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A quarter of an hour before midday, just five minutes before the High Commissioner was due to drive in state from the Residency, Monsarrat hurried from the Kgotla to one of the few telephones in Serowe and announced in his low voice: ‘There is no one here. Better tell H. E. not to come.' So Baring put down his cocked hat, unbuckled his sword and changed out of his uniform.
³⁰
‘In these circumstances,' Baring reported to the Secretary of State, ‘vigorous police action was clearly undesirable and would in any case have been ineffective. I therefore cancelled the Kgotla.'
³¹

It was a humiliation for Baring. He had looked majestic in his white uniform and sword, crowned with the tall cocked hat and white feathers, and with his Star of St Michael and St George on his chest.
³²
But this finery now looked absurd. ‘The boycott of the Kgotla,' wrote Monsarrat, ‘was, in its context, an atrocious personal insult.' He felt personally humiliated himself – ‘the white uniform, white helmet, medals and sword which I had donned for the great occasion seemed ridiculous'. They were also, he complained, very hot.
³³
‘Never before, in British Africa,' wrote Monks, ‘had the Crown's representative been so insulted.'
³⁴
The boycott was a very public defeat of the British Administration by the Tribe they claimed to govern and was covered in painful detail by a Movietone newsreel. As it showed a close-up of a reporter in the deserted Kgotla, with a typewriter on his knee, it observed mockingly, ‘As you see, the press turned up in
full
force.'
³⁵

Yet again, the Khama family had embarrassed the British. Clark told officers at the US embassy that one of the reasons for the British decision to exile Seretse had been to get rid of the ‘trouble-making' Khama ruling house. ‘This small group of wretched Bamangwatos who have caused His Majesty's Government so much trouble in the past,' said Clark, ‘are not worth it.' From the ‘puritanical Khama the Great down to Seretse,' he added, they had been a source of trouble. But at least now, ‘a unique opportunity' of getting rid of them had presented itself.
³⁶

Baring had still to deliver the terms of the Parliamentary statement on Seretse's banishment. He arranged for a written instruction by the District Commissioner, acting as Native Authority, to be delivered to twenty-four senior men, asking them to appear before him. But only twelve of these orders were successfully delivered, and not one of the recipients obeyed. ‘Only if we are handcuffed and carried will we go to the Kgotla,' said one headman.
³⁷

As a last resort – so as to deliver his statement to
somebody
– Sir Evelyn gave a press conference at the Residency. In any case, he needed to offer some kind of explanation to the journalists. The press event took place in the Sullivans' beautiful garden, with chairs set out on the well-watered lawn in a semi-circle for the twenty-two press men and photographers. They were plied with drinks and made as comfortable as possible, but it was ‘not a happy experience', said one of the local officials. ‘The press were in a destructive mood, for they all sided with Seretse and questioned Baring with cheerful contempt verging on open hostility.'
³⁸
Baring told them that the boycott was a case of
simple intimidation and he emphasized the threat of conflict between Seretse and Tshekedi. The history of the Bamangwato people, he said, was one of quarrels and feuds. The government's objective ‘has been to stop the development of what we feel might become one of the biggest and the worst dynastic feuds that has ever been':

There is a danger to peace and good order if you have either of them [Seretse or Tshekedi]… We thought that you would get the position of the feud between Tshekedi and Seretse, whatever the position at this moment is, that there would develop one in which the feud between Tshekedi and Seretse would become worse, and then you have disasters… We think that with either in the saddle we are going to have almost endless trouble in the near future.

Then he developed the idea that Gordon Walker had put forward to the House of Commons – that Seretse's banishment was a progressive measure aiming at greater democracy.
³⁹

The first questions of the press were about the role of South Africa, to which Baring unhesitatingly lied, just as Gordon Walker had done in the House of Commons:

PRESS
: Has the present position arisen through the Union Government?

HE [HIS EXCELLENCY, BARING]
: The Union Government has taken no action whatever.

PRESS
: I mean by action an approach to the United Kingdom Government saying if you do this then we will do something else.

