Conceived in Liberty (174 page)

This original phase of the nonimportation movement was organized by Massachusetts town meetings and pledged the public not to consume certain British imports. These actions were partially spurred by a commercial depression triggered by the restrictions and burdens of the Townshend Acts. Clearly, they would help those caught by the depression to retrench their expenses and hence their purchases of imported goods.

Massachusetts towns were not alone in following Boston’s example. Rhode Island, in fact, not only followed but went one better: on December 2 a Providence Town Meeting pledged the town’s
merchants
not to import a list of imported goods after the first of the year. Such a pledge of a nonimportation boycott by merchants was far more concrete and finely edged, and far easier to maintain than a vague and unwieldy pledge by the mass of consumers. Providence’s action was really the first effective move for a mercantile boycott to pressure England for repeal. Any merchant failing to sign or to conform to the boycott was himself to be boycotted by the people. Two days later, Newport followed suit, and then small Rhode Island towns. In Connecticut, town meetings, led by Norwich, adopted nonconsumption agreements after the pattern of Boston’s.

Historians have made much of the fact that popular resistance to the Townshend duties early took the form of boycott agreements, whereas resistance to the Stamp Act had stressed armed rebellion. This has been interpreted as a significantly conservative shift led by merchants fearful of popular mob actions. But this view ignores the crucial difference between the two threats. The stamp tax, being internal to all colonial transactions,
had
to be fought by dismantling the new Stamp Act bureaucracy and then immobilizing the stamped paper. This could be done only by the armed action of the aroused people. But the Townshend levies reverted to the more orthodox import duties, and early mob action would have been pointless. What was needed now was
mercantile
action: smuggling in defiance of the duties, and boycott pressure on English merchants. Mob violence at that point would have been ineffectual and even absurd, and hence was not embarked upon. As would soon be seen, neither the American liberal leaders nor the public had become more timid or conservative since the stamp crisis; different methods of oppression simply called for different means of resistance. The change was one of tactics, not of spirit.

As in the case of the Stamp Act, popular local action was supplemented by petitions and resolutions of the assemblies. A clarion call was sounded in the form of a letter drawn up by the indefatigable Samuel Adams and presented to the Massachusetts General Court. Adopted on February 11, 1768, the missive was sent out as a circular letter to the assemblies of all the other colonies. The letter acknowledged the power of Parliament to regulate the colonies, but categorically denied any power of taxation, internal or external. Furthermore, not only the constitutional but the
natural
rights of Americans were charged to have been violated by such a tax, because the doctrine of consent to taxation was an “unalterable right in nature ingathered into the British constitution.” Hence the Townshend duties were spurned, along with any move to make executive (including judicial) offices independent of Assembly appropriations, and united action was called for. The Massachusetts circular letter was approved by the assemblies of New Hampshire, New Jersey, Connecticut,
Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, and South Carolina during the spring and summer, and Virginia reinforced it by a circular letter of its own against British taxation.

Another powerful and widely influential statement of the American case against the Townshend duties was delivered by the eminent leader of the Pennsylvania liberals, the young lawyer John Dickinson. Dickinson’s
Letters from a Farmer
appeared in the
Pennsylvania Chronicle
around the turn of the year 1767–68. It denied the right of any parliamentary taxation and hence of the Townshend duties, although it conceded the right to raise a revenue incidental to regulation of American trade (as under the Sugar Act). Dickinson also called for a determined nonimportation campaign to effect repeal of the Townshend taxes.

It soon became clear that official petitions and individual protests and even uncoordinated local boycotts were not enough; more concerted and unified efforts were evidently necessary. On March 1, the merchants of Boston, led by Captain Daniel Malcom, pledged to cease importing
all
goods from Great Britain for one year, provided that the merchants in New York and Philadelphia, the two other major American ports, would agree to join. Almost all the merchants of Boston signed this agreement, as did the merchants of Salem, Marblehead, and Gloucester (although the merchants of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, refused). After several meetings, almost every merchant and trader of New York agreed to import no British goods after October 1, 1768, and until repeal of the Townshend duties, provided that Boston continued its boycott and Philadelphia concurred. The Boston merchants accepted these terms in early May, but Philadelphia was a different story.

