Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (47 page)
At this juncture, it is important to grasp why Rand used the word “selfishness” to connote something beneficent. She argued in
The Virtue of Selfishness
, that she used it for the very reasons that make people afraid of it (vii). She claimed that conventional morality creates a conceptual “
package-deal
” in which only two alternatives are possible: the sacrifice of the self to others (traditional
altruism
) or the sacrifice of others to the self (traditional egoism).
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Convention equates altruism with benevolence and egoism with brutality. In both cases, however, the spirit of benevolence is sabotaged and the practice of brutality is made inevitable.
In Rand’s view, the conventional alternatives obscure the true meaning of the word “
selfishness
,” which is: “
concern with one’s own interests
.” Such a definition is morally neutral, according to Rand.
It is debatable whether Rand pinpointed the actual definition of “selfishness.” Most dictionaries define “selfishness” as “concern
only
with one’s own interests,” which is not neutral. In any event, the major obstacle for Rand is not philological, but philosophical. By transposing the concept of “selfishness” into a nondualistic context, Rand aimed to alter its conventional meaning (
Virtue of Selfishness
, vii). To effect this metamorphosis of meaning, Rand had to transcend the limitations of the very categories she was using. This is a difficulty faced by most
dialectical
thinkers: utilizing terms whose meaning has been tainted by a vastly different, one-dimensional philosophical context. To avoid such terms entirely, Rand would have been compelled to invent wholly new terms at the risk of becoming incomprehensible. By using known terms, she might appear to have actually endorsed one pole of a duality. Thus, in the conflict between egoism and altruism, for example, she was an egoist. In the conflict between
capitalism
and socialism, she was a capitalist. But such a one-sided characterization profoundly distorts Rand’s philosophical project. She was not a
conventional
egoist. Her
ethics
constitutes a rejection of traditional egoism and traditional altruism alike. Likewise, she was not a
conventional
capitalist. As I will discuss further in
Chapter 10
, Rand defended capitalism as an
unknown
ideal. If we fail to grasp these important distinctions, we risk viewing Rand as a monist. In actuality, Rand’s approach to ethics is but another illustration of her revolt against formal dualism.
Rand’s ethics are internally related to every other aspect of her developed worldview. It is impossible to comprehend the extent and depth of her vision in a single chapter or study. But there are immediate ramifications that further illustrate the essentially nondualistic tenor of her philosophy. In no area of ethics or psychology is this more apparent than in the Objectivist perspective on love and
sex
. These issues highlight Rand’s understanding of the connections between the conscious and the subconscious, the mind and body.
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Rand’s integration of the material and the
spiritual
is central to her concept of productive work. But it is equally essential to her examination of love and
sex
. Rand traced a philosophical link between those who deny the spiritual roots of production and those who believe that sex is a purely
mechanical function. In production, the materialist engages in promiscuous acquisition devoid of principles, and the idealist excoriates material values. In sex, the materialist engages in literal promiscuity, and the idealist extols the virtues of Platonic love. Rand ([1976] 1992T) warned that the cultural treatment of sex as a bathroom function would lead to a Victorian backlash. She maintained that this swinging from one pole to another was an inevitable by-product of the materialist and idealist bifurcation of mind and body.
Rand argued that just as material production emerges from cognitive and creative activity, so too, sexual choices will reflect consciously or
subconsciously
held convictions. As a distinctively human activity, sex involves the exploration of all of our sense modalities and spiritual values (N. Branden 1980, 90–92). Ideally, it is the expression of romantic love. Such an integration of love and sex is neither exploitative nor submissive. It “is the most profoundly
selfish
of all acts,” because it celebrates the self as an object worthy of desire and appreciation (
Atlas Shrugged
, 489–90). It requires self-assertion, self-responsibility, self-respect, and above all, self-esteem. Indeed, as Rand explained through Roark, “To say ‘I love you’ one must know first how to say the ‘I’” (
Fountainhead
, 377).
In a passage from
Atlas Shrugged
, Rand describes an encounter between Dagny Taggart and Hank Rearden which expresses the fully integrated nature of the sex act:
She knew that what she felt with the skin of her arms was the cloth of his shirt, she knew that the lips she felt on her mouth were his, but in the rest of her there was no distinction between his being and her own, as there was no division between body and spirit.… The course led them to the moment when, in answer to the highest of one’s values, in an admiration not to be expressed by any other form of tribute, one’s spirit makes one’s body become the tribute, recasting it—as proof, as sanction, as reward—into a single sensation of such intensity of joy that no other sanction of one’s existence is necessary. He heard the moan of her breath, she felt the shudder of his body, in the same instant. (252)
Of course, Rand’s belief in the full integration of mind and body does not mean that romantic partners are
morally obligated
to have a simultaneous orgasm. Rather, Rand argued that in all relationships of affection, from friendship to romantic
love
, the partners incorporate the welfare of each other into their hierarchy of values.
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In romantic love, the interpenetration of each body is a synthesis of both spirits (N. Branden 1980, 120).
Sex, however, is not a primary. One cannot generate
self-esteem
through sexual conquest and adventure. For Rand, only the “rationally selfish,” are capable of giving and receiving love. People who do not value themselves first are incapable of valuing anything or anyone.
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From the time of his association with Rand, Branden developed the deeper implications of the Objectivist view in his examination of the principle of psychological
visibility
and its relationship to self-esteem and romantic love.
