Authors: Thomas Ricks Lindley
Alamo Traces (5 page)
The previously mentioned Colonel Robert M. Coleman left this description of Houston's activities at the convention:
Thus, while Col. Travis and his gallant companions were closely besieged by an overwhelming Mexican force, with Santa Anna at its head and letters were daily received from that brave officer imploring aid, and declaring that
without timely and efficient assistance he must perish. While Col. Fannin was daily calling for a force to enable him to meet the enemy in the vicinity of Goliad. While too, the citizens were abandoning their homes and fleeing to the Eastward to escape from their barbarous enemy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Texas was spending his nights in the grog-shops of Washington, in company with the gamblers and dissipated multitude which the session of the Convention had collected at that place; and his days were devoted to sleep, except that portion of them which he spent in vain efforts to ally the fears of the people, and to account for his disgraceful inactivity.
With this view he declared that a fraud had been practiced upon the people by the officers of the frontier, for party purposes; that there was not an enemy on our borders; that one of the officers was endeavoring to wrest from him the command of the army, for which purpose he had caused these reports to be circulated, hoping the authorities, in the event of an invasion, and absence of the Commander-in-Chief, would confer that appointment upon another.
47
One document that appears to repudiate Coleman's allegation that Houston did not believe the enemy was on the frontier is an entreaty to the public that was published under Houston's name, allegedly on March 2, 1836. It reads:
War is raging on the frontiers. Bexar is besieged by two thousand of the enemy under the command of General Sesma. Reinforcements are on the march to unite with the besieging army. By the last report, our force in Bexar was only one hundred and fifty men. The citizens of Texas must rally to aid of our army, or it will perish. Let the citizens of the east march to the combat. The enemy must be driven from our soil, or desolation will accompany their march upon us.
Independence is declared
; it must be maintained. Immediate action united with valor, can alone achieve the great work. The services of all are forthwith required in the field.
Sam Houston Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
P.S. It is rumored that the enemy are on their march to Gonzales, and that they have entered the colonies. The fate
of Bexar is unknown. The country must and shall be defended. The patriots of Texas are
appealed to in behalf of their bleeding country
.
48
Houston's words were the truth, but his previous actions, his subsequent behavior, and the ensuing actions of the convention suggest that if the proclamation was actually issued on March 2, 1836, it was an insincere political action to give the impression that Houston was doing something to answer Travis's call for assistance. Indeed, “the services of all” were required at the front, including the services of the “Commander-in-Chief of the Army.” Other evidence indicates that the Coleman accusation is true, and that Houston was successful in convincing most of the delegates that the Alamo was not threatened.
49
On February 25 Travis wrote Houston of the conditions at the Alamo. He detailed the events that had passed since the enemy's arrival and praised his troops: “I take great pleasure in stating that both officers and men conducted themselves with firmness and bravely.” Then, he closed with: “Do hasten on aid to me as rapidly as possible, as from the superior number of the enemy, it will be impossible for us to keep them out much longer. If they overpower us, we fall a sacrifice at the shrine of our country, and we hope posterity and our country will do our memory justice. Give me help, oh my Country! Victory or Death!” The missive arrived at Washington-on-the-Brazos on the evening of March 2. The impact of Travis's call for immediate aid is recorded in the diary of a spectator at the convention. It reads: “It is believed the Alamo is safe.”
50
The following day the delegates, indicating they possessed a degree of skepticism about Travis's call for relief, passed the following resolution: “Believing it of vital importance that this convention know correctly the condition of our army, they would recommend the convention to accept the services of Major [Matthew] Caldwell, who purposes to start this day for the frontier.” Caldwell, a Gonzales resident, had every reason (Gonzales was next in line after San Antonio) to believe that Travis's letters were the truth, even if Houston and the other delegates doubted the documents.
