Burn After Reading (35 page)

On the eve of the invasion of North Africa, in the fall of 1942, it became necessary to establish surreptitious contact with pro-Allied French generals in Algeria and Morocco. Eisenhower toyed with the idea of personally going on that secret mission. “Since manifestly I could not go myself,” he wrote, “I chose, from many volunteers, my deputy, General Mark W. Clark, to make the journey.” Clark and his fellow “agents” sneaked to the rendezvous by submarine and experienced some of the perils of espionage. They were forced into hiding to escape detection by Vichy security forces whose suspicion had been aroused. This was the celebrated clandestine journey on which Clark lost his pants but gained invaluable information.

Later Eisenhower sponsored other such secret missions, one by Brigadier Strong and General Walter Bedell Smith, his own chief of staff, to negotiate the surrender of Italy with General Castellano at clandestine meetings in Lisbon in August, 1943; another by General Maxwell D. Taylor, who operated as his seeing-eye in Rome when the city was still held by the Germans.

Ike fully appreciated not only the importance, but also the thrills of such clandestine operations. In
Crusade in Europe,
he described them with the starry-eyed enthusiasm of an Eric Ambler fan. “Then began,” he wrote, “a series of negotiations, secret communications, clandestine journeys by secret agents, and frequent meetings in hidden places that, if encountered in the fictional world, would have been scorned as incredible melodrama. Plots of various kinds were hatched only to be abandoned because of changing circumstances.” He was especially impressed with Taylor's conspiratorial skill and daring in enemy-held Rome, “where his personal adventures and those of his companion added another adventurous chapter to the whole thrilling story.” Ike added: “The risks he ran were greater than I asked any other agent or emissary to undertake during the war—he carried weighty responsibilities and discharged them with unerring judgment, and every minute was in imminent danger of discovery and death.”

In England, between January and the end of May, 1944, Brigadier (later Major-General) Strong was responsible for a complex intelligence enterprise in preparation for D-Day. It consisted of three interrelated but essentially different manipulations. One was the collection of intelligence. The other was a negative effort to conceal the impending venture. The third was the development of elaborate deception measures to mislead the enemy as to the real Allied intentions, strength, and the direction of the attack.

This game of grand illusions began in January, 1944, as soon as Eisenhower arrived in England and assumed command of
Overlord
. At that time a nebulous smokescreen was put up, behind which the Germans were allowed to suspect feverish preparations for an imminent invasion of Western Europe. During those days and weeks, Ike's own movements were furtive and clandestine. The mystery was concocted to keep the Germans confused and to compel them to spread their forces all along an extensive front.

In March, a single, brand-new B-29 super-bomber was
flown to Bovingdon Airfield in England. Its arrival was leaked to the Spanish Military Attaché in London, from whose reports to Madrid the Germans were known to be getting considerable intelligence. In actual fact, the B-29s were intended for the Pacific, but the impression was created that they would be used against Germany. The deception resulted in much reshuffling of Germany's air defenses and in considerable wasteful exercise, when concentration on realistic defense measures was imperative.

In May, only weeks before D-Day, deception went into high gear. It was designed to exploit to the fullest Germany's major deficiency—the lack of a general reserve of troops. According to the estimate of the Allies' Joint Intelligence Committee, Hitler had a total of three hundred and thirty-six combat divisions, but only fifty-eight of them had been identified in France and the Low Countries. Almost two hundred of them were on the Eastern Front, locked in desperate battle with the Red Army. The rest were thinly spread from the Arctic Ocean to Italy, reflecting the plight into which Hitler had maneuvered himself when he bit off far more than he could digest.

In order to bolster their defenses in France, the Germans would have had to withdraw forces from elsewhere, and the Allied command resorted to deception to prevent this. Misleading information, supported by shadowy moves, was put out to convince the Germans that Ike intended to strike at Norway, where they had only twelve divisions. Strong was gratified when his agents in Norway reported the arrival of another German division there, when, if the Germans had known the truth, it was sorely needed in France.

