Chanakya's New Manifesto: To Resolve the Crisis Within India (10 page)

1.7    Without diluting the fundamental tenets of a democratic polity, the need, therefore, is to change the
system
of democratic functioning so that it fulfils one of its primary objectives—good governance.

1.8    Several suggestions have been mooted on what this change could be. Of these, two deserve mention. The first proposes a presidential polity patterned on the US. The proposal is not bereft of merit, since directly elected presidents with a secure tenure of five years (except in the improbable and rare instance of impeachment) are better equipped to pursue a long-term governance agenda. However, this proposal requires the change to the existing system of parliamentary democracy to be much too radical. Moreover, in a country as complex as India, the possibility of the entire nation agreeing on one directly elected presidential candidate may prove to be divisive not to mention elusive. There is also the possibility of the same political impasse if the elected president has to deal with a parliamentary body where parties opposing him or her have a majority.

1.9    The second suggestion is to adopt the German system, wherein elected governments have a fixed tenure and only the leader of the ruling party or alliance can be changed through ‘a constructive vote of no confidence’ where a vote of no-confidence has to be accompanied by a confidence motion in favour of another ruling alliance. While this proposal has merit, the basic problem of constituents
within
the ruling alliance holding governance to ransom for motivated reasons, will still not be solved. Nor will it be easy to find another ‘ruling alliance’ which can rule with stability. A mere change of leadership will not change much if the ability of the ruling alliance to govern is impaired because of the unstable or confrontational nature of its constituents.

1.10  Senior politburo member of the Communist Party of India (CPI) and member of parliament (MP), Sitaram Yechury’s suggestion that the Constitution be amended to make a hundred sittings of Parliament mandatory in a year would also achieve little since there is no guarantee that a ‘sitting’ by itself would produce decisions pertinent to governance.

1.11  Therefore, the best option would be to make the functioning of the democratic system we already have better by tweaking it suitably but firmly.

1.12  All political parties that propose to be part of a coalition grouping or front must declare their intention to do so prior to elections taking place. Coalition groupings, such as the UPA, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and a putative Third Front already exist so this would only require their constituents, and any other party that wishes to be part of them, to make a choice, not after, but
before
votes are cast.

1.13  Along with unattached political parties, each coalition must publicly announce a common Governance Agenda, with indicative timeframes for specific deliverables. This must be worked out prior to the elections so that voters know what rival political groupings are offering. Such a carefully worked out document is an important part of coalition arrangements in many other parts of the world. For instance, in Denmark, after the elections in September 2011, the three opposition parties spent seventeen days of intense negotiations to prepare a 76-page document of objectives. Similarly, in the UK, when the 2010 elections created a hung parliament, the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats worked out an agreement which clearly spelt out governance objectives in eleven key areas, including deficit reduction, tax measures, banking reform, immigration, education and civil liberties.

1.14  This Governance Agenda would be different from the manifestos of political parties, which promise everything under the sun and, as examples of populist excess, stand greatly devalued in the eyes of the electorate. The Governance Agenda would be a business-like document, substantive yet focused, and drafted along broad guidelines provided by the Election Commission (EC) and a proposed Governance Commission. The purpose of the guidelines would be to ensure political parties eschew irresponsible populist rhetoric and follow pragmatic parameters of achievable goals that can begin to be systematically implemented after assumption of power.

1.15  Following elections, pre-identified coalition partners would be compulsorily committed to the declared Governance Agenda for a lock-in period of at least three years.

1.16  Further, during the minimum lock-in period of three years, no coalition partner will be allowed to withdraw support to, or defect from, the coalition partnership.

1.17  Far from being an infringement of democratic rights, this would considerably enrich the democratic process. First, voters would know of coalition groupings in advance of the elections, rather than finding out subsequent to the elections that parties they did not support, or were openly opposed to, have become partners solely for the pursuit of political power at any cost. Secondly, voters would know, prior to elections, what a pre-known party or coalition is promising to deliver. They would therefore be able to make an informed choice about who to support, rather than vote merely on the basis of individual personalities or election symbols or caste or other fealties.

1.18  The Anti-Defection Law, currently applicable to individual legislators, would be amended to apply to all constituents of the pre-announced coalition for the compulsory lock-in period of three years. Those who deliberately flout the anti-defection provision would attract its penal provisions, including disqualification from membership of the house, but their support would be deemed to be available to the ruling party or coalition for the compulsory lock-in period of three years.

1.19  Thus, the winning party or coalition would have a minimum period of three years, free of the perennial political instability of recent times, to implement the Governance Agenda promised collectively to the people.

1.20  The objectives of both democracy and governance will be enhanced if talented people, with a proven track record of competence in governance, are available to implement the Governance Agenda. Hence, individual parties and coalition groupings will announce, prior to the elections and along with the Governance Agenda, a list of at least twenty individuals who would be in the Cabinet should that party or coalition win.

1.21  Individual parties and coalitions should also announce their prime ministerial nominee in advance. The PM is the pivot of the governance structure. Voters are entitled to know who that is likely to be. Otherwise they may be saddled with an individual with little authority and even worse governance skills as a result of intra-coalition compromises. This would be a betrayal of their democratic choice.

1.22  With a compulsorily binding Governance Agenda, and an indicative list of the individuals who would helm its implementation, the electorate will be better able to judge, at the time of voting, which party or coalition is most likely to fulfil their expectations from an elected government.

