Conversations with Myself (7 page)

10. CONVERSATION WITH AHMED KATHRADA ABOUT THE 1960 STATE OF EMERGENCY
⁸

KATHRADA: Then, page 81 [of
Long Walk to Freedom
draft], you are saying, ‘After one has been in prison it is the small things that one appreciates – the feeling of being able to take a walk whenever one wants, to cross a road, to go into a shop and buy a newspaper, to speak or choose to remain silent – the simple act of being able to control one’s person. Free men do not always appreciate these things and one takes
joy
in them only
after
one has been in chains.’ Then, they [the publishers] are saying here, ‘Any way to turn this abstraction into a description of what you did that day that seemed so sweet? More on your reunion with your family.’…

MANDELA: No, except that day I went to town with the car and I got two traffic tickets for…

KATHRADA: Speeding?

MANDELA: Hmm?

KATHRADA: For speeding?

MANDELA: No, no, no, for wrong parking.

KATHRADA: Oh.

MANDELA: And so on. Then Winnie then told me, look, this is the last time I’m driving.

KATHRADA: Aha.

MANDELA: That’s all.

11. CONVERSATION WITH AHMED KATHRADA ABOUT WHETHER EVIDENCE INCRIMINATING HIM WAS REMOVED FROM LILIESLEAF FARM IN RIVONIA
⁹

KATHRADA: Ja, well I remember I came to see you at a consultation in Pretoria, with Joe [Slovo].

MANDELA: Oh, I see.

KATHRADA: They at first said said no, but then Joe said, ‘No, this is my defence witness so we have to consult’ and we discussed it, and then you raised the question of your stuff at Rivonia and Joe said, ‘Don’t worry,
everything
is gone from there.’

MANDELA: [
laughs
] Ja, I know! I know!

KATHRADA: [
laughs
]
Everything
is gone.

MANDELA: Yes, I know.

[
both laugh
]

KATHRADA: And then nothing was gone. They found
everything
.

MANDELA: Yes.

12. CONVERSATION WITH AHMED KATHRADA ABOUT BEING UNDERGROUND

MANDELA: We can also say that very big people, very important people who were not known…to have identified themselves with the movement used to be generous and to support us. And we won’t deal with names, with specific names, but people
were
very generous, as long as they were sure that we would observe the element of confidentiality. Planning our visits meant that I would see the people, you know, in the infrastructure, to say, ‘Today I am going to attend a meeting in Fordsburg’, which is a real, a what-you-call, something that actually took [place].

KATHRADA: Ja.

MANDELA: Two cases, very striking cases, by the way, when I attended meetings in Fordsburg, and I saw [Ben] Turok and others on one occasion during the day and Maulvi [Cachalia] went to a family in Fordsburg.
¹⁰

KATHRADA: In Vrededorp.

MANDELA: Vrededorp. That’s right.

KATHRADA: Ja.

MANDELA: And said, ‘Look, somebody is going to come and stay here tonight. Could you accommodate him?’
They
agreed very enthusiastically because they respected Maulvi. Now, I was wearing an overall, and very often, you see, I didn’t comb my hair,
¹¹
and I went to this house, you know, just to be aware of the house (Maulvi gave me the address) and to tell them that I’d come back in the evening. I knocked and a lady came forward, opened the door, says, ‘Yes, what do you want?’ I said, ‘Well, Maulvi Cachalia has arranged that I should stay here’ and she says, ‘I have no room for you.’ Banged the door [
laughs
] because she saw this
wild
fellow you know?

