Call Sign Extortion 17 (20 page)

Chapter 31

Extortion 17 and the Earlier Ranger Mission

After reviewing Extortion 17's odd and repeated delays, the sparkle vs. burn confusion, and its apparent stall in the air, one thing seems clear: the helicopter's odd behavior does not add up.

Isn't it interesting that just prior to its shoot-­down, Extortion 17 was the only aircraft in the sky over the Tangi Valley that could not locate the landing zone? The Apache helicopter gunships knew exactly where the landing zone was. The AC-130 fixed-­wing gunship circling 7,000 feet overhead knew exactly where it was.

Of course those other aircraft knew where the landing zone was. In an age of guided-­precision GPS that allows smart bombs to find their targets with absolute accuracy and precision when launched from a thousand miles away, landing on the eye of a needle, it is impossible to envision a realistic scenario under which Extortion 17 should have had difficulty finding the landing zone.

Yet Extortion 17 indicated that it was having trouble lining up with the landing zone, claiming that “our lane direction isn't matching up” and the sparkle was to “give them [whoever ‘them' is] a little better idea where we're landing.”

None of this makes sense in the computerized GPS era, and suggests the aircraft had been infiltrated. It smacks of a pilot trying to stall, perhaps for self-­preservation purposes.

Recall that this final, fatal flight was not Extortion 17's only mission that night. Earlier in the evening, before its mission with the SEAL team,
the chopper dropped off a platoon of US Army Rangers several clicks (kilometers) outside the battle zone, meaning that it did not fly over “hot” air space where Taliban RPGs posed a direct threat.

So naturally, one might wonder, “Did Extortion 17 have all those problems finding the landing zone when it dropped off the Rangers earlier in the evening?”

The answer: absolutely not. The chronology of the earlier flight showed the chopper approaching the Rangers' landing zone with no problems finding it. The pilot radioed his approach on time, executed the landing on time, infiltrated the Rangers, then took off and flew back to Base Shank to await his next mission, which, unfortunately, would be his last.

Here is the chronology from Extortion 17's earlier mission (the Ranger mission), laid out in Enclosure H, at page 2 [author's emphasis]:

 

2253 EX 17 depart Sayyid Abad for

2254 EX 17 reports 6 minutes to infill (3)

2256 EX 17 reports 3 minutes to infill (3)

2258 EX 17 wheels down at (3)

2259 EX 17 infill complete (3)

2300 EX 17 depart, en-­route FOB (3)

2308 EX 17 arrival FOB, assume casualty alert posture (19)

2323 1/B reports arrival at CP1 (19)

2327 While ground force conducts movement toward Objective area, positively identifies (PID) eight (8) insurgents with RPGs and AK-47s (3)

 

Note that Extortion 17 made timely call-­ins, and there are no unexplained delays, nor any requests for sparkles.

Extortion 17, under the command of Bryan Nichols, had absolutely no trouble locating the landing zone for the Rangers. The pre-­landing calls were radioed in on time.

On Extortion 17's first mission of the evening, there were no delays. There was no indecisiveness on the part of the pilot. There were no requests for a sparkle. There were no radio transmissions from Bryan
Nichols requesting the sparkle to “give
them
a better idea of where we're landing.” There were no odd comments from Bryan Nichols indicating that “Lane direction not matching up.”

As a matter of fact, Extortion 17's first mission, infiltrating the Army Rangers,
ran so smoothly that the landing took place one minute ahead of schedule
.

How could Nichols have displayed such crisp precision on the first mission of the evening with the Rangers, then showed such odd indecision, and what appears to be borderline incompetence during the second mission involving the SEALs?

As mentioned earlier Nichols and Carter were not Special Forces pilots, and they were not trained in the same way as the aviators of the 160th Special Operations Airborne Regiment out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky. They did not have the same type of training for low, fast-­speed approaches as did Special Forces pilots, nor did they pilot the Special Forces helicopters that would have allowed them to pull off this type of mission.

But the ability to simply find and approach a landing zone, using GPS navigation, is not an ability that is unique just to Special Forces aviators.

Bryan Nichols clearly possessed the ability to land his aircraft on target, in a timely manner, and with crisp precision, as he proved in the first infiltration that night involving US Army Rangers.

So logic dictates that the second mission—involving the SEALs—shows a pilot that for whatever reason did not have full control of his aircraft. Nichols had proven himself earlier in the evening, and the more experienced co-­pilot David Carter could have put that helicopter down on the head of a dime in his sleep.

