Authors: David Hitt,Heather R. Smith
Tags: #History
As the Launch Control Center was trying to figure out the problem, a hydrogen fire was noticed on the pad. “The trouble with a hydrogen fire is you can’t see it,” said Hartsfield. “Hydrogen and oxygen burn clear, and you can just see some heat ripples when you’re looking through it, but you can’t see the flame. I think one of the sensors picked it up, a
UV
sensor, which can see it.”
When the fire was discovered, there was talk about having the crew leave the shuttle via the slide wire Emergency Egress System. No one had ever ridden the slide wire, Hartsfield said, and flight controllers were afraid to tell the crew to do it. “That bothered a lot of us in that they were concerned enough about the fire that they really wanted us to do an emergency egress from the pad area, but since the slide wire had never been ridden by a real live person—they’d thrown sandbags in it and let it go down—they were afraid to use it, which was a bad situation, really.”
Hawley remembered the crew members talking about whether or not they should get out of the orbiter and use the Emergency Egress System baskets. “I remember thinking, well, fire’s not too bad because then you’re sitting inside this structure that’s designed to take several thousand degrees during reentry. It’s well insulated. Then I got to thinking, on the other hand, it’s attached to millions of gallons of rocket fuel, so maybe that’s not so good. But eventually they came and got us.”
As a result of the pad abort,
NASA
revamped and tested the procedures for the Emergency Egress System and implemented new training for aborting and recycling launches.
Steve Hawley said Mullane was very concerned after the fire that the flight was going to be canceled. “I really didn’t think they would do that, but I remember him being very concerned about that, probably more concerned than [about] the incident itself. He was concerned about the effect it would have on his flight assignment.”
While the flight did get delayed for two months and its payloads were changed as a result, the mission did not get canceled entirely. Mullane said he found scrubs personally and emotionally draining. “There is nothing that is more exhausting than being pulled out of that cockpit and knowing you
have to do it tomorrow,” he said. “It is the most emotionally draining experience I ever had in my life of actually flying on the shuttle. I will admit that it is terrifying to launch. Once you get up there, it’s relaxing, but launch, it’s terrifying. And people assume that it gets easier. I tell people, no, it doesn’t. I was terrified my first launch. I was terrified my second launch. I was terrified my third launch. And if I flew a hundred, I’d be terrified on a hundred.”
Mullane said that before every launch he felt like he faced the possibility of death, as if he were preparing to die. “I know it’s ridiculous to think you can predict your death,” Mullane said.
You could get in an auto accident driving out to get in the
T
-38, and that’s your death, and here you are thinking it’s going to be on a shuttle. But I certainly prepared for death in ways, in a formal way. I served in Vietnam, and there was certainly a sense of you might not come back from that. And I said my goodbyes to my parents and to my wife and young kids when I did that, but this time it was different because it’s such a discrete event. It’s not like in combat where in some missions you go off and fly and never see any enemy antiaircraft fire or anything. But this one you knew that it was going to be a very dangerous thing. And as a result, twenty-four hours before launch, you go to that beach house and you say goodbye to your family, to the wife, at least. That is incredibly emotional and draining, because the wife knows that it could be the last time she’s ever going to see you, and you know it’s the last time you might ever see her.
Weeks before launch, crew members and their families choose a family escort to help families with launch details and to be with them during launch. The family escort stands next to the family on top of the Launch Control Center during launch. Part of that role is simply helping the family get to where they need to be, making sure everything goes smoothly. However, in addition, the family escorts serve as casualty assistance officers in the event something unexpected happens.
Mullane recalled that his wife commented to him, “‘What I’m picking isn’t a family escort; it’s an escort into widowhood.’ You have this buildup, this incredible emotional investment in these launches that just ticks with that clock. Picking the astronaut escort. The goodbye on the beach house, at the beach house, that lonely beach out there. And now to go and get into the cockpit. Like I said, I thought a lot about death. I mean, I felt this was the most dangerous thing I would ever do in my life was ride this shuttle.”
