Armed Humanitarians (48 page)

The new doctrine of armed humanitarianism, and the reorganization of government around the tasks of nation building, creates more, not less, temptation to intervene in failed states. If we take at face value the assertion by Defense Secretary Gates—that the best approach is the “indirect” one of building the institutions of partner governments and their security forces—the question becomes this: How do we avoid costly, ultimately self-defeating commitments?

Over the past decade, and with little fanfare, we have managed do this kind of mission without a massive U.S. military presence. In the Philippines, for example, U.S. Special Operations forces have been running a low-key advisory mission since 2002. Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines has only around six hundred personnel, and they are limited to training missions and Civil Affairs projects. It's the traditional foreign internal defense approach: The military of the Philippines has to take the initiative, with behind-the-scenes support from U.S. advisors. It demonstrates that there are ways to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign without a large foreign force and in a way that is mindful of nationalist sensitivities. In Pakistan, we are waging a covert war using drones and a handful of advisors to take on al-Qaeda and its allies. The heavy presence of foreign troops and advisors might only destabilize the situation, which is something to be avoided in a country armed with nuclear weapons.

In El Salvador, veterans of the Vietnam conflict made a similarly wise effort to avoid a massive U.S. presence that would ultimately have undermined the self-reliance of the local government. The same has been true for Georgia, which has also been an important recipient of U.S. military assistance and training since 2002. U.S. military assistance to Georgia had its downside: It gave Georgia's government overconfidence about its military capabilities, its ability to take back the secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force, and the U.S. willingness to intervene on its behalf during its brief, ruinous war with Russia in 2008. But U.S. assistance also helped build functioning security institutions, reinforced the rule of law, and helped move Georgia out from the bottom of the transparency index. While Georgia suffered a serious defeat in 2008, it has better prospects in the longer term for becoming a functioning market economy and democracy than many of its neighbors.

Reorganizing government around the ambitious goals of “global counterinsurgency” or “stability operations” currently demands a massive, quasi-colonial bureaucracy, a large constabulary army, and long-term occupation of failed states. As President Obama weighed a troop increase in Afghanistan, an anonymous Pentagon official complained to
Slate
: “Counterinsurgency has become synonymous with nation building … We have to change that.”
4
How, exactly, can that be achieved? It would be ludicrous to believe that the United States can simply step away, avoid nation building altogether, and somehow free ourselves from foreign entanglements. The U.S. military maintains a global force that protects global shipping lanes, guards strategic airspace, and enables free trade. And in limited instances, it can provide that crucial margin of security that allows aid and development to flourish.

But the real mission of living and working with populations that are vulnerable to extremists requires a degree of cultural sophistication that we are not even close to attaining. After the Soviets launched Sputnik, the United States began a crash effort to fund engineering and science. If the main existential threat to the United States does come from militant extremism in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, or Somalia, then we need a decades-long investment in real social science research, language studies, and higher education, not cheap solutions delivered by contractors. Long term, continuing the kinds of nation-building projects we are involved in today without contractors would require a massive realignment of our foreign policy objectives, or a reinstatement of the draft.

The real locus of U.S. ingenuity is in places like Silicon Valley and New York, not Washington. Mobilizing capital to invest in developing countries is far superior to exporting aid workers with guns. Some of the most innovative thinkers in aid and development are now broadly skeptical of the ability of state institutions and multilateral organizations to foster effective development. As Ashraf Ghani, the former finance minister of Afghanistan, put it: “A dollar in private investment is equal to twenty dollars of aid.”
5
Rebuilding broken states is not purely a task for the military or for government consultants.

The American public has, in the end, been divorced from the reality of nation building. While boots were on the ground in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans were at the mall. When a small fraction of the population was engaged in the bloody business of repairing war-torn, failed states, the class of nation builders had become estranged from the American people, widening the divide between civilian and military. We have failed to have a national conversation about the real cost of this commitment, the limits of what nation building can and cannot achieve, and what place nation building plays within the larger national interest.

Acknowledgments

Anton Mueller, my editor at Bloomsbury, helped shape this book from its inception. I am immensely grateful for his enthusiasm, his guiding vision, and his belief in the importance of this subject. I am also indebted to Michelle Tessler, a wonderful literary agent and incisive reader.

This book grew out of a decade spent covering U.S. military operations around the globe. As I followed the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq, I saw the military taking on more and more nonmilitary tasks: building roads, digging wells, and repairing schools. Over time, it became clear that these were not unusual cases. Armed development work was the new norm, and I wanted to tell this story from the point of view of the practitioners: the people putting themselves in harm's way as part of this ambitious experiment.

It would have been impossible to tell this story without the active assistance of many men and women in uniform, as well as civilian employees of the military. The relationship between reporters and the Pentagon's public-affairs apparatus can sometimes be adversarial, but units in the field often showed extraordinary willingness to open up to me. This speaks to their democratic values and respect for an independent press.

At Fort Riley, Kansas, Army Sergeant First Class Ken McCooey helped arrange my stay at FOB Army Strong, and Army Lieutenant Colonel Eric Borgeson and the members of Team Mohican were kind enough to let me follow them through part of their training. At Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Stephen Nolan and Army Colonel Steve Boylan lined up a series of valuable interviews.

In 2002, Army Major Bryan Hilferty set an excellent precedent, encouraging an open-door policy for military reporters at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. Army Lieutenant Lory Stevens and Captain Scot Keith helped organize several Afghanistan embeds in the summer of 2009, and understood the focus of my reporting. Air Force Major David Faggard opened many doors as well. In 2004, Army Captain Jacob Larkowich and Lieutenant Steve McKeon of Alpha Company, 1–4 Infantry, part of the first U.S. contingent under the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, brought me along on a security mission outside of Kabul. And in 2008, Lieutenant Colonel Tony Henderson, commander of First Battalion, Sixth Marines, and Captain Charles O'Neill, commander of Bravo Company, First Battalion, Sixth Marine Regiment, hosted me in Helmand Province. Thanks are also due to Major Kelly Frushour, public affairs chief for the Twenty-fourth Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Colonel Peter Petronzio, commander of the Twenty-fourth Marine Expeditionary Unit.

