America At War - Concise Histories Of U.S. Military Conflicts From Lexington To Afghanistan (10 page)

The
Monitor
’s captain was Lieutenant John Worden. He weighed anchor at 8:10 in the morning and steamed out into Hampton Roads. His goal was to protect a Union ship that had run aground the day before. This was the USS
Minnesota
, a vessel the
Virginia
was determined to sink. Thus began the famous “duel of the ironclads.” The fight lasted four hours as the two ships turned and fired, then fired and turned. Neither the
Monitor
nor the
Virginia
was sunk, nor was either seriously damaged. Late that afternoon, they returned to their respective ports. Southerners claimed a victory although the blockade remained in force. Northerners, disputing the claim, simply went to work and built more ships like the
Monitor
.

They also built a large number of shallow-draft, armored steamboats for use on America’s rivers. These would play a key role in the war, ferrying troops and supplies and bombarding Confederate fortifications.

Union shipyards were central to the success of Abraham Lincoln’s cause. During the war years they built 200 warships. They also helped convert 418 merchant ships into military vessels. At the beginning of the conflict the U. S. Navy had only 90 ships. By 1865, the number was 671.

This huge armada enforced the blockade, no mean task as the Southern coastline extended some thirty-five hundred miles from Virginia to Texas. Confederate blockade runners occasionally slipped through, but the overall effort was to stifle the South’s lucrative trade in cotton and to reduce significantly the importation of British firearms. In addition to blockade runners, which used Bermuda, Nassau, and Havana as ports of origin, the South had a small number of oceangoing warships, built mostly in England. They were deployed to intercept Northern vessels far out at sea, much as the tiny U.S. Navy had done in the War of 1812. Perhaps the most famous of the Confederate warships was the CSS
Alabama
. Commanded by Raphael Semmes, she sunk sixty-five ships during her two-year cruise. However, on June 19, 1864, the federal navy caught up with her off Cherbourg in the form of the USS
Kearsarge
, which took but ninety minutes to end her career as a maritime raider.

Whether on the high seas or on fast-flowing rivers, the Union navy had much to do with the defeat of the South, a role that seems overlooked as Americans today recall their Civil War. Yet throughout the conflict sailors and marines were in action. Early in the war, for example, the United States Navy conducted a successful amphibious operation capturing the forts that defended Hatteras Inlet in North Carolina. Two months later, a fleet of seventy-seven vessels, under the command of Samuel F. Dupont, took control of the Confederate forts off Port Royal Sound along the coast of South Carolina. Of greater importance to the Union cause was the seizure in April 1862 of New Orleans by ships directed by David G. Farragut who, three months later, was rewarded with the rank of rear admiral, the first such American to be so invested. Better known is Farragut’s later exploit off Alabama. In attacking the Confederate positions guarding Mobile, Farragut shouted, “Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead,” as his ships charged through a narrow channel. The “torpedoes” were, in fact, what today are called mines, a munition which, according to naval historian Jack Sweetman, the South showed great resourcefulness in using to eventually put forty Union warships out of action. Farragut’s fleet made it through the channel losing but one vessel, the monitor
Tecumseh
. Subsequently, his ships destroyed several Confederate warships and closed the port to Southern commerce, further tightening the naval screws that so weakened the Confederacy.

One last aspect of the conflict at sea is worth noting. Of the more than 170,000 men who served in the Union navy during the War Between the States, 18,000 were black Americans. Ten times as many served in the Union armies, but, unlike those soldiers, these black sailors were assigned to units in which white Americans served. Thus the Union navy, to a degree, was an integrated force. Congress recognized that black citizens represented a valuable pool of manpower. So in 1862 it authorized military service for African-Americans by passing the Second Confiscation Act in July. This act and other steps led to a large number of blacks donning the blue uniform of the Union army. By war’s end there were 166 black regiments in the army’s Order of Battle. More than a few were given secondary or menial tasks, yet when called upon to fight they performed well.

When General McClellan withdrew from the Peninsula, contingents of the Army of the Potomac were detached for service with a newly established Union army. Its commander was Major General John Pope, an officer who had had success in the West. He would not have much in Virginia. Abrasive and conceited, he was an unpopular choice. But Lincoln wanted a general who was eager to do battle, and Pope, for all his faults, was that.