Mullane opined that it was a mistake on
NASA
’s part to build the shuttle without an escape system. “I don’t know what the thought process was to think that we could build this rocket and not need an escape system, but it was the first high-performance vehicle I was ever going to fly on with no escape system,” said the three-time mission specialist.
If something went wrong, you were dead. So that was the sense of death that kind of rode along with you as you’re driving, preparing for this mission and driving out to the launchpad. You know it’s the most dangerous thing that you’ve ever done in your life. And to get strapped in and be waiting for that launch, and man, I’ll tell you, your heart is in your throat. I mean, after a launch abort, I swear, you could take a gun and point it right at somebody’s forehead, and they’re not even going to blink, because they don’t have any adrenaline left in them; it’s all been used up. To be strapped in out there and then to be told, “Oh, the weather’s bad. We got a mechanical problem,” and to be pulled out of the cockpit, and now it’s all going to start over. Twenty-four hours you go back, you’re exhausted, you go back, have a shower, meet your wife, say goodbye again, and then start the process all over the next day. And you do that two or three times in a row, and you’re ready for the funny farm. It really is a very emotionally draining thing.
The 41
D
mission had a total of three scrubs—two in June and one more in August—and finally lifted off on 30 August 1984.
Once the crew was finally in orbit, Steve Hawley, for whom 41
D
was his first flight, said it took several days to adjust to microgravity, but the team didn’t have several days before starting to work. “It’s interesting because what we’ve always done . . . is plan the mission so that the most important things happen first,” Hawley said.
That goes back to the days when we’d not flown the shuttle before and everybody was concerned that it was going to fall out of the sky, and so if you got up there, you needed to get rid of the satellite or whatever it was right away, so that when a problem happened, you’d have the mission accomplished. But the shuttle is very reliable, and so what you end up doing is doing the most important, most challenging, most difficult tasks when the crew is the least prepared to do it, because they’re inefficient and they haven’t adapted yet. . . . Back in those days, we were launching satellites five hours after we got on orbit, and we were still trying to figure out how to stay right side up.
The 41
D
mission deployed three satellites: two Payload Assist Modules and a
SYNCOM
for the navy. It was the first time three satellites were launched on one flight. The mission also performed a demonstration of the Office of Application and Space Technology solar wing, referred to as
OAST
-1. The 102-foot-tall, 13-foot-wide wing carried different types of solar cells. It demonstrated the use of large, lightweight solar arrays for future use in building large facilities in space, such as a space station.
As part of the demonstration,
OAST
-1 was extended to its full height several times, stretching out of a canister mounted on a truss in the payload bay. “When fully extended, it was 102 feet tall, and really spectacular to look at,” Hartsfield said.
The array did not have very many actual solar cells; instead, it was primarily a test structure to see how well the truss would extend. It featured three linear rods with cross-rods and cables, such that the rods were in compression and the cables were in tension. The structure collapsed into a cylindrical canister for launch.
NASA
engineers had predicted how rigid the structure would be based on models, and the orbital experiment would give them the opportunity to validate those predictions and models.
“Surprisingly, once the thing is deployed, it’s fairly rigid,” Hartsfield said. “What was interesting was the array was an order of magnitude stiffer than the engineers had predicted, which was a big surprise to them. In fact, by the time we got ready to fire the second set of firings, which was supposed to increase the motion, the thing had almost stopped completely, it was so stiff.”
Walker’s Continuous Flow Electrophoresis System worked as planned, but postflight analysis showed that the samples had some biological contamination. “In other words, a little bit of bacteria had gotten into some of the fluids during preparation before flight, and the bacteria had grown during flight and contaminated what we intended to have as . . . biologically pure, uncontaminated by extraneous bacteria,” Walker said. “So the work that I had done had been, so to speak, technically productive. We learned new procedures. We validated the procedures. But the veracity of the biological sample itself for the medical testing that we were going to do postflight turned out to be a problem, turned out to be bad. So we were not a complete success in terms of our mission accomplishment because of that.”