1.23  If no single party or coalition grouping has the requisite majority in Parliament to form the government, they would be free to invite unattached parties or independent legislators to provide support. However, if such independent legislators, or unattached parties, do join the coalition, they would have to publicly endorse its pre-announced Governance Agenda, and compulsorily commit to the same lock-in period of support for a minimum period of three years.

1.24  Parties that have already committed themselves to a pre-announced coalition will
not
be allowed to switch their support to a rival coalition even if the stated purpose is to provide that coalition with the required majority. This is essential to further the fundamental democratic objective of preventing unethical horse-trading that occurs at the time of formation of governments, where alliances are forged bereft of all principles or ideological affinity, and in violation of the basis on which voters made their choice during the elections.

1.25  If no party or coalition is able to get a majority, fresh elections will be called for. This would be a better option than unstable and opportunistic arrangements which are perennially on the verge of failing and are inherently antithetical to the implementation of governance and the fulfilment of voters’ expectations. Once a government is formed, the cabinet would be constituted by giving representation to each of the constituents of the coalition in proportion to the seats it has won. The cabinet would strive, as is practice, to take decisions by consensus, but if this is not possible, resort to majority vote. This is essential to ensure that vital decision-making is not held hostage to the internal conflicts of the coalition.

1.26  At the end of the lock-in period of three years, any coalition partner or any group of legislators as is permissible under the Anti-Defection Law, if a single party, would be free to leave the party or the parent coalition should they wish to. This would be applicable to the majority party of the coalition as well. However, it is expected that if the track record of the ruling party or coalition on governance and on meeting the expectations of the people has been good, it would be a disincentive to any legislator or coalition partner to leave purely in the short term pursuit of power or for less than good reason, as voters might punish them for their political opportunism in the next election which would be only two years away.

1.27  If a new government is formed after the three-year period, the party or coalition which stakes its majority must simultaneously announce its common Governance Agenda to which all its members or coalition partners have agreed to
prior
to the government assuming charge. A lock-in period of support for the remaining two-year term of the house, on the same terms as described above, would then becoming binding on all the constituents of the coalition and members of a party.

1.28  Such an arrangement would ensure that even if the government changes after the initial three-year period, the next government would have a stable period to rule, albeit for a shorter period of two years.

1.29  It can be asked why a majority party or coalition should not be bound to the compulsory lock-in period for the entire five year duration of the house. This would, in a sense, guarantee a longer period of political stability, and provide to a government the longer tenure it needs to fully implement its vision of governance. However, the manifest need for political stability has to be balanced with the imperatives of democratic choice which includes rejection as much as it does support. Thus, the aim is to strike a balance between a sustainable period of guaranteed stability in order to meet vital governance goals as well as the need to protect the freedoms of choice inherent in a parliamentary democracy.

1.30  While such an arrangement would ensure a balance between governance imperatives and democratic accountability, it cannot be ruled out that on the guarantee of an assured majority, the ruling coalition may resort to behaviour which violates the Constitution. However, such a situation would be no different than when in the past single parties had absolute and comfortable majorities. In theory, such parties also had the same leeway for unconstitutional behaviour, especially when backed by the Anti-Defection Law. In any such situation, the only real restraint must be the inbuilt checks built into a parliamentary democracy, viz., the judiciary, a free press and the restraining advice of an impartial president of India.

1.31  Parliament must pass the necessary enabling legislation to usher in these reform measures before the next general elections. The new system outlined for national elections and the formation of the central government would apply to state elections as well.

1.32  A five-member Governance Appraisal Panel (GAP) should be set up as an independent evaluation body. It will be provided a compact secretariat, will have constitutional status, and report to the president of India.

1.33  The president’s role in preserving the authority and autonomy of bodies with constitutional status needs to be strengthened. In this context, consideration should be given to modifying the 42
^nd
amendment to the Constitution introduced by Indira Gandhi during the Emergency. This amendment bound the president of India to act in all matters only on the advice of the cabinet, and even after it was diluted subsequently, still seriously curtails the legitimate constitutional powers vested in an elected head of state. For independent constitutional bodies which are directly under the president and report only to that office, it is essential that the president exercises powers to protect the jurisdiction and authority of such bodies from interference, subversion or infringement by the government of the day.

1.34  The GAP will consist of a leading economist (or a senior representative from the corporate sector), a distinguished member of the media, a respected former administrator, an academic of eminence in the area of public affairs and governance, and a retired chief justice of India or a retired Supreme Court judge.

1.35  Its members will be selected by a three-member committee consisting of the PM, the leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and the chief justice of India. The committee will select the members of GAP by consensus.

1.36  The GAP will have a five-year term and will submit its report annually to the president of India. The report will make an independent assessment of the governance performance of the government on the basis of the objectives it had promised in its Governance Agenda. It will also devise its own criteria for the measurement of the ruling government’s performance and will be guided in its endeavours by the measurement indices of World Government Indicators or WGI, which has been working in this field for more than two decades. A report on the WGI rightly states that all modern democratic societies require independent evaluation, which is possible with a good set of indicators, and public debate on the quality and improvement of governance.
¹⁰

1.37  The report will be made public by the president of India. If the members of the panel are unable to submit a common report, the assessment of each of the members should be separately submitted and each of these made public.