Blood of Tyrants: George Washington & the Forging of the Presidency (25 page)
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Authors: Logan Beirne
Tags: #American Revolution, #Founding Fathers, #George Washington, #18th Century
BOOK: Blood of Tyrants: George Washington & the Forging of the Presidency
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Like earlier in the war, Washington’s actions reinforced his words. But now, he began standing up to Congress rather than obligingly following its militarily imprudent commands. For example, when some congressmen called for another foolhardy attempt to invade Canada, he objected. “I am always happy to concur in sentiment with Congress,” he wrote, “and I view the emancipation of Canada as an Object very interesting to the future prosperity and tranquility of these States; but I am sorry to say, the plan proposed for the purpose does not appear to me to be eligible.”
10
Ethan Allen’s invasion of Canada and subsequent attempts had been disasters, and Washington did not want to repeat them. While many in Congress likewise saw an invasion of Canada as impractical, other members continued to press the matter. When the issue came up again a month later, Washington repeated his opposition and declined to proceed with the invasion.
11
He was now the master of war tactics, not Congress, since he was far better versed in military strategy and more familiar with the strength of his own forces. Barely keeping his army together, he knew that an offensive against Canada would be a ludicrous military decision.
10
Ethan Allen’s invasion of Canada and subsequent attempts had been disasters, and Washington did not want to repeat them. While many in Congress likewise saw an invasion of Canada as impractical, other members continued to press the matter. When the issue came up again a month later, Washington repeated his opposition and declined to proceed with the invasion.
11
He was now the master of war tactics, not Congress, since he was far better versed in military strategy and more familiar with the strength of his own forces. Barely keeping his army together, he knew that an offensive against Canada would be a ludicrous military decision.
The commander risked exceeding the limits of his vast military authority by objecting to the invasion on political grounds as well. He reasoned that ousting the British from Quebec would leave the country vulnerable to a French attack down the road.
12
While the Americans were courting the French as allies, Washington still did not trust his old adversaries. Luckily for the American cause, Congress acquiesced to their commander’s opposition and abandoned the invasion.
12
While the Americans were courting the French as allies, Washington still did not trust his old adversaries. Luckily for the American cause, Congress acquiesced to their commander’s opposition and abandoned the invasion.
Washington had grown bold. In one episode he may have gone too far. He asserted too much authority, and some politicians began to question their benevolent military dictator.
In an effort to turn more of the patriots’ American brothers against them, General Howe offered amnesty to defectors. He proposed that any American who swore allegiance to the Crown would be pardoned. This was a very appealing proposition for many Americans—especially since it appeared that the British were winning. The patriotic exuberance that characterized the beginning of the war had faded. And now many Americans saw Howe’s offer as a great opportunity to return to their homes and farms in peace, and to escape punishment for their transgressions against the mother country. If Washington was going to lose anyway, they might as well save themselves.
This was a tremendous predicament for Washington, as Howe’s amnesty proposal threatened to spur mass defection from the American cause. Washington wrote with alarm that many Americans were being “Influenced By Inimical Motives, [and] Intimidated By The Threats Of The Enemy.”
13
Many were beginning to swear allegiance back to the Crown. Washington already faced Loyalist Americans who were working against him, but now Howe’s plot threatened to turn the moderates and even some patriots against him as well—or at least keep them from fighting on his side.
13
Many were beginning to swear allegiance back to the Crown. Washington already faced Loyalist Americans who were working against him, but now Howe’s plot threatened to turn the moderates and even some patriots against him as well—or at least keep them from fighting on his side.
Washington no longer knew whom he could count on to fight for him, and thus he drew the proverbial line in the sand.
Washington declared that “it had become necessary to distinguish between the friends of America and those of Great-Britain.” So he ordered an oath of his own. In early 1777, to pressure his countrymen to “stand ready to defend the [nation] against every hostile invasion,” Washington presented an ultimatum:
. . . I do therefore, in behalf of the United States, by virtue of the powers committed to me by Congress, hereby strictly command and require every person having subscribed such declaration, taken such oath, and accepted such protection and certificates from Lord and General Howe, or any person acting under their authority, forthwith to repair to Head-Quarters, or to the quarters of the nearest general officer of the Continental Army or Militia (until farther provision can be made by the civil authority) and there deliver up such protections, certificates, and passports, and take the oath of allegiance to the United States of America.
14
This was an uncharacteristically draconian order. But if Howe’s oath was persuading moderate Americans to abandon the patriot cause, Washington would take drastic measures to reverse that trend. He required this “counter-oath” from his countrymen if they wanted to remain in their homes. If they had pledged their allegiance to Britain and now refused to pledge to the United States, then they’d better run. Washington was “hereby granting full liberty to all such as prefer the interest and protection of Great-Britain to the freedom and happiness of their country, forthwith to withdraw themselves and families within the enemy’s lines.” Adding a thinly veiled threat, Washington concluded, “And I do hereby declare that all and every person, who may neglect or refuse to comply with this order, within thirty days from the date hereof, will be deemed adherents to the King of Great-Britain, and treated as common enemies of the American States.”
