78
Polybius 1.5.1, 39.8.4; Walbank 2002, 172–3.
CHAPTER 7: THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
3
Morrison & Coates 1986, 259–60.
4
Goldsworthy 2000, 101–2.
5
Frost 1989, 127–35; Lancel 1995, 131–3.
8
Ibid. 1.17.4–1.19.15; Diodorus 23.7.1–23.9.1; Zonaras 8.10.
12
Ibid. 1.20.10–1.21.2; Lazenby 1996, 63–6.
13
Polybius 1.21.3–1.21.9.
14
Pliny
NH
8.169; Lazenby 1996, 66–7.
16
Ibid. 1.23.3–10; Zonaras 8.11; Lazenby 1996, 70–72; Goldsworthy 2000, 106–9.
17
Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum
12.2.25.
18
Diodorus 23.10.1; Dio 11.18; Zonaras 8.11; Valerius Maximus 7.3.
19
Zonaras 8.12. In another version of this story he was stoned to death (Orosius 4.4.4). Polybius (1.24.5–7) merely states that Hannibal was punished for losing many ships and being blockaded in one of the harbours.
20
Polybius 1.24.3–4; Diodorus 23.9.4; Goldsworthy 2000, 82–4; Lazenby 1996, 74–6.
21
Polybius 1.25.4. Some sources suggested that the Carthaginian admiral, Hamilcar, had been tricked by the Romans, who had divided their ships (Zonaras 8.12), or concealed a number of their craft (Polyaenus 8.20). Lazenby 1996, 78–9.
22
Polybius 1.26.1–9. For a discussion of these numbers see Goldsworthy 2000, 110–11; Lazenby 1996, 81–4.
23
Frontinus
Strat
. 2.13.10, although Lazenby (1996, 96) has doubts about whether this incident really took place at Ecnomus.
24
Polybius 1.26.10–1.28.14; Goldsworthy 2000, 109–15; Lazenby 1996, 81–96.
25
Zonaras 8.12; Valerius Maximus 6.6.2.
26
Polybius 1.29.1–1.30.8; Zonaras 8.12; Goldsworthy 2000, 84–6; Lazenby 1996, 97–100.
27
Polybius 1.30.9–1.31.8; Diodorus 23.11–12; Zonaras 8.13; Livy
Epitome
18; Orosius 4.9.1; Eutropius 2.21.4; Lazenby 1996, 100–102.
28
Polybius 1.36.2–4,
contra
other stories that told of his murder by the Carthaginians (Diodorus 23.16; Zonaras 8.13; Valerius Maximus 9.6; Silius Italicus
Pun
. 6.682; Appian 8.1.4); Lazenby 1996, 106.
29
Polybius 1.32.1–1.39.6; Diodorus 23.14.1–23.19; Zonaras 8.14; Appian 8.1.3; Orosius 4.9.3–8; Eutropius 2.21.4–2.22.3; Lazenby 1996, 102–12; Goldsworthy 2000, 88–92.
30
For the Carthaginians’ harsh pacification of the Numidians, see Orosius 4.9.9.
31
The Carthaginians had sent spies into the city, but they were supposedly uncovered by Metellus, who assembled all the citizens and asked them to take hold of all those whom they recognized (Zonaras 8.14). However, it should be said that Zonaras says that the same tactic was used by Mummius at the fall of Corinth in 146 BC.
33
Polybius 1.39.7–1.40.16; Diodorus 23.21; Zonaras 8.14; Eutropius 2.24; Orosius 4.9.15. The numbers of elephants cited vary from 10 (Polybius 1.40.15) to 142 (Pliny
NH
8.16). Metellus was said to have offered freedom to any of the captured drivers who could control the elephants, and arranged their transport back to Italy on a series of enormous rafts (Diodorus 23.21). Zonaras (8.14), Pliny (
NH
8.16) and Frontinus (
Strat
. 1.7.1) all give descriptions of the triumph–after which the elephants were killed. Lazenby 1996, 112–22; Goldsworthy 2000, 92–4.
35
Polybius 1.41–47; Diodorus 24.1.