Something went terribly wrong inside that helicopter, and whatever went wrong was most likely beyond the pilots' control.

This draws our attention right back on the pink elephant in the room—namely the seven unidentified Afghans who infiltrated Extortion 17, and whose names have not been released.

Did Bryan Nichols suddenly forget how to fly? Did he forget how to find a landing zone?

Of course not.

Frankly, the bizarre behavior exhibited by Extortion 17 on its final, fateful mission was the behavior of an aircraft that was under siege from forces within.

Could this be the reason that the Executive Summary of the Colt Report does not mention the seven Afghans at all? Or, could this be the reason that the Joint Special Operations Task Force commander abruptly cut off the J3 (operations officer) mid-­sentence when he attempted to offer more information on the unidentified Afghans? Could this be the reason that the sergeant major, sitting in Billy and Karen Vaughn's Florida home, in the presence of Admiral McRaven, told the Vaughns that the Afghans getting on that aircraft without being properly identified on the manifest was a “very big deal”?

Were they trying to hide the politically embarrassing fact that this flight was, or could have been, compromised by Taliban infiltrators determined to help sabotage it from the inside, or to communicate with Taliban forces on the ground about the choppers approach to coordinate the timing of a point-­blank shot?

The military's attempted secrecy on this matter, combined with the inexplicably erratic behavior of the helicopter in the air on its final mission, suggest that there is a cause-­and-­effect relationship here, and that the presence of the seven Afghans may have been a cause of the chopper stalling, delaying, and making odd requests (for a sparkle) and comments (“Lane direction not matching up”) just before the shoot-­down.

Bryan Nichols and David Carter were not blind mice flying in the dark. They could have, and should have, been able to land that helicopter on time, had they not been interfered with.

Moreover, the chronology on the first flight of Extortion 17 (the Rangers flight) underscores another important point about where the Rangers were infiltrated when the helicopter landed. Remember, at paragraph 3 of his Executive Summary, Brigadier General Colt stated, “The aircrew, having flown into the valley only hours before to insert the initial force, was the most familiar aircrew available to effectively carry out this mission.”

With this statement, Colt implied that the flight path taken by Extortion 17 in both its first and second missions was the same, and that the level of danger was the same in both flights.

But this is not accurate. In fact, the second missi
on involved a far more dangerous flight path than the first. Look at Enclosure H, beginning at 10:59 p.m. (2259), the moment the Rangers had completed exiting the aircraft.

 

2259 EX 17 infill complete (3)

2300 EX 17 depart, en-­route FOB (3)

2308 EX 17 arrival FOB, assume casualty alert posture (19)

2323 1/B reports arrival at CP1 (19)

2327 While ground force conducts movement toward objective area, positively identifies (PID) eight (8) insurgents with RPGs and AK-47s (3)

 

The Rangers “infiltrate” (step off the chopper and onto the ground) at 10:59 p.m., and one minute later, at 11:00 p.m. (2300), Extortion 17 took off and headed back to Base Shank. Translated, “EX 17 depart” means Extortion 17 had taken off, and “en-­route FOB” means that the helicopter was en route to Forward Operating Base Shank, where it would soon pick up the SEAL team.

Now take a look at the last entry from this section, at 11:27 p.m. (2327), twenty-­seven minutes after Extortion 17 has dropped off the Rangers and taken off and headed back to Base Shank.

Note that the ground force, the same ground force of Rangers that Extortion 17 just put on the ground, was conducting “movement toward (the) objective area.” What does that mean? Well if the ground force was moving “toward (the) objective area,” that means that the ground force had been moving for nearly thirty minutes on foot, and they still hadn't reached the objective area yet. That's because Extortion 17 on this mission (the Ranger mission) did not fly into or over the objective area, but in fact, dropped the Rangers off several clicks (kilometers) behind the battle zone (objective area), and left the Rangers to move into the danger zone on foot.

Note too, that the Rangers had moved on foot for twenty-­seven minutes before they even spotted enemy forces, as noted in the language stating, “positively identifies (PID) eight (8) insurgents with RPGs and AK-47s (3).” That means that Extortion 17, on its earlier “Ranger mission” did not fly the Rangers over a hot zone occupied by RPG-­bearing Taliban as later happened with the SEALs
, but dropped the Rangers off several kilometers behind the lines
. It took the Rangers half an hour before they had even seen a Taliban fighter with an RPG.

So, Colt was either intentionally obscuring the truth (likely) or was woefully uninformed about the earlier mission (highly unlikely) when he implied that the same degree of danger applied to both the first and second missions.

