Closing the Ring (49 page)

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The first plenary meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy on Sunday, November 28, at 4
P.M.
The conference room was spacious and handsome, and we seated ourselves at a large round table. I had with me Eden, Dill, the three Chiefs of Staff, and Ismay. The President had Harry Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, and two other officers. General Marshall and General Arnold were not present: “they had misunderstood the time of the meeting,” says Hopkins’ biographer, “and had gone off on a sight-seeing tour round Teheran.”
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I had my admirable interpreter of the previous year, Major Birse. Pavlov again performed this service for the Soviets, and Mr. Bohlen, a new figure, for the United States. Molotov and Marshal Voroshilov alone accompanied Stalin. He and I sat almost opposite one another. We had agreed beforehand that the President should preside at this first meeting, and Roosevelt consented to do so. He opened our proceedings in a felicitous speech, saying, according to our record, that the Russians, the British, and the Americans, were sitting round the table for the first time as members of the same family, with the single purpose of winning the war. No fixed agenda had been drawn up for the meeting, and it was open to anybody to discuss whatever he liked and to leave undiscussed whatever he did not
like. Everyone could speak as freely as he wished on the basis of friendship, and nothing would be published.

In my opening remarks I also stressed the importance of the occasion. This meeting, I said, probably represented the greatest concentration of worldly power that had ever been seen in the history of mankind. In our hands lay perhaps the shortening of the war, almost certainly victory, and, beyond any shadow of doubt, the happiness and fortunes of mankind.

Stalin said that he appreciated our references to the friendship of the three Powers. It was indeed true that a great opportunity had been given to them, and he hoped they would make good use of it.

The President then began the discussion with a brief account of the war situation from the American point of view. He first dealt with the Pacific, which had particular importance for the United States, since American forces there were bearing the main load, assisted by Australia, New Zealand, and China. The United States had concentrated in the Pacific the greater part of their Navy and the best part of a million men. The vast extent of that theatre could be gauged by the fact that a supply ship could do only three trips a year. The United States were pursuing a policy of attrition, which up to the present had been successful. It was certain that Japanese ships, both naval and mercantile, were being sunk more rapidly than new construction could replace them. Mr. Roosevelt then explained the plans for the recapture of Northern Burma. Anglo-American forces would co-operate with the Chinese, and would be under the command of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. Plans were also being discussed for an amphibious operation against the Japanese lines of communication from Bangkok. Considerable forces were to be employed, although every effort had been made to keep them down to the minimum required to achieve our essential objectives. Those objectives were to keep China actively in the war, to open the Burma Road, and to establish positions from which Japan could be vanquished with the greatest possible speed, once Germany had collapsed. It was hoped to secure bases in China which would enable Tokyo to be attacked in the coming year.

The President then turned to Europe. There had been many Anglo-American conferences and many plans. A year and a half ago it had been decided to launch an expedition across the English Channel, but owing to transportation and other difficulties it was still impossible to decide a definite date for the operation. An adequate force must be assembled in England, not only for the actual landing, but also for marching inland. The English Channel had proved such a disagreeable body of water that it was impossible to stage an expedition before May 1, 1944. This was the date decided upon at Quebec. He explained that landing-craft were the limiting factor in all landings, and if it were decided to mount a very big expedition in the Mediterranean, we should have to give up the cross-Channel operation altogether. If a lesser operation in the Mediterranean were decided upon, the delay would amount to one, two, or perhaps three months. Consequently, both he and I wished in this military conference to hear from Marshal Stalin and Marshal Voroshilov what action would be of the greatest service to the Soviet. Many plans had been mooted—increasing the strength of our attack in Italy, the Balkans, the Aegean, Turkey, and so forth. The most important task of the Conference would be to decide which of these to adopt. The governing object would be for the Anglo-American armies to draw the greatest weight off the Soviet forces.

Stalin, speaking next, welcomed the successes of the United States in the Pacific, but said that the Soviets could not join in the struggle against Japan at the present time, since practically all their forces were required against Germany. The Soviet forces in the Far East were more or less sufficient for defence, but they would have to be at least trebled in order to attack. The moment for joining their friends in this theatre would be the moment of Germany’s collapse: then they would march together.

As for Europe, Stalin said that he would like to begin with a few words about the Soviet experiences in the conduct of the war. Their attack in July had been anticipated by the Germans; but when sufficient troops and equipment had been collected, the Soviet had found it comparatively easy to pass
to the offensive. He frankly admitted that they had not expected the successes which were gained in July, August, and September. The Germans had proved weaker than had been thought.

He then gave details of the latest situation on the Soviet Front. On some of the sectors they had been slowed down, on others they had stopped altogether, while in the Ukraine, west and south of Kiev, the initiative had passed to the Germans within the last three weeks. The Germans had recaptured Zhitomir, and would probably recapture Korosten. Their objective was the recapture of Kiev. Nevertheless, in the main the initiative still rested with the Soviet armies.

He had been asked, he said, how the Anglo-American forces could best help Russia. The Soviet Government had always felt that the Italian campaign had been of great value to the Allied cause in that it opened the Mediterranean. But Italy was not a suitable jumping-off ground for the invasion of Germany. The Alps stood between. Therefore, nothing was to be gained by concentrating large numbers of troops in Italy for the invasion of Germany. Turkey would be a better point of entry than Italy; but it was a long way from the heart of Germany. He believed that North or Northwest France was the place for Anglo-American forces to attack, though it was of course true that the Germans there would resist desperately.

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Though invited to speak earlier, I had hitherto said nothing. I now stated the British position.