36
Polybius 1.49.1–1.54.8; Diodorus 24.3–4; Orosius 4.10.3; Eutropius 2.26.1; Livy
Epitome
19; Suetonius
Tib
. 2.3; Aulus Gellius 10.6. Publius Claudius Pulcher would be described by the Roman poet Naevius as a man who ‘with pride and contempt ground down the legions’ (Naevius Fr. 42). Lazenby 1996, 132–41, Goldsworthy 2000, 119–22.
39
Jenkins & Lewis 1963, Groups VIII & IX; Baldus 1982; 1988, 171–6.
40
Baldus 1988, 178–82; Manfredi 1999, 72.
41
Jenkins & Lewis 1963, Group X; Baldus 1988, 176–9; Crawford 1985, 136; Visonà 1998, 14.
44
For an overly scathing view of Hamilcar’s talents as a general see Seibert 1993, 95–106.
46
Polybius 1.56.1–1.58.6; Diodorus 24.5.1–24.9.2; Zonaras 8.16; Lazenby 1996, 143–50.
48
Polybius 1.59–1.61; Diodorus 24.11.1–2; Lazenby 1996, 150–56; Goldsworthy 2000, 122–7.
49
Polybius 1.62.1–1.63.3; Lazenby 1996, 158.
50
Diodorus 24.10.2; Polybius 1.73.1, 1.74.7.
52
Greene 1986; Hoyos (2007, 23–4) questions whether Hanno’s outlook was exclusively focused on expansion in Africa.
54
They had been illicitly dug up and sold to a private collector. At least one of the tablets (VII) has been exposed as a fake. The recent bibliography for the Entella tablets is understandably very large, and still growing. The clearest general survey is still Loomis 1994. Hoyos’s arguments (1998, 28–32) for a possible earlier-fourth-century date seem implausible.
CHAPTER 8: THE CAMP COMES TO CARTHAGE: THE MERCENARIES’ REVOLT
2
Ibid. 1.66.1; Diodorus 24.13.
3
Polybius 3.9.6–7; Livy 21.1.5.
4
Polybius 1.66.12; Appian 5.2.2–3. I have given Hoyos’s calculations (2007, 27–31)
contra
Loreto (1995, 48–9, 64–7), who, without any historical justification, argues that the arrears were no more than two months’ pay.
5
Polybius 1.66.1–1.67.12. For a detailed account of events at Sicca see Hoyos 2007, 40–50. Hoyos (2007, 46–7) must be correct in his argument (
contra
Loreto 1995, 57–61) that there was no offer from Hanno to reemploy the troops for a further military campaign in Africa.
8
Hoyos (2007, 53–60) sees many of the mercenaries’ claims as being essentially legitimate, if exaggerated.
9
Polybius 1.68.1–1.69.3. Hoyos (2007, 26) is most probably correct in rejecting a story in Appian (5.2.3) that the Carthaginians massacred 3,000 Libyan deserters, who had been handed over to them by the Romans (
contra
Loreto 1995, 89).
11
Polybius 1.69.4–1.70.6.
12
Ibid. 1.70.8–9, 1.72.1–5. Hoyos (2007, 93–4) thinks that it is possible that the rebels at the height of the conflict did have this number of troops. See Hoyos 2007, xiii, n. 2, for a list of previous Libyan insurrections and alliances with Carthage’s enemies. Loreto (1995, 87–113) makes too much of Libyan disaffection being at the heart of the conflict, while at the same time playing down the role of the mercenaries in the insurgency. Manfredi (2003, 378–404) argues that during the mid third century BC, the Carthaginians were engaged in a campaign of Punicization in the Libyan interior. However, the process of acculturation through a number of different channels, including army service, had probably been taking place over a much longer period.
14
Polybius 1.67.7; Hoyos 2007, 6–10, on the ethnic make-up and conditions of service for these mercenaries.
15
Carradice & La Niece 1988; Acquaro 1989. For the various interpretations of the initials
M
,
A
and
Z
also found on the coins see Hoyos 2007, 141–2. The most plausible, but by no means secure, theory is that they stand for the initials of the rebel leaders Mathos, Autaritus and Zarzas. The theory of Manganaro (1992, 93–9) that these coins were minted much later, and based on Sicilian coinage dating to 214–211, is clearly incorrect.
