A World at Arms (122 page)

was to provide Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff with the opportunity to persuade the Americans that the date for “Overlord” should not be regarded as governing all other factors to the extent of imposing a rigid straight–jacket on Mediterranean operations. In particular it should not be allowed to dictate an absolutely rigid timetable for the return of troops and landing–craft to the United Kingdom.
¹⁰²

Here was the key to a major clash between the British and the Americans. The British had reluctantly agreed to the American urging of a deadline for “Overlord” at the Trident Conference in May. They had then reversed themselves to insist on greater flexibility in favor of Mediterranean operations but had yielded to American pressure and returned to the May 1 target date at the Quadrant Conference in August. In October this project had been set forth to the Russians. Even as that conference was in session, however, there was a lengthy discussion in the British War Cabinet in which the clear sense was that the Italian campaign should have priority over Overlord and that there should be no promise of Overlord in May 1944 in spite of all prior agreements with the Americans.
¹⁰³
So now the British wanted to open the issues once again.

The Americans had seen signs of this British shift coming and were absolutely determined to reject it. It was their view that at some point in the war Allied strategy simply had to be fixed and adhered to if major plans were ever to be implemented. The Americans had most reluctantly agreed to leave some of the landing–craft scheduled for Overlord in the Mediterranean a little longer, but they would not budge on the troop transfers: the first of the four American divisions, the 1st Infantry Division, embarked from Sicily on October 23, 1943, and was already gone from the Mediterranean by the time of the Cairo Conference; the other three were on the way before the end of the year.
¹⁰⁴
In this case an American military move was made deliberately to implement a prior agreement which the British still hoped to reverse.

One way in which the Americans hoped to contain what they correctly perceived as a recurrent British preference for immediate operations in the Mediterranean, regardless of the implications for Overlord, was to propose a single command for both theaters, headed by General Marshall, with separate commanders for the two campaigns under him. He would certainly see to it that Overlord received priority and that operations were conducted in and resources allocated to the Mediterranean in a manner designed to support the great invasion, not postpone it over and over. In the face of vehement British objections to this command set up which would place an American dedicated to Overlord between Churchill (and the British Chiefs of Staff) and the British commanders in the Mediterranean, the Americans were prepared to make a major concession. They would accept a British commander, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, in the position assigned to Marshall in their proposal. The Americans had such confidence in Dill’s willingness to adhere to the agreed strategy that they were prepared to place the bulk of American forces in action under his over–all command. But even this was not enough to divert the British from their insistence on revising strategy and keeping the Mediterranean command, in which they wanted to include both the North African and Italian theaters and the Middle East, under a separate structure which they could influence directly.
ⁱ

It was thus clear that the whole issue of strategy for defeating Germany would have to be thrashed out all over again at Cairo, with the British aggravated by what
they
saw as a straight–jacket on operations in the Mediterranean and with the Americans even more aggravated by what they saw as still another effort of the British to wriggle out of prior promises so that they could diddle on indefinitely around the periphery of the continent. What made the argument so difficult was that there was substance to both of these grievances. The British were entirely correct in the belief that opportunities in Italy and in Southeast Europe were being sacrificed to the Americans’ insistence on adherence to strategic priorities, though whether they would in the end have been that much happier if their troops had reached the Alps and the Western Powers had occupied Bulgaria while the Red Army liberated Belgium is at least open to question. The Americans, on the other hand, were correct in fearing that any further extension of Mediterranean operations risked almost indefinite postponement of Overlord. Even with eventual reaffirmation of the May target date and the Overlord priority, shortages of assault shipping forced a one–month postponement; two additional
months of further delay imposed by diversion of resources to the Mediterranean would almost certainly have pushed Overlord into 1945.
^j

