After Hitler: The Last Ten Days of World War II in Europe (35 page)

BOOK: After Hitler: The Last Ten Days of World War II in Europe
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You of course understand that such a truce would be a violation of our allied relationship.
As is known, something like a truce was permitted with our consent in Holland with the purpose of saving the Dutch population from flooding – which the Germans threatened to carry out – and hunger. This was permitted as an exception to the rule in view of extenuating circumstances.
As far as the remaining sectors of the western and southern fronts are concerned, what has to happen here is the surrender of German troops giving themselves up as prisoners. Without exception, this is what is happening on all sectors of the eastern front.

Then the Russians turned to the copy of the surrender document that Eisenhower had forwarded – the one that had now been signed at Rheims. They proposed a number of changes.

The first concerned an unfortunate slip in the drafting of the Rheims document naming the place and time of surrender, when the phrase ‘the truce’ was used. John Counsell, involved in the drafting of this, admitted: ‘The Russians reacted violently to the word “truce” which had been used in the “Agreement with German emissaries”, reading in to it confirmation of their suspicions that we were preparing to end hostilities at their expense.’

This mistake had been subsequently noticed and corrected, but given Russian sensitivity on this issue, and the deliberate use of this tactic by Dönitz (claiming a truce was in existence in the West to continue the struggle in the East), it was extremely unfortunate that it had cropped up in the first place.

Then the Soviet Union made it clear that it wanted nothing to do with the Dönitz administration:

In the message of Admiral Friedeburg to Admiral Dönitz the words appear: ‘New government’, ‘German government’ and ‘Head of State’. Of course, these words of Friedeburg in no way obligate us. However, in the interest of clarity, the Soviet command considers it necessary to state that it prefers to do business with the German High Command, and not with the German government, which in reality does not exist, which is recognized by no-one as a government and in the opinion of the Soviet command should not figure in our documents.

And importantly, it made clear it wanted to add a strengthening clause around the actual surrender of German troops. After ‘cease active operations’, the Russians wanted to insert the following: ‘And completely disarm, handing over their arms and equipment to the local allied commander or officers indicated by the allied representatives’.

This was no cosmetic change. The Russians did not trust the Germans or Dönitz. They envisaged German units ‘ceasing active operations’ (i.e. no longer fighting against them) but continuing to retreat away from them and towards the British and Americans in the west. The new clause was designed to pre-empt this – and would cause trouble in the second surrender signing at Karlshorst.

Finally, in blunt terms, the Soviet High Command expressed its wish that the signing of the act of military surrender should take place in Berlin, where it would be represented by Marshal Zhukov.

Two factors had powerfully changed the atmosphere between the Western Allies and Russia. The first was the way the Dönitz regime had portrayed the surrender at Lüneburg Heath as a truce with the West to enable the war in the East to continue. Russia now feared that the Germans would not honour a full unconditional surrender and began to imagine – with the failure to disarm some Wehrmacht troops in north-west Germany and Holland – that there might be those in the West willing to support such an outcome. The reference to ‘a violation of our allied relationship’ conveyed in the strongest possible terms the pain and indignation felt by the Soviet side.

The second was a failure to anticipate. General Dwight Eisenhower, the Allied supreme commander, was a brilliant operational planner and an absolutely fair and straightforward negotiator. These were great strengths – and men trusted him. Where he had slipped was in a failure of imagination. Preoccupied with ending the conflict as quickly as possible (and in a way that would be fair to the Russians) to save unnecessary casualties, he failed to perceive how important the symbolic termination of the war would be to the Soviet Union.

Having sacrificed some 27 million soldiers and civilians to defeat the Germans, every Soviet citizen would have wanted and expected the surrender to take place in Berlin and for Russia to be represented by its foremost commander, Marshal Zhukov. This was neither political machination nor pedantry. No other alternative would have been acceptable to any Russian.

