Closing the Ring (32 page)

No attempts should be made to minimise the poignancy of the loss of the Dodecanese, which we had a chance of getting so easily and at so little cost and which we have now lost after heavy expenditure. You should also stress the tremendous effort made by the Germans, their withdrawal of almost half their air forces from
Italy, where they were already outmatched, and the assistance given to our troops thereby.

3. Don’t forget that we probably drowned the best part of two thousand Germans on the way, which, together with those killed in action, is at any rate an offset to our three thousand prisoners. It may well be that the Germans have paid much more than life for life, including prisoners, in this struggle. Nonetheless, it is just to say that it is our first really grievous reverse since Tobruk 1942. I hope however that there will be no need to make heavy weather over this at all.

*  *  * *  *

I have recounted the painful episodes of Rhodes and Leros in all their details. They constitute, happily on a small scale, the most acute difference I ever had with General Eisenhower. For many months, in the face of endless resistances, I had cleared the way for his successful campaign in Italy. Instead of only gaining Sardinia, we had established a large group of armies on the Italian mainland. Corsica was a bonus in our hands. We had drawn an important part of the German reserves away from other theatres. The Italian people and Government had come over to our side. Italy had declared war on Germany. Their Fleet was added to our own. Mussolini was a fugitive. The liberation of Rome seemed not far distant. Nineteen German divisions, abandoned by their Italian comrades, lay scattered throughout the Balkans, in which we had not used a thousand officers and men. The date for “Overlord” had not been decisively affected.

I had been instrumental in finding from the British and Imperial forces in Egypt four first-class divisions over and above those which, according to General Whiteley’s report, the Northwest African Supreme Headquarters had deemed possible. Not only had we aided General Eisenhower’s Anglo-American Staff upon their victorious career, but we had furnished them with substantial unexpected resources, without which disaster might well have occurred. I was grieved that the small requests I had made for strategic purposes almost as high as those already achieved should have been so obdurately resisted and rejected. Of course, when you are winning a war, almost everything that happens can be claimed to be right and wise. It would however have been easy, but for pedantic denials in the minor sphere, to have added the control of the Aegean, and very likely the accession of Turkey, to all the fruits of the Italian campaign.

¹
See
Chapter 6
, page 114.

²
See also my telegram to him of the same date,
Chapter 8
, page 150.

³
4th Battalion, the Buffs, 2d Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, 1st Battalion, King’s Own

⁴
See Map, “Leros.”

13
Hitler’s Secret Weapon

General Ismay’s Minute of April
15, 1943___
Mr. Sandys’ Appointment
___
Reports on Peenemünde
___
Decision of the Defence Committee to Attack Peenemünde, June
29___
Hitler’s Sanguine Hopes
___
Warning of Rockets and Pilotless Aircraft
___
Difference of Opinion About Their Relative Importance
___
Successful Attack on Peenemünde, August
17___
Prolonged Delay Caused to the Germans Thereby
___
Far-reaching Consequences___Report by Dr. R. V. Jones, September
25___
My Telegram to President Roosevelt, October
25___
His Reply, November
9___
Our Timely Measures of Defence.

S
EVERAL YEARS BEFORE THE WAR
, the Germans had begun the development of rockets and pilotless aircraft, and had built an experimental station to carry out this work on the Baltic coast at Peenemünde. This activity was of course a closely guarded secret. Nevertheless, they were not able entirely to conceal what was going on, and already in the autumn of 1939 references to long-range weapons of various kinds began to appear in our Intelligence reports. During the early years of the war, rumours on this subject and scraps of information, often contradictory, reached us from various quarters. In the spring of 1943, the position was reviewed by the Chiefs of Staff, as a result of which on April 15 General Ismay sent me the following minute:

Prime Minister

15 April 43

The Chiefs of Staff feel that you should be made aware of reports of German experiments with long-range rockets. The fact that five
reports have been received since the end of 1942 indicates a foundation of fact even if details are inaccurate.

The Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that no time should be lost in establishing the facts, and, if the evidence proves reliable, in devising counter-measures. They feel this is a case where investigation directed by one man who could call on such scientific and Intelligence advisers as may be appropriate would give the best and quickest results. They therefore suggest that you should appoint an individual who should be charged with the task forthwith. They suggest for your consideration the name of Mr. Duncan Sandys, who, they think, would be very suitable if he could be made available.

In addition, the Chiefs of Staff propose to warn the Minister of Home Security of the possibility of such an attack, and of what is proposed. It is not considered desirable to inform the public at this stage, when the evidence is so intangible.

The Chiefs of Staff ask for your approval to the proposals above.

  Mr. Sandys had served in an anti-aircraft unit in Norway in the early days of the war. Later he had suffered crippling disablement to both his feet in a motor accident when commanding the first experimental rocket regiment. He had joined the Government in July 1941 as Financial Secretary at the War Office, and afterwards as Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Supply. In both these offices he had had considerable responsibility for the general direction of weapon development, and had consequently been brought into close contact with the Chiefs of Staff Committee. As he was my son-in-law, I was naturally glad that the Chiefs of Staff should wish to give him this important work, though I had in no way suggested it.

A month later he presented his first report, which was circulated to the War Cabinet. The following extract gives the main points:

  I have reviewed the evidence regarding German long-range rocket development. In order to supplement this, I asked that an air reconnaissance should be undertaken of the area around Peenemunde, on the Baltic coast of Germany, where, judging from the reports, it seemed probable that rocket development was proceeding.
This flight has been made, and the photographs obtained have provided further important information.

