Conscience of a Conservative (11 page)

There is still another reason for questioning the value of negotiations. Assume that somehow we achieve an agreement we think advances our interests. Is there any reason for supposing the Communists will keep it one moment longer than suits their purpose? We, and they, are different in this respect. We keep our word. The long and perfidious Communist record of breaking agreements and treaties proves that the Soviet Union will not keep any agreement that is not to its advantage to keep. It follows that the only agreement worth making with the Soviets is one that will be self-enforceable—which means one that is in the Kremlin's interest to keep. But if that is the case, why bother to "negotiate" about it? If an action is in the interest of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin will go ahead and perform it without feeling any need to make it the subject of a formal treaty.

The next time we are urged to rush to the conference table in order to "relax world tensions," let our reaction be determined by this simple fact: the only "tensions" that exist between East and West have been created, and deliberately so, by the Communists. They can therefore be "relaxed" by the Kremlin's unilateral act. The moment we decide to relax tensions by a "negotiated compromise," we have decided to yield something of value to the West.

THE "EXCHANGE" PROGRAM

In recent months, the so-called exchange program has become an increasingly prominent feature of American foreign policy. The program began modestly enough in 1955 at the Geneva Summit Meeting, when we agreed with the Soviets to promote "cultural exchanges" between the two countries. Since then we have exchanged everything from opera companies and basketball teams, to trade exhibitions and heads of governments. We are told that these exchanges are our best hope of peace—that if only the American and Russian peoples can learn to "understand" each other, they will be able to reconcile their differences.

The claim that the conflict between the Soviets and ourselves stems from a "lack of understanding" is one of the great political fables of our time.
Whose
lack of understanding?

Are the American people ill-informed as to the nature of Communism and of the Soviet state? True, some Americans fail to grasp how evil the Soviet system really is. But a performance by the Bolshoi Ballet, or a tour of the United States by Nikita Khrushchev, is certainly not calculated to correct
that
deficiency.

What of the Soviet leaders? Are
they
misled? All of the evidence is that the men in the Kremlin have a greater knowledge of America than many of our own leaders. They know about our political system, our industrial capacity, our way of life—and would like to destroy it all.

What about the Russian people? We are repeatedly told that the Russian man-on-the-street is woefully ignorant of the American way, and that our trade exhibition in Moscow, for example, contributed vastly to his knowledge and thus to his appreciation of America. Assume this is true. Is it relevant? As long as the Russian people do not control their government, it makes little difference whether they think well of us or ill. It is high time that our leaders stopped treating the Russian people and the Soviet government as one and the same thing. The Russian people, we may safely assume, are basically on our side (whether or not they have the opportunity to listen to American musicians); but their sympathy will not help us win the Cold War as long as all power is held firmly in the hands of the Communist ruling class.

The exchange program, in Soviet eyes, is simply another operation in Communist political warfare. The people the Kremlin sends over here are, to a man, trained agents of Soviet policy. Some of them are spies, seeking information; all of them are trusted carriers of Communist propaganda. Their mission is not cultural, but political. Their aim is not to inform, but to mislead. Their assignment is not to convey a true image of the Soviet Union, but a false image. The Kremlin's hope is that they will persuade the American people to forget the ugly aspects of Soviet life, and the danger that the Soviet system poses to American freedom.

It is a mistake to measure the success of this Communist operation by the extent to which it converts Americans to Communism. By that test, of course, the operation is almost a complete failure. But the Kremlin's aim is not to make Americans
approve
of Communism, much as they would like that; it is to make us
tolerant
of Communism. The Kremlin knows that our willingness to make sacrifices to halt Communist expansion varies in direct ratio as we are
hostile
to Communism. They know that if Americans regard the Soviet Union as a dangerous, implacable enemy, Communism will not be able to conquer the world. The Communists' purpose, then, is to show that Khrushchev does not have horns,—that he is fundamentally a nice fellow; that the Soviet people are "ordinary people"—just like ourselves; that Communism is just another political system.

It would not have made sense, midway in the Second World War, to promote a Nazi-American exchange program or to invite Hitler to make a state visit to the United States. Unless we cherish victory less today than we did then, we will be equally reluctant to treat Communist agents as friends and welcome guests. The exchange program is a Communist confidence game. Let us not be taken in by it. Let us remember that American confidence in the Soviet government is the very last thing we want.

Many people contend that a "normalization" of Soviet-American relations, as envisaged by the exchange program, is only a logical extension of granting diplomatic recognition to Communist governments. I agree. Accordingly, I think it would be wise for the United States to re-examine the question of its diplomatic relations with Communist regimes. We often hear that recognition permits us to gather information in Communist countries. I am unaware, however, of any advantage that our diplomatic mission in Moscow confers along these lines that does not doubly accrue to the Soviet Union from its diplomatic spy corps in Washington and other American cities. Espionage possibilities aside, I am quite certain that our entire approach to the Cold War would change for the better the moment we announced that the United States does not regard Mr. Khrushchev's murderous claque as the legitimate rulers of the Russian people or of any other people. Not only would withdrawal of recognition stiffen the American people's attitude toward Communism; it would also give heart to the enslaved peoples and help them to overthrow their captors. Our present policy of not recognizing Red China
**
is eminently right, and the reasons behind that policy apply equally to the Soviet Union and its European satellites. If our objective is to win the Cold War, we will start now by denying our moral support to the very regimes we mean to defeat.

DISARMAMENT

For many years, our policy-makers have paid lip-service to the idea of disarmament. This seems to be one of the ways, in modern diplomacy, of proving your virtue. Recently, however—under strong Communist propaganda pressure—we have acted as though we mean this talk to be taken seriously. I cite our government's momentous decision to suspend nuclear tests.

