Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (83 page)

41
. Rand (27 March 1937), in
Fountainhead,
702.

42
. Rand (22 February 1937), in ibid., 701. Cox (3 May 1993C) reminds me that in the finished novel, Toohey is not quite portrayed as a “repulsive swine.” Rand achieves great literary irony by presenting him as a puny character with the “voice of a god.”

43
. Rand [1937] 1946, 108–10. Rand [1937] 1946 is hereafter cited as
Anthem
by page number in both text and notes.

44
. The Greek mythic imagery throughout Rand’s fiction could be the subject of a book in itself. In
Atlas Shrugged
, the Promethean metaphor figures prominently: “John Galt is Prometheus who changed his mind. After centuries of being torn by vultures in payment for having brought to men the fire of the gods, he broke his chains and he withdrew his fire—until the day when men withdraw their vultures” (517).

45
. The latter two screenplays were adaptations. See Cox 1987 for a fine overview of Rand’s writing for the cinema.

46
. Rand (1 January 1945), in Peikoff 1991a, x.

47
. Though Rand began outlining her novel in 1945,
Atlas Shrugged
is foreshadowed in a question Roark poses in
The Fountainhead
: “What would happen to the world without those who do, think, work, produce? (607). Raimondo claims that Rand’s novel,
Atlas Shrugged,
exhibits certain similarities to journalist Garet Garrett’s 1922 novel,
The Driver.
Raimondo (1993, 203) concludes that Rand “was influenced by Garrett.” I could not find any evidence to link Rand to Garrett, who was, as Raimondo correctly notes, an “exemplar of the Old Right.” A rebuttal to Raimondo is provided by Bradford (1994).

48
. Chambers 1957, 595–96. Even upon Rand’s death, William Buckley (1982a), editor of
National Review,
lamented that she had theologized her atheistic beliefs and had short-circuited her otherwise “eloquent and persuasive” antistatism. However, Berger (1986, 13) calls Rand’s philosophy “a vulgarized cross between Adam Smith and Friedrich Nietzsche.” Though there are many negative reviews of Rand’s works to choose from, it is possible to find an occasionally provocative characterization from an unlikely source. Feyerabend is said to have reported to McCawley (1990, 385 n. 21) that Rand “is much better than most academics.” In Feyerabend’s view, Rand defended her philosophy in “juicy tales full of sex, industrial espionage, murder, mystery, and at the climax introduces her beloved Aristotle (
Atlas Shrugged
—a story I read with considerable pleasure). And Aristotle, as far as I can see, by far exceeds all existing ‘thinkers’ in versatility and depth.… I prefer her to Derrida and Foucault any time.” Rand herself, was not as generous toward Feyerabend. See Rand (March 1970), “Kant versus Sullivan,” in
Philosophy.
For another positive review of Rand’s work, see Pruette 1943.

49
. Rand (20 January 1947), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for
Atlas Shrugged
,” in Binswanger 5.2.2.

50
. Rand (31 July 1950), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.4.4–5.

51
. Rand (6 October 1949), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.4.1–2. Rand recognized (through her character Hank Rearden), “that by accepting the mystics’ theory of sex I was accepting the looters’ theory of economics” (
Atlas Shrugged
, 859). This observation had far-reaching implications that Rand developed later in her assessment of the conservative-liberal duality in U.S. politics.

52
. Rand (29 June 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for
Atlas Shrugged
,” in Binswanger 4.6.8–9.

53
. Rand (28 August 1949), in Peikoff, “Editor’s preface,” in
Early Ayn Rand,
260.

54
. Peikoff (1987bT) questions, period 1, explains that Rand could have named her philosophy “rationalism,” “existentialism,” “realism,” or “conceptualism,” but these labels were preempted by other traditions. Rand ultimately chose “Objectivism” because it emphasized the “objective” nature of her approach in every philosophic branch.

55
. Rand (8 June 1958), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.4.7.

56
. Hook 1961, 3. Despite Rand’s theatrical expository style, some of her critics have praised her ability to capture the essence of other systems of thought. See, for instance, Hollinger, “Ayn Rand’s epistemology in historical perspective,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984.

57
. The affair ended for a variety of reasons. It has been acknowledged by Barbara Branden (1986), Nathaniel Branden (1989), and Leonard Peikoff (1987aT).