This risk had already struck one of Eisenhower’s staff. Liaison officer at SHAEF Colonel Richard Wilberforce had noted in his diary, as negotiations commenced at Lüneburg Heath:

It was thought that the Germans opposing 21 Army Group were about to surrender and their emissaries were expected on bigger business. It wasn’t known who would come or what powers they would have, so we provided for three contingencies: Firstly, for a total [unconditional] surrender: But how about the Russians – surely they would want the document signed in Berlin? Here they only have a miserable liaison officer, a General Susloparov.

When they learnt that the signing had gone ahead, the Russians were deeply shocked and angry. General Sergei Shtemenko was on the Soviet High Command. He recalled meeting with General Antonov just after the news of the Rheims signing had reached Moscow. ‘The western allies have forced this on us,’ Antonov said. ‘They want the world to picture the Nazi surrender in front of them, with our country relegated to a supporting role.’ Soon both men were summoned to an emergency meeting at the Kremlin. It took place in the Soviet leader’s study and the atmosphere was grim. Stalin was pacing the carpet, thinking aloud.

The western allies have negotiated this directly with Dönitz, and no good will come of it. It looks like some sort of shady deal – not a proper surrender agreement. None of our leading commanders or government officials were present. We have suffered most from Hitler’s aggression and made the greatest contribution to our common victory. Russia broke the back of the Fascist beast. And now – at the very end of the war – this happens. No good will come from this supposed ‘capitulation’.

Stalin gathered himself. ‘The surrender of Nazi Germany will become an important historical fact. It should not take place in France – the territory of one of the “winners” – but in the place where all the aggression came from, the capital of the Nazi state, Berlin.’ He turned to those in the room. ‘The agreement signed at Rheims cannot be undone – but we cannot and will not accept it as it stands.’

The Soviet leader asked that a new signing be set up. The Rheims surrender had allowed for the ceremony to be repeated, but Stalin did not want to publicly recognise the agreement of 7 May at all. Instead, for him the Berlin surrender would be definitive. The Soviet Union would be represented by Marshal Zhukov for the Soviet High Command and Andrei Vyshinsky, deputy foreign minister, on behalf of the Russian government.

Stalin looked at General Antonov: ‘Can suitable premises be found for the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany in Berlin?’ he asked. ‘The centre of the city is badly damaged,’ Antonov replied, ‘but much of the suburbs are reasonably intact. I am sure we will be able to find an appropriate building there.’ Zhukov was delegated to make the choice. He decided on a military engineering school in one of Berlin’s eastern suburbs, at Karlshorst.

Supreme Allied Command was told that the Soviet Union was not willing to ratify the Rheims agreement and Susloparov was summarily recalled to Moscow. ‘Who the hell is this famous Russian general?’ Stalin had exclaimed angrily. John Counsell caught the moment:

‘Major General Susloparov emerged from behind a screen. Gone was the jocund, upright figure with whom we had been exchanging toasts only minutes earlier. Instead, we saw an old man, sagging at the knees, his face drained of all colour, his eyes expressionless. He passed us into the night and to a fate at which we could only guess.’

The Soviets now proposed a compromise arrangement. The Rheims surrender – which they did not report to their own citizens – would be regarded as an initial or preliminary signing, with the conclusive signing taking place in Berlin. To his credit, Eisenhower now stepped into the breach – to limit the damage from this as much as possible – and went along with the Soviet proposal.

He sent the following clearly worded reply:

I feel sure you will understand that we have scrupulously adhered to the engagement of no separate truce on this front … We have consistently refused to discuss a separate truce with anyone and have proceeded exactly in accordance with our understanding of Russian desires.
While a brief instrument of unconditional military surrender, of which you have a copy, was signed here at 0240 hours this morning, before receipt of your message, that instrument provides that the German High Command is required to report at a time and place fixed for a more formal signing. I would be happy to come to Berlin tomorrow, at an hour specified by Marshal Zhukov, who I understand will be the Russian representative.

A bridge was being rebuilt between the Western Allies and Russia. But more was to happen on this fateful day. The hiatus meant that American and British forces on the ground now understood there to be a ceasefire, the Germans believed that a ceasefire was in place between them and the Western Allies but were not willing to surrender to the Russians, and the Russians – not knowing about the ceasefire or, in the case of the Soviet High Command, not choosing to accept it – were carrying on fighting.