Students of history have always recognized that armament races are a symptom of international friction—not a cause of it. Peace has never been achieved, and it will not in our time, by rival nations suddenly deciding to turn their swords into plowshares. No nation in its right mind will give up the means of defending itself without first making sure that hostile powers are no longer in a position to threaten it.

The Communist leaders are, of course, in their right minds. They would not dream of adopting a policy that would leave them, on balance, relatively weaker than before they adopted such a policy. They might preach general disarmament for propaganda purposes. They also might seriously promote mutual disarmament in certain weapons in the knowledge that their superior strength in other weapons would leave them, on balance, decisively stronger than the West. Thus, in the light of the West's weakness in conventional weapons, it might make sense for the Communists to seek disarmament in the nuclear field; if all nuclear weapons suddenly ceased to exist, much of the world would immediately be laid open to conquest by the masses of Russian and Chinese manpower.

American leaders have not shown a comparable solicitude for our security needs. After the Second World War, the United States had a conventional military establishment rivaling the Soviet Union's, and an absolute monopoly in nuclear power. The former weapon we hastily and irresponsibly dismantled. The latter we failed to exploit politically, and then we proceeded to fritter away our lead by belated entry into the hydrogen bomb and guided missile fields. The result is that we are out-classed in the conventional means for waging land warfare; regarding nuclear weapons, we are approaching the point, if it has not already been reached, where Communist power is equal to our own.

To the impending physical parity in nuclear weapons must be added a psychological factor assiduously cultivated by Communist propaganda. The horrors of all-out warfare are said to be so great that no nation would consider resorting to nuclear weapons unless under direct attack by those same weapons. Now the moment our leaders really accept this, strategic nuclear weapons will be neutralized and Communist armies will be able to launch limited wars without fear of retaliation by our Strategic Air Command. I fear they are coming to accept it, and thus that a military and psychological situation is fast developing in which aggressive Communist forces will be free to maneuver under the umbrella of nuclear terror.

It is in this context that we must view the Communist propaganda drive for a permanent ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, and the inclination of our own leaders to go along with the proposal. There are two preliminary reasons why such proposals ought to be firmly rejected. First, there is no reliable means of preventing the Communists from secretly breaking such an agreement. Our most recent tests demonstrated that underground atomic explosions can be set off without detection. Secondly, we cannot hope to maintain even an effective
strategic
deterrent unless we keep our present nuclear arsenal up to date; this requires testing. But the main point I want to make is that tests are needed to develop
tactical
nuclear weapons for possible use in limited wars. Our military experts have long recognized that for limited warfare purposes we must have a weapons superiority to offset the Communists' manpower superiority. This means we must develop and perfect a variety of small, clean nuclear weapons; and this in turn means: testing. The development of such a weapons system is the only way in which America will be able to fight itself out of the dilemma—one horn of which is superior Communist manpower, the other, the impending neutralization of strategic nuclear weapons.

Our government was originally pushed into suspending tests by Communist-induced hysteria on the subject of radio-active fallout. However one may rate that danger, it simply has no bearing on the problem at hand. The facts are that there is practically no fallout from tests conducted above the earth's atmosphere, and none at all from underground tests. Therefore, the only excuse for suspending tests is that our forbearance somehow contributes to peace. And my answer is that I am unable to see how peace is brought any nearer by a policy that may reduce our relative military strength. Such a policy makes sense only under the assumption that Communist leaders have given up their plan for world revolution and will settle for peaceful coexistence—an assumption we make at the risk of losing our national life.

If our objective is victory over Communism, we must achieve superiority in all of the weapons—military, as well as political and economic—that may be useful in reaching that goal. Such a program costs money, but so long as the money is spent wisely and efficiently, I would spend it. I am not in favor of "economizing" on the nation's safety. As a Conservative, I deplore the huge tax levy that is needed to finance the world's number-one military establishment. But even more do I deplore the prospect of a foreign conquest, which the absence of that establishment would quickly accomplish.

UNITED NATIONS

Support of the United Nations, our leaders earnestly proclaim, is one of the cornerstones of American foreign policy. I confess to being more interested in whether American foreign policy has the support of the United Nations.

Here, again, it seems to me that our approach to foreign affairs suffers from a confusion in objectives. Is the perpetuation of an international debating forum, for its own sake, the primary objective of American policy? If so, there is much to be said for our past record of subordinating our national interest to that of the United Nations. If, on the other hand, our primary objective is victory over Communism, we will, as a matter of course, view such organizations as the UN as a possible
means
to that end. Once the question is asked—Does America's participation in the United Nations help or hinder her struggle against world Communism?—it becomes clear that our present commitment to the UN deserves re-examination.

The United Nations, we must remember, is in part a Communist organization. The Communists always have at least one seat in its major policy-making body, the Security Council; and the Soviet Union's permanent veto power in that body allows the Kremlin to block any action, on a substantial issue, that is contrary to its interests. The Communists also have a sizeable membership in the UN's other policy-making body, the General Assembly. Moreover, the UN's working staff, the Secretariat, is manned by hundreds of Communist agents who are frequently in a position to sabotage those few UN policies that
are
contrary to Communist interests. Finally, a great number of non-Communist United Nations are sympathetic to Soviet aims—or, at best, are unsympathetic to ours.

We therefore should not be surprised that many of the policies that emerge from the deliberations of the United Nations are not policies that are in the best interest of the United States. United Nations policy is, necessarily, the product of many different views—some of them friendly, some of them indifferent to our interests, some of them mortally hostile. And the result is that our national interests usually suffer when we subordinate our own policy to the UN's. In nearly every case in which we have called upon the United Nations to do our thinking for us, and to make our policy for us—whether during the Korean War, or in the Suez crisis, or following the revolution in Iraq—we have been a less effective foe of Communism than we otherwise might have been.