13. FROM A CONVERSATION WITH RICHARD STENGEL ABOUT HIS ARREST ON 5 AUGUST 1962

At Howick, that’s right, a car – a Ford V8 – passed and immediately ordered us to stop. And they selected the spot
very
well because on the left-hand side there was a steep bank like this, [
gestures
] and I was sitting, you see, to the left, on the left side…I was
very
fit those days, and I could virtually climb any wall. And then I looked at the back, just at the rear-view mirror, [and] I saw there were two cars behind. Then I felt that, no, it would be ridiculous for me to try and escape; they’ll shoot me. And we stopped. So a fellow came – tall, slender fellow in private [plain clothes] – he came right to my side and he says, ‘I am Sergeant Vorster’ and took out his warrant…He was
very
correct in everything – very, very, very correct and courteous. And he says, ‘May I know who your name is?’ I said, ‘I am David Motsamayi.’ He says, ‘No, but aren’t you Nelson Mandela?’ I said, ‘I am David Motsamayi.’ He says, ‘Ag, you are Nelson Mandela. This is Cecil Williams.
¹²
I am arresting you. And we’ll have to turn back and go to Pietermaritzburg.’ I said, ‘Very well.’ And he says, ‘…the Major will get into your car, at the back of your car. You can just drive back.’ So we turned back.

Now, I had a revolver which was unlicensed and I just took it out and put it in between the seats. There were seats – the driver’s seat and my seat – but they were separate seats, but linked, and there was a
small
space here, which you can hardly see, and I just pushed it in. And also I had a notebook, and I took it out and I pushed it in, whilst I was talking to this major [in] the back. And at one time I thought I could open the door
fast
and roll down, but I didn’t know how long, you know, this bank was and what was there. I was not familiar with the landscape. No, I thought that would be a gamble, and let me just go and think of a chance later. So we went to the police station and they locked me up.

14. CONVERSATION WITH AHMED KATHRADA ABOUT BEING ALLOWED TO VISIT HIS OFFICE DURING HIS 1960 STATE OF EMERGENCY DETENTION

KATHRADA: ‘And I would stay there all day and evening. I walked downstairs to the ground floor, to the café to buy incidentals and he [the policeman] turned his head aside on one or two occasions when Winnie came to see me. We had a kind of a gentleman’s code between us. I would not escape and thereby get him into trouble, while he would allow me a degree of freedom that I would not otherwise have [been] permitted.’ The question they [the publishers] are asking, ah: ‘
Later
you say you were quite willing to try to escape.’ ‘Was that a philosophical change or simply a matter of personal loyalty versus a principle?’

MANDELA: That’s a technical question, you know?

KATHRADA: Ah…

MANDELA: I mean, as a prisoner I would take any opportunity to escape, but when dealing with a particular individual whom you respected, you would not like to put into trouble. That was the position.

KATHRADA: Aha.

15. CONVERSATION WITH RICHARD STENGEL ABOUT THE RESORT TO ARMED STRUGGLE

MANDELA: There are stages when one in a position of authority has to go…public to commit the organisation. Because otherwise people are eloquent and you have an idea, and you have the
gut
feeling that this is a correct idea, but you deal with people, you know, who are
very
powerful, who can assemble facts and who can be systematic and so on. And they will sway everybody. Therefore, if you want to take an action and you are convinced that this is a correct action, you do so and confront that situation. It’s not a question of being [un] disciplined. You have to
carefully
choose the opportunity and make sure that history would be on your side.

STENGEL: I’d like to explain the whole process of how the decision to form MK [Umkhonto we Sizwe] was made.
¹³
At the Rivonia Trial you explain it in a general way. You said at the end, the second half of 1960, you and some colleagues reached the conclusion that violence was going to be inevitable. How did this whole process happen? Did you talk first privately with people and then there was the decision of the Working Committee? Was there a build-up to the decision?