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Branden argues that a person’s self-concept is constituted by “a cluster of images and abstract perspectives on his various (real or imagined) traits and characteristics.” Like any broad, metaphysical abstraction, this cluster of images cannot be held in full conscious awareness at any particular moment. We are
tacitly
aware of our self-concept in each of our activities, but we never perceive it, as such (N. Branden [1969] 1979, 200). Branden argues that even though we can come to experience ourselves in terms of higher-level concepts, it is only in our interaction with another
consciousness
that we can experience ourselves
perceptually
.
This Brandenian argument mirrors Rand’s own insights into the
creative
nature of production and
art
. Rand suggested that human
productive
activity as such is essentially objectifying, creative praxis. In concretizing their goals, people make visible not only their explicit production designs, but the implicit values that propel them toward achievement. So too, art enables a person to experience his or her broadest, metaphysical abstractions in objective, perceptual form. By creating an art work, an artist makes visible a tacit
sense
of life. The artist objectifies materially that which is internal to consciousness. This process is duplicated by the responder. By articulating the basis of his or her aesthetic responses, the responder’s own core evaluations become self-visible. In this communicative interaction with an artist’s creation, the responder’s subconsciously held values are objectified for contemplation. A positive aesthetic experience will suggest a congruence between artist and responder that is mediated through the art work.
Branden recognizes that the experience of objectification and visibility is augmented exponentially in the context of human
relations
. Just as art allows one to grasp valuational concepts with the ease of perceptual focus, so human relationships permit people “to perceive [themselves] as [entities] in reality—to experience the perspective of objectivity—through and by means of the reactions and responses of other human beings.”
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Branden’s articulation of the principle of psychological
visibility
emerged initially from his interactions with his dog,
Muttnik
. He acknowledged that a human being could experience visibility even with a nonhuman
consciousness
. By playing aggressively with Muttnik, Branden noticed that the
dog responded in a fully appropriate manner. Muttnik’s response seemed to objectify Branden’s actions in a way that mirrored his playful intentions.
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The experience of visibility allows us to view ourselves as objective
existents
. Branden (1980) states somewhat cryptically: “The externalization of the objectification of the internal is of the very nature of successful life” (74). What Branden means is that to the extent that we articulate and make explicit that which is within our own consciousness, we can experience ourselves as objectified beings in the eyes of another. To be genuinely visible to others, we must also be willing to be self-visible. To the extent that we have articulated and grasped our own convictions and values, we will optimize our visibility to others. To the extent that these convictions and values are shared with others, we will maximize the possibility for genuinely intimate
relations
. In our relations, we can achieve an “expanded awareness of self” (79).
In romantic
love
, the highest form of human visibility, the relationship constitutes a dynamic system (211). Since no one is a static entity, and since each “is engaged in a constant process of unfolding,” the self-visibility of each and the visibility of each to a significant other will evolve over time (N. Branden 1983a, 260). The dynamism inherent in the interpenetration of two selves creates a new universe that is unlike that occupied by either person alone. The result is an intermingling of many complex conscious and subconscious factors, including biological elements that science has yet to fully understand.
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Romantic love, then, is the concrete expression of human integration. It is
not
infatuation
. An infatuation is a distortion based on the reification of one or two aspects of a person’s character. When we are infatuated with another person, we abstract these selected qualities from the totality and respond to the person as if these characteristics constituted the whole (N. Branden [1969] 1979, 210). Romantic love eschews such one-dimensionality. It is a synthesis of body and mind, sense modalities and spirituality, self-visibility and objectification. It is a totalistic and mutual response that preserves the independence of the lovers, even as it heightens their sense of unity. In Rand’s fiction, lovers may be willing to die for one another, but they refuse to live for one another. Even in unity, each person retains the self-actualizing values and virtues consonant with their individual, human survival.
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Like Rand, Branden recognizes that this conception of
self-esteem
and romantic love is a product of historical evolution. It is profoundly individualistic, egoistic, secular, and
rationally
selfish and stands in stark opposition to all premodern and religious theories. Such a conception would not have been possible without the accomplishments of the
Industrial Revolution
. Industrialization engendered the rise of a middle class that reached beyond its purely material needs and embraced an ideal of romantic love that was
revolutionary in its impact (N. Branden 1980, 37). Both Rand and Branden suggest that the implications of this concept have yet to be fully appreciated or understood.
EUDAEMONIA
It should be apparent by now that Rand’s
ethics
are as expansive as her
epistemology
. In Rand’s epistemology,
reason
is constituted by many interrelated practices. Reason is
consciousness
.
Consciousness
is mind. But mind includes
articulated
, conscious convictions and
tacit
,
subconscious
integrations
, the capacity for logical deduction and inductive inference, as well as the ability to evaluate, to feel, and to create. And the mind cannot be abstracted from the body, without losing the totality of what it means to be human. Rand does not identify reason with
emotion
or thought with
action
. Her system seeks their integrated and organic unity, such that no part is in fundamental conflict with the other parts or the totality that gives it meaning.
It is this expansive, multidimensionality that is reproduced within Rand’s ethical theories.
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And yet a number of thinkers have criticized Rand because they believe that she never fully explained the exact nature of her standard of moral
values
. For instance,
Mack
notes that “man’s
life
qua man” as the standard of moral values seems to incorporate
rationality
and productivity into the fabric of human survival. Mack wonders why Rand did not make
pleasure
and
happiness
partially constitutive of this standard. He asks if Rand valued rationality and productivity instrumentally, as means to the goal of human survival, or if these
virtues
are constituent elements of that ultimate goal.
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Henry Veatch
is also perplexed by Rand’s use of “life” as the ultimate end, since she gives no precise indication of what “man’s life qua man” might be.
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