On May 20, Commander Butcher recorded in his diary: “When we invade west of the Seine, we hope the Germans will believe that this is merely a minor operation and that they may expect the major thrust in Pas de Calais, thus keeping the Nazis from shifting troops from the latter place to the coast between the Seine and Cherbourg.” During those days, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery was seen in the most unlikely and indiscreet places, indicating by his presence certain activities
discernible to the trained intelligence analyst. This Montgomery was merely an actor resembling the real Field Marshal; the genuine article was preoccupied in places whose significance had to be quietly concealed from the enemy.

Elaborate efforts were thus made to permit the enemy to ascertain exactly what we wanted him to learn. The efforts to conceal from him the truth were even more elaborate.

The unprecedented magnitude of the impending operation, the ramifications of the preparations, and the very vastness of the Allied forces made it impossible to conceal everything from the enemy. A substantial portion of information had to be known to military attachés and other privileged persons in London known to be friendly to the Germans. Some preparations could not be concealed from the frantic reconnaissance efforts of the
Luftwaffe
. Many confidential communications had to be put on the air, and although they were encoded or enciphered, there was reason to believe that the
Luftwaffe's
so-called
Forschungsamt,”
a central cryptographic agency, was reading many of them.

Yet so efficient was the screening operation that the Germans had little hard intelligence in the end. They knew D-Day was coming, but they had little precise information from which to gauge our intentions, our timetable, our strength and the direction of our attack. While security was never taken for granted, today we know that it proved well nigh ironclad. In fact, aside from a harmless, bibulous indiscretion that threatened to reveal the date of D-Day, there was but a single major “leak” through which, it was feared, the Germans could acquire the sort of intelligence they so desperately and urgently needed.

In March, 1944, a package containing highly classified documents concerning
Overloard
was discovered in Chicago. Sent by the War Department's Ordinance Division through the mail, it was addressed to a private residence in a section of the city that was densely populated by people of German origin or descent. The package was improperly wrapped and the documents fell out. At least ten persons read them in the Chicago Post Office. It was then forwarded, not to the obviously improper
address on the wrapper, but to the Army's 6th Service Command in Chicago. There, four more unauthorized persons had a chance to peruse the documents before agents of G-2 and the Counter Intelligence Corps got them.

General Clayton Bissell, new head of G-2 in Washington, entered the case personally, and directed the investigation. It developed that in the Ordnance Division, back in Washington, the package had been addressed by an American soldier of German extraction. The explanation he offered was anything but satisfactory. He claimed that his sister had been seriously ill in Chicago and he must have been preoccupied with her when he erred by addressing the package to her street address.

Was the soldier a spy? Was this clumsy handling of a sensitive package part of a greater espionage plot? The case was never solved to everybody's satisfaction. The persons who read the documents were placed under surveillance, as were the soldier and his family. Nothing derogatory was discovered about them. They were warned not to divulge anything they had read, but their discretion could not be guaranteed. Nevertheless, it appears that nothing ever leaked from them to the Germans—but for six weeks no one in the Allied High Command drew an easy breath.

An outstanding feat of D-Day screening was the concealment from the Germans of any knowledge of a couple of artificial ports. Called “Mulberries” and “Gooseberries,” these were monstrous quays which were to be floated across the Channel and sunk in position to make improvised landing places for supply ships. This heavy flow of supplies would make it possible to concentrate the invasion on a single major landing. Special efforts were made to ascertain whether or not the Germans had any inkling of the piers. A week before the invasion, Strong was satisfied that the Germans still expected several landings, the first one to be diversionary. From this he deduced that they knew nothing of the Berries. When, only ten days later, the piers were in place, with merchantmen disgorging their supplies, the Germans simply refused to believe they were real and thought
that the reconnaissance planes of the
Luftwaffe
had photographed some elaborate camouflage.

