Aetolians: they were to operate by land and keep any territory wrested from Philip; Rome was to supply naval help and have the portable booty or part of it.
¹⁶
The alliance – the first concluded between Rome and a Greek people – was soon joined by many Greek states, Elis, Messenia and Sparta, by Attalus of Pergamum and by the chieftains of Thrace and Illyria. Not only was all possibility of Philip helping Hannibal in Italy averted, but by this skilful move the war in Greece was shifted largely on to the shoulders of the Greeks themselves.

In four campaigns Philip hurried with surprising energy from front to front (211–208). In 211 or 210 Laevinus was succeeded by P. Sulpicius Galba who celebrated his arrival in the Aegean by failing to relieve Echinus which Philip was besieging, although he captured Aegina. So the war dragged on,
notwithstanding fruitless attempts by various parties to negotiate a peace. Throughout this war Philip in vain awaited naval help from Carthage and the growing realization at Rome that this support to their enemy was not forthcoming led to a gradual slackening of interest in this theatre of war. In 208 Attalus returned to Asia, and Rome did little in Greece; the Aetolians could be left to oppose Philip by themselves. This might suit Rome, but it did not suit the Aetolians, who ended the Hellenic War in 206 by making peace with Philip. This act, which Rome herself had made inevitable, at last stirred her to activity. In 205 P. Sempronius Tuditanus was sent out with a large force to succeed Sulpicius and to protect Illyria. But a successful demonstration there was not sufficient to rekindle the spirit of Aetolia against Philip. So Rome decided to abandon the war; she did not wish for a long single-handed struggle with Philip, especially at a time when, as will be seen, she was preparing to make her final effort against Carthage. Sempronius was ordered to decline battle and to come to terms. The Peace of Phoenice (205), which was concluded on the basis of
uti possidetis
, made only slight territorial adjustments. It was clearly an agreement for the mutual convenience of Rome and Philip. The Romans had been drawn into Greek affairs to meet a specific danger; with that removed they were ready to leave Greece to work out its own salvation. For Philip further resistance was futile, since no support came from Carthage. Further, the eastern world, of which Rome knew so little but was soon to learn so much, claimed his thoughts. Thus Carthage had signally failed to utilize her ally in Greece to the full in her struggle with Rome.

Events in Magna Graecia proved more formidable than those in Greece proper, for Sicily was suddenly swept into the war on the death of the aged Hiero (215). During his reign he had raised Syracuse to great prosperity and culture, and though the loyal ally of Rome, he had avoided the enmity of Carthage. Some of his subjects, however, including his own son, began to intrigue with Carthage and Rome’s rebellious allies in Italy, while others desired to end the monarchy. But if they hoped for a glorious war of independence they forgot that the citizens of Syracuse lacked the resources and spirit which had made possible the resistance of their ancestors to the armada of Athens. Successful revolt from Rome could only lead to dependence on Carthage.

Since Hiero’s son died shortly before his father, the kingdom fell to a grandson of the old king. This fifteen-year-old boy, Hieronymus, was soon entangled in the meshes of court intrigue. Two of Hiero’s sons-in-law quickly usurped the regency of fifteen members which Hiero had appointed, and forced Hieronymus to approach Hannibal, whose agents, Hippocrates and Epicydes, arranged a treaty by which all Sicily was conceded to Hieronymus
– notwithstanding the warning protests of the praetor Appius Claudius. A reaction of popular feeling against the monarchy quickly followed, and resulted in the murder of Hieronymus and nearly all the royal house (214); relations with Rome might yet be established. But suddenly the pendulum swung back again and the new republic chose as generals the two Carthaginian agents, Hippocrates and Epicydes. Meanwhile the Romans were alarmed, and sent the consul M. Claudius Marcellus to Sicily with an additional legion to join the two already there – the disgraced survivors of Cannae; the fleet was raised to a hundred sails. On Marcellus’ arrival an attack on a Roman frontier post led to the outbreak of war. In reply Marcellus sacked Leontini with great severity. Hippocrates and Epicydes, who escaped to Syracuse, there massacred the Roman party and amid the utmost confusion prepared to defend the city against the might of Rome. It was a different beginning to the war from the one they had hoped for, when Syracuse, supported by the uprising of all the Siceliots, might have taken a glorious offensive; yet they could trust in the strength of their city, protected by the walls of Dionysius and the engineering skill of Archimedes.