The city of Philadelphia, scarcely hit by the trade depression, was more heavily ridden with Tories than any other city in the American colonies. Here the Tory machine of Joseph Galloway was in control, and was able to overrule John Dickinson. During meetings in Philadelphia in March and April 1768, Dickinson eloquently reminded the merchants of the numerous attempts by Great Britain to cripple the trade and the nascent manufacturing of the colonies. The Townshend Acts were an invasion of liberty; and liberty, property, and industry went hand in hand. Therefore, Dickinson urged the merchants to forgo present advantage for principle and for long-run self-interest. But the Philadelphia merchants, taking their cue from Galloway, remained unmoved, and the great and imaginative project for a nonimportation league of merchants from the leading American cities collapsed.

Philadelphia’s betrayal was a severe blow to the colonial cause. Notwithstanding, nearly all the merchants of Boston fearlessly agreed on August 1 to go it alone, and to discontinue imports of all goods from Great Britain for the entire year of 1769, as well as imports of all goods on the Townshend duty list until those duties were repealed. The heroic example of Boston’s merchants inspired others; soon the merchants of Salem, Plymouth, and other
towns followed suit. On August 27, the New York merchants decided to go far beyond their Boston confreres. Almost unanimously they agreed to cease
all
importation after November 1, 1768, and until the Townshend duties were repealed. Any subscribing merchants violating the agreement would be publicly designated “Enemies to their Country.” Furthermore, the retail tradesmen in New York signed an agreement to refuse to buy from any merchants who themselves refused to sign or follow the merchants’ agreement. The merchants of Albany and other towns of the province also concurred. The following April, New York’s Assembly, on motion of Philip Livingston, merchant and leader of the liberal wing of the landed oligarchy, voted its thanks to the New York merchants for their patriotic decision for a boycott.

Once again, in the fall of 1768, the merchants of Philadelphia were on the spot. And once again they coolly ignored the pressure for a boycott, and confined themselves to their own petitions, supporting a request to England by the Pennsylvania Assembly for repeal of the Townshend Act. Finally, however, the Philadelphia merchants pledged themselves to nonimportation effective next spring, if the Townshend Act had not then been repealed. With no sign of repeal in mid-March of 1769, the great bulk of the Philadelphia merchants at last agreed to import virtually no goods from Great Britain after April 1, 1769, until the Townshend duties should be repealed. Any violator would be publicly stigmatized as an “Enemy of the Liberties of America.” Thus, by the spring of 1769, the three great ports had joined in a boycott until repeal. After a year of shilly-shallying, Philadelphia was at last permitting concerted American pressure upon Great Britain. The boycott movement was over the top.

Meanwhile, during 1768, the British government managed only to stiffen American resistance by its frenzied reaction to the circular letter of Massachusetts. Charles Townshend had died suddenly in early September 1767. The Townshend Acts of course remained; the evil that he did lived after him. The subsequent reshuffle of the cabinet swung the balance of forces sharply to the right, with new power accruing to the followers of the arch-imperialist Duke of Bedford. Townshend’s post as chancellor of the Exchequer was filled by the arch-Tory Frederick Lord North, who also replaced the liberal Conway as leader in the Commons. A critical new post of secretary of state for the colonies—in charge of colonial affairs—was filled by the imperialist Lord Hillsborough, formerly president of the Board of Trade.

Hillsborough reacted in horror to Massachusetts’ circular letter. At the end of April 1768, he countered that mild action with a circular letter of his own, ordering the royal governors to dissolve any colonial assemblies that would dare to endorse the Massachusetts letter. For Massachusetts, Hillsborough ordered special punishment: its cherished Assembly was not to be allowed to meet again until it repudiated its circular letter. Here Hillsborough had been anticipated by Governor Bernard of Massachusetts, who had condemned the circular letter as seditious and dissolved the Assembly in early March.

Lord Hillsborough’s bombshell was issued too hastily on several counts. For one thing, it had been sent without consulting the cabinet, where it was severely denounced by the liberals. But the fat was already in the fire. Second, several of the assemblies had already endorsed the letter by the time Lord Hillsborough’s order was received in America. In any case, Hillsborough’s effrontery was enough to influence Americans once more against British tyranny.
The colonies were incensed at this ferocious attack on their elementary right to petition, something enjoyed even by the slaves in America. Even someone as conservative as George Washington began to think of taking up arms in defense of American liberty.