HE [HIS EXCELLENCY, BARING]
: The Union Government has taken no action, except banning Seretse Khama from Union territory. The Union Government has made no approach to the British Government.
⁴⁰

Redfern was impressed by the way in which Baring carried the press conference off. ‘This was the British colonial chief at his best,' he thought. ‘So calm, so cool, an oasis in a desert of exacerbation.'
⁴¹
But however calm Baring appeared, deep down he was apprehensive. He had even been boycotted by Ruth, who had gone to Palapye to spend the weekend with the Bradshaws, in order to avoid him.
⁴²
He had the uncomfortable knowledge that news of his failure would very soon reach Britain and every corner of the Empire, through newspaper reports and newsreels. Liesching sent him a message of sympathy.
‘This Seretse business is very troublesome,' he said, ‘but we always knew it would be.' He put the blame squarely on Seretse: ‘I am sorry that the Serowe situation turned so sour on you for the Kgotla. Our original plan would of course have timed the announcement of the decision here with your appearance in Serowe.'
⁴³

Baring was afraid, he confided to his wife Mary, that he might get the sack over the Seretse Khama affair.
⁴⁴
He suspected that the Government were considering plans to rescind or modify the exclusion order on Seretse – and he was right. On the very day of the failed Kgotla, even before the news reached London, Gordon Walker told Liesching that he was increasingly doubtful about their policy. ‘We have had a very bad reception: not too good even in some Union papers,' he observed in dismay. ‘We cannot ignore this,' he added, ‘indeed it may in the end prejudice our whole policy. We must, therefore, see what we can do, whilst keeping our principal policy intact.' The policy of non-recognition must be sustained, he thought, but he hoped for a compromise on Seretse's return to the Protectorate:

The question of where Seretse resides is I think a matter only of law and order. I don't think the mere residence of Seretse plus Ruth in the Protectorate or Reserve would unite and inflame S. African opinion.

And he added:

It strikes me that if Seretse's appearance in Lobatse at this moment does not endanger order, his permanent residence could not do so either. Indeed, we will be on weak ground if, basing ourselves on the law and order argument, we let him go back now and remove him later. There is also the point that Seretse in the Protectorate may be much less of an embarrassment and a source of disorder than in London, where he has organisations and the whole Press at his disposal.
⁴⁵

Then the situation in Bechuanaland deteriorated even further. The boycott of the Kgotla was now being followed by a boycott of the Administration. Six senior headmen signed a letter stating that the tribe would not obey any orders ‘by or emanating from a newly constituted Native Authority and would not pay further taxes without the authority of Seretse'.
⁴⁶
Nor would they elect a new Kgosi – because he was born, not elected.
⁴⁷
In other words, the Bangwato
were on strike. The Tribal Treasury stayed open, but collected no revenue; the Kgotla was deserted except for a few old men; and in the course of their work, government officers were met by polite preoccupation.
⁴⁸
Nobody attended a Kgotla called by the District Commissioner, in his position as Native Authority, and the native courts ceased to function.
⁴⁹
The campaign was further strengthened when the diKgosi of other nations in the Protectorate joined in.
⁵⁰
Feelings ran high.
⁵¹

The boycott drew on the precedent of the civil disobedience campaign that had been led in India by Mahatma Gandhi against British rule. Gandhi had first used this method of protest –
Satyagraha
– in South Africa, in the Transvaal, between 1906 and 1912, to resist the racist laws of the Government.
⁵²
It was a form of opposition that suited the people of Bechuanaland, who preferred to negotiate a solution to a problem, rather than to fight. ‘We are sure the natives won't raise a hand and use violence,' wrote Doris Bradshaw to her family in the UK. ‘They are just taking it quietly and resisting passively.'
⁵³
She believed that the Administration would have
preferred
violence. ‘There's been such a lot of dirty work by the Gov,' she wrote to her sister in the UK. ‘You've no idea. They seem to be trying hard to
create
disturbances but the natives are too shrewd to be stampeded into anything the Gov could use against them or Seretse.'
⁵⁴

