Ancient Chinese Warfare (22 page)

Significant differences in burial practices and ceramics can also be discerned at the two sites, even though ceramics were already being de-emphasized with a shift in focus to bronze objects. A second definitive cultural aspect, the use of symbols or early writing, also advanced, if
only in terms of the number of symbols appearing on the artifacts. However, despite claims of essential continuity the numbers remain minuscule, hardly the language of the oracle bones identified with Anyang.

The palace quarters similarly show distinctive Hsia and Shang placements. The essentially self-fortified compound at Erh-li-t’ou, which extends some 100 meters on a side, contains a highly systematized central hall with a surrounding portico built in the third period of fluorescence that faces south and, apart from being slightly offset toward the east, is fundamentally centered and thus surrounded by industries and living quarters. However, the palace compound at Yen-shih, which apparently also faced south, was located in the southern portion of the fortified city, slightly offset to the west, between two other walled compounds that seem to have been reserved for defensive functions.
³⁹

Yen-shih thus resembles Cheng-chou and other well-known Shang cities and fortified towns in which the markets, living quarters, and industries are usually found “behind” or to the north of the inner compound or administrative center, within the enclosure created by the outer walls. The construction techniques employed at Yen-shih, including the incorporation of a drainage ditch with a very slight but sufficient pitch, the solidity of the walls and foundations, and the overall systematic organization of the city thus all manifest perceptible differences and incremental advances over Erh-li-t’ou practices.
⁴⁰

For more than two millennia traditional Chinese historians have dogmatically asserted that China’s three founding dynasties—the Hsia, Shang, and Chou—completely dominated the minor states and relatively insignificant, uncouth tribes about them. Even twentieth-century topical analyses of Shang events tended to view any deviation from this idealized depiction as an aberration or chimera, the consequence of flawed interpretation. Thus, for example, the Kuei-fang’s presumptuous challenge of Shang authority, incontrovertibly recorded in the
Yi Ching
, has been understood as exceptional not because of the infrequency of such affronts, but because the Kuei-fang obdurately shunned Shang wisdom, culture, and sagacity. However, the innumerable archaeological artifacts
and divinatory records recovered over the past century depict a remarkably different situation. Thus, most scholars now agree that the Shang’s political power and material achievements affected an extensive area in central China, allowing it to impose its rule and cultural norms to a significant degree, but not to the exclusion of stimulating the development of local cultures and indigenous styles.
⁴¹

Although Shang clan states within the core domain were basically homogenous, in more remote regions localized focal cultures such as those ensconced in the future state of Ch’u, the astounding enclave at San-shing-tui, and the remote southeast continued to evolve their own identities, habits, and material characteristics. Moreover, cultural and technological stimuli did not just radiate outward from the Shang, but also inward from the diverse tribes and distinctive peoples about them, prodding Shang developments.
⁴²
For example, the Shang not only adopted images and practices from the Tung Yi, but also absorbed bronze decorative elements from the earlier Liang-chu culture (3200-2100 BCE).
⁴³
Conversely, many peripheral peoples found the Shang’s opulence, magnificent bronzes, intricate jade carvings, silks, wine, and profusion of foods difficult to resist, especially when ostentatiously displayed in the royal court and offered as potential recompense in tributary relationships.

However idealized, the Shang might be envisioned in terms of concentric realms marked by varying degrees of dominance and influence. The personal lands of the royal house, close clan members, and a few privileged “others” were located in the core; somewhat farther out were the more distant clan members and subjects who had been integrated into the Shang hierarchy.
⁴⁴
However, the degree of control diminished as the distance increased, with the truly outer peoples or proto-states generally termed “
fang
”—a somewhat problematic appellation that may have been reserved for enemy states—vacillating between allegiance and relative independence, sometimes even aggressive opposition and outright rebellion.