15
15
Washington’s order elicited a firestorm of criticism. It was condemned as undemocratic and possibly a sign that Americans had invested their commander with too much power. While many states adopted comparable measures, some Americans saw it as a power too dangerous to entrust to any military leader, however beloved. It was one thing for Washington to command his own troops or punish the enemy, but it was another when he started to order American civilians around. Many of those civilians declared that their empowered commander had grown insensitive to personal liberties and was morphing from a
military
dictator into an
absolute
one. One congressman believed that Washington had “assumed the Legislative and Executive powers of Government in all the states.”
16
military
dictator into an
absolute
one. One congressman believed that Washington had “assumed the Legislative and Executive powers of Government in all the states.”
16
A proud republican who deeply believed in the ideals of his budding country, Washington did not intend to use his broad military powers to trample the civilian leadership’s nonmilitary laws. John Adams defended America’s commander, stating that “General Washington’s proclamation . . . does not interfere with the laws of Civil Government of any State; but considering the Army was prudent and necessary.”
17
Washington felt wounded by assertions otherwise, and he never actually enforced the order. However, he never recanted it either.
18
As the master of the military, he was not one to back down.
17
Washington felt wounded by assertions otherwise, and he never actually enforced the order. However, he never recanted it either.
18
As the master of the military, he was not one to back down.
In stark contrast to his defense of New York City, Washington next informed Congress that he did not intend to protect their capital city at all costs.
19
Political pressure had compelled him to take, and linger in, indefensible positions in New York; he would not repeat that mistake in Philadelphia. After Washington drove back the enemy forces at Trenton and Princeton, Congress had returned from Baltimore in March 1777. But Washington did not make them feel particularly welcome.
19
Political pressure had compelled him to take, and linger in, indefensible positions in New York; he would not repeat that mistake in Philadelphia. After Washington drove back the enemy forces at Trenton and Princeton, Congress had returned from Baltimore in March 1777. But Washington did not make them feel particularly welcome.
Even though Philadelphia was the political heart of the nation and the politicians expected him to defend it with the full might of the Continental Army, Washington declined. He knew he could not risk his fragile army against another major British naval and land assault. His main focus was to defend his army, even if it meant ceding cities to the British war machine. Thus, he needed the flexibility of a quick retreat, and so he sent Nathanael Greene to inform Congress of his new defensive strategy.
Greene reported back to Washington, “I explained to the House your Excellency’s Ideas of the next Campaign [and] it appear’d new to them. ”
20
Put less delicately, Congress was shocked. They had expected their commander to defend their capital to the bitter end.
21
20
Put less delicately, Congress was shocked. They had expected their commander to defend their capital to the bitter end.
21
Many of the remaining patriots fled Philadelphia. John Adams colorfully described the largely abandoned city to his wife: “This City is a dull place, in comparison of what it was. More than half the Inhabitants removed into the country as it was their Wisdom to do—the remainder are chiefly Quakers as dull as Beetles.”
22
Whatever his dislike for the current populace, however, Adams and other congressmen had not expected Washington to run from any threat to their seat of government. But Washington had adopted a “Fabian Strategy.”
23
22
Whatever his dislike for the current populace, however, Adams and other congressmen had not expected Washington to run from any threat to their seat of government. But Washington had adopted a “Fabian Strategy.”
23
20
Dictator Perpetuo
W
ashington, the “American Cincinnatus,” again borrowed from the wisdom of the Roman Republic. His new defensive strategy was based on that of Quintus Fabius Maximus, the fabled Roman general who successfully wore down the stronger Carthaginian forces during the First Punic War, in the third century B.C. Like the army of Fabius Maximus, Washington’s forces were relatively weak, so rather than risk his army in the all-out defense of Philadelphia or any other location, he would wear down the British by engaging them in smaller battles much as Fabius had done. Washington’s main goal was to preserve his troops, even if that meant ceding land.
ashington, the “American Cincinnatus,” again borrowed from the wisdom of the Roman Republic. His new defensive strategy was based on that of Quintus Fabius Maximus, the fabled Roman general who successfully wore down the stronger Carthaginian forces during the First Punic War, in the third century B.C. Like the army of Fabius Maximus, Washington’s forces were relatively weak, so rather than risk his army in the all-out defense of Philadelphia or any other location, he would wear down the British by engaging them in smaller battles much as Fabius had done. Washington’s main goal was to preserve his troops, even if that meant ceding land.
