Chanakya's New Manifesto: To Resolve the Crisis Within India (26 page)

The MAC, which sought to bring in the information of all the intelligence agencies under one umbrella, was mooted in 2001; it did not see the light of day until 2008. The NCTC, which was meant to subsume MAC, was proposed in 2008; it took another three years for it to be created, only to be put on hold because of opposition from states for trampling on their ‘federal’ rights. The controversy over the NCTC is truly revealing about our approach to issues of paramount security. First, the original proposal of the NCTC, which should have been adopted, was watered down to the point where it is close to being a defunct body. The original proposal gave the NCTC much wider powers; the National Security Guard (NSG) and the NIA were to be under it, and it was to operate autonomously. However, as former Home Secretary Gopal Pillai said in an interview after his retirement,
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resentments in the other intelligence agencies which did not want to be overshadowed by such a powerful body downsized the organization and placed it under the IB with an additional director level bureaucrat heading it. What is even more shocking is that the Cabinet Committee on Security took thirteen months to even read the discussion paper prepared by the ministry of home affairs on the NCTC.

The subsequent politicization of the debate on the NCTC provides one of the finest examples anywhere in the world on how vital security concerns can be finessed for short term and myopic political one-upmanship. Even if we grant that the notification setting up the NCTC could have been preceded by more sensitive and widespread consultations with states, the opposition by some non-Congress chief ministers to the creation of a nodal agency with nationwide powers to tackle the pervasive threat of terrorism was truly extraordinary. India has been the target of terrorism for over three decades; terrorists recognize no boundaries and strike at will, with increasingly sophisticated means and the most modern communications and weapons at their disposal; externally sponsored terrorism, which shows no signs of abating, has reinforced its potency by incubating home-grown terrorist modules; terrorists are defying conventional profiles; they are not short of money and are deeply motivated by their perverted hatred. In such a situation only a nation which has learnt no lessons from the past, and considers the country’s security interests to be subsidiary to short-term political gains, would derail a proposal of this nature on the specious ground that it infringes the principle of federalism.

If the Indian State does not exist, or is dangerously undermined, can its constituents survive? If the enemy treats the whole of India as a target, can our response be compartmentalized? Where have the principles of federalism prevented the Centre from devising a national response to a national threat? Does not Article 355 of the Constitution state that it is the duty of the union to protect the states against external aggression and internal disturbance? Are there not already agencies such as the NIA, NSG, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF) and the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) which have nationwide jurisdiction and have never been objected to by the states? Given that ‘law and order’ is a subject under the jurisdiction of the states, there could have been a constructive debate on the need for the search and arrest powers of the NCTC, and on proposals to co-opt state police counter-terrorism units in the functioning of the NCTC. But to argue that the NCTC itself is a ‘counter-productive’ idea, or that it will be used to ‘target political rivals’, or will destroy India’s federal fabric, was ridiculous. Arun Jaitley, the BJP leader, asked a very cogent question in Parliament: ‘When will India’s security policy be guided solely by security considerations’?

If this mismatch between the threat of terrorism and our ability to meet it is not bad enough, the country is also facing its most serious threat ever from left wing extremism. Maoist Naxalites today control large areas in eight states, and in six more their cadres routinely terrorize the local population. At the chief minister’s conference, Chidambaran admitted that our capacity to face this threat is ‘not commensurate with the nature of the challenge’ and that results remain ‘sub-optimal’. ‘There are not enough police stations; not enough men, weapons and vehicles, not enough infrastructure. . . not enough roads, and not enough presence of the civil administration. . .’
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The Naxalites run their jan adalats, zonal committees and military training camps with impunity in the areas they control. They target the state economic infrastructure and eliminate so-called police informers at will. They extort and kidnap hostages, including senior officials. They have no shortage of arms. And, in carefully prepared campaigns carried out with military precision, they kill ruthlessly. In Orissa, in June 2008, thirty-six policemen were murdered by the extremists. In Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, in April 2010, seventy-six CRPF men were slaughtered in an ambush; and, in Maharashtra, a landmine placed by them blew up scores of paramilitary personnel.

