Cold Blooded Murders (18 page)

The judge, nearing the end of his summing
up, came to the gloves. Ang had admitted that he brought two pairs of gloves
with him in the sampan on 27 August 1963, one dark blue and the other dark
brown. He said they were to wear them because the coral they were going to
collect were sharp and the gloves would prevent their hands being cut. Ang had
said this was an expedition for the express purpose of going coral-hunting.
“When Jenny went down the second time the intention was to collect coral, and
she was to help Ang carry them. Ang said it was necessary to wear these gloves
and he said that Jenny did wear them when she went down on the second occasion,
never to return. That,” said the judge, “would appear to be a complete
falsehood, gentlemen of the jury, because both pairs of gloves were still in
his bag which he had left that night at the police station. They were produced
before you. If Jenny had been wearing the gloves there would have been only one
pair left for you to see.” When he saw them in court, Ang was forced to admit
that they appeared very new, that they had never been in the water. What then,
became of his evidence that they were going down to collect coral? “Did he ever
intend that afternoon that they should? Ang was unable to offer any explanation
as to how the gloves came to be in the bag.”

Ang denied ever telephoning Rutherford (of
one of the insurance companies). He was shown his diary, ‘that red-back diary’.
He admitted that it was his and in his handwriting. “And then we had a
succession of astonishing answers which speak much for his powers of
improvisation and ingenuity under pressure.” The judge thought his reference to
Ruth—R-U-T-H—as Ruth Tan a remarkable effort. “Finally on being shown the entry
alleged to be referring to Rutherford and beside it ‘on leave in the United
Kingdom’, that did stump him. He said he did not know what it meant. The only
thing he did maintain was that it did not refer to Rutherford, who was on leave
in the United Kingdom.”

The judge dealt briefly with the
‘astonishing episode of the letters’ which Ang wrote to the Under-Treasurer of
Gray’s Inn. One of Ang’s ambitions was to become a barrister-at-law. “Though
never a student at the University of Singapore he wrote that he was. What a
sorry performance this was! First of all he said he never sent the letter: then
he could not remember if he sent it: then, on being shown the letter he said he
did not think he sent it because it was torn. He said he never despatched torn
letters. Finally, on being shown the postmark he said, ‘I must have sent it’.
Quite a remarkable performance, don’t you think?”

The judge told the jury that these were
matters selected at random, as instances, ‘instances only’, of Ang’s lack of
regard for the truth. Justice Buttrose told the jury that when they came to
consider Ang’s evidence they must take these matters into consideration. “How
much reliance can you place on his evidence? That is the question you must ask
yourselves. How much weight can you attach to his evidence that Jenny had made
amazing progress in her swimming and scuba-diving? That he and Jenny had been
to the Sisters Islands two days before with the boatman Yusuf? That he had his
tank on his back when Jenny went down a second time, and was ready to go down
with her? That he had sold Jenny his chicken farm?”

The judge instructed the jury that if they
were in any reasonable doubt as to whether Jenny was dead, or that Sunny Ang
murdered her, they would resolve that doubt in favour of Ang and acquit him.
“But equally, gentlemen of the jury, on the other hand, if you are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenny is dead, and that the accused murdered
her, you will, of course, do your duty and return a verdict of guilty
accordingly.”

The jury retired at 12:13
pm
and luncheon was sent in. They were
out for less than two and a half hours. At 2:38
pm
they returned with a unanimous verdict. They found the
accused guilty.

Ang stood stiffly in the dock, his hands
clasped before him as the judge sentenced him to death. It was the 13th day of
the trial.

Ang showed no emotion when he was taken in a
green prison van for the 10-mile ride to Changi Jail. He was checked in at the
main gate. His details were recorded in the normal manner. He asked for a meal
and then listened impassively as the prison routine was explained to him.
Prison officials told a
Straits
Times
reporter that the calmest prisoner in the
prison that day was Sunny Ang. He was still supremely confident he would not
hang. There were 18 other condemned prisoners in the prison, and ‘an air of
tension prevailed within the prison walls’.

A medical officer examined him after his
personal clothing and other articles were taken away from him. He had a bath
and a shave, in accordance with prison regulations. Escorted to his sparsely
furnished cell in a concrete block, Ang looked around as the door slammed
behind him. He was told that he would be allowed newspapers, books and
periodicals; relatives and friends could visit him. He would be allowed to
write and to receive letters. His day, officials told him, would begin at 6:30
am
every morning with a cup of tea, but
he would not be wakened if he was still asleep. There would be three meals a
day, and twice a day he would leave his cell, for a bath and for exercise.
Lights out at 10:00
pm
.

Five
months after his trial,
Sunny Ang’s appeal against
conviction and sentence opened on 25 October 1965, before Justice Tan Ah Tah,
the Acting Chief Justice, Justice Chua and Justice Winslow. The defence
presented eighteen principal grounds of appeal. The hearing lasted nine days.
In a few words the Acting Chief Justice delivered the judgment of the Court. He
said, “Although Jenny’s body has never been found, there is overwhelming
evidence on the record that the appellant murdered her. In our judgment no
miscarriage of justice has occurred in this case. The appeal is dismissed.”

Ang was in court. He showed no emotion.

In his petition, put forward by his counsel,
Mr Coomaraswamy alleged that his conviction was a ‘substantial miscarriage of
justice’ on the following grounds.

