28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.
30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.
The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. “He does not move recklessly,” says Chang Yü, “so that when he does move, he makes no mistakes.”
31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.
Li Ch’üan sums up as follows: “Given a knowledge of three things—the affairs of man, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth—victory will invariably crown your battles.”
That the four seasons have regularities is the principle of Heaven and Earth. . . . That three seasons are for coming to completion and achievement and one season [winter] is for punishment and killing is the Dao of Heaven and Earth.
Geoffrey MacCormack, “Mythology and the Origin of Law in Early Chinese Thought” (2001)
XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS
These can include elements of the six geographical features noted in Chapter X, as well as conditions of the army itself—that is, situations as opposed to grounds.
DG
The overwhelming lesson the PLA learned from its brushes with the Americans was the need for speed: “In the Liberation War (in China), we might take days to surround a Kuomintang division, then slowly close the circle around it. With the Americans, if we took more than a few hours, they would bring up reinforcements, aircraft, artillery.”
Yu Xiu, regimental deputy political commissar, on the storming of the 8th Cavalry’s positions (1950)
Wang Hsi . . . says: “There are nine military situations, good and bad.”
1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.
2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.
So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. “In their advance,” observes Tu Mu, “they will lack the valour of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find harbours of refuge.”
3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground.
Tu Mu remarks, “When your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home.”
4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground.
I must apologise for using [“contentious”] in a sense not known to the dictionary, i.e., “to be contended for.” . . . Ts’ao Kung says: “ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the strong,” such as “the neck of a pass,” instanced by Li Ch’üan. Thus, Thermopylae was [contentious ground], because the possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time. [Wu Tzu writes]: “For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass.”
When Lü Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-ch’ang, counselled him, saying, “Lü Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two positions.” Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.