Baring assumed that his problems with the Bangwato had been caused by a few ringleaders and he was especially bothered by the ‘participation of certain local Europeans'. The worst offender, he told Gordon Walker, was the representative of the Native Recruiting Corporation, Alan Bradshaw. He resolved to remove him from Bechuanaland without delay. ‘When passing through Johannesburg,' he reported to London, ‘I asked formally for his transfer and was told that this would be arranged at once.'
⁵⁵
Within just three days, Bradshaw got a telegram telling him that he was on ‘immediate transfer' to Vryburg in South Africa, about 150 kilometres south-west of Mafikeng.
⁵⁶
When the telegram arrived, Doris was helping Ruth make baby clothes. She showed it to Ruth, who commented sadly, ‘Doris Bradshaw is the only white woman in this whole territory whose home is open to me. She is the only white woman I can confide in at this rather trying time for me.'
⁵⁷

‘We don't like Vryburg very much,' wrote Doris shortly after her arrival,

though we have a nice house in the centre of the town, with electric light and indoor sanitation – a treat after Palapye. But it's so cold here, the people are all Afrikaans and speak only Afrikaans and don't like us because we are English.

They were especially unpopular because of their known support for Seretse and Ruth. ‘Poor Seretse,' sighed Doris, ‘they're treating him like a leper aren't they? Ruth has all the guts and courage in the world… We feel ashamed of being English when we see what's going on.'
⁵⁸
The tribe ‘do not and never have trusted the Administration, who only order them around and never hardly listen to their point of view,' wrote Alan to Doris's sister.
⁵⁹

Baring decided to inject some fresh blood into the Administration in Serowe. He brought in Forbes MacKenzie, the Government Secretary of Swaziland, who was a Rhodesian and famous throughout the Protectorate for his height – 6 feet 7 inches. MacKenzie was told on 1 April 1950 ‘to take control of the situation'
⁶⁰
and was appointed the new District Commissioner. This meant that he was also designated ‘Native Authority', under the new regime of direct rule by the British Government. MacKenzie started to develop the machinery for the direct rule of the Bangwato Reserve and appointed Keaboka Kgamane as ‘Senior Tribal Representative' and Senior Judicial Officer. Keaboka was one of Seretse's principal supporters and was fourth in the line of succession to the kingship of the Bangwato.

Throughout Bechuanaland, there was dismay and concern at the idea of direct rule in the Bangwato Reserve. In Maun, in the north of the country, the Regent of the Batawana, Mrs Moremi, who was well known as a progressive and just administrator, said that it raised ‘an important point of principle'.
⁶¹
Not only in Bechuanaland, but also in Basutoland and Swaziland, the other two High Commission Territories, there were protests. From their point of view, it created an unhappy precedent – ‘This might happen to us.'
⁶²

In London, Seretse was taking legal advice on what course to follow to return to his wife and his country. He was much heartened by messages of support. ‘Britain's 20,000 Negroes rallied around me,' he wrote, gratefully.
¹
The day after Gordon Walker's speech to the House of Commons, concerned individuals and organizations in the UK – including the West African Students Union (WASU), the African League, the League of Coloured Peoples and the Council for Overseas Indians – met together in London and immediately formed the ‘Seretse Khama Fighting Committee'.
²

Learie Constantine, a veteran campaigner on issues of injustice relating to colour and race, played a leading role in setting up the Committee and was appointed Chairman.
³
Nii Odoi Annan, a law student from the Gold Coast and Financial Secretary of WASU,
⁴
was Joint Secretary of the Fighting Committee along with Billy Strachan, a Jamaican who was the Secretary of the Caribbean Labour Congress and had served with distinction as a pilot in RAF Bomber Command during the war. Joe Appiah, President of WASU, was also involved. The Committee was based at the WASU hostel on the Chelsea Embankment and was publicly supported by numerous other organizations, ranging from the University of Oxford Socialist Club to the Birmingham Trades Council.
⁵
The Afro-American Association in the USA, which had a membership of 15 million people, had sent rep resentatives to Britain and was in touch with Seretse.
⁶
Edinburgh set up its own Fighting Committee, to support the campaign from Scotland.