Ancient Chinese Warfare (18 page)

According to variants of this theory, whether through the dramatic shifts of the capital summarized in the literary records or simply through gradual emigration, the early Shang embarked on a sort of northwestern progression from an initial site in Shandong into middle Hebei, proceeded as far as Yi-shui, then moved to the western part of Hebei and finally back to the western part of Shandong.
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Their final assault on the Hsia would therefore have originated in the east just as literary accounts that refer to them attacking a capital in the west demand, but required King T’ang to first send troops around to the south and ultimately strike from the west in order to actualize Chieh’s prophetic dream.

In contrast, theories of northern origin stress that several of the numerous groups that emerged over the ages among the peoples identified with the north and the northern complex developed sufficient power to aggressively challenge sedentary China’s rulers.
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Whether the Shang are seen as originating in the Po-hai area, around Yu-yen, or in Tungpei, possibly out of Hungshan or Lungshan cultures, this thesis ultimately assumes a downward movement along the eastern side of the T’ai-hang Mountains to the site from which they mounted their final assault. If accurate, it is an explanation that entails considerable impact because the environmental stimuli and their allies in Hebei, a strategically advantageous area, would have differed considerably. Moreover, in envisioning
the Shang’s final preconquest capital being in the east, the northern origin theory can equally accommodate any reconstructed conquest sequence that entails first neutralizing the smaller coalition states arrayed in an arc running from east to south.

The third view revitalizes an ancient theory by asserting that the Shang arose in the west, one expression even claiming that T’ang’s final, prestrike capital of Po is the recently discovered fortress at Yüan-ch’ü in Shanxi.
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Although intriguing, this theory suffers from two glaring defects: the radiocarbon dates do not cohere with the probable conquest period, and several of the minor states that were systematically conquered prior to assaulting the Hsia itself would have to be relocated in a western-to-southern arc around the Hsia capital. However, this deficiency is rectified if, as proposed, the Shang emigrated eastward into the Shandong area before ultimately descending along the eastern side of the T’ai-hang Mountains.

A variant of the theory that assumes the proto-Shang peoples primarily populated a natural corridor delimited by the T’ai-hang’s foothills to the west and the old course of the Yellow River to the east, both of which would have constituted significant impediments for aggressors, suggests that global cooling precipitated their movement southward.
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Originally a comparatively wet area populated by numerous ponds, lakes, marshes, and streams that had formed over the previous two millennia, the terrain in this 120-kilometer-wide swath apparently suffered considerable drying, loss of small wildlife, and changes in forest composition commencing about 2000 BCE after the temperature had dropped about 3 degrees C and rainfall amounts had substantially declined over the previous 500 years.
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Areas farther to the north were more drastically affected, the reduction in rainfall making agriculture infeasible outside of the line along which the Great Wall would eventually be constructed. Confronted by gradually deteriorating conditions, migrating to more viable terrain must have been an obvious option. Even though the Shang were thus motivated by enhanced prospects for survival rather than any grandiose design for conquest, frequent clashes with well-entrenched indigenous groups must have been inescapable. Ironically, postconquest, a slight warming trend prevailed virtually throughout the Shang era.

Although eastern China was an area much in flux as clans with various cultural affiliations expanded, contracted, intermixed, and moved about, and the eastern thesis currently predominates, the issue not only remains unresolved but is essentially bereft of the requisite evidence for realistic assessment. The military implications of the Shang’s origin therefore continue to be unframed and unexplained, as does whether these reputed capital movements were simply seminomadic shifts of focal locale; expressions of a will to power; compelled by environmental degradation or internal strife; or undertaken to expand their basic domain, consolidate control, and project power. Numerous articles have attributed them to every possible cause, including a strategic determination to move the population center away from looming threats and, contradictorily, deliberately positioning the capital closer to contiguous enemies to blunt and contain them. If the Shang were stimulated by population pressures, each displacement may have cumulatively expanded their territory, the excess populace allowing them to extend their control over additional, rather than alternative, areas.

Some historians have argued that all the predynastic shifts were made en masse, no residual forces being left behind, but others assert that a significant portion of the population remained to retain control over the area, implying that it continued to be secured. However, archaeological evidence indicates that several of the later capitals were actually abandoned despite being in threat-free areas. Moreover, despite numerous archaeological reports and extensive speculation on Erh-li-t’ou, Yen-shih, Cheng-chou, Huan-pei, Hsiao-shuang-ch’iao, and Anyang, the rationale for the commonly recognized postconquest movements of the combined administrative and ritual capital also remains equally unknown, together with which locations correspond to the traditionally enumerated names.

Due to lacking the clarity of the Kanmu Emperor’s movement of the capital from Nara to Kyoto to avoid Buddhist monastic power in 794 CE or Peter the Great’s decision to construct a new political and cultural center in the marshes of St. Petersburg, in the context of the Shang’s rising power these shifts probably reflect a transition from loosely organized settlements to cohesive states. Accordingly, even though primarily intended to reorient or increase the Shang’s domain of influence,
they must have also played a role in elevating the leader’s status and solidifying the power of the ruling clan.