In the meantime, Intelligence was working feverishly,
collecting
information. The magnitude of the task cannot be adequately expressed. German units down to single platoons and squads had to be identified. Airports of the
Luftwaffe
had to be located and the
Luftwaffe's
strength established in number and quality of its planes, supplies and personnel. Detailed blueprints of the vaunted
Westwall
—the system of German fortifications all along the coast—had to be obtained. Specific information was needed about the coastal batteries, including some new ones, big naval guns removed from major warships and emplaced at strategic points. Rail traffic had to be monitored.

Intelligence had to find out about the condition of the landing beaches, minefields both on and off shore, and the intricate system of underwater obstacles. Those underwater obstacles represented a special problem that had to be solved at all costs. Among them Intelligence had identified gatelike structures of steel angles, called “Element O”; another, named “Tetrahedra,” was a pyramid of steel angles about four feet, six inches each. Commonest were steel stakes consisting of I-beams or rails. If the ships were to get through to the beaches, these obstacles had to be destroyed, and they required hand-placed demolitions.

In the end, Strong and his special force succeeded in procuring virtually all the data needed, including samples of the mines and obstacles, enabling special demolition teams to practice on them in preparation for the real thing.

The nerve center of this fantastic activity was the War Room at Widewing, Eisenhower's invasion headquarters. There, all the pertinent data was spelled out and marked on huge maps. One map showed the beaches, also indicating the depth of water in which the troops were to wade ashore. Another map showed the location of gun emplacements, hedgehog defenses, barbed wire installations and minefields. Still another displayed all enemy airfields within striking distance of the invasion fleet.

Down on paper was the German Order of Battle, identifying all the commanding officers from Field Marshals von Runstedt and Rommel down to regimental leaders; and listing every unit with their combat characteristics. According to this Order of Battle, there were fifty-eight German divisions in the invasion area. Intelligence also identified some two hundred thousand dissident Russian troops deployed in France, former war prisoners recruited for this special force. The
Luftwaffe
was believed to have two thousand two hundred and fifty planes.

Where did all of this information come from?

The vast bulk of the data emerged from the routine sources of conventional Intelligence—from aerial reconnaissance and the painstaking study of aerial photographs; from monitoring the enemy's communications and intercepting his documents; and the other usual means of Intelligence collection. From time to time, special patrols were put ashore to bring back detailed information on certain obscure targets. Resident agents sent back additional information on specific installations, on last-minute changes in the Order of Battle and on certain objectives whose assessment required specialized knowledge.

It was a spectacular job, but it was performed with a minimum of melodrama and bravado. Whatever part the romantic variety of story-book espionage played in this intelligence effort, it was infinitesimal and insignificant compared with the routine, almost humdrum, teamwork of conventional Intelligence.

There was one area of friction and controversy that was sufficiently serious to cast a shadow over the operation. It was the role Frenchmen (or, for that matter, Frenchwomen) were to be permitted to play in this crucial effort aimed at their liberation.

Inside France, the army of resistance stood ready, but the role it was to play was still obscure. This was due mainly to Roosevelt's enduring annoyance with France (whose collapse in 1940 left him with a bitter taste) and his irrational hostility to de Gaulle, in whom he saw an egomaniacal troublemaker. Roosevelt refused to believe that de Gaulle had any influence
over men and events inside occupied France or, indeed, that any real forces of resistance existed at all. His attitude was certainly not founded in fact. The evidence was available to the President from Donovan's O.S.S., whose special teams, individual agents and weapon instructors were plotting inside France in close co-operation with the French underground. From 1943 on, the O.S.S. was in London in force to support French resistance, and in January, 1944, it developed a quasi-autonomous organization called Special Forces Headquarters (S.F.H.Q.), created specifically for clandestine operations in connection with the invasion. In that first month of S.F.H.Q., the Americans dropped ninety-six containers of supplies for the French underground, and this surreptitious support increased rapidly both in quality and quantity until S.F.H.Q. was dropping five thousand containers in a single month.