Alamo Traces (45 page)

The alleged Jose Enrique de la Pena memoir also has what appears to be a fictional report about Colonel Mendoza that speaks to the authenticity of the Pena narrative. According to Pena: “After the capitulation [December 11, 1836], Lieutenant Colonel Jose Maria Mendoza, who was later to lose a limb from a cannonball wound received defending the Alamo, was saved, together with other officers, thanks to the diligence and assistance given them by Dr. James Grant. Certainly this conduct is in contrast to that followed by our commander in chief: ‘I neither ask for nor give quarter,' he used to say at Bejar, and he was known to have said once to one of his aides that he would authorize him to strike him with a pistol were he to deviate from his resolution.”
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The story is suggestive but does not identify exactly what Grant did to save Mendoza and the other officers. Still, one can assume three things about the Pena description. First, it appears to be constructed on the Sanchez claim that Edward Burleson offered Texian medical help to Cos's wounded soldiers. Second, the incident is used to contrast Texian goodness to Santa Anna's cruelty. Third, Mendoza appears to have been wounded while defending the main plaza of San Antonio, not the Alamo. Fourth, the Pena element does not claim that Grant actually treated Mendoza and the other officers in some kind of medical manner. The chronicle only suggests that Grant, a physician, did something medically to save Mendoza and the other, unnamed Mexican officers. That conclusion, however, is extremely unlikely for two reasons. Grant did not participate in the siege and storming of Bexar as a physician. His was a combat commander. Also, he was seriously wounded on December 5, the first day of the storming of the city. On December 17 Dr. Amos Pollard and Dr. Samuel Stivers, the Texian surgeons, downgraded Grant's condition to “slightly wounded.” Moreover, Mendoza's wound, the loss of a lower leg, was one that would have required immediate medical attention. Grant would not have treated Mendoza for the same reason Morris could not have taken Mendoza's property. Grant would not have had access to Mendoza immediately after he was wounded. Alejandro Vidal probably treated Mendoza at the time of his injury. Dr. Moro and Dr. Arroyo would have treated Mendoza after their arrival in San Antonio.
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If the Pena account is authentic, why would Pena have created the story about Grant saving Mendoza—a report that portrays Pena's
enemies in a positive way? Again, as with Sanchez's Mendoza/Morris story, the answer is hard to determine. One can assume Pena would not have created the tale for he had no admiration for his enemy. In an authentic letter, he wrote: “He [Filisola] has been very ignominious because he retired the whole army from a handful of armed civilians [Texians] who are ignoramuses in the art of war, without union, without tactics, without discipline, and without any of those things that give strength to the masses.” Of course, as the story is presented in the Pena document, the tale is not attributed to Pena, but to “Officers who were present when Bejar was besieged in 1835. . . .” But is that the truth? Still, the story appears to be designed to picture the Texians in a positive light and to paint Santa Anna in evil black—a view that was held by most Texas historians and Texana collectors of the 1950s.
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In the end, what became of Mendoza and the other officers who had been left behind by Cos? Filisola does not say. Neither do the Pena and Sanchez narratives. Those two accounts give no more information about the men left behind than is found in Filisola's history and an August 11, 1836 letter written by Jose F. Moro that appeared in the September 30, 1836 issue of
El Mosquito Mexicano
, a Mexican newspaper. This letter appears in the appendix of the Jesus Sanchez Garza Spanish language edition of the memoir draft Pena account. If the Pena and Sanchez accounts are authentic, why do they fail to report the fate of the wounded men? Soldiers left in the hands of the enemy was an important event. No soldier wants to be left wounded on the field, and no soldier wants to leave a brother on a battleground. On the other hand, if the two accounts are forgeries, why would the forgers have failed to explain the fate of the wounded men? The answer is simple when one thinks about it. If the forgers did not have a reliable source that answered the question, then they could not afford to create a fictional explanation that might later prove to be incorrect. Better to leave the question of what happened to the wounded men unanswered.
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Previous to the storming of Bexar, the last serious engagement was the “Grass Fight” on November 26, 1835. Edward Burleson reported that fifteen Mexican soldiers were found dead on the field and seven wounded men were carried from the field for a total of twenty-two. Whereas, Cos reported one wounded official, three dead soldiers, thirteen wounded soldiers, and thirty-nine horses lost (probably captured) in
the action. Either Burleson inflated the number or Cos did not report the true numbers.
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In total, Cos appears to have suffered about 170 dead and wounded during the siege and storming of Bexar. He retreated from the city with over forty wounded men and left about fourteen men behind in the Alamo, including Lt. Col. Jose Maria Mendoza and Second Lieutenant Ignacio Solis. Cos's number of dead was probably around 116 men. Doctor Mariano Arroyo and interns Jose Maria Ylisariturri and Jose Cardenas remained in San Antonio to care for the wounded men. Captain Francisco de Rada remained behind to help the wounded, probably with nonmedical activities. Therefore, when Santa Anna and his army marched into San Antonio on February 23, 1836, one surgeon and two interns were there to greet their commander-in-chief.
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Nevertheless, in regard to the medical staff available during the February and March 1836 siege of the Alamo, the published Pena account makes this unbelievable claim: “None of these commanders [Cos, Castrillon, Almonte, Duque, Amat, Romero, and Salas] was aware that there were no field hospitals or surgeons to save the wounded, and that for some it would be easier to die than to be wounded, as we shall see after the assault.” Pena, speaking to the medical aid available after the attack, quoted an alleged letter from an unknown person: “. . . it is true that few among us are sick, but we have 257 wounded with no surgeons to treat them, no medicines, no bandages, no gauze, and very meager food.”
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Then the Pena memoir seems to vacillate about the question of surgeons being available for the Alamo wounded. Pena claims: “Among the victims who perished because of General Santa Anna's faults and lack of resources, one finds the name of Don Jose Maria Heredia, a sapper officer. . . . Urging on the platoon he commanded, at times scolding with sword in hand the soldier who showed little courage as the Sapper Battalion advanced, he received a mortal wound two inches above the right nipple in one of the last enemy barrages; this courageous officer could have been saved by the services of a good surgeon, but the lack of such and of medicine took him to his grave after thirteen days, during which, with admirable courage, he suffered intense pain.” Does the lack of a “good surgeon” mean the army had a surgeon, but he was incompetent, or does it mean there was no surgeon to treat Heredia?
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Mexican infantryman

