“In case you fear, Hiero, that the cost of offering prizes for many subjects may prove heavy, you should reflect that no commodities are cheaper than those that are bought for a prize. Think of the large sums that men are induced to spend on horse-races, gymnastic and choral competitions, and the long course of training and practice they undergo for the sake of a paltry prize.”
10.
“Well, Simonides,” said Hiero, “I think you are right in saying that. But what about the mercenaries? Can you tell me how to employ them without incurring unpopularity? Or do you say that a ruler, once he becomes popular, will have no further need of a bodyguard?”
[2]
“No, no, he will need them, of course,” said Simonides. “For I know that some human beings are like horses — the more they get what they want, the more unruly they are apt to become.
[3]
The way to manage men like that is to put the fear of the bodyguard into them. And as for the gentlemen, you can probably confer greater benefits on them by employing mercenaries than by any other means.
[4]
For I presume that you maintain the force primarily to protect yourself. But masters have often been murdered by their slaves. If therefore the first duty enjoined on the mercenaries were to act as the bodyguard of the whole community and render help to all, in case they got wind of any such intention — there are black sheep in every fold, as we all know — I say, if they were under orders to guard the citizens as well as the depot, the citizens would know that this is one service rendered to them by the mercenaries.
[5]
Nor is this all: for naturally the mercenaries would also be able to give fearlessness and security in the fullest measure to the labourers and cattle in the country, and the benefit would not be confined to your own estates, but would be felt up and down the countryside.
[6]
Again, they are competent to afford the citizens leisure for attending to their private affairs by guarding the vital positions. Besides, should an enemy plan a secret and sudden attack, what handier agents can be found for detecting or preventing their design than a standing force, armed and organized? Or once more, when the citizens go campaigning, what is more useful to them than mercenaries? For these are, as a matter of course, the readiest to bear the brunt of toil and danger and watching.
[7]
And must not those who possess a standing force impose on border states a strong desire for peace? For nothing equals an organized body of men, whether for protecting the property of friends or for thwarting the plans of enemies.
[8]
Further, when the citizens get it into their heads that these troops do no harm to the innocent and hold the would-be malefactor in check, come to the rescue of the wronged, care for the citizens and shield them from danger, surely they are bound to pay the cost of them with a right good-will. At all events they keep guards in their homes for less important objects than these.
11.
“Nor should you hesitate to draw on your private property, Hiero, for the common good. For in my opinion the sums that a great despot spends on the city are more truly necessary expenses than the money he spends on himself.
[2]
But let us go into details. First, which do you suppose is likely to bring you more credit, to own a palace adorned with priceless objects of art, or to have the whole city garnished with walls and temples and verandahs and market-places and harbours?
[3]
Which will make you look more terrible to the enemy, to dazzle all beholders with your own glittering panoply, or to present the whole of your people in goodly armour?
[4]
Which plan, think you, will yield revenues more abounding, to keep only your own capital employed, or to contrive to bring the capital of all the citizens into employment?
[5]
And what about the breeding of chariot horses, commonly considered the noblest and grandest business in the world? By which method do you think you will gain most credit for that, if you out-do all other Greeks in the number of teams you breed and send to the festivals, or if the greatest number of breeders and the greatest number of competitors are drawn from your city? And how is the nobler victory gained, by the excellence of your team, or by the prosperity of the city of which you are the head?
[6]
Indeed my own opinion is that it is not even seemly for a great despot to compete with private citizens. For your victory would excite envy rather than admiration, on the ground that many estates supply the money that you spend, and no defeat would be greeted with so much ridicule as yours.
[7]
I tell you, Hiero, you have to compete with other heads of states, and if you cause your state to surpass theirs in prosperity, be well assured that you are the victor in the noblest and grandest competition in the world.
[8]
And in the first place you will forthwith have secured just what you really want, the affection of your subjects. Secondly, your victory will not be proclaimed by one herald’s voice, but all the world will tell of your virtue.
[9]
The observed of all observers’ eyes, you will be a hero, not only to private citizens, but to many states: you will be admired not only in your home, but in public among all men.
[10]
And you will be free to go wherever you choose, so far as safety is concerned, to see the sights, and equally free to enjoy them in your home; for you will have a throng of aspirants before you, some eager to display something wise or beautiful or good, others longing to serve you.
[11]
Everyone present will be an ally, everyone absent will long to see you.
“Thus you will be not only the loved, but the adored of mankind. You will need not to court the fair, but to listen patiently to their suit. Anxiety for your welfare will fall not on yourself, but on others.
[12]
You will have the willing obedience of your subjects; you will mark their unsolicited care for you; and should any danger arise, you will find in them not merely allies, but champions and zealots. Accounted worthy of many gifts, and at no loss for some man of goodwill with whom to share them, you will find all rejoicing in your good fortune, all fighting for your interests, as though they were their own.
