Blood and Daring (45 page)

In early 1867, Seward first spoke with Britain’s minister in Washington, Sir Frederick Bruce, and offered to trade the money owed the United States in an
Alabama
settlement for Britain’s Bahamian Islands. He then wrote to Adams in London to see if Britain would cede British Columbia in exchange for the money owed.
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Seward believed that taking the British colony, composed mostly of the small towns of Victoria and Vancouver, would help American progress by ridding the west coast of a European power. At the same time, it would provide more ports to spur Asian-American trade and, by taking the continent’s west coast, put pressure on the rest of Canada to eventually become American.
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Seward’s ideas leaked and by May 1867 were being openly discussed and became the subject of editorial newspaper debate in Britain, Canada and the United States.
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Russian minister to Washington Edouard de Stoeckl made things even more interesting by asking Seward if America was interested in purchasing Alaska. Russia and America were close allies at the time and both saw Britain as a strong and dangerous competitor. Consequently, Czar Alexander II was quite receptive to the argument that if America owned Alaska, then there would be increased pressure on Britain to sell or cede British Columbia and perhaps even all of its North American territory to the United States. Russia would win either way because Britain would no longer have a North American Pacific presence.
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The offer thrilled Seward, who agreed with the czar’s geopolitical analysis.
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He also realized that the purchase would bring prestige for him and his state department, while meeting his long-held goal of expanding America. Seward negotiated well and quickly, and bought Alaska for only
$7.2 million. President Johnson signed the treaty ceding Alaska to the United States on the same day—March 29, 1867—that Queen Victoria signed the British North America Act that created Canada.

The purchase instigated a storm of protest in the United States against what many called “Seward’s Folly.” There were some, however, who recognized and supported his Manifest Destiny strategy. The
New York Tribune
, for instance, praised the purchase as part of a move to eventually swallow Canada and argued, “When the experiment of the ‘dominion’ shall have failed, as fail it must, a process of peaceful absorption will give Canada her proper place in the great North American Republic.”
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Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee Charles Sumner was a vehement believer in Manifest Destiny and saw the annexation of Canada as a part of that vision. In the Senate debate approving the Alaska purchase, Sumner sold the idea to his colleagues as a significant step toward American occupation of all of North America.
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Upon the Senate’s ratification of the treaty, Seward wrote to Adams that the
Alabama
claims should now be brought back to the fore because, “now they could be settled in one way, by such acquisition from England as would enable us to round off our North-Western territory.”
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The British Columbia legislature had passed a motion in March 1867 expressing its desire to join Canada. The Alaskan purchase, however, drove a wedge between those in the colony’s civil society who wanted to maintain ties with Britain and its American ex-patriots, many of whom began to fly the stars and stripes from their homes and shops. British Columbia’s Governor Frederick Seymour wrote to the British Colonial office, fretting that the power of the annexationists was growing, and was supported by money flowing in from San Francisco.
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In September, those concerned with growing American influence watched with dismay as six American warships dropped anchor in Victoria’s harbour.

If Canada was to survive, British Columbia needed to become Canadian, and Macdonald needed to move quickly to shore up support for Confederation and win the western colony. He demonstrated the political genius for which he was so highly respected by first negotiating
new financial arrangements between his government and Nova Scotia and then moving Joseph Howe, still the province’s chief anti-Confederation spokesperson, into his cabinet. Demands to leave Canada slowly faded from Nova Scotia’s political discourse.

In late 1868, Macdonald sent George-Étienne Cartier and William McDougall to London to negotiate the purchase of Rupert’s Land, the great swath of territory north and west of Canada that was owned by the Hudson’s Bay Company. Seward wanted the land for America and had sent feelers to Britain about arranging an American purchase. The negotiations were protracted—the American elephant was always present in the room—but an agreement was finally made whereby Britain would loan Canada three hundred thousand pounds to make the purchase. Minnesota railway men and Washington annexationists ground their teeth as Canada suddenly took ownership of land from the Great Lakes to the Rockies and north to the Arctic, and did so for a pittance.

Macdonald then turned his attention to British Columbia, where arguments continued to rage between those who wished to join the United States, centred mostly in Vancouver, and those who preferred to join Canada, predominantly those in Victoria. In October 1869, at Macdonald’s behest, Britain’s Lord Granville, who had become secretary of state for the colonies the previous December, had sent a note to British Columbia’s political leaders stating that Britain preferred the colony to join Canada. Of more significance was that Macdonald promised that Canada would assume the colony’s debt and build a railway connecting it to Canada within ten years. Canada had proven that it wanted British Columbia, the Americans would not risk war to take it and Britain would not risk losing North America by surrendering it. British Columbia officially joined Canada in July 1871.

In late 1868, with Macdonald negotiating the Hudson’s Bay Company land and British Columbia out from under him, Seward had moved to settle the
Alabama
claims. Union general and Northern hero Ulysses S. Grant had been elected to the presidency in November; Seward’s time in office was ending and he had to move fast. He initiated new talks that
led to the signing of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention in January 1869. The agreement lumped the
Alabama
claims with a number of other grievances that Britain and America had left unresolved since 1853.

President-elect Grant let it be known that he did not like the terms of the agreement.
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Senator Charles Sumner, at that point Seward’s ally, thought Johnson-Clarendon was an abomination because it did not demand a British apology or establish the amounts that would be paid. Further, it left Canada Canadian. He delivered a long speech slamming its terms and concluding that America remained interested in taking Canada as settlement for the
Alabama
claims.
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To make the swap more tempting to Britain, Sumner said that the United States demanded $15 million for the loss of property and an astronomical $110 million for indirect costs, including increased marine insurance premiums, and lost trade and economic expansion opportunities. Michigan senator Zachariah Chandler made a motion that Britain should immediately cede Canada to the United States as a down payment on all
Alabama
claims. He said that he could rally sixty thousand volunteers from his state who would gladly cross the border, take Canada and hold it hostage until Britain agreed.
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The lame-duck Senate voted 54 to 1 against the Johnson-Clarendon Convention.