·
        
The trial judge erred in law in allowing the
prosecution to tender irrelevant evidence of a collision involving a car, which
the appellant was driving and in which Jenny Cheok was a passenger.

·
        
The trial judge erred in law in permitting the
prosecution to adduce this evidence at the preliminary inquiry, notwithstanding
that the notice under a section of the Criminal Procedure Code was not served
on the accused or his advocate before the trial.

·
        
The trial judge erred in law in permitting the
prosecution repeatedly to abuse the provisions of a section of the Criminal
Procedure Code by adducing evidence of witnesses who did not give evidence at
the preliminary inquiry, on the prosecution serving notice three minutes before
the commencement of the trial, notwithstanding that the evidence of such
witnesses was available to the prosecution long before and during the
preliminary inquiry.

·
        
The trial judge erred in law in allowing
evidence of inadmissible hearsay, in particular, evidence relating to the
circumstances in which Jenny Cheok was alleged to have taken out insurance
policies.

·
        
The trial judge erred in law in permitting the
prosecution to adduce irrelevant evidence, in particular, (a) evidence of
alleged attempts to suborn a witness, (b) evidence of a proposal form which
Jenny Cheok was alleged to have submitted to the Prudential Assurance Company
Limited, there being no evidence whatever to connect the accused with the
proposal form.

·
        
The trial judge erred in casting unnecessary and
unwarranted aspersions on the conduct of the appellants’ advocate and others
associated with the accused. Further, having made them of the appellant’s
advocate, the trial judge failed to give the appellant’s advocate an adequate
opportunity to explain himself before the jury.

·
        
The trial judge erred in law in rejecting
admissible evidence of statements made by Jenny Cheok to her sister as to her
intentions to go to Britain, and as to her intention that she would be going
away for a long time.

·
        
The appellant was throughout the trial subject
to such prejudice that he could not in the circumstances be said to have had a
fair trial.

·
        
The trial judge erred in law in permitting the
deputy public prosecutor to suggest to the jury that a flipper used by Jenny
Cheok was cut by the appellant between her first dive and her second dive,
notwithstanding that no such suggestion was made in the course of the deputy
public prosecutor’s opening address. Nor was this suggestion put to any witness
who could have given evidence on the matter.

·
        
The trial judge in his summing up to the jury
was so biased against the appellant and implied, or suggested as proved, facts
which were challenged, with the result that the appellant could not be said to
have had a fair trial.

·
        
The verdict of the jury was wrong and against
the weight of evidence.

·
        
The trial judge erred in law in failing to
direct the jury on a possible verdict of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder.

·
        
The trial judge in his direction to the jury
erred in law in using, upon the facts of the case, the analogy of a person
being induced to walk to a cliff top to illustrate the necessary intention for
the offence of murder, and the trial judge generally failed to direct the jury
adequately on intention.

·
        
The trial judge erred in failing to direct the
jury adequately on causation, in particular, he failed to direct the jury that
if Jenny Cheok was dead, (a) she significantly contributed to her death by
voluntarily going into the water, and (b) a number of possible causes for which
the appellant was not legally responsible could have caused her death.

·
        
The trial judge erred in law in failing to
direct the jury adequately on certain questions of law relating to the offence
of murder.

·
        
The trial judge did not at times clearly
distinguish between prosecution allegations, evidence and his own views
thereon.

·
        
The trial judge erred in law in failing to
direct the jury adequately on the burden of proof on the prosecution.

·
        
The trial judge was wrong in his direction to
the jury on circumstantial evidence and erred in law in failing to direct the
jury adequately on the dangers of convicting an accused person on
circumstantial evidence.

Mr Coomaraswamy’s first ground of appeal was
based on the admission of evidence relating to the accident when Ang was
driving a car with Jenny as passenger near Seremban. He said the accident
happened a full two weeks before the alleged murder. He submitted that what
happened, on 13 August could not be said to be ‘part of the same transaction’
or ‘closely associated in time, place and circumstances’—which, he argued, were
the conditions laid down in law for such evidence to be admissible.

“This particular accident, which took place
two weeks earlier and 200 miles from Singapore cannot be associated in time,
place and circumstances with the facts that were the subject matter of the
charge,” defence counsel submitted. He said it was clear that the prosecution
could not seek to adduce evidence of this accident for the purpose of showing
that the accused was a person, who by his past conduct, was likely to have
committed the crime with which he was charged. If that were the purpose, it
would be totally and completely irrelevant. Therefore, the only other purpose
was to show that the accused deliberately crashed the car and tried to kill or
maim Jenny and that the events of 27 August could not be an accident. Counsel
argued that this piece of evidence was highly prejudicial because, if the
interpretation the prosecution sought to put on the car collision remained, it
would be evidence of the commission by the accused of an offence other than
that with which he was charged. It could have been evidence of anything,
ranging from voluntarily causing grievous hurt to attempted murder. That in
itself was evidence of bad character and tended to show that the accused had
committed an offence which was not the subject matter of the charge. The fact
that an accused was of bad character, Mr Coomaraswamy argued, was irrelevant in
criminal proceedings. He cited a series of authorities to substantiate his
arguments.

Counsel submitted that the trial judge had
admitted hearsay evidence and disallowed relevant evidence. He had disallowed
evidence which would have shown that Jenny intended going to Britain and would
be away for a long time. Had the judge allowed this evidence, counsel said, he
would have submitted to the jury that there was a likelihood Jenny was alive
and abroad, because of her expressed intention of going to Britain.