The magnitude of the Naxalite threat cannot be overstated, but our ability to respond to it is weakened by a debilitating ideological ambivalence. The aim of the Maoists is to overthrow the Indian State. They are not, as their propaganda machine projects to the ignorant or the gullible, disaffected youth or exploited tribals or misguided rebels. They are enemies of the State and seek to terminate a constitutional democracy by violence. Such an act is treasonable, and needs to be dealt with as such. But the response of our inadequately equipped forces is further weakened by a sterile debate on whether the strategy should be development or punitive action. Of course, poverty and lack of optimal development is a problem and provides fertile ground for the Maoist leadership to recruit cadres. But how can development be initiated when the State has itself ceased to exist in an area as large as 40,000 square kilometres? The situation becomes near farcical when the ministry of home affairs and the Planning Commission lock horns on which agency, the panchayats or the district administration, should deliver (under the Integrated Action Plan) development projects to Naxal-affected districts, when the truth is that neither of them can. The first priority thus must be to retake these areas, defeat the Naxalites, and end their illegitimate rule. For this, given the violent nature of the enemy, there can be no other option except a national consensus on resolute, effective and punitive action by the State. Once the Naxalites are defeated, and their influence eliminated or significantly reduced, the State must work with equal vigour to bring in development and progress for the deprived. If such a sequential two-pronged strategy is not followed, we will neither be able to promote development, nor will we be able to tackle an enemy that, taking advantage of a weak State, continues to expand its area of control.

The Naxalites cynically exploit the Indian State’s ideological hesitation. They use every instrument of the very democracy they want to overthrow to create misguided sympathy for their cause. There are enough NGOs and human rights groups and, alas, opportunist politicians, brimming with the delusional milk of human kindness, to further their propaganda machine. While the government blunders along, the Naxalites choose their moment to strike, and make national headlines when they kidnap a senior bureaucrat or a foreigner. It is an unseemly spectacle to see our leaders negotiating with the extremists for the release of hostages, through the mediation of interlocutors approved by the Naxalites. It is also a mystery why, when TV crews are able to reach Maoist hideouts, and interlocutors keep directly in touch with the Maoist leadership, our intelligence agencies and armed forces seem unable to find them. With Maoist kidnappings on the rise, it is inexplicable too why the government has not yet devised a hostage negotiating policy and trained hostage negotiators. A 2006 guideline of the union home ministry bars negotiations in a hostage situation. But in reality, in every hostage situation, the government negotiates, and more often than not, capitulates. It did so in 1989 when Rubaiya Sayeed was kidnapped by Kashmiri militants; it did so when IC-804 was hijacked; in more recent times it has negotiated every time the Naxalites have kidnapped officials or foreigners. Negotiations are a strategic tactic which cannot be ruled out. But they must be done by professionals, who have a definitive policy framework, and never lose sight of the ultimate goal to defeat the enemy. The US and Israel have a crisis negotiation unit, but India, where hostage taking is rampant, does not.

It is instructive to see how other countries, such as the US, have responded to the threat of terrorism, both internal and external. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, that country’s leadership immediately worked on upgrading its security apparatus. The Congress started work on several antiterrorist bills. After the Justice Department drafted a bill called the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, it was introduced in Congress as the Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 2001, and passed as the Uniting and Strengthening America (USA) Act on 12 October 2001. The senate, with some amendments, passed the USA PATRIOT Act on 23 October 2001. President Bush signed it into law on 26 October 2001. Thus, within roughly six weeks of 9/11, the key agencies in the country—the government, the justice department, the Congress and the senate—had united to arm the nation with an Act which, given the nature of the threat, gave law enforcement agencies far greater leeway in gathering intelligence, expanded the Secretary of the Treasury’s powers to regulate dubious financial transactions, amplified the discretion of immigration and allied agencies to detain and deport immigrants suspected of terrorist-related acts, and amended the definition of terrorism to include domestic terrorism. All caps on the number of full-time employees assigned to the immigration authorities were waived; in fact, the number of employees of the border patrol, customs and immigration departments increased threefold and adequate funds to finance this expansion were provided. Expectedly, there was opposition from human right organizations to some of the provisions of this law, but this did not deter the resolve of the policy makers.