MANDELA: No, what actually happened was I discussed the matter with Comrade Walter [Sisulu]. We discussed it because when Comrade Walter was going overseas, in 1953, I then said to him, ‘When you reach the People’s Republic of China, you must tell them, ask them, that we want to start an armed struggle and get arms,’ and then I made that speech in Sophiatown. I was pulled up for this but I remained convinced that this was the correct strategy for us.
¹⁴
And then when I was underground I then discussed the matter with Comrade Walter and we decided to
raise
it at a meeting of the Working Committee. We raised the matter but, as I told you, I was dismissed very cheaply, because [Moses] Kotane – the secretary of the Party and of course a member of the Working Committee and the National Executive –
his
argument was the time had not come for that: ‘Because of the severe measures taken by the government you are unable to continue in the old way.
¹⁵
The difficulties have paralysed you and you now want to talk a revolutionary language and talk about armed struggle, when in fact there is still room for the old method that we are using
if
we are imaginative and determined enough. You just want to expose people, you see, to massacres by the enemy. You have not even thought very carefully about this.’ So he dismissed me like that and he was
quick
to speak and everybody supported him. I discussed the matter with Walter afterwards…The opposition was so heavy that Walter did not even dare to say a word. [
laughs
] But he has always been a very diplomatic chap, you know, but
reliable
, you know, when you take a decision with him. Very reliable. And so we reviewed the matter, and he has always been resourceful, and he says, ‘No, call him alone; discuss it with him. I’ll arrange for him to come and see you’ because I was already underground. So Kotane came and we spent the whole day together. This time I was
very frank
and I said, ‘You are doing precisely what the Communist Party in Cuba did – they said the conditions for a revolution had not yet arrived. Following the old methods, you see, which were advocated by Stalin – how a revolutionary situation can be identified, that is, by Lenin and Stalin. Here we have to decide from our own situation. The situation in this country is that it is time for us to consider a revolution, an armed struggle, because people are already forming military units in order to start acts of violence. And if we don’t do so, they are going to continue. They haven’t got the resources, they haven’t got the experience, they haven’t got the political machinery to carry out that decision. The only organisation that can do so is the African National Congress which commands the masses of the people. And you must be creative and
change
your attitude because your attitude really is the attitude of a man who is leading a movement in the old way when we were legal, who is not considering leading now in terms of the illegal conditions under which we are operating.’ So I was able to be blunt in order to challenge him, you know…I was able to challenge him. So he says, ‘Well, I’m not going to promise anything, but raise it again.’ So I went and raised it and he said, ‘Well I’m still not convinced, but let’s give him a chance. Let him go and put these ideas to the Executive, with our support.’ So we then went down and everybody agreed. We went down to Durban at a meeting of the National Executive of the ANC. Then Chief [Albert Luthuli], Yengwa and others opposed this very strongly.
¹⁶
So we knew of course that we were going to get a position from the Chief, because he
believed
in non-violence as a
principle
, whereas we believed in it as a
tactic
, although we couldn’t say so to court…To the court, that is [during] the Treason Trial, we said we believe in non-violence as a principle, because if we had said [we believed in it] as a tactic it would give a loophole to the crown, to the state, to say that at any time, when it suited us, we would use violence, and that in fact, that is what we had been doing. So we avoided that, but
only
for that reason. We have always believed in non-violence as a tactic.
Where
the conditions demanded that we should use non-violence we would do so; where the conditions demanded that we should depart from non-violence we would do so. So, but we knew that Chief was…would oppose this,
and
he opposed it
very
well, but we persuaded him…

.....................................................................................

From a notebook, about Mandela’s involvement in the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC, and going underground.

16. FROM A CONVERSATION WITH RICHARD STENGEL ABOUT THE FORMATION OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE (MK)

Then
they said, ‘Very well, you have made a case. We now authorise you. We give you permission. You can go and
start
this organisation. That is, you, Mandela, you can go and start this organisation…and you can join with others and so on: collaborate with others, cooperate with others. But
we
, as the ANC [African National Congress], we are formed to prosecute a non-violent policy; this decision can only be changed by a national conference. We are going to
stick
to the old policy of the ANC.’ That turned out to have been a good decision because when we came to court…[and] when the state looked at these minutes…they found that [they]…did not support their case at all, because
here
is the ANC deciding. People like…Chief Luthuli, like Moses Kotane, like Dr Monty Naicker, who was the chairperson of the South African Indian Congress, all of them were saying, ‘Let us not embark on violence; let us continue with non-violence.’
¹⁷
And when they couldn’t resist the argument I was putting forward, they said, ‘You go and start that organisation. We will not discipline you because we understand the conditions under which you have taken this line. But don’t involve us; we are going to continue with non-violence.’ The state found that, those minutes, they [proved our] whole case and they did not hand it in. We, the defence, handed that document in to say, ‘
Support
for our point of view is this.’ So, that is what happened, you see, with Umkhonto we Sizwe.