The SEALs were later flown over a hot valley, where Taliban forces were waiting with RPGs to shoot down a US helicopter, and the Army knew this at the time the mission was ordered. Put another way, the Rangers' flight path was a flight into the park. The SEALs' flight path, later in the evening, was a flight into a buzz saw.

To make matters worse, they ordered Extortion 17 to carry these SEALs into a buzz saw, but set rules of engagement to prevent the aircraft accompanying the SEALs from attacking Taliban on the ground—a subject covered in more depth in the following chapters.

Chapter 32

The Rules of Engagement: Groundwork for the Death of Thirty Americans

For those unfamiliar with the military, the rules of engagement are the rules under which US military forces are authorized to use force against an enemy.

Almost always, commanders have standing rules of engagement to fire if fired upon. But in other circumstances, US military forces are not allowed to fire against an enemy unless given permission from higher-­ups in the military chain of command.

One sub-­element in the rules of engagement is an option called “pre-­assault fire.” When pre-­assault fire is authorized, it is usually designed to clear the ground for an American landing force and minimize loss of life. Put another way, a lack of pre-­assault fire often creates the most dangerous situation for American forces attempting to land in hostile zones. The pre-­assault fire can (a) kill enemy insurgents who are waiting to kill Americans about to land, or (b) drive enemy insurgents away from the landing zone, far enough away so that their guns are not within reach of American forces.

Perhaps the most famous example of pre-­assault fire in American military history occurred on D-­day, June 6, 1944, when Allied naval forces began bombarding the beaches at Normandy to soften the beachhead, to make way for amphibious and infantry forces about to hit the beaches.

In helicopter assaults, such as the one attempted by Extortion 17, often other aircraft will begin firing into the landing zone prior to the arrival of the helicopter carrying the landing force, for the purpose of, again, (a) killing enemy insurgents who are waiting to kill Americans about to land, or (b) driving enemy insurgents away from the landing zone, far enough away so that their guns are not within reach of American forces.

Put simply, these SEALs and the aircrew were probably killed because the rules of engagement set down by the US military did not allow for pre-­assault fire to protect the SEAL team as it approached the landing zone.

There were three aircraft accompanying Extortion 17 that were capable of delivering pre-­assault fire. But these aircraft were not allowed to do so, because of the self-­imposed American rules of engagement. These aircraft included the two AH-64 Apache helicopters, referred to collectively as the “Air Weapons Team,” or AWT.

The third US aircraft capable of delivering pre-­assault fire was the AC-130 gunship, which was orbiting about 7,000 feet above the landing zone. Both the Apaches and the AC-130 were denied by the rules of engagement of the ability to use pre-­assault fire to clear the landing zone. In fact, the C-130 asked permission to fire against enemy forces on the ground, and was denied.

Enemy Taliban forces were all over the ground, in the vicinity of the landing zone. On the night of the attack, Extortion 17's mission was in support of a military operation code-­named Operation Lefty Grove.

This operation was executed with the purpose of killing or capturing a Taliban terrorist leader named Qari Tahir. Two groups of US Special Forces were designated as part of the operations plan to capture or kill Tahir.

The first group, a platoon of US Army Rangers, was designated as the Initial Assault Force (IAF), and was the principal Special Forces group, and if things went well, the only Special Forces group that would be involved in the operation. The two CH-47D Chinooks, Extortion 16 and Extortion 17, had flown the Ranger group, the IAF, to the edge of the combat zone earlier in the evening. Then, the Chinooks flew back to Forward Operating Base Shank, where they remained on standby.

The second group, the Navy SEAL group that died on Extortion 17, was designated as an Immediate Reaction Force (IRF). The Immediate Reaction Force was designated as “reactionary” because it was not planned to be part of the operation. It was to be called into action to “react” if something went wrong. The reactionary force was on the ground to bail out the Rangers if the Rangers got into trouble.

Indeed, during the first couple of days after the shoot-­down, the American press reported that the SEAL team had been deployed aboard Extortion 17 to “rescue” the Ranger team that according to their erroneous reporting had been “pinned down.” In other words, numerous press outlets reported a story that would have fit the SEALs' planned role on this mission. But as it turns out, the press's initial reports that the SEALs were deployed to save the Rangers were not true.

In fact, the SEALs were deployed to find Qari Tahir, and in doing so, Extortion 17 flew right over the top of enemy forces on the ground moving north, actually moving away from the Ranger platoon, toward a “compound” in which the terrorist leader, Qari Tahir was believed to be near the landing zone that was targeted.