Caligula: A Biography (9 page)

Then it was Silanus’s turn. It sufficed for the emperor to indicate his displeasure with him in the Senate. Caligula altered the procedure so that the former consuls would vote in order of seniority, thus terminating Silanus’s privilege as highest-ranking senator. Everyone who had lived through the reign of Tiberius realized that it was only a matter of time until some unscrupulous senators would bring charges against the man whom Caligula had publicly demoted. Silanus saw the handwriting on the wall and committed suicide, enabling his family to retain his fortune, since if he had been tried and found guilty it would have been confiscated.

Judged by the standards of a modern society in which political disagreements and power struggles are conducted without violence, Caligula’s elimination of the people who had helped him secure the throne, and particularly his treatment of young Gemellus, were reprehensible. Given his experience of life near the throne, however, he may well have felt he had a stark alternative: Either them or me and my family. From the perspective of today this assessment can hardly be termed incorrect, and contemporaries concurred with it. Philo, whose aim is otherwise to stress Caligula’s immorality, cites at length opinions that ran counter to his own appraisal:

“Of his own cousin and fellow heir they would talk thus: ‘Sovereignty cannot be shared; that is an immutable law of nature. He being the stronger promptly did to the weaker what the
weaker would have done to him. This is defense, not murder. Perhaps, too, it was providential and for the benefit of all mankind that the lad was put out of the way, since some would have been partisans of him and others of Gaius, and it is such things that create disturbances and wars both civil and foreign.’ . . . Of Macro they said, ‘His pride extended beyond reasonable limits . . . What reason had he for reversing his part and transferring the subject to the rank of ruler, and Gaius, the emperor, to the place of a subject? To command, which is what he did, befits best the sovereign, and to obey, which is what he deemed Gaius should submit to, befits the subject’ . . . In the case of Silanus, the argument ran, ‘he was under a ridiculous delusion in thinking that a father-in-law had the same influence over a son-in-law as a real father has over his son . . . But this silly man, even though he had ceased to be a father-in-law, extended his activities beyond his sphere and did not understand that the death of his daughter carried with it the death of the matrimonial affinity’ ” (Phil.
Leg
. 67–71).

Together with the elimination of the emperor’s last rival for power, the two most powerful men in his circle, and old family enemies, other measures shed light on the difficulties and dangers of the transitional period. Shortly after recovering his health Caligula married for a second time, indicating that he intended to father an heir and provide for a dynastic succession. His chosen bride was Livia Orestilla, whom he is said to have obtained by high-handedly abducting her during her wedding to another man, Gaius Calpurnius Piso. Supposedly Caligula justified his behavior by the examples of Romulus and Augustus, each of whom chose to wed a woman who was already married. Augustus had even married Livia while she was pregnant. Livia Orestilla behaved quite differently from her predecessor of the
same name. This aristocratic young woman appears to have had no interest in being empress—a status for which others would have been prepared to suffer a good deal more than abduction. She remained loyal to the husband she had chosen herself, and had unauthorized contact with him, thereby effectively disqualifying herself for the task intended for her of giving birth to legitimate imperial offspring. A short time afterwards, the marriage ended in divorce, and Orestilla was banished from Rome, although the surviving accounts provide contradictory details. Calpurnius Piso’s admission to the distinguished priestly college of the Arval Brethren in May 38 suggests that Caligula’s choice of bride was accomplished less sensationally, or at least that it occurred with the consent of her former bridegroom and thus conformed to Roman custom.