It would appear that the Germans have for some time past been trying to develop a heavy rocket capable of bombarding an area from a very long range. This work has probably been proceeding side by side with the development of jet-propelled aircraft and airborne rocket torpedoes. Very little information is available about the progress of this development. However, such scanty evidence as exists suggests that it may be far advanced. London, in view of its size, is much the most likely target.

An intensive effort should be made to obtain further information on this subject from agents on the Continent, from prisoners of war, and by air reconnaissance.

The experimental establishments and factories which appear most likely to be connected with the development and production of this weapon in Germany and German-occupied territory, together with any suspicious works in the coastal region of Northwest France, should be subjected to bombing attack. A preliminary list of suggested targets is being sent to the Air Staff.

On June 4, Air Marshal Evill, Vice-Chief of the Air Staft, issued instructions enabling Sandys to deal directly with the Intelligence branches concerned about obtaining further information from agents and prisoners of war, and requested him to make recommendations for air reconnaissance and to notify the Air Staff of the conclusions drawn therefrom. All possible methods of tracing the trajectory of such projectiles and of locating the firing-point were examined. Civil Defence and security measures were set on foot.

On June 11, Mr. Sandys sent a minute to the Air Staff asking that reconnaissance flights should be made at regular intervals over the Peenemünde area and that air photographs should be obtained of all territory in Northern France within a hundred and thirty miles of London. He also recommended that the experimental station at Peenemünde should be bombed. In his next report he stressed the importance of making the attack without delay.

The latest reconnaissance photographs provide evidence that the Germans are pressing on as quickly as possible with the development of the long-range rocket at the experimental establishment at Peenemünde, and that frequent firings are taking place. There are also signs that the light anti-aircraft defences at Peenemünde are being further strengthened.

In these circumstances it is desirable that the projected bombing attack upon this establishment should be proceeded with as soon as possible.

  On June 28, Sandys reported that aerial photographs of Peenemünde showed large rockets alongside the firing-point. They might have a range of about ninety to a hundred and thirty miles.

  In spite of all efforts to prevent them, the Germans may, without being detected, succeed in emplacing a number of projectors in Northern France, and in launching a rocket attack upon London. In that event it would be necessary to locate with the utmost speed the sites from which the rockets were being fired, in order that these might be put out of action by immediate bombing attack.

With the equipment already available at existing radar stations, it should be possible to observe the rockets during flight and to determine the points from which they have been fired, to within a circle of ten miles radius. This performance can be considerably improved by fitting certain ancillary apparatus. The construction of this ancillary apparatus has already been put in hand. The first equipment is now in process of being installed at Rye. The remainder will be completed within two to three months. Special instructions have been issued to the five most suitable stations (Swingate, Rye, Pevensey, Poling, and Ventnor), and the necessary training of operators has begun.

  On June 29, the Defence Committee, having been kept fully informed since April, decided:

  That the most searching and rigorous examination of the area in Northern France within a radius of one hundred and thirty miles of London should be organised and maintained, no step being neglected to make this as efficient and thorough as possible.

That the attack on the experimental station at Peenemünde should take the form of the heaviest possible night attack by
Bomber Command on the first occasion when conditions are suitable.

That as far as possible plans should be prepared for immediate air attack on rocket firing-points in Northern France as soon as these are located.

*  *  * *  *

Hitler was meanwhile intent upon the plan. Accompanied by some of his principal adherents of Cabinet level, he inspected Peenemünde about the beginning of June 1943. We were at this time better informed about rocket missiles than about pilotless aircraft. Both methods were in full preparation on a large scale, and Peenemünde was the summit of all research and experiment. No decisive progress had been made by the Germans towards the atomic bomb. “Heavy water” gave little encouragement, but in pilotless aircraft and the rockets Hitler and his advisers saw a means of delivering a new and possibly decisive attack upon England and the rupturing of the Anglo-American plans for a major cross-Channel return to the Continent. The Fuehrer was comforted by all he learned at Peenemünde, and he hurled the utmost German effort into this new and perhaps last hope.

About June 10, he told his assembled military leaders that the Germans had only to hold out. By the end of 1943, London would be levelled to the ground and Britain forced to capitulate. October 20 was fixed as zero day for rocket attacks to begin. It is said that Hitler personally ordered the construction of 30,000 rockets for that day. This, if true, shows the absurd ideas on which he lived. The German Minister of Munitions, Dr. Speer, said that each V2
¹
required about as many man-hours to make as six fighters. Hitler’s demand was therefore for the equivalent of 180,000 fighters to be made in four months. This was ridiculous, but the production of both weapons was given first priority and 1500 skilled workers were transferred from anti-aircraft and artillery production to the task.

On July 9, Mr. Sandys reported that, in addition to their plans for a rocket attack on London, there was also evidence
that the Germans intended to use pilotless aircraft and very long-range guns. Two excavations of a suspicious character had been detected—at Watten, near St. Omer, and at Bruneval, near Fécamp. Special instructions were therefore issued to the selected radar stations in Southeast England to watch for rocket-firing. Plans were also made by the Home Office, not for any wholesale evacuation of London, but for the removal when the time came of a hundred thousand persons in priority classes, such as school-children and pregnant mothers, at the rate of ten thousand a day. Thirty thousand Morrison table shelters were moved into London, bringing the reserve in the Metropolis up to about fifty thousand.

On July 19, our reports stated:

  Work of an unexplained nature, including railway sidings, turntables, buildings, and concrete erections, is proceeding in Northwest France. At most of these places construction is going ahead at a considerable pace, particularly in the case of Watten, where great activity is developing. Some attempt is being made to camouflage this work, and in one case the arrival of anti-aircraft guns has been observed.