Repression had only lit the spark of resistance in America. Colony after colony rushed to commend the Massachusetts circular letter. The spirit of resistance even stirred in Pennsylvania, although here Joseph Galloway was able to table any endorsement of Massachusetts. Massachusetts itself stood firm; Otis demanded that Britain promptly rescind its actions. The Massachusetts Assembly on June 30 defeated the royal order to rescind by the overwhelming vote of 92 to 17. The Assembly was then promptly dissolved by Governor Bernard. Throughout America the “glorious 92” were hailed as heroes of American liberty, while the seventeen rescinders were condemned as traitors and tools of Great Britain. Of the seventeen, twelve had been appointed officials under the royal governor. The town of Marblehead, Massachusetts, in unanimously voting to thank the ninety-two, trenchantly warned that the British were seriously miscalculating in thinking of the resistance as the product only of a minority faction rather than of the bulk of the people. The radical Massachusetts engraver, Paul Revere, depicted the seventeen in an influential cartoon as marching into hell. Sam Adams and the Sons of Liberty mobilized against the rescinders, and no less than twelve of them lost their seats in the elections of the following May.

Meanwhile, Boston was being particularly scourged by the presence of the new Board of Commissioners of the Customs, which began operations at the end of 1767. The customs board soon found to its horror that salutary neglect had indeed been in operation: violation of the imperial trade laws was rampant. Only six seizures of shipping had been made in New England since 1765; and of these violations, only one court case had been won by the Crown. Of the five other cases, two had been acquitted in Rhode Island under severe public pressure, and the three other ships in Massachusetts and Connecticut had been rescued by mobs.

The customs board swiftly and radically transformed the customs service. The old customs officials, who had settled into a mutually pleasant and profitable arrangement with the merchants, were dismissed and replaced by eager and unfortunately incorruptible Scotsmen. The new bureaucracy, led by a network of paid informers, swept down upon ships and managed to suppress the bulk of smuggling, and hence of shipping, in Boston. Boston’s economic depression was thereby greatly intensified. The board did not succeed in suppressing smuggling, and hence shipping, in the other ports, but Boston was seriously crippled. The Massachusetts merchants were understandably embittered; and the customs commissioners were denounced as robbers, miscreants, and “bloodsuckers upon our trade.”

Confronted with the oppression of customs and of Navigation Acts
enforcement, the people of the colonies, especially in the northern seaports, were forced to turn once again to their most powerful weapon: rebellion in the streets. The armed rioting was directed against the oppression of the customs officials. First, ships and cargoes were recaptured from the clutches of the government, under cover of night; second, as a supplement, stern warnings were issued to customs officials and their hired informers. Throughout 1768 and 1769, stripping, tarring, and feathering by mobs proved to be highly useful devices for intimidating the enemies of the people. Informers quickly learned a valuable lesson and abandoned their underhanded profession, while customs officials promptly fled the colony. Despite arrogant demands by the governors, local sheriffs and magistrates happily refused to do anything to stop the people’s resistance. And even when officials were foolhardy enough to track down the mob leaders and bring suit, the sympathetic juries invariably freed the resistance leaders. Prosecution of rebel leaders could only take place in common-law courts, and here juries were eager to protect their heroes.

The customs commissioners, like Lord Hillsborough and most of the British officialdom, were nothing if not hard-line scorners of any “appeasement” of the colonies. In this they were aided by the arrival of a British man-of-war sent in answer to their request for armed help. The consequence, each step of the way, was to inflame and redouble the popular resistance. The customs board decided to repress the resistance by concentrating on and crucifying a man who was the leading financial angel of the Massachusetts radicals: John Hancock. Hancock, one of the wealthiest merchants in New England, symbolized the popular struggle. He had refused to lead a parade in honor of the commissioners’ arrival, and had snubbed them socially. More important, he had early and energetically announced in the Assembly that he would not permit any customs officials to board any of his ships.