Ancient Chinese Warfare (62 page)

Even when the horses were protected with armor and their health otherwise ensured, the chariot’s many components, being fabricated from bronze, leather, and wood with dissimilar material characteristics, frequently failed in both routine use and battle. No literary evidence that artisans and engineers accompanied field forces appears until the Warring States period, yet these and other specialists must have assumed a critical role early on, because expeditionary campaigns subjected the chariots to prolonged use under harsh conditions even before their failure rates soared in battle.
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Low-ranking personnel had to be assigned to ongoing maintenance tasks, whereas skilled craftsmen such as metalsmiths, carpenters, joiners, tanners, wheelwrights, and others were required to undertake the more complicated repairs stemming from component fatigue and catastrophic breakage.
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The durability of moving parts, particularly the ability of the wheels to revolve on the axle without binding due to friction, adhesion, grooving, and other forms of damage, was also questionable. Before the invention of ball bearings the areas of contact within the wheel hub at the bottom, where it sustained the axle’s weight and where the revolving hub constantly pressed against the cap and interior mounting, must all have been large. Bronze fittings reinforced many other contact points, and lubricants were employed in the hub or nave, but none eliminated the wood-towood contact that produced the greatest destructive wear. Furthermore, neither bronze nor brass, probably the best material for moving fittings but unavailable at any time during the chariot’s fluorescence, was yet employed inside the nave. Therefore the slightest deviation from the requisite component profiles could quickly doom a Shang chariot.

Axles and spokes were also known to snap, wheels sometimes came off in the heat of combat, glue joints failed, speed and bumpy conditions caused structural breaks, and leather bindings tore. In one case a charioteer boasted that his surpassing skill alone had allowed him to keep the traces intact during the day’s combat, a claim that was subsequently supported when they snapped upon simply driving over a piece of wood.
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In another Spring and Autumn incident, a chariot threw its axle mount, disabling it.
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Battlefield encounters resulted in various degrees of irrecoverable damage and destruction. Collisions, whether accidental or the result of
deliberate action, inflicted a heavy toll. Crushing blows sometimes sundered major chariot components, attesting to their ferocity as well as to the fragility of wooden structural members,
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and a crossbar reportedly broke when a soldier was hurled against it during the Battle of Yen-ling.
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At the end of the Spring and Autumn period Sun-tzu estimated that six-tenths of a state’s resources would be consumed in a normal expeditionary campaign
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and therefore advised seizing and incorporating opposing chariots whenever possible, thereby “conquering the enemy and growing stronger.”
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Minor variations in the terrain, particularly sharp depressions, pits, and holes, not only caused difficulty, but frequently halted or even disabled chariots. Heavy vegetation and the boundaries between cultivated fields would be expected to impede progress—after vanquishing Ch’i at the Battle of An, Chin insisted that Ch’i should henceforth orient the boundaries between their fields to run from east to west, presumably to facilitate operations as they invaded from the west
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—but even shrubs, tree roots, and fallen limbs could prove surprisingly problematic. In one Spring and Autumn incident a chariot hit the root of a cassia tree and overturned while the occupants were charging forward and shooting their arrows, resulting in the charioteer being slain.
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During the Battle of An in 589 BCE, when the Chin commander Hsi K’o complained that he had been badly wounded but was carrying on, his spearman noted that he had frequently gotten down and pushed the chariot on difficult terrain.
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An incident in which a chariot got caught in some sort of depression a few years earlier preserves evidence of the taunts and repartee hurled between opposing fighters:
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Efforts were therefore sometimes made to prepare the battlefield and smooth the area of an expected clash by at least filling in the largest holes. Water, however, posed an additional problem, and though a sprinkle might improve dusty fields and roadways, significant rainfall would prove inimical:
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This was a lesson that Sisera and his 900 iron chariots painfully learned in a famous historical battle when a downpour muddied the terrain, hampering their mobility and making them vulnerable to Israelite infantry attacks under Barak.
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Being confronted by more permanent bodies of water, including wetlands that might initially seem conducive to mobile operations, required abandoning chariot warfare altogether:

Sun Pin similarly advised “making the infantry numerous and the chariots few” in aquatic warfare,
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while the
Liu-t’ao
warned against undertaking operations on wet terrain (in passages already cited). Although it was never explicitly discussed and generally not insurmountable, compelling reluctant horses to cross rivers and streams was another campaign problem frequently encountered.
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This fear of wetlands, no doubt derived from extensive experience with unfathomably deep and extensive quagmires, is historically attested by a few Spring and Autumn incidents, including one that occurred at the famous Battle of Yen-ling (575 BCE) between Chin and Ch’u.
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Because they had initially deployed with a mire or swampy area in front of them, Chin divided their chariots into two groups intended to maneuver around the outer edges. Somehow the commander’s chariot failed to clear the muck and sank in, forcing the warrior on the right to dismount and raise it up sufficiently to lurch forward. Fortunately, Chinese chariots were light enough that one man alone could lift them.

