An Inoffensive Rearmament (10 page)

The other key individuals of the initial staff were assigned to the group by the Far East G-1 and included Colonel Charles E. Knowlton, Adjutant General, who became our G-1; Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Weetman, our G-4; and Lieutenant Colonel Paul A. Freyereisen, the comptroller. These were the men who initiated the rearmament of the nation. Other officers and noncommissioned officers were added to the staff as they became available.

In addition to selecting the key members of our staff, our major task was to find a suitable office space for the national headquarters of the new force and for the American staff that would be required as advisers. After considering several possible locations in Tōkyō, G-1 GHQ resolved our worries by making available for our use the buildings of the former Japanese Tōkyō Maritime Training School.
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The U.S. 7th Cavalry Regiment, part of the 1st Cavalry Division, moved into these facilities after the surrender and had since then enjoyed a most desirable location and home away from home. Now they were moving. When Major General Shepard and I visited the installation on July 15, the troops were loading
into trucks and jeeps, preparing to embark for Korea. They were tired, unhappy-looking soldiers, loaded with packs and equipment, bidding good-bye to their friends and families. It was difficult to realize at that time that these “Tōkyō Commandos” of the 1st Infantry Division were to become heroes of Korea.

On July 21, we took over the barracks vacated by the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and Sergeant Ratcliff announced that the Civil Affairs Section Annex (CASA), the cover name for our Advisory Group, was operational.

Meanwhile, on July 18, a joint American-Japanese conference was held in Tōkyō to determine several basic operational policies. The conference was attended by Mr. Katsuo Okazaki, cabinet secretary of the Japanese government who was later to become the first foreign minister of an independent, democratic Japan; Mr. Takeo Ōhashi, the attorney general of Japan; Major General Shepard; and Colonel Howard E. Pulliam, chief of the Public Safety Division, SCAP. The conference attendees discussed and reached working agreements regarding the administrative and operational control of the force, recruiting responsibilities of the various agencies involved, and arrangements for financing the NPR. Although General MacArthur had directed the prime minister to establish the NPR, no action could be taken until the Japanese government promulgated a national ordinance. Until such an ordinance was issued, there could be no legal basis for the organization. We, of course, were eager to get moving, and both General Shepard and Colonel Pulliam pressed for an immediate governmental program. Mr. Okazaki, however, objected strenuously, pointing out that the Diet was in session and that even though the prime minister's party would support the government, the Socialists in the Diet were strong enough to raise a violent rumpus. Accordingly, he urged that the ordinance be delayed until after August 3, the date on which the Diet planned to adjourn. Though our forces were hard-pressed in Korea, and Japan remained unprotected against communist attack and subversion, Prime Minister Yoshida refused to be rushed. He resisted all American urgings until the Diet adjourned. Finally, on August 10, 1950, with the Diet adjourned, Yoshida's cabinet promulgated Cabinet Order No. 260, establishing the National Police Reserve.

The cabinet order, when issued, was a masterpiece of evasion and chicanery. No one could begin to suspect that the innocent words of Article I were intended to initiate the rearmament of Japan. This article states, “The purpose of this Cabinet Order is to establish the National Police Reserve and to provide for the
organization thereof . . . for the purpose of supplementing the strength of the National Rural Police and Local Autonomous Police Force to the extent necessary to maintain peace and order within the country and to guarantee the public welfare.”

Given the conditions as they were in the summer of 1950, one can excuse the cabinet order as the only method the Japanese government had to comply with a SCAP directive. Japan was, after all, still an occupied country; sovereignty rested in the supreme commander for the Allied powers. Until Japan could secure a peace treaty, it could be argued that the authority of the occupying powers superseded the constitution of Japan, but that argument is sophistry.

Traditionally the constitution of a nation is a sacred document. Where it may be expedient to sidestep unpopular laws, the constitution is self-correcting through the process of amendments. Accordingly, the rearmament of Japan, undertaken as it was in the face of constitutional prohibitions, raises some awkward legal questions and stirs fundamental queries.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONSTITUTION BANS WAR

Why did Japan adopt a constitution banning war, military forces, and war potential? And faced with such a constitution, why did those in power not amend the constitution to permit legal rearmament of the nation? The answers to these questions are rooted in history.

Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which was ratified in 1946 and went into effect in 1947, renounces war, bans war potential, and prohibits the maintenance of land, sea, and air forces. Its purpose could not have been clearer if it had been one of the Ten Commandments. But because its provisions have created formidable obstacles to rearmament and have raised difficulties for U.S.-Japan security arrangements, the article has been a source of continual embarrassment to American policy makers and Japanese government leaders.

In later years, both governments tried to disavow responsibility for the disarmament clause. On the American side, documents were released to support the argument that no one in the United States really intended that Japan should be permanently disarmed. Successive conservative governments in Japan, on the other hand, maintained that the no-war, no-arms clause did not mean at all what it said, and in any case a nation has an inherent right to self-defense. But, as we shall see, if the constitution does not mean what Article 9 says, then its framers were careless or they went to a lot of trouble to create stumbling blocks in other unrelated articles of the constitution to make it difficult to maintain viable military forces under its provisions.