Because Shang rulers certainly thought in these terms, the submissive were expected to furnish tribute (including the all-important divinatory media) and participate in military campaigns.
⁴⁵
The king controlled the disbursement of core lands
⁴⁶
and probably much of the terrain in the extended subjugated realm and also awarded a number of titles
such as
po
(duke) and
nan
(earl) to the privileged, no doubt in recognition of actual power rather than as an attempt to create a systematically enfeoffed hierarchy such as would be implemented by the Chou, even though there seems to have been a basic distinction of
nei-fu
and
waifu
, submissive clan members and external peoples, respectively.
⁴⁷

Shang power and culture were at one time believed to have been confined to the middle and lower Yellow River. However, although they never reached the upper Yangtze, extensive Shang sites have been discovered in most of Shandong, the middle and southern parts of Hebei, all of Henan, eastern and southwestern Shanxi, middle and southern Shaanxi, most of Hubei, the northern part of Hunan, northwest Jiangxi, and western Anhui. Based on archaeological evidence, especially bronzes, weapons, and the exploitation of natural resources, it can be concluded that the Shang completely dominated in some areas, but indigenous local cultures remained vigorous in others. This immediately raises questions about the nature of the Shang presence: Was it a purely military occupation, a colonization carried out by a collateral member of the Shang ruling household, or merely the result of recognizing a powerful local chieftain who had nominally submitted and thus retained some independence even though accepting the main trappings of Shang culture, voluntarily or otherwise?

Traditional accounts state that 10,000 states all paid homage to King T’ang immediately after the conquest, obviously an exaggeration even if “ten thousand” is understood simply as “myriad” or some vague but large number, as in most military contexts. Nevertheless, this depiction well characterizes the evolving dynamics as contiguous groups realized the need to at least nominally acknowledge the suddenly ascendant Shang. However, over the centuries the degree to which clan members, allies, subjugated peoples, and external groups were actually subservient would fluctuate with the vibrancy of Shang central power. The number of clan leaders and peripheral lords paying homage at the court probably varied between much of the known, or at least readily accessible, realm to just Shang members resident in the core domain and a few close allies.
⁴⁸
Even if, as claimed, relationships existed with some 500 peoples and states, only a fraction of them were at all noteworthy.

Recent archaeological overviews, coupled with hundreds of detailed reports, allow the vectors of Shang power to be sketchily plotted. Extensive
evidence indicates that the Shang conquest of the Hsia quickly impacted not just the Yen-shih to Cheng-chou region, but also a widespread area where lower Erh-li-kang manifestations suddenly displaced or overlaid Erh-li’t’ou (Hsia) cultural artifacts.
⁴⁹
Several fortified towns constructed about the same time as or slightly later than Yen-shih and Cheng-chou illustrate the Shang’s ability to project power and establish defensive strongpoints against incursion, as well as the thoroughness of early efforts to subjugate the recently conquered populace until they became somewhat assimilated, coincidentally attesting to the fictional nature of claims that the Shang dominated through Virtue alone.

However, as predicted by the
Tao Te Ching’s
explication of extremes being unstable, apparently because of internal strife the Shang experienced a generalized contraction of its power and influence after a century or so. Once the capital was finally shifted to Anyang, Wu Ting managed to initiate a vibrant resurgence whose promise was subsequently subverted by the pleasure-oriented final rulers. Nevertheless, even under their reputedly debauched leadership, right through its waning days the Shang continued to vigorously pursue external campaigns into the east and southeast.

During the initial phase of their rule from Yen-shih and Cheng-chou the Shang aggressively expanded north to Chi-pei, south to P’anlung-ch’eng, along the eastern bank of the Han River, down into the lower Han River and T’ung-t’ing Lake areas, and even into parts of Shandong and Anhui.
⁵⁰
In the west, Shang forces penetrated to the farthest parts of Kuan-chung and up to Ch’i-shan (Mt. Ch’i) and Chou-yüan, establishing a presence in the western part of Shanxi, Shaanxi’s northern plains, along the northern Wei River, and eventually Hanchung, though their influence rapidly diminished west of a demarcation line that runs down along the lower reaches of the Ching River in Yaohsien.
⁵¹
In addition to quickly occupying former Hsia fortresses and enclaves in the west, including Tung-hsia-feng, Shang forces established bastions such as Yüan-ch’ü and a number of smaller citadels to control the perimeter, resist incursions, and provide staging points for military expeditions. As in the east, members of powerful clans also seem to have been deputed to occupy the hinterlands in Shaanxi but were supplemented by local lords.
⁵²