As a result of painful experience it was quickly realized that except on the grassy steppe, open plains, well-developed roads, or other easily traversed ground—what the
Ar t of War
terms “accessible terrain”—chariots would not convey any operational advantage. Furthermore, efforts to surmount the difficulties caused by the ground could only add to the battlefield’s inherent chaos, making awareness of inimical terrain paramount. Thus, within the pronounced thrust initiated during the Spring and Autumn to categorize different configurations of terrain and develop tactical measures for exploiting them, outlining the parameters for chariot operations seems to have been focal.
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The first known discussion of maps, preserved in the
Kuan-tzu
, states: “Now the army’s commander-in-chief must first investigate the maps and thoroughly know the tortuously winding constricted areas, rivers that will overflow chariots (attempting to ford), famous mountains, traversable valleys, key rivers, and where the plains are marked by mounds and hillocks, what areas are heavily vegetated by reeds, grass, and water rushes, whether the road is distant or near, the size of interior and exterior walls, famous and decrepit towns, and difficult and fertile terrain.”
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It was so widely recognized that chariots get entangled and obstructed that in recommending a commander Kuan Chung reportedly said, “In
keeping the chariots from being bound up in their tracks or the troops from turning about on their heels [out of fear], beating the drum so that the warriors of the Three Armies regard death like returning home, I am unequal to Wang-tzu Ch’eng-fu. I request that you make him Minister of War [Ta Ssu-ma].”
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Chariots require extensive space to maneuver because of their fixed axles and the inability of the horses to move laterally when harnessed to the draught pole. Conversely, noting that chariots are hampered by constricted terrain, the military writings frequently suggested exploiting it whenever infantry forces found themselves confronted by chariot contingents:
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The climate in the south, especially in the increasingly semitropical areas, historically posed nearly insurmountable problems for horses, particularly those acclimated to steppe temperatures and humidity. In the imperial period northern invaders such as the Khitan and Jurchen would often find themselves compelled to retreat with the onset of spring or be decimated as their horses fell ill and died. Knowing of this vulnerability, when preparing to conquer the still-obstinate state of Ch’en south of the Yangtze River, the Sui tricked them into misdirecting their defensive resources and acquiring large numbers of horses that quickly weakened and perished.
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Not surprisingly, the extremely wet terrain in the southeastern states of Wu and Yüeh generally deterred Wu from adopting the chariot, despite the Duke of Shen’s advisory mission undertaken at Chin’s behest in 584 BCE. Perhaps somewhat successful in improving Wu’s military organization and training, he reportedly failed to convince the leaders
to adopt the chariot despite bringing thirty horses because of the problems posed by riverine warfare.
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Wu and their nearby nemesis Yüeh therefore stressed infantry and naval forces and developed weapons for close combat, particularly swords that became famous throughout the realm and still retain their sharpness and surface qualities when unearthed today.

At the same time the commonly expressed view that the south’s wetness completely precluded the chariot’s adoption is erroneous because Wu subsequently relied on them to invade Ch’i to the north and Ch’u to the southwest, adroitly ferrying them upriver wherever necessary when mounting the major thrust that carried them to Ch’u’s capital in 506 BCE. However, because heavily watered terrain would always convert chariots into a liability, their utilization had to be judiciously planned.

Requiring chariot and cavalry operations to “adhere to the road” not only constrained their freedom of movement but also made their routes predictable. Insofar as roads in the Shang and even early Chou were minimal, often just unimproved narrow trails that meandered along higher terrain, their speed of advance would have been severely curtailed. Only on the broad roadways that gradually developed in the later Western Chou and Spring and Autumn and on the flat, open plains and nearby steppe would the swiftness discussed in the theoretical manuals ever be attained, with somewhat reduced effectiveness inevitably being experienced whenever they crossed fields of millet or other dry crops.

Much in accord with the emphasis on identifying basic topographical features and developing appropriate tactics for them, the
Liu-t’ao
eventually delineated what might be termed ten inimical terrains—actually combinations of environmental factors and tactical situations—“upon which death is likely” for chariot forces. Despite being compiled from a millennium of experience, insofar as they are founded on the idea that “chariots value knowing the terrain’s configuration,” they provide insights into the operational problems that Shang forces certainly would have encountered:
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