Sumner and Chandler could bluster and Seward could steam, but the next steps would be Grant’s. After years of Johnson’s harsh and troubled leadership, the country was ready for a strong and skilled chief executive. Unfortunately, it did not get one. While scandal and misdeed never touched Grant personally, almost from the outset his administration was soiled by corruption and bureaucratic blunder. Grant was an intelligent and able man but a poor administrator. The skills that had put him in the White House were not those he needed to succeed once in office.

As he had hinted during his brief visit to Canada after the war, Grant was an expansionist. He considered Chandler’s boast silly and had said many times that he would never sanction military action in order to win more land. However, in the same breath he had told aides that the settlement of the
Alabama
claims would end with the United States owning Canada.
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He was among those who believed that the Civil War
had been prolonged by Britain’s declaration of neutrality and actions it took that helped the South, most significantly the building of ships for the Confederate navy. He had also made many public and private remarks about his disdain for Canada on account of its Southern sympathies and its harbouring of Confederates who acted against the United States. In one of his early cabinet meetings, he spoke of his hatred of Britain and Canada: “If not for our debt, I wish Congress would declare war on Great Britain, then we could take Canada and wipe out her Commerce as she has done ours, and then we would start fair.”
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In February 1869, days before Grant took office, British minister to the United States Sir Edward Thornton and Macdonald exchanged a series of letters concerning rumours of another Fenian invasion. Macdonald argued that he would prepare for it but would not ask the Americans to help stop it. Thornton agreed, noting that he had told the Americans about the rumours and that it was up to them to take action.
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Grant’s secretary of state, Hamilton Fish, had taken word of Fenian plans to one of the administration’s first cabinet meetings. He recommended that the raids be stopped and that arms being assembled near the Canadian border be seized. President Grant silenced the room by snapping, “The British did not seize or stop the
Alabama
.”
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The decision was eventually made to alert American ships on the Great Lakes with orders to stop the Fenians, and local law enforcement agents were told to capture the arms. The Fenians lost their nerve and nothing of consequence occurred. Grant’s cabinet debated using detectives to investigate future Canadian raids, but Grant said no, adding, “The British did not employ detectives to prevent raids from Canada during our war.”
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In July 1869, Macdonald dispatched Finance Minister John Rose to Washington to meet with Fish. The secretary of state was a graduate of the Columbia Law School and had been a New York congressman, governor and senator. His slow-talking nature and long, sad face fringed with scraggly chin-whiskers disarmed those who met him, but he was as intelligent as he was shrewd. Fish was also as determined an annexationist as his president and his predecessor. Fish explained to Rose that Sumner’s harsh words in
the Senate expressed the thoughts of most Americans. He felt, nonetheless, that Canada and the United States needed to rationally address matters of concern but that a resolution of the
Alabama
claims needed to occur first. They talked about a joint commission to settle the claims.

Rose left for Britain shortly afterward to try to initiate discussions. Fish did the same with Grant, but hit a wall. The president stated in a cabinet meeting that he believed the
Alabama
discussion should be postponed for perhaps a year. He predicted that time would lead to Britain’s becoming desperate to settle and thus willing to withdraw from Canada, allowing all claims to be settled through a money-for-land swap.
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Grant publicly revealed his harsh feelings for Canada and Britain in his State of the Union address:

In November 1869, Fish invited British minister Thornton to his home. As they settled into large wingback chairs and puffed cigars, Fish said that he and Grant both wanted to see the United States ultimately take control all of North America. He said that Canadian-American fishing disputes and the
Alabama
claims needed to be settled, and that Grant would give up his pressure to take Canada only if Britain offered amenable terms in respect to both issues. Thornton felt the offer was reasonable and forwarded it to London.
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Fish reported to cabinet with the argument that Canada should not immediately be taken, but that Britain might yet surrender it to the United States to settle the
Alabama
dispute.
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Grant agreed to be patient. When
told of the Fish-Thornton agreement, Senator Sumner was furious. He wrote a long memo to Fish arguing that the United States must exploit the
Alabama
claims in order to force Britain to surrender Canada immediately. He concluded, “Therefore, the withdrawal of the British flag cannot be abandoned as a condition or preliminary of such a settlement as is now proposed. To make the settlement complete, the withdrawal should be from this hemisphere, including the provinces and the islands.”
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Sumner and Grant had earlier parted ways over an issue involving the purchase of Santo Domingo (later the Dominican Republic), and over a number of impolitic personal attacks that Sumner had made on the president. His power was somewhat reduced from its previous strength, but because the Senate would eventually need to ratify whatever was decided, his views remained significant.

Fish met with Thornton several more times over the coming months and at one point bluntly enquired whether Britain would mind if the United States simply annexed Canada. Thornton replied that Britain would not stop the United States from doing so if Canada expressed an interest but, he added, Canadians seemed somewhat bitter about thoughts of annexation.
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Macdonald heard of the exchange and launched protests to Westminster and directly to Thornton. Thornton softened his stand only a little, telling Fish the next time they met that Macdonald was unhappy about British policy. The policy, however, did not change—nor did American goals. In an April 1870 cabinet meeting, Grant stated that if Canada would simply agree to join the United States, the
Alabama
claims could be “settled in five minutes.”
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