Photo courtesy of Joseph Musso collection

There was an officer named Jose Maria Heredia. He was the lowest ranking lieutenant in the third Zapadore company. At the time of Heredia's death, judging from what Pena actually wrote, the event did not make much of an impression on Pena. According to the Pena memoir Heredia died on March 19. The 109-page Pena second draft campaign diary does not mention Heredia being wounded or his death. The campaign diary manuscript has no entries for March 18, 19, and 20.
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Whatever, one surgeon and two interns does not equal Pena's claim of “no” surgeons. There was one surgeon, Dr. Mariano Arroyo, who, with the assistance of the interns, could have handled the amputations. Whereas, the two interns were probably capable of performing minor surgery, such as removing lead balls from soft tissue, cleaning wounds, and stitching up wounds. Second, if there had been no medical personal, it is unbelievable that the commanders mentioned would have been unaware of the situation. Cos, given that he had left Arroyo and his two interns behind, most certainly would have known about them.

Third, as the Pena memoir often does, it reads just like Filisola, who wrote: “By taking the rather insignificant fortification of the Alamo, a large number of the best soldiers, including 26 leaders and officers, were sacrificed for no plausible reason. Santa Anna could have left a guard of the cavalry that could go no further because of the bad condition of the horses, or he could have knocked the adobe walls down with the 20 artillery pieces at his disposal. But he [Santa Anna] wanted blood, and blood was what he got. Those killed suffered no more, but the wounded were left to lie without any attention and with no shelter.” Both Filisola and Pena claim it was better for a soldier to have been killed than to have been wounded.
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In regard to the previous Filisola quote, there are passages in the Pena memoir that echo Filisola's content. First, Pena reports: “We were in a position to advance, leaving a small force on watch at the Alamo, the holding of which was unimportant either politically or militarily, whereas its acquisition was both costly and very bitter in the end.” Second, the account claims: “In fact, it was necessary only to await the artillery's arrival at Bejar for these [rebels] to surrender; undoubtedly they could not have resisted for many hours the destruction and imposing fire from twenty cannon.” Then, in regard to Santa Anna having desired a “bloody” battle, Pena alleges: “. . . because he [Santa Anna] wanted to cause a sensation and would have regretted taking the Alamo without clamor and without bloodshed, for some believed that without these there is no glory.” Both Filisola and the Pena memoir express the opinion that the capture of the Alamo by infantry assault was not worth the dead and wounded it cost. Rather, Santa Anna should have left a guard around the Alamo and continued east with the campaign. Or, Santa Anna should have destroyed the Alamo's walls with their twenty cannon, forcing the Texians to surrender. Never mind that regardless of the state of the
walls, the Texians were not going to surrender without an agreement that would have allowed them to live, conditions which Santa Anna was not going to give them. Both Filisola and the Pena memoir claim Santa Anna wanted a battle with unneeded bloodshed.
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In total, the Pena memoir reports that the casualties for the March 6 attack were 257 wounded and more than 300 dead, for a total of over 557 dead and wounded. Also, the Pena memoir claims that Colonel Esteban Mora, a cavalry officer, was appointed as the hospital director. According to a manuscript in the Pena papers, the order that made Mora the “inspector-general” of the hospital was issued as a general order on March 20, 1836. Dr. Arroyo, however, was most likely the hospital's administrator until the arrival of Dr. Jose F. Moro.
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The earliest summary of the Alamo Mexican dead and wounded comes from Colonel Juan Andrade.
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It reads:

Andrade reported 60 dead and 251 wounded, for a total of 311. Santa Anna reported that he had 70 killed and 300 wounded. Colonel Juan N. Almonte reported “60 soldiers and 5 officers killed, and 198 soldiers and 25 officers wounded.” The alleged San Luis battalion journal (a manuscript in the Jose Enrique de la Pena papers) lists the dead and wounded as 21 officers, 295 soldiers, for a total of 316 men. Sergeant Santiago Rabia, of the Tampico lancers, reported the dead and wounded as 500. Jose Juan Sanchez claimed that 11 officers were killed, 19 were wounded and 247 soldiers were wounded and 110 were killed, for a total of 121 dead and 266 wounded men. Caro, Santa Anna's private secretary, claimed: “Though the bravery and intrepidity of the troops was general, we shall always deplore the costly sacrifice of the 400 men who fell in the attack. Three hundred were left dead on the field and more than a hundred of the wounded died afterwards as a result of the lack of proper medical attention and medical facilities in spite of the fact that the injuries were not serious.” Caro's number of immediate dead from the attack appears to match the Pena memoir's number.
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