It had long been agreed, I said, with the United States that we should invade North or Northwest France across the Channel. The enterprise was absorbing most of our preparations and resources. A long dissertation on facts and figures would be necessary to show why it had been impossible to carry out this operation in 1943, but we were resolved to do it in 1944. Instead of the cross-Channel invasion of 1943, a series of operations had been launched in the Mediterranean. This had been done with full recognition that they were of a secondary
character; but we had felt that they were the best contribution we could make in 1943, having regard to our resources and to transportation. The British and American Governments had now set themselves the task of carrying out a cross-Channel invasion in the late spring or summer of 1944. The forces which could be accumulated by that time amounted to about sixteen British and nineteen United States divisions—a total of thirty-five divisions. These divisions were much stronger both in numbers and equipment than the German divisions.

Stalin here observed that he never regarded the operations in the Mediterranean as being of a secondary character. They were of the first importance, but not from the point of view of invading Germany.

I replied that nonetheless the President and I had both regarded them as stepping-stones to the decisive cross-Channel operation. Having regard to the British forces engaged in the Mediterranean and India, the sixteen British divisions which were being put into the cross-Channel operation were the most that could be provided by a country with a total population of forty-five millions. These divisions could be kept up to strength in the line, but the number could not be increased. It would have to be left to the United States, who had a large number of reserve divisions, to broaden the front and nourish the battle. The early spring and summer of 1944 were still six months away however, and the President and I had been asking ourselves what could be done during these six months with the resources available in the Mediterranean that would best take the weight off Russia, without postponing “Overlord” for more than perhaps a month or two. Seven of the best Anglo-American divisions and a certain number of landing-craft had already been, or were being, moved from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom. The result had been a weakening of effort on the Italian Front. The weather had been bad, and it had not yet been possible to take Rome. But it was hoped to take it by January; and General Alexander, who, under General Eisenhower, was commanding the Fifteenth Army Group in Italy, aimed, not only at taking Rome,
but at destroying or capturing ten or eleven German divisions.

I explained that we had not contemplated going into the broad part of the leg of Italy, still less invading Germany across the Alps. The general plan was first to capture Rome and seize the airfields north of it, which would enable us to bomb Southern Germany, and then to establish ourselves on a line towards Pisa-Rimini. After that, the possibility of establishing a Third Front in conformity with, but not in substitution for, the cross-Channel operation would have to be planned. One of the possibilities was to move into Southern France, and the second, suggested by the President, was to move from the head of the Adriatic northeast towards the Danube.

Meanwhile, what should be done in the next six months? There was much to be said for supporting Tito, who was holding a number of German divisions and doing much more for the Allied cause than the Chetniks under Mihailovic. There would clearly be great advantage in supporting him with supplies and guerrilla activities, but these would not contain any considerable number of enemy troops. This brought us to the biggest problem which would have to be decided after consideration by the military staffs, namely, how to bring Turkey into the war and open communications through the Aegean to the Dardanelles and thence to the Black Sea. Once Turkey was in the war and we had the use of her air bases, we could capture the islands in the Aegean with comparatively small forces, say two or three divisions, and the air forces already in that theatre. If we had access to the Black Sea ports, convoys could be run continuously. At present we had had to limit ourselves to four convoys by the Northern route, as the escorts were required for “Overlord”; but once the Dardanelles were open, the escort vessels already in the Mediterranean could keep up a ceaseless flow of supplies to the Soviet Black Sea ports.

How could we persuade Turkey to come into the war? If she came in, what should she be asked to do? Should she merely give us her bases, or should she attack Bulgaria and declare war on Germany? Should she move forward or should she stay on the Thracian frontier? What would be the effect on Bulgaria,
who owed a profound debt to Russia for rescuing her in former days from the Turkish yoke? How would Rumania react? They were already putting out genuine peace feelers for unconditional surrender. Then there was Hungary. Which way would she go? There might well be a political landslide among the satellite states which would enable the Greeks to revolt and hustle the Germans out of Greece. All these were questions on which the Soviets had a special point of view and special knowledge. It would be invaluable to know what they thought about it all. Would these plans in the Eastern Mediterranean be of sufficient interest to the Soviet Government to make them wish us to go ahead, even if it meant a delay of one to two months from May 1 in launching “Overlord”? The British and American Governments had deliberately kept their minds open on the subject until they knew what the Soviet Government felt about these problems.

The President here reminded me of the further project of moving up to the Northern Adriatic and then northeast to the Danube. I agreed, and said that once we had taken Rome and destroyed the German armies south of the Apennines in the narrow part of Italy, the Anglo-American armies would advance far enough to make contact with the enemy. We could then hold the line with the minimum forces and keep the option to strike with the remainder either in the South of France or, in accordance with the President’s idea, northeast from the head of the Adriatic. Neither of these problems had been considered in detail, but if Stalin should look upon them with favour a technical sub-committee could be set up to examine ways and means and facts and figures and to report to the Conference.

The discussion now came to a crucial point. The record says:

  Marshal Stalin addressed the following questions to the Prime Minister:

Question:
Am I right in thinking that the invasion of France is to be undertaken by thirty-five divisions?

Answer:
Yes. Particularly strong divisions.

Question:
Is it intended that this operation should be carried out by the forces now in Italy?

Answer:
No. Seven divisions have already been, or are in process of being, withdrawn from [Italy] and North Africa to take part in “Overlord.” These seven divisions are required to make up the thirty-five divisions mentioned in your first question. After they have been withdrawn, about twenty-two divisions will be left in the Mediterranean for Italy or other objectives. Some of these could be used either for an operation against Southern France or for moving from the head of the Adriatic towards the Danube. Both these operations will be timed in conformity with “Overlord.” Meanwhile, it should not be difficult to spare two or three divisions to take the islands in the Aegean.