Some of Caligula’s other measures, political in the narrower sense, were more successful. At the New Year oaths were usually sworn to uphold the decrees of previous emperors; in the year 38 Tiberius was excluded, in a nod to the Senate, which had desired to expunge his memory. In addition Caligula rescinded Tiberius’s ban on the historical writings of Titus Labienus, Cremutius Cordus and Cassius Severus, announcing that he attached great importance to full historical records for later generations. He also reintroduced the custom of publishing and presenting to the Senate the
rationes imperii
, the accounts of the officials responsible for administering military and financial matters in the Empire. Because the relationship between the emperor’s own assets and the public treasury was a complex one, it is unclear exactly which outlays were included, but in any case the measure corresponded well to his announced intention of sharing rule with the Senate. Further innovations were aimed at the judicial system. Caligula limited the legal cases that could be
appealed to him as emperor, a move to enhance the importance of work done by judges of senatorial rank. He created a fifth
decuria
or panel of judges to expedite hearing cases. And finally the emperor carried out a long overdue reform of the equestrian order, expelling unworthy members and admitting new ones, with special attention to high-ranking and wealthy officials of cities around the Empire. To many of them he granted the privilege of wearing senatorial rather than equestrian insignia of rank, even though they were not members of the Senate.

For all of Italy Caligula waived the general sales tax, which had probably been earlier reduced to one half of one percent. This measure benefited the lower classes above all. A return to the old procedure for electing magistrates was aimed at the people of Rome. Under Tiberius these elections had been removed from the popular assemblies and given to the Senate. The change had made it easier for the emperor to exert control, had relieved senators of ruinous campaign expenses, mostly from sponsoring games. Cassius Dio makes it clear that the aristocracy responded to the revival of popular elections with skepticism. The emperor’s goal may have been to restore the advantages the common people enjoyed when candidates had to try to win their favor. The measure had no noticeable effect in the political sphere, however, since there was rarely more than one candidate for any given office. The voters paid so little attention to the reinstated electoral process that Caligula was forced to abolish it later. Presumably the renewal of permission to found
collegia
was also granted as a boon to the plebs. These were corporations and social clubs, and sometimes economic ventures as well, most of whose members came from the lower classes; they had been banned during the late Republic for political reasons. Caligula held lavish gladiatorial games whose cost in both blood and money was
extravagant. And finally he had the floor removed from the
Saepta
—originally a gathering place for elections—and flooded it, so that naval battles could be presented there. It was later replaced by a wooden amphitheater.

Most of the political measures introduced early in the year 38, around the time that Macro and Silanus fell from power, were enthusiastically received. The Senate responded by voting special honors to the emperor. Every year on a particular date, for example, a golden bust of Caligula was to be carried to the Capitol, with the entire Senate marching in the procession and boys and girls from the leading senatorial families singing songs in praise of the emperor’s virtues. The first day of Caligula’s reign was designated
Parilia
like 21 April, the date of Rome’s founding, implying that he had founded the city anew.

Caligula’s policies were undoubtedly aimed at reconciling the various politically relevant populations to his rule. A clear difference emerges, however, from earlier actions at the time of Macro and Silanus, which still bore the stamp of the Augustan Principate. Caligula accommodated the Senate—which continued to look to the ideal of the “free” Republic, now long gone—by making the finances of the Empire public and by changing the appellate procedure for legal cases, but he also took the Republican ideal seriously in instances where it jarred with the senators’ interests. Historians could circulate their works uncensored in keeping with the notion of Republican freedom, but there were disadvantages. As Tacitus showed in his account of Tiberius’s reign in the
Annals
, a frank account of past events documented not only the emperor’s despotism but also the unscrupulous opportunism of some senators and the submissiveness of the Senate as a whole—discreditable behavior which the Senate would have preferred forgotten. Reintroduction of popular
elections for magistrates was similarly two-edged. Elections were a fundamental element of the Republican political order, but they had been contrary to the interests of the senatorial aristocracy for some time. Now that the Empire was administered by the emperor, senators had lost their former opportunities for enriching themselves as administrators in the provinces. Because many senators could thus no longer run exorbitant election campaigns, they had come to terms with holding elections in the Senate, though it was tantamount to appointment of magistrates by the emperor. Caligula’s renewal of old traditions outdid the Senate in its conservatism and simultaneously forestalled its objections; the senators could not criticize without exposing the selectivity in their glorification of the past, so that they were forced to remain silent.