Late in August Pope’s army met that of Lee. The result was a victory for the South. The battle again took place at Bull Run in Virginia. Union casualties were high: some thirteen thousand soldiers were killed or wounded.

Several of Lincoln’s advisors urged him to sack both Pope and McClellan, as neither general had distinguished himself. The president agreed that this was so, but dismissed only Pope. The general’s army became part of the Army of the Potomac. Thus this latter army was now a substantial military force. It required a commander who could restore its pride and prepare it for battle. Lincoln knew, better than anyone else, that McClellan would do both.

Meanwhile, in Richmond, Jefferson Davis devised a strategy he believed might win the war. A West Point graduate, the Confederate president planned an invasion of the North, In fact, he set in motion two such endeavors. One in the West would strike into Kentucky. The other would take Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia across the Potomac River into Maryland. Kentucky and Maryland were border states with residents sympathetic to the Southern cause. Success likely would bring them into the Confederacy.

Robert E. Lee was fully supportive of this plan. He wanted to relieve his beloved Virginia of the hardship of war. He wanted Northerners to experience firsthand the destruction that accompanies military conflict. He wanted to engage the Army of the Potomac in a decisive battle, one he believed he would win. And, along with Jefferson Davis, Lee wanted a victory up north that might persuade Abraham Lincoln to sue for peace. Moreover, both Lee and Davis were convinced that such a victory would cause Great Britain to recognize the Confederate States of America. Such recognition would enhance the chances of gaining Southern independence, much as victory at Saratoga in 1777, by bringing about recognition from France, had aided the American rebels.

The advance into Kentucky began late in August 1862. Commanded by Braxton Bragg, thirty thousand Confederate soldiers moved from Mississippi to Tennessee, then into Kentucky, a state Lincoln believed had to remain in Union hands. Defending Kentucky was Major General Don Carlos Buell, whose Army of the Ohio outnumbered that of Bragg. Buell was a military professional who rarely moved with speed and lacked an aggressive approach to war, much like McClellan. The two armies clashed at Perryville on October 8. Neither appeared to win, but with Confederate setbacks at Iuka and Corinth, Bragg wisely decided to return home. Buell did not pursue him and was relieved of command. But, as he no doubt said to himself more than once, he had kept Kentucky in the Union.

The advance into Maryland began in September 1862, when lead elements of the Army of Northern Virginia began crossing the Potomac River. Numbering approximately forty-five thousand, the army was structured as two corps. One was commanded by Jackson, the other by James Longstreet, both extremely capable senior officers. Lee sent Jackson and his men to capture the federal garrison at Harpers Ferry. Longstreet was to continue north. Once reunited, the army either would head into Pennsylvania or turn and fight the Union army that Lee expected would be in pursuit. Thus Robert E. Lee had split his army in two, a tactic military experts say is often unwise.

If McClellan and the Army of the Potomac could fall on each of the Confederate corps separately, they could destroy the South’s principal military force. Such an outcome became a realistic possibility when Union soldiers found a copy of Lee’s orders describing his plan. To succeed, McClellan had to move quickly. He did, but not quickly enough.

Troops belonging to Longstreet delayed the Army of the Potomac in battles at South Mountain in which each side suffered more than twenty-two hundred casualties. Soon thereafter, Stonewall Jackson took control of Harpers Ferry, taking twelve thousand prisoners along with much needed supplies. Learning that McClellan was aware of his intentions, Lee ordered Jackson to promptly link up with Longstreet, which he did. Lee then placed his entire army just outside Sharpsburg, Maryland, and prepared to fight. Close by flowed Antietam Creek.

When McClellan arrived at Sharpsburg, his army was a powerful force, comprising some eighty thousand soldiers. His plan of attack was to have three assaults in sequence, on the Confederate left, center, and right. This would prevent Lee from moving troops from one spot to reinforce another. The plan was sound, but it required clear communication, constant pressure on the enemy, and precise timing. These three goals the Union army and its commander could not deliver. What the soldiers in blue could deliver was raw courage and murderous firepower, and on that day, September 17, 1862, the Army of the Potomac brought with it plenty of both.