58
. Peikoff (1964). Barbara Branden also took courses with Hook. Nathaniel Branden took courses with William Barrett. N. Branden 1989, 115–16.

59
. Peikoff 1972T, Lecture 10; 1985T, Lecture 1.

60
. Peikoff 1972T, Lecture 12. However, Peikoff (1990–91T, Lecture 15) warns that one cannot simply take any twelve topics in philosophy and thread them together seamlessly. Some issues are more closely related than others.

61
. Peikoff 1991b, 4. Peikoff (1983T, Lecture 2) admits that he struggled with rationalism for fifteen years in his understanding of Objectivism.

62
. Peikoff (1990–91T, Lecture 5) admits to preferring synthesis over analysis.

63
. The most important aspect of Brandenian revisionism is its attempt to transcend the cultic qualities of the early Objectivist movement. Branden accepts most of the responsibility for having generated a virtual cult around Ayn Rand. N. Branden 1989, 402; B. Branden 1990, 51.

64
. Branden claims that he has some differences with Rand that relate to her theories of sex and emotions. Branden (1983b, 225n) argues that he tends to emphasize generosity and mutual aid as essential to an ethic that “holds
man’s
/
woman’s life
as its standard” (emphasis added). Even if Branden’s formulation seems more “politically correct” than Rand’s, it is still within the broad Objectivist tradition. Ironically, in a 1978 lecture, Rand (1978T) claimed that Objectivism had made very little impact on the science of psychology. She stated that she could name exceptions, “but not in print.” This is the closest Rand has come to recognizing Branden’s post-1968 contributions. In any event, if Nathaniel Branden is the legitimate father of the self-esteem movement, Ayn Rand is its mother.

CHAPTER 5. BEING

1
. Rand (June 1970), “The chickens’ homecoming,” in
New Left
, 108.

2
. Peikoff 1987T, Lecture 1; 1985T, Lecture 3.

3
. Peikoff 1991b, 122–23. One crucial question which must be considered is this: If Rand is wrong about a single aspect of her system, does this invalidate the totality? I do not consider this issue in the current study because it relates to the validity of Rand’s system-as-such. But it is worth examining.

4
. In this regard, Rand’s system resembles Marx’s system. On Marx’s approach, see Meikle 1985, 71.

5
. Rand rejected nearly every imaginable dichotomy: mind vs. body; idealism vs. materialism; rationalism vs. empiricism; internalism vs. externalism; intrinsicism vs. subjectivism; concepts vs. percepts; reason vs. emotion; the conscious vs. the subconscious; the articulate vs. the tacit; reason vs. art; fact vs. value; conventional egoism vs. traditional altruism; love vs. sex; anarchism vs. statism; atomistic individualism vs. organic collectivism.
A number of other dichotomies are mentioned by Peikoff (1976T, Lecture 1): happiness vs. pleasure; pure vs. applied science; woman vs. man; art vs. business; politics vs. economics; morality vs. science; art vs. entertainment. In his course on logic, Peikoff (1974T, Lecture 3) explains that these dichotomies are all examples of the fallacy of the false alternative. This tendency toward the analysis of the “coincidence of opposites” in the modern world is not distinctive to Objectivism. It is also apparent in the systems of Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Emerson. See Kuntz 1981.

6
. Robbins 1974; Barry 1983, 1986; Barnes 1967. Interestingly, Berger (1986) alludes to the similarity between Rand’s epistemology and Lenin’s dialectical materialism. It is perhaps in this spirit that Tuccille (1972, 16) called Objectivism “a kind of New Marxism of the Right.” Robbins argues further that Rand is a philosophic materialist. He believes that her defense of objective reality, sense perception, the open-ended nature of concepts, natural being, and Promethean humanism is virtually “indistinguishable from the general materialist position of the 19th century.” He adds: “Both Engels and Lenin rejected the ‘vulgar materialist’ idea that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile.” In this area, Rand, Lenin, Marx, and Feuerbach are opposed only to “the non-dialectical vulgar materialists.” Although I disagree with some of Robbins’s characterizations, I applaud his ability to see some of the parallels between Rand and the dialectical tradition. See Robbins 1974, 46 n. 100, 48 n. 107, 80 n. 49, 82–83, 85 n. 73, and 87 n. 85.