In his ingenious positioning vis-à-vis the Senate, Caligula at the same time made good use of his support among the plebs, who profited more than the aristocracy from his political and economic changes. The emperor was not afraid to give the lower classes greater scope for political action through popular elections and
collegia
. He elevated upper-class inhabitants of the provinces to the equestrian order and smoothed their path to the Senate by awarding them the symbols of senatorial rank in advance. All this was definitely in the emperor’s own interest as well. As already apparent under Augustus, “new men” who were indebted to the emperor for their advancement to the Senate tended to be considerably more compliant than members of the old aristocratic families (at least in the first generation). The changes were presented, however, as a return to the good old ways, an aim that no senator could publicly oppose.

The political measures accompanying the removal of Gemellus, his supporters, and the two leading figures from the reign of
Tiberius were thus clever and astute. They furthered the interests of the senatorial aristocracy, the equestrian order, the upper class in the provinces, and the plebeians in Rome itself, while also strengthening the emperor’s hand. It is probably a credit to them that no threat to Caligula’s position emerged in the period immediately following.

How much was Caligula himself responsible for these successful efforts to consolidate power and how much should be ascribed to his advisers? It is difficult to know. A number of people besides Lepidus, Drusilla, Agrippina, and Livilla probably influenced him, and the two new Praetorian prefects and other senior officers of the imperial guard undoubtedly played an important role. Individuals like King Julius Agrippa, who is supposed to have been on friendly terms with the emperor, and perhaps a few senators presumably turned their proximity to him to account. Finally, probably already active behind the scenes was a group whose significance would not become evident until later—the freedmen who acted as secretaries and administrators in the imperial household. Such men were employed in all large aristocratic households, and because of their dependent status and specific skills they often possessed important specialized knowledge that their noble masters were unwilling or unable to acquire themselves.

A hint of Caligula’s own personal stamp on the measures described above is provided by a strange episode immediately after his illness. A Roman citizen named Afranius Potitus had sworn a vow to offer his own life if the emperor recovered, while a knight named Atanius Secundus had vowed that he would fight as a gladiator. After regaining his health Caligula insisted that both men fulfill their promises, to keep them from perjuring themselves. Instead of receiving the rewards they had hoped to
obtain by their exaggerated devotion, both met their deaths. Caligula’s reaction is telling. It has affinities with his measures in 38 and typifies behavior to emerge in crasser form more and more frequently as time passed. Caligula began, like Augustus, by enjoying flattery, but this changed after the first few months of his reign. He did not respond like Tiberius, however, seeking to avoid flatterers by withdrawing from the public sphere entirely. Instead, Caligula framed a new response to the ambiguous communication that had become normal in dealing with the emperor. The two men’s vows were ambiguous in that the explicit wish—for the emperor’s recovery—did not match the unstated wish—to be rewarded for their flattery. Caligula showed that he would abjure this form of communication, by taking it at face value. One could say that he simply outed them. He attributed to their utterances a sincerity that they could not deny without admitting that the emperor’s health had not been foremost in their minds—and the consequences of such an admission were foreseeable.

In Caligula’s dealings with the Senate after the fall of Macro and Silanus too, he took the declared ideals—derived from the old Republic—at face value and implemented them. This contravened the real interests of men who had professed the ideals, but they could not complain without losing face. The principle behind the emperor’s actions was cynical, but not without wit of a kind. At this point it took fairly harmless form, apart from the fate of Afranius and Atanius. Later, however, the principle would operate in much more unpleasant forms.

Never before had Rome been ruled by a young man. For centuries a handful of experienced older men, the
principes
of the
Roman aristocracy, had been the leaders and made the decisions. The first two sole rulers, Julius Caesar and Augustus, had won their positions by victories in protracted civil wars and were middle-aged when they began to govern. Tiberius had been a successful general in the provinces for many years before he became emperor at the age of fifty-four. Now the question was: How would a young man measure up? Caligula came from a prestigious family, certainly, and had survived the webs of intrigue spun around the old emperor, but he had no experience at all in politics. How would the aristocracy, led as always by old men of great experience, deal with a young man on the throne?