At the Cairo Conference (referred to as Sextant), the Americans and British in sometimes bitter conversations failed to reach agreement on the most important issue. Taking advantage of the more favorable comments on the Italian campaign and the push for Mediterranean operations in relation to Turkey by the Soviets at the Moscow Conference, the British now refused to adhere to the Quebec agreement on strategy and insisted on a decision by Stalin at the forthcoming meeting at Teheran. The British hoped–and the Americans feared–that in a choice between further operations in the Mediterranean at the cost of deferring Overlord and adherence to an early date for Overlord and reduced action in the Mediterranean, Stalin would pick the former. Because of their anger over lost opportunities in the Eastern Mediterranean, symbolized by the arguments over their desire for an attack on the island of Rhodes (operation “Accolade”), the British not only argued their case in Cairo but intended to continue arguing it at Teheran.
¹⁰⁵
The result of this approach, which should have been obvious to them at the time but was not (nor to many observers later), was that a very large part of the available time at Teheran was occupied by debates on issues that the British and Americans had thrashed out repeatedly and had apparently settled several times, with the consequence that adequate time was simply not available for other questions.

In addition, the British absolutely refused any idea of an over–all European commander even if the position went to Dill, with Montgomery as Northwest Europe commander. This in turn made it less likely that Marshall would command operations in Europe while Eisenhower went to Washington as Acting Chief of Staff, and instead set the stage for Eisenhower’s later appointment for Overlord. The Americans agreed to a general Mediterranean command, including the Eastern Mediterranean, but continued to prefer a landing in southern France to assist Overlord, instead of any operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Americans, furthermore, also accepted minor delays in some
ship transfers to Northwest Europe so that an additional effort could be made in the interval in Italy; as will be seen, Churchill’s success in persuading the Americans to try an amphibious operation in Italy did not produce the great new victory, including the seizure of Rome, which he anticipated. There was, on the other hand, no discussion or agreement on the latest version of the “Rankin” plan. Roosevelt had made clear to his advisors on the trip to North Africa that he wanted the western and eastern occupation zones to meet in Berlin, and for the United States to have the northwestern zone with the North Sea ports rather than the southern zone with access overland across France.
¹⁰⁶
These questions would become the subject of long debates later (and after the war as well).

As the Americans had intended, much of the time at Cairo was devoted to the Pacific War and questions involving China. Not only Chiang but Mountbatten and Stilwell were at the meeting.
¹⁰⁷
The. Americans, with British agreement, promised that the areas Japan had seized from China since 1894 should be returned to her. The British were not then about to return Hong Kong, but it is clear that in their private talks Roosevelt and Chiang were in agreement on the need to end colonial rule in Asia. There would be difficulties in working out a coordination between Soviet ambitions and China’s desire to regain all her lost territories, but the existing record of the talks on this point is vague. To help open a land route to China, there would be a land campaign in northern Burma (about which the British were most unenthusiastic), and Roosevelt promised a small amphibious operation against the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean (“Buccaneer”) to which the British objected even more vehemently. With the Chinese government and military in very poor condition, these steps might help keep them in the war.
¹⁰⁸
As the Western Allied leaders left Cairo for Teheran, they had still not agreed on a definite strategy for the defeat of Germany and were by no means in real accord about operations in Southeast Asia either. With Churchill in rather poor health at this point, the setting for Teheran was not at its best.
¹⁰⁹

The insistence of Churchill on repeatedly returning to the charge on extended operations in the Mediterranean and delays in Overlord meant that most of three of the four days at the Teheran Conference was taken up with the arguments over strategy in the European war, although Stalin made his own preference absolutely clear at the very first meeting.
¹¹⁰
Whatever may have caused him to consider further Mediterranean operations earlier, he now insisted that all be subordinated to Overlord in May 1944, with that operation to be accompanied
and preferably preceded by a landing on the southern coast of France.
^k
A Soviet offensive would be coordinated with the invasion. Stalin’s insistence in fact settled the issue, and if it meant that the Soviet Union thereby decided an Anglo-American dispute, one must remember that anyone who asks a question risks receiving an answer. Having put the issue to Stalin in view of their inability to agree, the Western Allies now had his reply.