Those who argue that it is a mystery how the provisions of Article 9 got into the constitution cite two American documents issued within a few months of the surrender of Japan. In the first of these, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, on October 17, 1945, in secret instructions to Mr. George C. Atcheson Jr.,
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General MacArthur's political adviser, directed in part that the future Japanese constitution may or may not provide for an emperor, but if the emperor was retained, the constitution should include a safeguard that “any ministers for armed forces which may be permitted in the future should be civilians and all special privileges of direct access to the throne by the military shall be eliminated.”

The second of these two documents, a subsequent fourteen-page policy paper titled “Reform of the Japanese Governmental System,” adopted on January 7, 1946, by the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee (SWNCC),
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contained views similar to the instructions Secretary Byrnes sent to Atcheson. The SWNCC policy paper was sent to General MacArthur for his information. It provided the following:

Although “The Ultimate Reform of the Government of Japan” is to be determined by the “freely expressed will of the Japanese people,” the Allies . . . as a part of their overall program for the demilitarization of Japan, are fully empowered to insist that Japanese basic law be so altered as to provide that in practice the government is responsible to the people, and that the civil is supreme over the military branch of the government.

SWNCC further elaborated:

Although the authority and influence of the military in Japan's governmental structure will presumably disappear with the abolition of the Japanese Armed Forces, formal action permanently subordinating the Military Services to the Civil Government by requiring that the Minister of State of the members of the Cabinet must, in all cases, be civilians would be advisable.

From the above two cited documents, it would appear that neither Secretary Byrnes nor the SWNCC contemplated any need for a disarmament provision in
the Japanese constitution. If this was the intention of the U.S. government, then why was the controversial provision inserted in the constitution? The answer is that there were at the same time other directives and other forces at play in the United States and Japan.

On August 29, 1945, the U.S. government issued its Initial Postsurrender Policy for Japan. In this document, the supreme commander for the Allied powers was given clear and specific guidance on the basic program for the occupation and subsequent rehabilitation of the country. The policy directive in part declared,

Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic and social life. Institutions expressing the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed. Japan is not to have any Army, Navy, Air Force, Secret Police organization or any Civil Aviation.

The instructions were specific and clear and formed the basis for an unrelenting program designed to uproot every vestige of militarism in Japan. All regular career officers of the Imperial Army and Navy were purged. The highest military policy makers were executed as war criminals, and most significant, all propaganda agencies of the occupation forces and the Japanese government were concentrated on an inspired peace campaign within the country. The national slogan became “peace based on justice and order.”

In October 1945, General MacArthur directed Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, an uncle of the emperor who served as prime minister immediately following the surrender, to revise the constitution of the nation in line with occupation forces' policy announcements. Prince Higashikuni selected Prince Fumimaro Konoe, a former prime minister, to take the lead in democratizing the constitution. Prince Konoe and his advisers held several conferences with Mr. Atcheson and other State Department officials in Japan. Before Konoe could reduce his views to writing, though, the Higashikuni government fell and General MacArthur directed Mr. Atcheson to cease negotiations with Konoe. The Konoe recommendations, which were reported to the throne, contemplated eventual rearmament and subordination of the military to the civil elements of the government. SCAP announced that it was not sponsoring Prince Konoe's recommendations and his proposals had no impact on the constitution.

About the middle of October 1945, after Baron Kijurō Shidehara became prime minister, General MacArthur again issued instructions to the Japanese government to reform the constitution. Baron Shidehara promptly appointed state minister Jōji Matsumoto to head a group known as the Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee to determine whether or not the constitution needed to be revised and if so to what extent.
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After several months' delay, during which time it became evident that the Japanese were making little progress on their new constitution, General MacArthur called Prime Minister Shidehara into a conference on January 21, 1946. The men talked privately for two hours. General MacArthur, in the following account of the meeting reported in the May 8, 1951, edition of
U.S. News and World Report
, endeavors to show how the idea of Article 9 was born at this conference:

The Japanese people, more than any other people in the world, understand what an atomic warfare means. It wasn't academic with them. They counted their dead and buried them. They, of their own volition, wrote into their Constitution a provision outlawing war. When their Prime Minister came to me, Mr. Shidehara, and said, “I have long contemplated and believed,” and he was a very wise man—he died recently—“long contemplated and believed that the only solution to this problem is to do away with war.” He said, “with great reluctance I advance the subject to you, as a military man, because I am convinced that you would not accept it, but,” he said, “I would like to endeavor in the constitution we are drawing up, to put in such a provision.” And I couldn't help getting up and shaking hands with the old man, and telling him that I thought it was one of the most constructive steps that could possibly have been taken. I told him that it was quite possible that the world would mock him—this is a debunking age, as you would know—that they would not accept it. That it would take great moral stamina to go through with it, and in the end they might not be able to hold the line, but I encouraged him and they wrote that provision in. And if there was any one provision in that Constitution which appealed to the popular sentiment of the people of Japan, it was that provision.