In Washington, Navy Lieutenant Jennifer Cragg of the Pentagon's new media directorate played a key role in helping ensure that online reporters had fair access to important news stories. Jaime Wood and Army Lieutenant Colonel Holly Silkman showed great patience and persistence in helping arrange my visit to Timbuktu. Tom Cooney and Todd Calongne of the State Department organized several key interviews.

In Baghdad, Army Lieutenant Colonel Craig Simonsgaard and the members of his transition team brought me along on their missions in Sadr City. Major Michael Humphreys and Scott Flenner of the Army's Third Brigade Combat Team, Fourth Infantry Division, helped facilitate my stay at FOB War Eagle. Air Force Major Jason “Fitz” Kirkpatrick and Tarah Hollingsworth organized a unique 2007 visit to Iraq. Steve Bird helped arrange a 2005 visit to Baghdad. In Kabul, I enjoyed the support of Gillian Sandford, Wali Azizi, Wahidullah Amani, and many other friends at the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. David Trilling, Sanjar Qiam, Saira Shah, and Hugo MacPherson were great companions in 2004.

During my research, I also relied on Michael Bear Kleinman, Nancy Lindborg, and Roman Ponos for insights into the world of aid and development. I'm also indebted to Lynda Granfield, Dan Green, and Ramon Negron, who helped explain the mission of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, which helped support one of my trips to Afghanistan.

Many friends provided valuable comments and criticism on various chapters and drafts. Thanks go to Noah Shachtman, my friend and co-writer at Danger Room,
Wired
's national security blog: an immensely talented writer who helped refine an early version of the manuscript. Kris Alexander, Sally Cooper, Steven Lee Myers, Jonathan Hayes, Kathryn Schulz, and Askold Krushelnycky all provided me with key feedback. Tara McKelvey, Robert Wall, Richard Whittle, Greg Renoff, and Kathleen Kuehnast offered encouragement and advice during the writing process. Sean Allen and Nikolai Firtich were patient friends. Thanks also to the staff at the library of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where I conducted some of the background research.

My gratitude as well to Evan Hansen of
Wired
; Peter Felstead and Nick Brown of
Jane's Defence Weekly
and
International Defence Review
; Pavel Bykov of
Expert
; Llewellyn King of King Publishing; John Robinson of
Defense Daily
; June Thomas of
Slate
; and Chuck Holmes of Cox News.

My father, Brien Hodge, served in Vietnam as an Army advisor in the Mekong Delta region from September 1967 to September 1968. His experiences during his tour helped inform my reading of history. My mother, Marjorie Hodge, and my sisters, Miriam and Naomi, gave tremendous encouragement during my travels.

Finally, I am forever grateful to my wife, Sharon, whose support has been beyond measure. She has been a sounding board for every story idea, a capable editor of every draft, my closest friend and collaborator. Without her, I would not have had the courage to start. This book is dedicated to her.

Notes

Prologue

1
John Kruzel, “Colonel Describes Orderly Traffic at Haiti Airport,” American Forces Press Service, January 17, 2010.

2
Kelly Webster, “Lessons from a Military Humanitarian in Port-au-Prince, Haiti,” Small Wars Journal, March 28, 2010, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/401-webster.pdf.

3
Yochi Dreazen, “Military Finds an Unlikely Advisor in School-Building Humanitarian,”
Wall Street Journal
, December 26, 2008.

4
Lin Wells, “Tides Week One Summary by Lin Wells,” Star-Tides blog, http://star-tides.blogspot.com/2007/10/below-is-summary-of-first-week-of-tides.html.

5
Donna Miles, “Obama Cites Responsibility to ‘Get It Right' in Iraq, Afghanistan,” American Forces Press Service, February 28, 2009.

6
Robert Gates, National Defense University (Washington, D.C.), Speech, September 29, 2008, www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1279.

7
John Hillen, “Superpowers Don't Do Windows,”
Orbis
, Spring 1997, http://www.fpri.org/americavulnerable/03.SuperpowersDontDoWindows.Hillen.pdf.

8
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience,” report, February 2, 2009, www.sigir.mil/files/HardLessons/Hard_Lessons-Report.pdf.

9
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” April 30, 2010, www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Apr2010/SIGARapril_Lores.pdf.

10
Robert Gates, “Eisenhower Library (Defense Spending),” speech, May 8, 2010, www.defense.gov/speeches.aspx?speechID=1467.

11
Ken Dilanian, “Clinton: U.S. Will Try to Repair Broken Aid,”
USA Today
, April 1, 2009.

12
USAID, “Budget Justification FY 2001,” www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001.

13
Max Boot, “The Case for American Empire: The Most Realistic Response to Terrorism Is for America to Embrace Its Imperial Role,”
Weekly Standard
, October 12, 2001.

14
American Foreign Service Association, “AFSANET: Telling Our Story: October 17, 2007,” factsheet, www.afsa.org/101707presupdate.cfm.

15
See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “The United States: Development Assistance Committee Peer Review,” 2006, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/57/37885999.pdf.

16
Corine Hegland, “Pentagon, State Struggle to Define Nation-Building Roles,”
National Journal
, April 30, 2007.

17
An updated version of this document, dated September 16, 2009, is available at www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf.

18
August Cole, “Defense Firms Look to Fill Gaps as U.S. Policy Shifts,”
Wall Street Journal
, March 2, 2009.