The British nevertheless kept arguing the point to little purpose except the creation of much aggravation and a common front between the American and Soviet delegations, both with their own suspicions of British intentions: the Americans that the British would always find ways to postpone Overlord, the Russians that the British really did not want to carry it out at all. Though rarely touched on in the meetings, there was in my opinion an issue in the background. The British feared that an invasion attempt might fail, and for them, that would be the end of the road. They had been driven off the continent by the Germans three times in the war; the fourth time would be fatal. The Americans, on the other hand, certainly hoped and expected that the invasion would succeed, but if it did fail, they could and they would try again. The Russians undoubtedly felt that, success or failure, it was about time the Western Powers did their share of the fighting. At Stalin’s insistence that the operation would never be launched unless a Commander-in-Chief were appointed for it, the President promised that this would be done within a few days. Since the British had blocked an over–all European command, he decided right after the Teheran Conference to keep Marshall in Washington and appoint Eisenhower.

The obstinacy with which the British argued did lead to slight modifications in the timetable: Overlord would take place during May, not on the first; the landing in southern France would come at the same time as Overlord and possibly even a bit later and with a full two division assault landing; and landing craft would remain in the Mediterranean until mid-January for an amphibious operation in Italy. The Allies also agreed once again to try to persuade Turkey to enter the war, but this was surely considered a futile exercise by both the Americans and Soviets, as indeed it proved to be.
¹¹¹

At the first session, Roosevelt had discussed the war in the Pacific at
some length, and Stalin now formally promised him and Churchill to join in after the defeat of Germany. This promise and the desire to increase the operation in southern France would enable the British to insist on the abandonment of the “Buccaneer” operation, a decision reached at the meeting in Cairo afterwards and of great significance in symbolizing a major reduction in the importance of the China-Burma-India theater. China would get back the lands Japan had taken from her, Korea would regain its independence, and the Soviet Union would regain southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Roosevelt explained that he had raised with a most unenthusiastic Chiang the possibility of the Soviets using the warm–water port of Dairen; Stalin insisted that the Chinese like others had to do their share of the fighting to earn their rewards.

For the future generally, Roosevelt urged an international organization in which the four great powers would have a major role, sketching out what came to be the organization of the United Nations and getting Stalin’s agreement. If the great powers could cooperate, it would work; but if they did not, there was trouble ahead. On this as on other occasions, Roosevelt pointed to the early withdrawal of most United States troops from Europe. He did not expect the American public to support long-term stationing of troops overseas, especially with the memory of Bataan so strong, and on this issue he would be proved entirely correct–it took the Korean War to bring a reversal.

With so much time spent on military strategy, there was not much left for political issues. Roosevelt spoke up for Finland (with which the United States was not at war); and Stalin explained that the Soviet Union did not wish to annex it, would insist on the 1941 border but might trade Hangö for Petsamo, would expect the Finns to drive out the Germans during the war and pay reparations in kind afterwards.
¹¹²
Both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to all intents and purposes to the Soviet demand for the 1941 border with Poland with some minor modifications in favor of the Poles where the Curzon Line ran further east. Here the 1939 second partition of the country with Germany paid off for the Russians-the Western Allies could hardly reject a border drawn up by their representatives in 1919 and named for a famous British Foreign Secretary. Roosevelt, however, made it clear that, with the possibility of his having to run for President again if the war were still going on in 1944, he could not afford to make this position public. On the other hand, Poland was to gain extensive territory from Germany between the Oder and its pre-war border in the west, thus acquiring some very valuable
agricultural and industrial areas in exchange for the loss of larger but nowhere near as rich a territory. Whether the Polish government-in-exile would agree to this shift westwards, and whether the British and Americans could then persuade Stalin to resume diplomatic relations with that government, remained open but highly doubtful.