51
The convention took no further action until the morning of Friday, March 4. Houston claimed that because of the actions of the General Council he was no longer the army's commander-in-chief. He argued that independence demanded a new appointment, as his “former oath of
office was under the constitution of 1824, and in obedience thereto.”
52
To satisfy Houston, the following preamble and resolution were introduced.
Whereas we are now in a state of Revolution, and threatened by a large invading army, from the central government of Mexico; and whereas our present situation, and the emergency of the present crisis, renders it indispensably necessary that we should have an army in the field; and, whereas, it is also necessary that there should be one Supreme head or Commander in Chief, and due degrees of subordination defined, established and strictly observed, Therefore, be it Resolved, that General Samuel Houston be appointed Commander in Chief of all land forces of the Texian Army, both regulars, volunteers, and militia, while in actual service, and endowed with all the rights, privileges and powers due to a Commander in Chief in the United States of America, and that he forthwith proceed to take command, establish headquarters and organize the army accordingly.
53
Apparently over lunch a number of the delegates decided the government needed to ensure its control over Houston. Thus, the preamble and resolution were passed with an addition:
“And that Samuel Houston retain such command until the election of a chief magistrate of this government, and to continue in such office unless, superseded by order of the government, subject, however, to the general orders of the government
de facto
, until the general organization agreeable to the constitution, and always amenable to the laws and civil authorities of this country.”
54
Another resolution was introduced that specified that if Houston did not “immediately set out for the army” he should resign. Houston said that he would depart the next morning and requested that the resolution be withdrawn. The proposed mandate was dropped by its sponsor. The body then adjourned for the weekend, agreeing to meet on Monday, March 7.
55
In the late 1830s, Isaac W. Burton reported his opinion of Houston's behavior at the convention: “I thought him a man of uncommon natural abilities â But I
fancied
perhaps that his acquired ones were in a great measure superficial â I thought him in the main a man of an excellent
heart but dissipated, eccentric, and vain â and on the whole I ranked him among the first men in Texas and was at that time his Political as well as warm personal friend â However, he delayed taking Command of the Volunteer Army and staid [
sic
] in the Convention employed in Legislative matters when I thought that his honor as a soldier was hourly getting dimmed.”
56
On Sunday morning, March 6, Houston still had not left for the Alamo. Travis's final dispatch, however, arrived at Washington-on-the-Brazos during the delegates' breakfast and, after some hesitation, brought the issue of Houston's departure to a head. Richard Ellis, president of the convention, called the delegates together and the secretary read the letter. Many members, apparently because of Houston's influence, continued to doubt that the Alamo was under siege.
57
Forty years later, Lancelot Abbotts remembered it this way:
The veracity of the courier who carried it to Washington, and the authenticity of the signature of Travis, were questioned by some members of the Convention and by citizens. Two or three of the members were aware that I knew well the handwriting of Col. Travis, and a Committee of the Convention waited on me to ascertain my opinion on the matter. I unhesitatingly pronounced the despatch (brief as it was) to be the handwriting of the brave Travis.
A public meeting was called for the purpose of enlisting volunteers for the relief of the Alamo. At this time there was living in Washington a doctor by the name of Biggs, or Briggs, who was a big, burly, brave Manifest Destiny man. He made a speech, in which he declared his unbelief in the despatch, and the utter impossibility of any number of Mexicans to take the Alamo, when defended by near 200 men.
58
Finally, late that afternoon Houston left for Gonzales to take command of the forces that had mustered under the command of Lt. Colonel James C. Neill to reinforce the Alamo. Mrs. Angelina Eberly, a San Felipe resident, reported Houston's departure with these strong words: “it was Sunday â collecting his besotted faculties, he [Houston] said, with much levity, to the anxious spectators, [â]You must throw a shoe at me for good luck.['] No one did so â why? âI would have had my foot in it,' they cried. It was the 6th of March â the last express came from Fannin and Travis, with a letter from the latter to Miss Cummings to whom he was engaged.
They [Houston and staff] got off the same evening. That morning Travis fell!”