7
. Rand (March 1967), “An answer to readers: About the ‘horror file,’” in
Objectivist
6:237–38.

8
. Rand (17 June 1962), “Introducing Objectivism,” in
Voice of Reason
, 3.

9
. Peikoff (1980T, Lecture 9) explains that Objectivism does not make any distinction between ontology and metaphysics. He (1970T, Lecture 6) also explains that, in contrast to Comte and other positivists who used the word “metaphysical” as a reproach, Rand refers freely to “metaphysics” as the branch of philosophy dealing with the widest existential abstractions.

10
. Rand (April 1965), “The psycho-epistemology of art,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 19.

11
. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in.
Virtue of Selfishness,
14.

12
. Rand (19 June 1958), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.4.8; “Appendix,” 290.

13
. Rand (19 June 1958), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.4.7.

14
. Rand 1962T; Peikoff 1972T, Lecture 1.

15
. Peikoff 1972T, Lecture 9;
New Intellectual
, 28–29.

16
. Rand did not use the term “asymmetric internality.” For a fuller discussion of the differences among asymmetric, causal, and reciprocal relations, especially in Marx’s social ontology, see Gould 1978, 89, 92, and 184 n. 22.

17
. Rand (19 June 1958), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.4.7–9.

18
. Peikoff 1972T, Lecture 8. On the need to avoid the “dogmatizing” of science, Peikoff 1990–91T, Lecture 1.

19
. Peikoff 1991b, 16–17, 192; 1990–91T, Lecture 10.

20
. Rand’s perspective has some parallels with modern science. As N. Branden (1980) suggests: “Discoveries in physics and biology have exploded old-fashioned materialism and have led inexorably toward what is frequently described as an
organismic
rather than a
mechanical
model of the universe” (53).

21
. Objectivist literature is replete with attacks on the epistemological foundations of what Rand characterized as “pseudo-scientific” movements, for example, environmentalism. See
New Left.

22
. Peikoff (1974T, Lecture 4) explains that in her first two axioms, Rand merely distinguishes between existence and consciousness, metaphysics and epistemology. She rejects the idealist attempt to blend existence and consciousness into an “indeterminate package-deal” in which the crucial differences between them are ignored. Rand (12–26, March 1973), “The metaphysical versus the man-made,” in
Philosophy
, 29–30. O’Neill ([1971] 1977, 83) argues that Rand’s distinction between existence and consciousness suggests “at the very least, an
operational dualism
” in her ontology. I counter that the distinction is one of “asymmetric internality,” which is
not
dualism as I have defined it.

23
.
Introduction
, 29. In contemporary philosophical discourse, much work has been devoted to the relationship of consciousness and content by those in the phenomenological tradition, such as Husserl; and to the issue of being vs. nonbeing, as expressed in the works of Heidegger, Quine, Davidson, and Kripke. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Rand was influenced by the thought of any of these figures. Essays by Den Uyl and Rasmussen, and Hollinger in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984 discuss Rand’s metaphysics and epistemology as they relate to the contemporary context.

24
. Marx [1844] 1964, 145. Marx [1844] 1964 is hereafter cited as
Manuscripts
by page number in text and notes. A number of scholars have argued that Marx was not primarily a materialist, but a naturalist and/or an essentialist in the Aristotelian tradition. See Meikle 1985 and Bhikhu Parekh (1975), “Marx’s Theory of Man,” in Machan 1987, 40–61. Parekh believes that Marx’s project integrated radical humanism and naturalism. Marx saw people as a dialectical unity of natural and human being and took a vitalist, Aristo-telian view of nature in which each natural being strives toward the actualization of its potential. Furthermore, each being is involved in a network of complex interrelationships. Parekh adds that for Marx, “A non-objective being, a being that is totally self-sufficient, is a non-natural being, and therefore a non-being, a fantasy” (43). Other parallels between Marx and Aristotle are explored in McCarthy 1990 and 1992.

25
. Peikoff 1991b, 167; Rand 1979aT.

26
. As Phillips (1934–35, 2:36–37) explains, in all axiomatic concepts there is a “boomerang” attribute such that “even though we cast it away from us, it returns to us again.” The “boomerang” argument is characteristically used by many Aristotelians and Thomists in their defense of the law of noncontradiction.