Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (34 page)
In recent studies of
Rand
’s
philosophy
, little attention is paid to her reflections on
psychology
. Peikoff’s systematic presentation of
Objectivism
, for instance, is purely and self-consciously philosophical; he avoids, on principle, any discussion of the extensive implications for psychology of Rand’s
epistemology
and ethics (Peikoff 1990–91T, lecture 13).
Merrill
(1991, 179) indicates his own unwillingness to discuss these aspects of Rand’s thought because their “status” in Objectivist literature is somewhat uncertain. Such themes as “psycho-epistemology,” “the psychology of
self-esteem
,” and “
social metaphysics
” were a theoretical outgrowth of Rand’s interaction with her chief intellectual protégé, Nathaniel
Branden
, prior to their break in 1968. Since that time, many of these important issues have been left largely unexplored.
Merrill correctly notes that Rand never repudiated the pre-1968 writings of Nathaniel Branden and Barbara Branden. Because Rand refused to sanction any of their later work, however, Objectivist scholars have been reluctant to deal with the Brandens’ contributions. However, I believe that it is as legitimate to examine the works of the Brandens as those of Binswanger, Kelley, Peikoff, and other Objectivists and
neo-Objectivists
. Each owes an enormous intellectual debt to Rand. One cannot possibly assess the intellectual implications and historical impact of Objectivism without discussing the contributions of others whom Rand directly influenced. Indeed, in several instances where Rand’s initial formulations were one-sided, her successors have developed a more comprehensive response to
dualism
that is completely consistent with Objectivist philosophy.
In this chapter I explore themes in Rand’s philosophical
psychology
, particularly those pertaining to the relationship between
reason
and
emotion
. Peikoff (1972T, lecture 1) once defined “philosophical psychology” as the theoretical application of metaphysics and
epistemology
to
human
nature. “Philosophical psychology” considers those topics in epistemology which have implications for psychology. It deals with the intersection between philosophy and psychology, and further illuminates the radical antidualism of Rand’s Objectivism.
THE NATURE OF EMOTIONS
Accepting Aristotle’s definition of human beings as “rational
animals
,” Rand did not reduce human “being” to rationality and animality. The definition serves the need for unit economy by isolating an essential characteristic distinguishing the human from the nonhuman. But such a definition does not capture the full complexity of the
existent
. In any study of the totality of human nature, it is important to consider both those aspects that are essential and those which are not essential to the definition. Hence, to define human beings as rational animals is not to deny that they have
emotions
.
For Rand,
reason
is an essential characteristic because it helps to explain seemingly nonrational aspects of human nature. In Rand’s view, human beings have an emotional capacity that is largely dependent on their distinctive rational character. Whereas any dog or cat can experience a “feeling” arising from associational
perceptions
, only humans are capable of experiencing
emotions
that are the complex product of their conceptual awareness.
1
Rand did not consider emotions to be primaries. They are not tools of cognition; they are not instruments for the acquisition of knowledge. They must be clearly distinguished from thought, even if they are a component of
consciousness
(
New Intellectual
, 55). For Rand, emotions are the “automatic result” of value judgments previously integrated by the subconscious mind. They are lightning-like estimates “of that which furthers man’s values or threatens them, that which is
for
him or
against
him.”
2
In Rand’s
epistemology
, reason is as basic as “
existence
” is in her
ontology
. Just as consciousness is asymmetrically internal to existence, so, too, is emotion asymmetrically dependent on the rational faculty for its content, even though it has reciprocal effects on mind and body. Those who would stress the primacy of consciousness or of emotion inevitably embrace a form of
subjectivism
or emotionalism that denies objectivity in cognition. Rand’s emphasis on the primacy of existence and the centrality of reason does not nullify either consciousness or emotion. Rand argued that consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that which exists; it cannot be in conflict with existence. So, too, reason is the human means of knowledge; it is not, properly, in conflict with emotion.
From her very earliest philosophical reflections, Rand rejected the view that reason and emotion were natural antagonists. Rand saw the dichotomy between the heart and the mind as a vestige of religious thought. Those who see emotions as the enemy of reason or vice versa perpetuate an erroneous dichotomy between two aspects of consciousness. By emphasizing “faith” as the means to knowledge, the
religionists
had, in actuality, proclaimed that their own “
mystic
” feelings were ineffable cognitive instruments, and declared war on reason.
Rand refused to regard
reason
as the enemy of the
emotions
. She refused to accept the view that “feelings,”
“emotions,”
and “instincts” are beyond rational control or understanding. In a 1934 journal entry, exploring whether the belief in such a dichotomy was the result of training, she wrote: “Why is a complete harmony between mind and emotions impossible?”
3
She asked: “Is there—or should there be—such a thing as emotion opposed to reason?” For Rand, emotion is not a mystical endowment external to the reality-based means of knowledge. In Rand’s view, it is “a
form of undeveloped reason,” a species of the
conceptual
faculty that may be comprehended through a process of
psychological
articulation.
4
It is no coincidence that these first reflections on the nature of emotion take place within the context of Rand’s condemnation of
religion
. Rand’s denunciation of religious thought was partially due to her exposure to Russian mysticism. Russian religious
philosophy
, like much of Russian culture, had rejected the “Western” emphasis on reason as an absolute. Even Rand’s own teacher,
Lossky
, had stressed the intuitive basis of knowledge. Lossky’s hierarchical personalism was a deeply mystical vision in which all entities are One with the Kingdom of God.