A little over a year later, on 25 November 2002, the US adopted the Homeland Security Act (HSA). This was a massive 484-page piece of legislation described as the biggest change to the legal framework in the federal government in decades. The aim of the act was to dramatically strengthen the government’s effectiveness to detect and eliminate emerging terrorist threats. To achieve this, the act consolidated more than twenty existing federal agencies, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the US Secret Service, the US Customs Service, the US Coast Guard and the Immigration and Naturalization Services, into one Homeland Security Department. The act did circumscribe some aspects of individual privacy, but its sponsors rightly argued that 9/11 justified this. Vice President Dick Cheney said with more than justified pride: ‘We created the Department of Homeland Security, brought together 180,000 federal employees from 22 agencies, for a single purpose: to better protect America.’

Not surprisingly, there has not been a single terrorist attack within the US since 9/11. The US continues to be a credible democracy. Lawmakers continue to face opposition from human rights advocates, and continue to occasionally face judicial challenges. But none of this has shaken the resolve of the nation as a whole to adopt exceptional measures to face down an exceptional threat. Compare this with our remarkably casual, dithering, disorganized, divided, turf-conscious, and blundering response to acts of war and terrorism.

Actions to safeguard the security of the nation require meticulous focus, planning and perseverance. The manner in which America finally located and killed Osama Bin Laden, is a copy book illustration of this. Apparently, President Obama’s first order to his CIA Director Leon Panetta in 2009 was to ‘make the killing or capture of OBL the top priority of the war against al-Qaeda’. This was only logical given his unequivocal campaign pledge: ‘We will kill bin Laden; we will crush al-Qaeda. That has to be our biggest national security priority’. Once the CIA zeroed in on the compound in Abbotabad as a possible hiding place for bin Laden, a remarkable process of planning began. No less than forty intelligence reviews took place between August 2010 and April 2011; secrecy was ensured by keeping only six people involved in crucial decision-making; a ‘three-inch binder listing every question about the operation, from assessing the risks of a leak at various stages to what to do with bin Laden’s body’
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was prepared; transcending turf wars and personal egos, the best men and equipment were deployed; a war cabinet of members of the NSC held five meetings in the six weeks of the final countdown to review matters; it has been reported that in these sessions Obama welcomed competing views, but never wavered in his determination to pull off his mission. The result was the ruthlessly successful killing of the man who had planned the murder of thousands of Americans, in a difficult operation in which ‘the biggest surprise of the entire operation was that it was a surprise’
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—even for the Pakistanis.

Nations are respected for their resolve and ability to deal with those who threaten their existence. If they have these qualities, they don’t let a hijacked airliner escape after it has providentially landed again in their territory; they don’t take thirteen months to read a cabinet note on setting up a counter-terrorism agency, especially after a horrific attack on their financial capital; they don’t raise issues of human rights and development when the first priority is to eliminate any threat to the unity or sovereignty of the country; they don’t allow their defence capabilities to languish through neglect or spurious moral imperatives; they don’t wait for the approval of others to take out those who target their country; they follow a foreign policy which is confident, pragmatic and proactive, especially on non-negotiable security matters; all their agencies charged with intelligence gathering, and internal and external security enforcement cooperate; and, above all, they act swiftly and purposefully, even ruthlessly where the security of the country is concerned. The country’s security will only be effective if an integrated security infrastructure is created that is greater than the sum of its parts—its various agencies, ministries and departments— including the foreign office, the defence establishment, intelligence, the police and security agencies.