Ardennes 1944: Hitler's Last Gamble (64 page)

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12. TUESDAY 19 DECEMBER

*
See map, The Destruction of the 106th Division,
p. 119
above.

*
In most accounts of the meeting, Patton apparently said the morning of 21 December, but in his own diary Patton puts 22 December. It is impossible to tell whether this was what he believed he said at the time, or whether he changed it because he recognized that Eisenhower was right.

*
Desobry encountered a number of paradoxes during his imprisonment, such as listening in a German hospital train near Münster to a recording of Bing Crosby singing ‘White Christmas’, while British bombers smashed the city. He was then held in a panzergrenadier training establishment in Hohne next to Belsen concentration camp, along with British paratroopers captured at Arnhem.

13. WEDNESDAY 20 DECEMBER

*
There are several accounts of Hodges’s collapse at this time. One comes in his aide’s diary three days later.
‘The General is now well located
in a private home. With a chance for rest, and with good food again provided, he is obviously feeling fitter and better able to cope with the constant pressure of this work and strain.’

*
Bayerlein claims that on 19 December, after the first attack failed, he had convinced Lüttwitz that the whole corps should be concentrated against Bastogne, because they could not afford to leave such a centre of road communications untaken in their rear. Lüttwitz is said to have referred the proposal upwards, but it was firmly rejected. Bayerlein heard from him that they
‘considered Bastogne child’s play’
.

18. CHRISTMAS DAY

*
SHAEF was hardly being duped by Montgomery. General Bedell Smith admitted later that the alarmist tone in cables back to Washington was a deliberate tactic.
‘You know, we exploited the Ardennes crisis for all it was worth’
to get resources and replacements which were otherwise going to the Pacific. ‘We were short of men, so we yelled loud. We asked for everything we could get.’

20. PREPARING THE ALLIED COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

*
It is worth noting that Generalmajor von Waldenburg of the 116th Panzer argued later that the Allied
‘counter-attack started too early’
and that this was what saved the German forces
‘from total annihilation’
.

*
Even Bradley’s 12th Army Group headquarters seemed to believe in a renewed attack northwards towards Liège with
‘from four to five panzer divisions’
, according to Hansen. Three days later Hansen made the unexpected remark:
‘Americans are very poor
on intelligence; we have to depend upon the British for almost everything we have.’

*
The role of Nazionalsozialistischen Führungsoffizier, or National Socialist leadership officer, was instituted on Hitler’s orders in imitation of the Soviet commissar, or political officer, to watch over the loyalty and determination of army officers.

*
Montgomery had in fact just sent his favourite corps commander home on enforced medical leave. He feared that his judgement had become impaired through exhaustion. Horrocks had suddenly advocated that they should let the Germans cross the Meuse then defeat them on the battlefield of Waterloo just south of Brussels.

22. COUNTER-ATTACK

*
This idea at 12th Army Group must have been based on speculation, since the first hint of withdrawal through Ultra intercepts did not come until late on 8 January when the 9th Panzer-Division revealed that it had pulled back to a line east of Rochefort and Marche, while the first indication of retreat around the Bastogne pocket came on 9 January.

*
General Patton, who unfortunately was drawn to writing verse, penned the following lines:

 
O little town of Houffalize
,
Yet in thy dark streets shineth
How still we see thee lie;
Not any Goddamned light;
Above thy steep and battered streets
The hopes and fears of all thy years
The aeroplanes sail by.
Were blown to hell last night.
 

*
‘We are aware of your views
on this question but again wish to emphasize that this offensive is an all-out effort in which Hitler will employ any weapon. It has always been appreciated by you that Germany might initiate gas warfare to obtain a decisive result. The battle having gone badly, Hitler may regard this as the moment. We should not overlook the chaos which would result among the civilian population in NW Europe on the possible employment of a gas warhead in V-1and V-2 [missiles] … Would you please re-examine the matter in light of this further information and inform us of your views urgently.’

23. FLATTENING THE BULGE

*
Hale recovered, but with a crooked oesophagus. The doctor gave him a medical chit excusing him from wearing a tie. Hale was later confronted by an obsessive General Patton demanding to know why he was improperly dressed. The sergeant was able to produce his authorization, which apparently left Patton speechless.

*
The call from SHAEF in this account was said to be from Bedell Smith, but his biographer is certain that it was Major General Whiteley.

24. CONCLUSIONS

*
The rancour lasted for the rest of his life. When Cornelius Ryan asked about Montgomery some years after Suez and long after the war, Eisenhower exploded.
‘He’s a psychopath
, don’t forget that. He is such an egocentric … He has never made a mistake in his life.’ Montgomery was trying ‘to make sure that the Americans, and me in particular, had no credit, had nothing to do with this war. I just stopped communicating with him.’

BOOK: Ardennes 1944: Hitler's Last Gamble
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