Several sites within Kuan-chung where settlements rapidly multiplied in the quest to exploit mineral resources represent the westernmost extent of Shang culture. However, despite an initially strong presence that saw mining expanded and foundries established at the outset, this formerly Lungshan/Hsia (Erh-li-t’ou) cultural area retained many indigenous traits
⁵³
and managed to reassert its independence when the Shang contracted and turned eastward late in the middle period with the shift to Anyang.
⁵⁴
Among the more interesting representatives are Lao-niu-p’o and Chin-hsi, the former located in the fertile Kuan-chung plains area near Hsi-an (Xian). Typical Shang manifestations found at this highly militarized site capable of controlling access in several directions include the palace, graves, and a horse and chariot burial.
⁵⁵
The early Shang Chin-hsi site is located in the southern quarter of Chin-hsi, an area where the T’u-fang would become active. Being another military bastion erected in former Hsia territory, the tamped earth walls were constructed with techniques identical to those employed at Cheng-chou, and all the recovered artifacts are similar to those associated with the Shang capital.
⁵⁶

Sometimes suggested as having been a secondary capital, the bastion at Yüan-ch’ü was probably the most formidable fortified city constructed by the Shang out in the western region. Located roughly one hundred miles west of Cheng-chou along the course of the Yellow River in Shanxi, the fortifications fully exploited the terrain’s strategic advantages.
⁵⁷
Erected on a semiplateau that projects out from a western ridge of hills and towers some fifty to sixty meters above the surrounding countryside, it relied for its initial defense on steep cliffs that drop away on the north, south, and east. Although an assault might still be attempted from the west, it was protected from the north around to the south by encircling rivers. (The minor Po-ch’ing River crosses to the north as it descends to the southeast, until it merges with the Yellow River flowing eastward across the south.) In addition, the Yen River, located slightly to the northeast, flows from north to south, merging with the Yellow just to the east of the Po-ch’ing.

The presence of massive walls well integrated into a comprehensive defensive system defines Yüan-ch’ü as a bastion rather than simple administrative center. Further evidence for the site’s definitive military character may be seen in the disorganized nature of the burials, the
presence of dismembered victims in more than 50 percent of the graves, and a few corpses that still have arrowheads embedded in their limbs.
⁵⁸
Located in the northeast corner of the plateau so as to more easily command the plains, the compound’s walls extend 338 meters on the north, 395 in the west, 336 down the east, and about 400 across the south, creating a slightly distorted rectangle that enclosed 130,000 square meters. None of the remnant walls exceed 2 meters in height even with their excavated bases included, but they range in width from 6 to 15 meters and probably once reached at least 7 or 8 meters in height.

Lacking the deterrence of cliffs in the west, a partial double-wall system—the first known construction of this type in China—was employed on the western and southern sides to thwart attacks emanating from the hills. The northern portion of the western wall diverged to comprise a screening rampart for an eight-meter-wide interior gate opening that was thus well insulated from direct assault. Although this outer wall was considerably thinner, it created a passageway some seven to ten meters wide that not only allowed for protected entrance and egress, but also provided a staging area for troops. Remnants of a double-wall system and vestiges of a similarly shielded gate show it was replicated on the south side as well. A smaller gate was located at the northeastern corner and another presumably on the eastern side, though the latter is no longer visible.

As a further reinforcement and thus clear evidence that threats were expected to emerge from the west, a formidable 446-meter-long ditch roughly 8 to 9 meters wide paralleled the entire length of the western wall about 6 to 8 meters from the footing. Although it extended right down to the plateau’s southern edge, the lack of water resources in this elevated area would have precluded its use as a moat, but the steep edges and impressive depth would have been sufficient to impede aggressors.