59
The ride to Gonzales should have taken two and a half days at the most. Instead, Houston took five days to make the trip. He spent the night of the sixth at Dr. Asa Hoxey's plantation at Coles Settlement, northwest of Washington-on-the-Brazos. On the seventh he traveled to Burnam's Crossing on the Colorado River, south of present-day La Grange. At Burnam's, William W. Thompson, an old settler, confronted Houston about his obvious delay in moving to the relief of the Alamo. Thompson described the encounter with these words: “Houston swore that he believed it [Santa Anna at the Alamo] to be a damned lie, and that all those reports from Travis & Fannin were lies, for there were no Mexican forces there and that he believed that it was only electioneering schemes [by] Travis & Fannin to sustain their own popularity[.] And Genl Houston showed no disposition of being in a hurry to the army, much to the surprise of myself & others; for he remained at Capt. Burnums all night, & all that day, and all night again before he started for Gonzales. And this at a time, when anxiety for the relief of Colo. Travis & his heroic comrades, appeared to fill the minds of everybody.”
60
Whereas, in 1859, Houston reported his ride to Gonzales with these words: “The Alamo was known to be in siege. Fannin was known to be embarrassed. Ward, also, and Morris and Johnson, destroyed. All seemed to bespeak calamity of the most ireful character. . . . The general proceeded on his way and met many fugitives. The day on which he left Washington, the 6th of March, the Alamo had fallen. He anticipated it; and marching to Gonzales as soon as practicable, though his health was infirm, he arrived there on the 11th of March.”
61
Thus, Houston did not hurry to Gonzales because he was sick and he believed the Alamo had already fallen.
Still others, besides Thompson, believed that Houston had traveled too slowly in riding to the sounds of war. San Jacinto captain Moseley Baker penned a private letter to Houston that detailed Baker's knowledge of Houston's participation in the revolution. In regard to the Alamo, Baker wrote:
While the coming of Santa Anna was . . . daily expected in the month of January, 1836, you [Houston] deliberately took your departure for Nacogdoches, on a plea of going to pacify the Indians, without having previously organized a single
company for the defense of the country. You remained absent, and was still so, when the Mexicans actually invaded the country and besieged the immortal Travis in the Alamo, and he in calling for assistance writes to the Convention, on account, as he himself says, “of the absence of the commander-in-chief.” But sir he called in vain â you had left no organization, nothing on which the people could rally, and no one to whom to look for orders in your absence, and before the people could recover from their consternation, the Alamo had fallen, he [Travis] and his brave comrades shouting for Texas and her rights [paper torn] if we are to believe all contempt [torn] testimony you fell shouting [torn] your post should have [torn] [San Antonio] because it was one of danger and glory. You should have been there because the destinies of Texas were nominally resting on you. But you were in the East removed from danger, and in a condition that even your enemies, for the honor of Texas are loath to mention.
On learning the fact that Santa Anna had actually invaded the country, you hurried to Washington to meet the Convention. You there read the appeals of Travis for assistance, but you stirred not, you remained for days waiting a reappointment, and how far you restrained yourself from your accustomed habits, let those speak who had the mortification to see you. You finally reached Gonzales, but before you did so, Travis and his Texian band had shouted their last battle cry for Texas, and then slept the sleep of the Brave. Lamented Travis, so long as brave and generous deeds shall command the admiration of the free and the good â will you and your band â be immortal. Had [Ben] Milam lived or had [Edward] Burleson commanded, you [Travis] now would be among us, but friend of my early days rest in peace. When the name of Houston shall be forgotten, yours will be repeated as the more than successful rival of Leonidas.
62
Today one can argue that the Coleman, Thompson, and Baker statements were nothing more than political attacks on Houston. While political considerations may have produced the statements, that does not
mean the declarations are false. Moreover, a document from Houston's own quill verifies an important element of the Coleman and Thompson reports.