One of the more memorable episodes on the flight was the infamous “peecicle.” During flight, the crew had a problem with an icicle forming
around the nozzle where they dumped wastewater, primarily urine and condensation from the orbiter’s humidity control. There was a lot of concern about the icicle because when the orbiter started reentry the frozen water was in just about the right place to break off and hit the Orbital Maneuvering System, Hartsfield said. “If you hit the
OMS
pod and broke those tiles, that’s a real high-heat area right on the front of that pod, you could burn through. And if you burned through, that’s where the propellant is for the
OMS
engines, and that’s not a good thing to have happen.”
Hawley recalled that the ground called up and had the crew test the wastewater dump. “I think we didn’t know anything was unusual initially,” Hawley said.
I think maybe the ground called us and told us to terminate the supply water dump because they had seen some temperature funnies. So we did, and then sometime later, I guess they got curious enough to use the cameras on the robot arm to see what was there. So we set the arm up, and yes, you could see this icicle there. For whatever reason subsequent to that, they decided that we ought to try a waste dump and watch it with the camera on the arm, and the icicle was still there. I remember, as we were doing it, watching the second icicle form. So we ended up stopping that dump, and now here we are with this icicle.
The ground crew started working to find possible solutions, one of which was to turn that side of the orbiter toward the sun and let the icicle melt. “After about three days we were convinced that the ice was not going to sublime off the orbiter,” Hartsfield said. “It reduced in size somewhat, but it was still there. I had people ask me, ‘Gee whiz, you got it right in the sun, why didn’t it melt?’ I said, ‘The same reason snow and ice don’t melt on a mountain. It’s in direct sunlight, but it doesn’t absorb much heat. It reflects most of it.’ That was the same thing as this icicle. It wasn’t going anywhere.”
The next option was to send astronauts on a spacewalk to break off the ice. Hawley and Mullane had trained as contingency
EVA
crew members and were selected for the
EVA
, if there was to be one. “I remember Mike was thrilled,” Hawley said,
because he was going to get to do a spacewalk, and I’m sitting there going, “This is not a good idea. I don’t know how in the world we’re going to get to it.” I mean, it’s down on the side of the orbiter aft of the hatch, and there’s no trans
lation path down there. I guess they were talking about taking the
CFES
unit apart, using some of the poles that the
CFES
was constructed with to maybe grab one of us by the boots and hang him over the side and have him knock it off. That all sounded like a bad plan to me.
It was decided not to try an
EVA
but to use the robotic arm to knock the ice off instead. “I remember thinking, ‘Yeah, it’s a good plan,’” Hawley recalled, “and Mike was thinking, ‘Oh no, I’m not going to get to do an
EVA
.’”
While mission controllers were trying to resolve how to get rid of the icicle, the crew faced another, more immediate issue inside the orbiter. To avoid making the icicle larger, the decision was made that the crew would not be able to dump the waste tank again. While there was still some room in the tank, calculations revealed that the condensation that would be collected during the rest of the mission would fill that volume. “What that meant practically to us,” Hawley explained, “was that we couldn’t use the toilet anymore, because there was no room in the waste tank for the liquid waste.”
The crew members collected their waste in plastic bags and stored the waste-filled bags on board. Walker said some of the bags were left over from the Apollo program. “I’m kind of an amateur historian,” Walker said, “so I felt a little bad at peeing in these historic bags, but we had to do what we had to do.”
In retrospect, Hartsfield said, the incident is funny, but it wasn’t funny at the time. “The problem was that in zero g, Newton’s third law is very apparent to you. If you just try to use a bag, when the urine hit the bottom of the bag, it turned around and came right back out, because there’s no gravity to keep it there. Didn’t take long to figure that wasn’t going to work.” The astronauts stuffed the bags with dirty underwear, socks, towels, and washcloths to absorb the urine.