16
There is no real evidence to support the claim, made by Loreto (1995, 112), that Mathos’ ambition was to establish a Libyan monarchical state.
17
Carradice & La Niece 1988, 51. The heads of the deities Zeus and (wearing a Corinthian helmet) Athena were both commonly used on Syracusan coinage. The horned bull was the most common emblem for the cities of Campania. The lion was a popular emblem in Punic Sicily. Manfredi (1999, 74) sees this coinage as an opportunity for the different ethnic elements within the rebel force to proclaim their known autonomy.
18
Carradice & La Niece 1988, 37.
19
There is no evidence to support Loreto’s argument (1995, 87–113) that this was essentially a Libyan rebellion, with the other mercenaries in the Libyans’ paid employ.
21
Carradice & La Niece 1988, 49–50.
25
For a detailed account of the battle see Hoyos 2007, 115–24.
26
For more on Naravas see Hoyos 2007, 146–50.
27
Polybius 1.75.1–1.78.9.
31
Ibid. 1.83.6–8, 3.28.3–4; Appian 5.2.3, 8.12.86; Zonaras 8.18; Hoyos 1998, 123–6. Appian’s assertion that the Romans also sent mediators to North Africa is very unlikely to have been true (Hoyos 2007, 129). There is no evidence to support the contention of Hoyos (1998, 125) that the Romans agreed to lower or to postpone the indemnity that Carthage had to pay.
32
Crawford 1985, 41–3, 106–9; Polybius 1.58.7–1.59.1.
34
For a study of this arsenical copper-alloy coinage see Carradice & La Niece 1998, 41–5.
35
Polybius 1.84.1–1.85.7. For a reconstruction of events at the Saw see Hoyos 2007, 197–218.
38
Ibid. 1.79.1–7; Hoyos 2007, 154–9.
39
Polybius 1.79.9–10. Both African and Sardinian rebels used the motif of three ears of corn on their coins, which was not a design found on Carthaginian coins (Visonà 1992, 125–6; Carradice & La Niece 1988, 38–9), which suggests some contact between the two groups.
40
Polybius 1.88.8–12, 3.10.3–5.
41
Ibid. 3.28.1–2; Champion 2004, 119–20.
42
Zonaras 8.18; Appian 6.1.4, 8.1.5. Other later Roman historians would argue that Sardinia was merely ceded to Rome (Livy 21.40.5, 22.54.11). For the lack of evidence for a series of new confrontations between Rome and Carthage in the early 230s see Hoyos 1998, 134–5.
43
Harris 1979, 192–3; Huss 1985, 266–7,
contra
Hoyos (1998, 142), who sees it as a way of protecting Sicily and perhaps Italy.
52
Cornelius Nepos
Ham
. 3.2.
53
Appian 6.1.4. There has been some dispute over the correct dating of the attempted prosecution of Hamilcar Barca. Loreto (1995, 205–10) and Lancel (1999, 28) accept Appian’s date of 237, whereas Seibert (1993, 13–14) and Hoyos (2007, 20–21) insist on 241, when Hamilcar’s popularity and political power base were at a low ebb.
55
Aristotle
Pol
. 2.11.1–2.
57
Although around 10 per cent of the votive dedications that have been found in the city were erected by females, it is striking that in most cases female supplicants were identified by their patrilineal descent or by the name of their husband (Amadasi Guzzo 1988, 144–7). Elite families also made joint sacrifices, with father and daughter offering male and female sacrificial victims respectively.
58
Huss 1985, 497–8. On some inscriptions, named individuals are referred to as ‘belonging to’ (
š
) another person (Amadasi Guzzo 1988, 143–4).
59
One inscription lists guilds of porters and packers, gold-smelters, smiths, vessel-blowers and even sandal-makers who had contributed to the construction of a new street.
60
Champion 2004, 173–234.
63
Polybius 2.1.5; Diodorus 25.8.
65
Wagner 1989, 152. It has been suggested that a series of fortified compounds dating from the fifth to the third century located in eastern Andalusia may have been Carthaginian bases for controlling the mines.
66
Guerrero Ayuso 1989, 101–5.