Rand’s insistence on the centrality of reason is in many ways an outgrowth of her antipathy toward such mysticism.
Rand’s stress on the role of reason cannot be fully appreciated apart from this Russian context.
For Rand, anything that even hinted at a devaluation of the rational faculty was to be rejected and criticized. In her view, reason was the
only
spiritual
endowment.
5
By 1946, Rand had begun to develop a more explicit theory of the relationship between reason and emotion. She wrote in her notes for
Atlas Shrugged
:
The basic process of a man’s life goes like this: his thinking determines his desires, his desires determine his
actions
. (Thinking, of course, is present all along the line, at every step and stage. His desires are a combination of thought and emotion (the “production” and the “consumption” sides being involved), and all his emotions, of course, are determined by his thinking, most particularly by his basic premises.) … This is the basic pattern, or “circle,” of man’s life on earth: from the spirit (thought) through the material activity (production) to the satisfaction of his spiritual desires (emotions). (He must eat in order to think;
but
he must think in order to eat. And he must think first.)
6
This theme guided Rand in nearly every aspect of her mature philosophic vision, including her ethics, politics, and theory of history. A person learns to utilize the
conceptual
faculty through various moments of
awareness
. From focal awareness to logical
reasoning
, thinking is set into motion—and sustained—volitionally. Thinking determines one’s goals. Goals are achieved by human action. Thinking, then, is not purely contemplative. Rand saw it as praxis-oriented, akin to “production.” It is a vital,
creative
activity aiming for the satisfaction of both material and spiritual needs. Thinking is the distinctive
activity
of human existence. Cognitive
activity
is translated into material
activity
.
7
The “basic pattern” Rand discerned is between “production” and “consumption”; the productive,
creative
act of
thought aims for the consumption and enjoyment of deeply spiritual and material needs. At once, Rand creates a link between spiritual and material concerns. She sees a movement from creative thought to material production to exalted spiritual satisfaction. But at the core of this “circle” is the prime mover of human action: the ability to think.
8
By the time Rand wrote
Atlas Shrugged
, she had fully formulated her theory of
emotions
. Her protagonist, John Galt, states in the novel: “Emotions are inherent in your nature, but their content is dictated by your mind” (1021). For Rand, emotions are natural, this-worldly phenomena whose content derives from our cognitive contact with reality. In the novel, she presents characters who are rational creatures with the capacity to experience ecstasy. As a paean to integrated human being,
Atlas Shrugged
presents a union of reason and emotion, cognition and evaluation. The novel is filled with tirades against “whim-worshipers” who act without thought or principles, and who view their own subjective emotions as axiomatic guides to practice. But the novel does not reject emotions as subjective per se; it attempts to link human emotional capacity to the conceptual faculty. One of Rand’s characters states: “Feelings? Oh yes, we do feel, he, you and I—we are, in fact, the only people capable of feeling—and we know where our feelings come from. But what we did not know and have delayed learning for too long is the nature of those who claim that they cannot account for their feelings” (783).
This is crucial to Rand’s understanding of emotions: truly
human
beings do not supplant their ability to feel with their ability to reason. They do not seek to conquer, rule, or direct their emotions. Rather, they seek to set into motion a process in which emotions and reason are brought into harmony. They seek to articulate the cognitive basis of emotions by introspecting.
Extrospection
is an outwardly directed
epistemological
process. It answers the typical questions of
epistemology
: “What do I know?” and “How do I know it?”
Introspection
, by contrast, is an inwardly directed epistemological process. It attempts to answer the questions: “What do I feel?” and “Why do I feel it?” Introspection seeks to identify explicitly that which is merely implicit (“Appendix,” 262). Though we experience emotions as immediate primaries in our awareness, the introspective person does not accept them as axiomatic. Fear, anger, guilt, shame, joy, arousal are emotions with both mental and somatic effects. But no emotion is without causal antecedents. Every emotion is a complex, derivative, integrated sum.
9
Nathaniel Branden explains that in our experience of an emotion, we move through a series of psychological events: from
perception
(of an external or internal event) to evaluation to emotional response. The entire sequence is not immediately apparent, however, for we are aware only of
the movement from perception to emotion. Training ourselves to introspect is one of the most important
epistemological
tasks because it enables us to isolate, through a process of abstraction, the actual moments of the emotive cycle.
10
Branden explains further that each feeling is experienced as a totality, that is, as a union of two inseparable aspects of the evaluation that they imply: content and intensity.
11
The content of the emotion refers to the implicit evaluation: is that which I have perceived “for me” or “against me”? The intensity of the emotion refers to the implicit judgment: “to what extent?” Thus, we never feel any emotion without content or intensity. We can be slightly angry, or in a state of rage. We can like somebody, or be deeply in love with them. In all cases, the content and the intensity of the emotion will have implications for the course of action, or inaction.
12
To understand the causal antecedents of a specific emotion then, one must assess it within a complex
conceptual
context
(Peikoff 1991b, 156–57). Rand’s Objectivism focuses on understanding this context in order to achieve an efficacious mind. She advocated the same epistemological precision for the introspective articulation of
emotions
as she did for the extrospective identification of existents. No emotion can be fully understood if it is abstracted from the context that gives it meaning. And no emotional response can be changed without a fundamental alteration of the cognitive context that generates it. The possibilities of self-deceit, evasion, repression, and rationalization are enormous in the introspective process. In Rand’s words:
