Carthage Must Be Destroyed (27 page)

Now that Rome was emerging as an important regional power, the Carthaginians were clearly anxious to maintain and indeed strengthen diplomatic relations between the two city states. Thus in 351 BC a Carthaginian embassy was sent to Rome in order to present a massive gold crown weighing 11 kilograms as congratulations for victory against the Samnites. So proud were the Romans of this recognition of their growing stature by the most powerful state in the western Mediterranean that it was decided to place the crown in their most important temple, that of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitoline Hill.
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This was followed in 348 by a fresh treaty between the two cities, the terms of which were a more detailed and expanded version of the first (with Spain now added to the zones of Carthaginian influence). Carthage had plenty of reasons for maintaining friendly relations with Rome. The terms of the treaty afforded both Roman and Carthaginian merchants the same rights and privileges as citizens in each other’s city, and there is reason to believe that there was a significant Punic mercantile presence in Rome and in the wider area of Latium.
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Certainly the placing of copies of this and the previous treaty in the Treasury of the Aediles–senatorial officials whose roles included the supervision of Rome’s commercial markets–adds to the picture of a thriving trading relationship between the two states that would have probably involved fish products, salt, Sardinian fleeces and African garlic, as well as almonds and pomegranates.
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There are also several other intriguing clues that point to a Carthaginian presence in Rome. Varro, a Roman writer of the first century AD, mentions an area of Rome called Vicus Africus on the Esquiline Hill, which he said had got its name from resident hostages of the Punic wars.
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However, recent research has shown that this ‘African quarter’ must have dated to well before that period.
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Further clues to a Carthaginian presence in Rome exist in the description of a strange monument called the Columna Lactaria, the Milkers’ Column, at Rome’s vegetable market, the Forum Holitorum: this may have actually been a sacred betyl originally worshipped by the Punic inhabitants of the district.
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Varro described the Forum Holitorum as ‘the old Macellum where vegetables were the provender’, assuming that
macellum
was a Greek word.
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However, it is in fact a Semitic word for a market that was much used in the Punic world. Indeed, the word
macellum
can be linked to several towns in Latium, suggesting that they also possessed Punic commercial enclaves.
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Moreover, there is strong evidence for a Punic presence elsewhere in the region at the town of Ardea, where a votive deposit containing Punic pottery and two Punic inscriptions has been found in the locality of the temple of Hercules.
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Carthage also had major mercantile links with Bruttium (modern Calabria) in the toe of Italy. Recent archaeological research into the provenance of transport amphorae found in Carthage has shown that in the fourth century BC Bruttium was a greater source of goods and materials even than Sardinia.
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Carthage had certainly developed strong links with the region, and had even sent troops to help the people of the town of Hipponium refound their city after they had been displaced by Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse.
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To the north, the region of Campania also had close links with Carthage, with a considerable number of mercenaries from the region fighting in the Carthaginian armies in Sicily.
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The new treaty was recognition of Rome’s growing influence in the Tyrrhenian region and also of Carthage’s interests on the peninsula.

The terms of the new treaty made allowance for Carthage to intervene again in Italy if it needed to. If the Carthaginians captured any Latin cities, they were to hand them over to the Romans while keeping any property or captives (although if any of the latter were brought to Rome they would be set free). North Africa (excepting the city of Carthage itself) and Sardinia would remain strictly out of bounds to Roman merchants, but the treaty terms seem to suggest that trade on Sicily was allowed. Militarily, the Carthaginians probably saw Rome as an important regional ally to counter the influence of Syracuse, and Rome may have seen Syracuse as a potential threat. Both Dionysius and Agathocles had displayed ambitions to extend their authority into Italy, and indeed the Romans had recently beaten off an unwelcome visit by a Sicilian Greek fleet.
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By the early decades of the third century BC the Romans had turned their attention to the wealthy cities of Magna Graecia, the area of southern Italy that had been colonized by Greek settlers. After clashing with Roman troops in several border incidents, Tarentum, the most powerful city in the region, started to cast around for allies both inside and outside Italy. Eventually a potential saviour was found in the form of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, a small Hellenistic kingdom roughly where Albania is now.
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Now thirty-eight, Pyrrhus had already led a very eventful life, which had included several depositions and restorations to the throne, a spell as a hostage at the Egyptian court, and a short-lived interlude as king of Macedonia.
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Once more confined to his small kingdom, he found the Tarentines’ invitation to save them from the clutches of Rome too good to refuse.

On the face of it Pyrrhus was an exceptional ally. He was widely considered by his peers (and by later admirers) as one of the finest generals of the ancient world. Moreover, many other Hellenistic monarchs–anxious to see the back of such an indefatigable creator of trouble as he strived to establish a powerful kingdom for himself –furnished him with troops, elephants, ships and money. The campaign started rather inauspiciously, with his armada being scattered by a severe storm in the Adriatic. However, after his forces had regrouped, and he had himself been appointed by the Tarentines as supreme commander with unlimited powers, Pyrrhus vigorously prepared his new charges for war with Rome.

The Romans had now faced the best military opposition that Italy had to offer, in the form of the tough Samnites, but Pyrrhus and his core of battle-hardened Molossian troops from Epirus were a different proposition altogether. Now, for the first time, Rome met Hellenistic troops on the battlefield, and it came off worst in two battles at Heraclea in 279. (Aside from his tactical nous, Pyrrhus was greatly aided by the panic and disarray of the Roman cavalry at the sight of the combat elephants that he had brought with him.) In the wake of his victory, Pyrrhus was even able to advance to within a relatively short distance of Rome itself.
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Carthage, which had watched the initial stages of the war from the sidelines, now decided to intervene. Any obligations that the Carthaginians may have felt towards their Roman allies were almost certainly increased by the fear of Pyrrhus’ ambitions towards Sicily. In 280 a Carthaginian commander named Mago had arrived at Ostia, the port of Rome, with a fleet of 120 warships and offered to lend assistance to the Romans. The Romans, clearly wary of leaving themselves open to future Carthaginian interference, politely rejected the offer.
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After almost agreeing to the peace terms that Pyrrhus had dictated, the Roman Senate, chastened by the defiance shown by one of its oldest and most distinguished members, Appius Claudius Caecus, at the last minute showed the resilience for which it would become famous, by rejecting them and voting to continue the war. Although Pyrrhus won another victory against the Roman legions, at Ausculum in 279, it came at such a cost to the king that he was said to have pithily exclaimed that if he won one more victory like that then he would be utterly ruined.
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With his army seriously weakened, he had little choice but to retreat back to Tarentum.

This devastating ‘Pyrrhic victory’, while positive for Rome, had serious ramifications for its Carthaginian allies, for Pyrrhus, his enthusiasm for the Roman campaign now at an ebb, was invited by the Syracusans to take a command against the Carthaginians. What made this proposition particularly appealing was that his wife, who was the daughter of no less a figure than Agathocles, had borne him a son, thus giving him a legitimate claim over Syracuse and its territory at a time when it was weak and politically divided.
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It was probably at this juncture that a third treaty between Carthage and Rome was signed. As well as renewing the terms of the 348 treaty, it also added several new clauses. Any peace negotiations with Pyrrhus would be entered into jointly, thus pre-empting an attempt on the part of the Epirote king to make an alliance with one against the other. Provisos were also included for limited military cooperation if either Carthage or Rome came under direct attack, and it was agreed that each side would supply and pay for its own troops (although Carthage would provide the naval support).
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Although Pyrrhus had initially landed in Sicily in the summer of 278 with a very modest force, he was quickly provided with troops, money and supplies by the anti-Carthaginian group of Sicilian cities. After a triumphal entry into Syracuse, where his mere approach had led to a substantial Carthaginian fleet abandoning their blockade of the harbour, Pyrrhus was able to acquire an army of 30,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry for the campaign ahead. Indeed, he quickly discovered that the Carthaginian army on Sicily did not present the same kind of stiff challenge as the Roman legions.

Pyrrhus showed himself to be an extremely effective propagandist, for he quickly appropriated the mantle of a Hellenic liberator who would rid Sicily of the barbarous Carthaginians once and for all. Indeed, in familiar fashion, he made a vow to institute games and a sacrifice in honour of Heracles if he captured the Punic stronghold of Eryx–a promise that he carried out ‘in magnificent fashion’ after the attack was successful.
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Of course Eryx was a central Punic religious site, sacred to the goddess Astarte and therefore also linked to her celestial consort, Melqart. It seems very unlikely that Pyrrhus’ evocation of Heracles was a mere coincidence: more probably it was a specifically targeted reference that associated his assault of Eryx with Alexander’s celebrated siege of Tyre, the city of Melqart, after the fall of which Alexander had instituted games and a festival in honour of Heracles.

The cities and strongholds in the Carthaginians’ zone of the island quickly fell, until only Lilybaeum remained under Carthaginian control. Increasingly desperate to see Pyrrhus return to Italy, the Carthaginians suggested a peace deal in which they offered a large sum of money and a supply of ships (presumably to ensure his withdrawal). The move, which must have surely outraged the Romans, was rejected. Ominously for Carthage, Pyrrhus had now begun to make preparations to cross to Libya, reminded of the success of Agathocles when he had invaded North Africa directly. The continued resistance of Lilybaeum, however, gave reason for Carthaginian hope, and Pyrrhus moreover had alienated his Sicilian allies through increasingly high demands and arrogant behaviour. Invited once again by the desperate Greeks in Italy to protect them against Rome, he finally left Sicily in 276.
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In Italy, Pyrrhus met with little of his previous success. Although the Roman legions earned most of the credit for driving him out, the Carthaginians appear to have provided logistical support. On one occasion the Carthaginian fleet transported a force of 500 Romans to Rhegium, where they destroyed a stockpile of wood earmarked for building boats for Pyrrhus.
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Carthaginian warships also managed to defend the Romans from further attack by intercepting Pyrrhus’ fleet while it sailed back to Italy from Sicily.
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After a comprehensive defeat at the hands of the Roman army at Beneventum in 275, Pyrrhus left the shores of Italy never to return.
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He eventually met a humiliating end at a siege in Greece three years later, for an old woman knocked him unconscious with a tile thrown from a rooftop. Captured by the enemy, he was then beheaded.
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With Pyrrhus gone, the Romans wasted little time in subduing Magna Graecia. In 275 a group of Campanian mercenaries, originally sent by the Romans to protect the city, had seized Rhegium, killing or expelling its male citizens and taking over their property and families. It was five years before they were dislodged by the Romans, who restored the city to its surviving citizens and took the captured mercenaries to Rome, where they were flogged and beheaded in the Forum, probably as a warning to others.
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Finally, in 270 Tarentum was besieged and captured. Soon afterward the process of territorial absorption honed by the long hard years of struggle in Latium swung into action. The road network was rapidly expanded, with the Via Appia being extended from Capua through the newly conquered lands of Samnium and Magna Graecia. The conquests of such wealthy cities meant a huge influx of war booty into Rome, much of it spent on providing the ever-growing citizen body with a better infrastructure as well as a series of magnificent new temples and victory monuments.

However, once the common threat of Pyrrhus had been seen off, it did not take long for the Roman–Carthaginian alliance to start to unravel. Indeed, the Roman refusal of Carthaginian naval assistance at a time of desperate crisis (when Pyrrhus had only been a few kilometres from Rome) suggests a level of distrust between the two allies before the defeat of the Epirote king. The impressive way that the Romans had eventually defeated Pyrrhus, a general whose talents were widely recognized across the Mediterranean world, had certainly caught the attention of the larger Hellenistic kingdoms in the East, and in 273 Ptolemy II Philadelphus, ruler of Egypt, the most powerful of the Hellenistic states, sent envoys to Rome to establish diplomatic relations, an initiative reciprocated by the Romans. This would suggest that Rome was casting around for new Mediterranean allies, perhaps already with the idea of jettisoning its relationship with Carthage. Roman suspicions of Carthaginian intentions were underlined in 270 when a Carthaginian fleet appeared at Tarentum while the Romans were besieging the city, leading to accusations it had been endeavouring to help the beleaguered Tarentines, although it is far more likely that the flotilla was merely on a reconnaissance mission.
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