According to popular recounting, King T’ang established the Shang as China’s preeminent power fourteen generations and eight shifts of their capital after their putative founding. Despite the momentousness of their conquest, the
Shih Chi
characterized the engagement in a single sentence, the Grand Historian opting not to offer any explanatory passages despite the materials presumably at hand. Fortunately the
Shang Shu
,
Mencius
, and various other Warring States works, all composed at least twelve to fifteen centuries after the Hsia’s overthrow, contain extensive, albeit scattered and fragmentary, material on their clash. However imaginative or inaccurate they may appear today, because there was little reason to doubt their veracity in antiquity, the traditional accounts derived from them and the
Shih Chi
were fervently embraced from the Han onward. As political and military thinkers integrated them into their theoretical constructs, they therefore came to affect court discussions, the image of Virtue, and the very conceptions of revolution and warfare.

For virtually everyone the essential facts were few but dramatic. When the Hsia became oppressive and debauched, the Shang cultivated its own Virtue, developed key alliances, and reluctantly assumed leadership of the disaffected lords before engaging in the decisive confrontation in which they easily vanquished King Chieh, the tyrannical last ruler. The
Shang Shu
, subsequently deemed one of the original five Confucian classics, came to provide the fundamental impetus for interpreting King T’ang’s assault not just as a righteous action mounted on behalf of all the people, but also as a punitive effort undertaken with Heaven’s sanction, even its mandate.

The chief document cited in justification is “T’ang’s Oath,” essentially a proclamation of purpose issued by King T’ang just before the campaign to elicit (or otherwise coerce) the requisite support:
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Although the “T’ang Shih” was probably composed no earlier than the Western Chou, prompted by traditional belief that King T’ang gave a stirring invocation before the campaign, it has assumed immense importance throughout imperial Chinese history.
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From the contents, vestigial or not, it appears that T’ang’s own people not only lacked enthusiasm for undertaking the campaign but also even murmured against it, implying that even “virtuous” rulers had to motivate the people before they would disrupt their lives and engage in military activities.
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Perhaps because other
Shang Shu
authors in the fourth century CE felt it necessary to buttress the king’s claim—and similarly that of King Wu of the Chou, equally guilty of regicide unless Heaven had sanctioned his revolt—of having acted righteously, another section of the
Shang Shu
depicts King T’ang as personally questioning the validity of his actions by ruefully saying, “I am afraid that in future generations, I will fill everyone’s mouth.”
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This device allows one of his righteous ministers, Chung Hui, to then justify his actions as both virtuous and necessary:
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King T’ang again condemns the Hsia in another late section, entitled “T’ang Kao,” which purportedly preserves his pronouncements upon returning to the capital. However, the lines most frequently cited in subsequent centuries, whether to simply recount the glorious Shang conquest or justify some divergent course of action, are again attributed to Chung Hui:
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In the absence of oracle bone or other contemporary records, the ancient spin masters simply fleshed out the rumors and legends transmitted from antiquity. The tale then assumed a life of its own as a true portrait of events, with the exemplary King T’ang reluctantly assuming the awesome yet baleful responsibility of executing Heaven’s will and restoring the people’s welfare. Thus the
Shang Shu
portrays King T’ang as a paragon of virtue: he is devoted to his task, oblivious to licentious distractions, effective in action, and focused in deed. Unfortunately, the
Shang proved to be a brutal theocratic state throughout its reign, long before perversity and licentiousness purportedly doomed it to extinction.

By drawing on numerous fragmentary records, traditionally oriented scholars have pieced together a fairly comprehensive picture of the conquest that merits consideration in itself, as well as a potential composite from which the historical outlines might be gleaned.
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In summary, the Shang began to flourish after removing to a strategically advantageous, semiremote position somewhat north and east of the Hsia capital, where they would be reasonably free from immediate interference though still nominally submissive;
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established their own network of allies and client states, presumably through Virtue, but more likely by emphasizing their evolving power while championing the idea of benign and beneficent government (which certainly would have translated into policies toward the elite and chiefs more than the common people, whose interests would be critical only in a military crisis); coercively expanded their power base through local conquests, some (according to the
Shang Shu
) ironically undertaken on behalf of the Hsia (such as against the Yu Yi), just as the Chou would centuries later on behalf of the Shang; maintained close relationships with the Tung Yi to gain their support and preclude their enmity; probed the strength of the Hsia and fidelity of its subject states; held a preliminary assembly of its own allies to determine the intensity of their commitment; defeated and otherwise neutralized the Hsia’s allies;
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gathered general intelligence and exploited the ruler’s paranoia by attacking the capital from an auspicious direction, forcing his flight; and finally defeated the K’un-wu, the Hsia, and even the San-tsung, where Chieh had sought refuge. Throughout these efforts King T’ang reputedly employed insightful advisors such as Yi Yin, a figure to whom sacrifices were still being offered during the dynasty’s last centuries at Anyang, attesting to his perceived importance.
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