The Union attack began shortly after sunrise. The Union I Corps, commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker, struck hard upon the Confederate left. Across a cornfield they marched, suffering heavily, as did their Southern cousins. A second federal corps entered the fray and it too paid a heavy price. Then to the south, in the middle of the Confederate line, other Union soldiers advanced against the rebels, who were entrenched along a sunken road. There the fighting was furious and long, lasting beyond three hours. The soldiers in blue prevailed, though the cost—on both sides—was high. Further south, on Lee’s right flank, a small narrow stone bridge crossed Antietam Creek. McClellan’s IX Corps, commanded by Major General Ambrose Burnside, was to cross the creek, push the Confederates back, and envelop Lee’s forces to the north. However, Burnside launched his attack late and, instead of fording Antietam Creek in several places, concentrated his men at the bridge. The result was heavy casualties and time lost in crossing the creek. Eventually, his men pushed the defenders back and were able to move north. But not very far north, for his soldiers were exhausted and unable to breach A. P. Hill’s division, fresh troops that had arrived from Harpers Ferry truly in the nick of time.

So the Battle of Antietam came to a close. It had been a day unlike any other in American history. From McClellan’s army the number of dead totaled 2,108. For Lee, 2,700. Soldiers listed as wounded or missing numbered 10,302 for the North and 11,024 for the South. Thus the butcher’s bill at Antietam added up to 26,134. September 17, 1862 was—and still is—the bloodiest day in American history.

Several of McClellan’s corps commanders urged him to continue the fight. They pointed out that Lee’s army had been hit hard and that their army had fresh troops available to strike again. But McClellan said no. He was satisfied with the results of September 17 and wanted the Army of the Potomac to regroup. Thus the Union army rested as Robert E. Lee took his men back to Virginia.

McClellan claimed a victory. He had confronted the best the South had to offer and had done well, forcing the Army of Northern Virginia to give up its invasion of the North.

Lincoln too saw Antietam as a victory. He had been waiting for such an outcome in order to issue a document of considerable importance. This was the Emancipation Proclamation. One page in length and dated September 22, 1862, it freed the slaves in those states that were in rebellion. Many Republicans wanted a stronger statement. Many Democrats spoke out in opposition. They did not see emancipation as a legitimate goal of the war and they believed that the proclamation would stiffen Southern resistance.

Along with other steps taken by Congress and the president, the Emancipation Proclamation changed the character of the war. No longer just an effort to preserve the federal union, Lincoln’s proclamation transformed the American civil war. It was now a crusade. The objective was to rid the United States of an evil that, since 1777, had made a mockery of Jefferson’s words that all men are created equal.

If Abraham Lincoln the politician was satisfied with the steps taken to free the slaves, Abraham Lincoln the American commander in chief was not satisfied with the progress of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln wanted McClellan to pursue Lee aggressively. But that was not the general’s modus operandi. Before campaigning again, he wanted more troops and more time. Finally, at the president’s direct urging, he marched his army south in search of Lee and the Southern army. But, as usual, he did so at a deliberate pace. Speed was not an attribute of McClellan’s leadership.

By late June, Lincoln had had enough. He wanted a commander eager for combat, willing to fight. McClellan, he concluded, was not that man. So he sacked George B. McClellan. In his place, the president appointed Ambrose E. Burnside, one of the Army of the Potomac’s senior commanders.

Burnside had several strengths, but high command was not one of them. He himself thought he was unequal to the task, a view shared by many in the army. Their judgment was vindicated when Burnside bungled the battle with Lee’s army at Fredericksburg. In that debacle, for that’s what it was, the Army of the Potomac suffered approximately twelve thousand killed or wounded and gained no advantage either tactical or strategic. Confederate casualties on December 13, 1862, were slightly more than fifty-two hundred.

Nothing Burnside did after the battle restored Lincoln’s confidence. So, to the surprise of no one, Ambrose Burnside was dismissed. The Union army’s new commander was Major General Joseph Hooker. Like Burnside, he had been one of the army’s corps commanders, though, unlike Burnside, he had done well at Antietam. Ambitious and aggressive, Joe Hooker intended to give his Confederate counterpart a solid thrashing. But Lee on a bad day was a better general than Hooker on a good day, a point proven at the Battle of Chancellorsville. There, not far from Fredericksburg, Robert E. Lee outmaneuvered a Union army twice the size of his own. For the South, it was a dramatic victory, though costly, for among the dead was Stonewall Jackson, brought down by friendly fire. For the North, it was a humiliating defeat. Once again, the mighty Army of the Potomac had failed, or at least its commander had.