Syracuse was situated partly on the ‘island’ of Ortygia, partly on the mainland. This latter settlement was divided into three separate regions: Neapolis (an extension of the old Temenitis) in the west, Achradina on the east coast, and Tyche to the north. The whole town nestled at the foot of the cliffs of the large plateau of Epipolae, around which ran the almost impregnable walls built by Dionysius, and guarded at their western extremity by the fort Euryalus. Nothing daunted, Marcellus approached with all speed and the Roman army camped in two divisions, one in the south at Olympeium, the other to the north of Epipolae near Hexapylon (Scala Graeca); thus they controlled the two main roads to the city. Then he launched an assault by land and sea from the north; Appius Claudius tried to storm the walls by Hexapylon, while Marcellus brought siege engines on his ships against the sea walls at Achradina. But the attack was beaten off, thanks largely to the efficiency of the artillery and contrivances devised by Archimedes; Marcellus had to desist and resign himself to a regular and lengthy blockade.
¹⁷

Meanwhile Carthaginian reinforcements under Himilco had captured Agrigentum, where Marcellus arrived too late. But he won over some towns that had belonged to Hiero and cut to pieces a force which had slipped out of Syracuse to support Himilco. Reinforcements from Rome reached the army at Syracuse in safety, while the Carthaginian fleet, after an abortive demonstration by Bomilcar, did not try to relieve the city. But an ugly incident in central Sicily provoked considerable anti-Roman feeling: in attempting to hold Enna in face of treachery, the Roman garrison massacred the inhabitants. So ended the year 213; though Rome had lost much of the south coast and centre of Sicily, she had satisfactorily withstood the first shock of the revolt of the Greeks.

Throughout the winter the siege of Syracuse continued; no Greek or Punic army appeared to divert the besiegers. One night in the spring of 212, utilizing the preoccupation caused by the drunken revelry of a festival, Marcellus stormed part of the northern walls of Epipolae and advanced over the plateau. Tradition tells how when day broke he gazed over the beautiful city weeping with joy at his achievement and with sorrow at the impending doom. This was not long delayed. Descending the southern slopes of Epipolae, he camped between Tyche and Neapolis (near the necropolis of Groticelli) and overran the two suburbs. In his rear was the great fort of Euryalus, the impressive ruins of which still demonstrate its impregnable strength; but the commander surrendered in panic. Thus Marcellus had won all Epipolae. Counter-attacks by a sortie from Achradina, by Himilco, and by the fleet, all failed. Then, as so often in the history of Syracuse, Nature intervened. A pestilence swept through both armies; the Romans on the higher ground and with better sanitation escaped lightly, but Himilco’s force perished. This decided the fate of Syracuse; the fall of the remaining portions, Achradina and Ortygia, was only a matter of time. In 211 Bomilcar arrived in Sicily with a Carthaginian fleet, only to panic and sail off again. Finally the city was betrayed by a Spanish mercenary captain; its rich artistic treasures were shipped to Italy, and Archimedes was killed during the looting of the city while absorbed in a geometrical problem. So after a siege of two and a half years fell a city which for three centuries had been chief among the Greek cities of the west.

The rest of the tale is soon told. Marcellus easily defeated a small Carthaginian force near Himera and then hastened home to enjoy an ‘ovation’. A praetor continued to reduce the smaller towns, while late in 210 Valerius Laevinus took out fresh forces and conquered Agrigentum. Sicily was pacified. So by the persistent energy of Rome and the dash of Marcellus, through Carthage’s lack of naval enterprise, fatal alike in Sicily and Greece, and above all because of the plague, a serious danger was averted. Sicily was the bridge between Italy and Africa, between Hannibal and his home government; the control of the bridge was of paramount importance.