At 7.45 a.m. on 7 May the US 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion – part of General George Patton’s Third Army – received orders to move along the road from Volary to Lenora in western Czechoslovakia and survey German positions. General Eisenhower’s instructions to all US troops in the country made clear that any further advance was prohibited beyond limited reconnaissance missions up to 6 miles ahead of American lines. As the battalion moved forward it ran into a German ambush. Troops of the 11th Panzer Division, concealed in the woods on either side of the dirt road, let off a barrage of fire from Panzerfausts. These exploded around the lead American vehicle and the GIs driving in the jeep behind it were also hit. One of them – Charles Havlat – was killed instantly.

The US force returned fire, but a few minutes later the radio operator received word that a ceasefire had come into effect and they were to return to Volary. Havlat would be the last American soldier killed in Europe. Taken captive later, the German officer who led the ambush said he had known nothing of the ceasefire until thirty minutes after the engagement, but nevertheless apologised for the incident. The surrender was then scrupulously observed between the two sides.

But when Germans were faced by the advancing Red Army, it was an altogether different story. The urge to escape at any cost led to terrible scenes at the bridge over the Elbe at Tangermünde, 45 miles north-west of Magdeburg. The western side of the river was held by General William Simpson’s US Ninth Army. Approaching from the east were the German troops of General Walter Wenck’s 12th Army, the remnants of the 9th Army and a mass of civilians. The Russians were in hot pursuit.

General Wenck’s army had been pulled from its position on the Elbe on 23 April, with dramatic orders to rescue Hitler in Berlin. Wenck had got as far as Potsdam. Then, faced with strong Soviet opposition, he abandoned all plans to fight his way into the Reich’s capital and instead concentrated on shepherding the German 9th Army, battered by the troops of Marshal Konev’s 1st Ukrainian Front, back to the safety of American lines. The 9th Army was an Eastern Front formation, the 12th Army had become one – yet both had resolved never to surrender to the Russians. Nearly 100,000 Wehrmacht troops – and the same number of civilians – were fleeing towards American lines.

On 4 May Wenck had sent one of his corps commanders, General Baron von Edelsheim, ahead of his army to negotiate with his American counterpart, General Simpson. The discussions took place in the town hall at Stendal. Simpson was more circumspect than Field Marshal Montgomery at Lüneburg. He did not merely pay lip-service to the terms of unconditional surrender. He was aware of the humanitarian issue but also the United States’ obligations to its Soviet ally – and also the practical problems of dealing with such a large influx of people. Simpson said he was willing to receive wounded and unarmed soldiers, but refused Edelsheim’s request to help repair the bridge to speed the evacuation and made it clear that he could not accept civilian refugees.

On 6 May the crossing of the Elbe had begun. The Germans gave priority to the soldiers of the 9th Army, while the 12th held a shrinking bridgehead some 5 miles wide and 2 miles deep around Tangermünde. Beyond them were the Russians – and their artillery was now opening up on the German position.

On the morning of 7 May the perimeter of the bridgehead started to collapse. There was no longer time for an organised crossing of the Elbe – and German soldiers and civilians started to succumb to mass panic. Although civilians had been prohibited from crossing, they surged forward nonetheless. Only hours after the unconditional surrender had been signed at Rheims, detachments of the US 5th Armored and 102nd Divisions watched scenes of utter chaos unfold before them on the opposite bank. British journalist James Wellard was with the American troops:

I have just witnessed the last battle on the western front, fought at Tangermünde on the Elbe, some 200 yards from me, between thousands of disorganized, hysterical, screaming Germans and the implacable, ruthless Russian tanks and infantry. From the top of an American tank, which if it had opened fire, could have slaughtered hundreds of Germans at point-blank range, I saw scenes so fantastic that they surpassed anything I had witnessed in four years of war.
BOOK: After Hitler: The Last Ten Days of World War II in Europe
10.54Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
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