Howe indeed had his sights set on Philadelphia, just as Congress feared. Having failed to break the Americans’ will, he was growing less sure of his ability to suppress the rebellion. In December 1776 he had been confident of a speedy end to the war, but by April the next year he concluded, “my hopes of terminating the war this year are vanquished.”
1
By retaking much of New Jersey, Washington had thwarted Howe’s plan to conquer the states one by one. In doing so, he made it very clear to Howe that the patriotic fervor was surprisingly durable; thus, Howe decided to strike at its heart. He saw the conquest of their political capital and largest city as a way to break the Americans’ unsinkable spirit. And so the indecisive Howe finally resolved to attack the American political leadership in Philadelphia.
1
By retaking much of New Jersey, Washington had thwarted Howe’s plan to conquer the states one by one. In doing so, he made it very clear to Howe that the patriotic fervor was surprisingly durable; thus, Howe decided to strike at its heart. He saw the conquest of their political capital and largest city as a way to break the Americans’ unsinkable spirit. And so the indecisive Howe finally resolved to attack the American political leadership in Philadelphia.
Howe sailed with his armada of a staggering 228 ships from New York, around Washington’s army in New Jersey, and landed near the not-so-bustling capital city. No longer dealing with a subservient commander who obediently followed Congress’s commands, John Adams now wondered, “Will W. attack him? I hope so . . . .”
2
2
While he knew he could not risk his army in a “winner takes all” battle, Washington did resist before ceding Philadelphia to Howe. “Public and Congressional opinion clamored for its defense,” and Washington so obliged.
3
He was a deferential dictator, after all. Plus, to avoid battle completely would be disadvantageous, since it would surely breed discontent among his troops and potential recruits.
4
As he showed repeatedly, Washington was as idealistic as he was practical.
3
He was a deferential dictator, after all. Plus, to avoid battle completely would be disadvantageous, since it would surely breed discontent among his troops and potential recruits.
4
As he showed repeatedly, Washington was as idealistic as he was practical.
The commander also had a theatrical side, which he displayed by leading his troops on a choreographed public relations parade through Philadelphia. The townspeople arose at seven o’clock one rainy August morning in 1777 to the sounds of fife and drum, and saw droves of American soldiers marching through their streets. Washington rode his horse in grand ceremonial style, followed by thousands of soldiers. In fact, they had been threatened with thirty-nine lashes should they abandon the parade, so they marched obediently before the admiring crowds who leaned out of Philadelphia’s windows and waved from the rooftops.
5
Washington warned the soldiers to follow the drumbeat “without dancing along or totally disregarding the music.”
6
Despite their “motley assortment of dress and occasional undress,” the troops “offered an amazing display.”
7
Washington sought to exhibit a powerful, trained army that would intimidate the city’s Loyalists and inspire men to join the cause.
8
5
Washington warned the soldiers to follow the drumbeat “without dancing along or totally disregarding the music.”
6
Despite their “motley assortment of dress and occasional undress,” the troops “offered an amazing display.”
7
Washington sought to exhibit a powerful, trained army that would intimidate the city’s Loyalists and inspire men to join the cause.
8
Due to troop reorganization as well as the surging “patriotism” that not-so-magically accompanied the warmer weather each year, Washington’s force had swelled to approximately 11,000 men. But he was still at a great disadvantage. With much of his ill-equipped force composed of unruly militiamen, Washington faced 13,000 well-fed professional soldiers under Howe’s command. Therefore, he resorted to his Fabian hit-and-run campaign, to Congress’s dismay.
Washington confronted Howe at Brandywine Creek on September 11, 1777. In a hard-fought battle, Howe and Cornwallis outgeneraled Washington. Suffering a disastrous 1,000 casualties versus Howe’s 500, the Americans were forced to retreat. But Washington’s focus was to protect his army, not Congress’s capital.
Eager for another victory like those at Trenton and Princeton, Washington attacked Howe yet again at Germantown on October 4, 1777. His overly complicated assault did not go well, however. One early historian vividly captured the scene:
the air grew darker as the smoke of the guns, and the still denser smoke of stubble and hay, which the enemy had set fire to, to increase the confusion, mingled with the fog; all hanging over the battle-field in sulphurous folds, which there was no wind to blow aside. And from it came shouts and huzzas, and shrieks and groans, and reverberations of cannon, and the crackling of musketry; and under it the fierce work still went on, the deadly thrust and clash of bayonet, the deadly struggle hand to hand, eyes glaring mortal hate into eyes they had never seen before, and foot sternly pressed on palpitating limbs and bespattering human blood. Look well to it, King George! think well of it under the gilded canopy of your royal closet!
9
Rather than risk the rest of his men in further attempts at defending Philadelphia, Washington fled with his battered army twenty miles back to Valley Forge for the winter. He had allowed the British to take the capital.
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