[13]
And all the riches in the houses of your friends will be yours in fee.
“Take heart then, Hiero; enrich your friends, for so you will enrich yourself. Exalt the state, for so you will deck yourself with power.
[14]
Get her allies [for so you will win supporters for yourself]. Account the fatherland your estate, the citizens your comrades, friends your own children, your sons possessions dear as life. And try to surpass all these in deeds of kindness.
[15]
For if you out-do your friends in kindness, it is certain that your enemies will not be able to resist you.
“And if you do all these things, rest assured that you will be possessed of the fairest and most blessed possession in the world; for none will be jealous of your happiness.”
Translated by E. C. Marchant
The treatise
Πόροι
was written in 354 BC and is believed to be Xenophon’s final work. Written half a century after Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War, it explores the subject of financial ruin that was facing the city at the time. In the first part Xenophon lists the qualities of Athens that should recommend it for producing a large revenue, including the mild seasons enjoyed in Attica, the highly productive nature of the surrounding land and sea and how distant the city is from ‘barbarian lands’. Xenophon goes on to suggest that Athens should increase the metic population, which was largely populated by foreigners - until then not granted citizenship - as a means of increasing revenue.
Athens at the time of Xenophon
WAYS AND MEANS
1.
For my part I have always held that the constitution of a state reflects the character of the leading politicians. But some of the leading men at Athens have stated that they recognize justice as clearly as other men; “but,” they have said, “owing to the poverty of the masses, we are forced to be somewhat unjust in our treatment of the cities.” This set me thinking whether by any means the citizens might obtain food entirely from their own soil, which would certainly be the fairest way. I felt that, were this so, they would be relieved of their poverty, and also of the suspicion with which they are regarded by the Greek world.
[2]
Now as I thought over my ideas, one thing seemed clear at once, that the country is by its nature capable of furnishing an ample revenue. To drive home the truth of this statement I will first describe the natural properties of Attica.
[3]
The extreme mildness of the seasons here is shown by the actual products. At any rate, plants that will not even grow in many countries bear fruit here. Not less productive than the land is the sea around the coasts. Notice too that the good things which the gods send in their season all come in earlier here and go out later than elsewhere.
[4]
And the pre-eminence of the land is not only in the things that bloom and wither annually: she has other good things that last for ever. Nature has put in her abundance of stone, from which are fashioned lovely temples and lovely altars, and goodly statues for the gods. Many Greeks and barbarians alike have need of it.
[5]
Again, there is land that yields no fruit if sown, and yet, when quarried, feeds many times the number it could support if it grew corn. And recollect, there is silver in the soil, the gift, beyond doubt, of divine providence: at any rate, many as are the states near to her by land and sea, into none of them does even a thin vein of silver ore extend.
[6]
One might reasonably suppose that the city lies at the centre of Greece, nay of the whole inhabited world. For the further we go from her, the more intense is the heat or cold we meet with; and every traveller who would cross from one to the other end of Greece passes Athens as the centre of a circle, whether he goes by water or by road.
[7]
Then, too, though she is not wholly sea-girt, all the winds of heaven bring to her the goods she needs and bear away her exports, as if she were an island; for she lies between two seas: and she has a vast land trade as well; for she is of the mainland.
[8]
Further, on the borders of most states dwell barbarians who trouble them: but the neighbouring states of Athens are themselves remote from the barbarians.
2.
All these advantages, as I have said, are, I believe, due to the country itself. But instead of limiting ourselves to the blessings that may be called indigenous, suppose that, in the first place, we studied the interests of the resident aliens. For in them we have one of the very best sources of revenue, in my opinion, inasmuch as they are self-supporting and, so far from receiving payment for the many services they render to states, they contribute by paying a special tax.
[2]
I think that we should study their interests sufficiently, if we relieved them of the duties that seem to impose a certain measure of disability on the resident alien without conferring any benefit on the state, and also of the obligation to serve in the infantry along with the citizens. Apart from the personal risk, it is no small thing to leave their trades and their private affairs.
[3]
The state itself too would gain if the citizens served in the ranks together, and no longer found themselves in the same company with Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and barbarians of all sorts, of whom a large part of our alien population consists.
[4]
In addition to the advantage of dispensing with the services of these men, it would be an ornament to the state that the Athenians should be thought to rely on themselves rather than on the help of foreigners in fighting their battles.
[5]
If, moreover, we granted the resident aliens the right to serve in the cavalry and various other privileges which it is proper to grant them, I think that we should find their loyalty increase and at the same time should add to the strength and greatness of the state.
[6]