Cross and Scepter (35 page)

No doubt, there were conflicts of interest between the king and the aristocracy over the government of the countries, and the many complexities of the Kalmar Union prevent a simple return to the national interpretations of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, Lönnroth's dismissal of the national—as well as the social—issue is facile. Lönnroth rejects not only the stories referred to above (or at least their importance), but also the account of the popular rebellion referred to in the
Engelbrekt Chronicle
, on the ground that it is a late invention. This chronicle survives only as a part of the
Karl Chronicle
, which was probably composed in the 1460s. In Lönnroth's opinion the
Engelbrekt Chronicle
was totally rewritten at about this time, roughly thirty years after the 1430s conflict that it depicts but now interprets as a popular rebellion rather than what it actually was—a conflict between a part of the aristocracy and the king. However, later research has largely succeeded in reconstructing the original
Engelbrekt Chronicle
and given strong arguments that its account of the popular rebellion, including the story of Jøsse, is almost contemporary. Although this is not necessarily proof of its historical accuracy, it at least makes it likely that Jøsse's behavior was one of the motives for the rebellion. Above all, it makes it difficult to dismiss the importance of Engelbrekt and the popular movement under his leadership. More generally, the national propaganda in the chronicles—also recognized by Lönnroth—becomes difficult to understand unless there really were national sentiments at the time. Foreign influence might easily be resented. Swedish and Norwegian peasants enjoyed a freer status than their Danish counterparts and tolerated less from their superiors, an attitude that is consistent with rebelliousness and demands that they be governed by their countrymen—although there are also examples of reactions against the latter. The lay and ecclesiastical aristocracy wanted to keep offices in their country for themselves and reacted against foreigners. A conflict over the archbishopric of
Uppsala at about the same time as Engelbrekt's rebellion may have contributed to the aristocracy's willingness to join it at the second stage. Finally, later research has found little evidence to support Lönnroth's thesis that the main interest of the rebels was to secure trade with Lübeck. After the temporary peace of 1432, the Hanseatic blockade had been relaxed, and besides, it is difficult to explain why problems with the export of iron from Dalarna would lead to a rebellion that involved the whole of Sweden.

Apart from people like Jøsse Eriksson, what did the rebels react against in the 1430s, and why did the Swedish rebellion eventually lead to the deposition of King Erik? Erik's foreign policy was not doubt an important factor, not (at least not mainly) because his conflict with the Hanseatic League created problems for the export of iron, but because of the extra taxes needed to finance the prolonged war he waged against the count of Holstein in order to conquer Schleswig. Another important factor is the character of Margrete and Erik's regime, which is commonly depicted as a
regimen regale.
The three countries were governed from a union chancery in Denmark, after 1417 increasingly located in Copenhagen, and the traditional offices in the central administration held by members of the high nobility were vacant. The council of the realm was rarely summoned to meetings, with some exceptions for Denmark; instead, the ruler sought advice from individual councilors. The principles underlying this form of government are aptly expressed in Queen Margrete's instructions to King Erik on his first visit to Norway in 1405. He should be pleasant to everybody he meets, but never give any exact promises. In particular, he should avoid promising anything in writing. If forced to do so, he should not issue charters in the most solemn and binding form, on parchment and with the great seal pendant from the document, but preferably on paper with a signet stamped on the back. He should speak to the councilors individually but not summon any meeting of the council as a whole. Apart from
the frequent admonition not to take any decision himself without consulting his “mother,” “because we know more about this than he does,” this advice corresponds perfectly to Margrete's own political practice, which made her one of the most successful rulers at the time and one of the great politicians of the later Middle Ages. Unfortunately, however, Erik did not follow her advice. He had the same aims as his “mother” but pursued them stubbornly and undiplomatically, which eventually led to his fall.

Margrete's advice is thus not only evidence of her political skill but also of the restrictions facing an ambitious ruler at the time.
Regimen regale
might work, but only if it was carefully disguised. The king had limited resources. He had no standing army and tax revenues were insufficient for any major enterprise and had to be supplemented with extra contributions, which needed the consent of either the council of the realm or of popular assemblies. Nor was there any class that could counterbalance the aristocracy. It was thus not possible to challenge this class a whole, though a monarch might gain considerable independence by playing its members off against one another. Margrete succeeded in this, whereas Erik did not. So far, Erik's fall can be explained by a too direct and provocative
regimen regale.
However, this policy was not equally provocative in all three countries, which means that we also have to consider the national issue.

Erik's regime was most constitutional in Denmark. Here he often consulted with the council of the realm and normally appointed Danish nobles as castellans; this in some contrast to Margrete who had made more use of low-ranking Germans and had more rarely summoned the council. In Norway, both Margrete and Erik ruled through a few select nobles, mostly Norwegian, in addition to a few Danish ones, in particular the bishop of Oslo. The council of the realm was rarely summoned. In Sweden, it is no coincidence that the rebellion was sparked by complaints against a Danish official. While few foreigners held royal office
in Denmark, a number of Danes held office in Sweden, which provoked not only the peasants but also the Swedish nobles. Although the rebellion started as a peasant rebellion and the nobles were in the beginning reluctant to join in, eventually the nobles took over and finally broke with Erik. Engelbrekt was dead already in May 1436. Although his killing was the result of a private feud, there had already been tension between him and some of the nobles, notably Karl Knutsson who now took over as the leader of the movement.

Admittedly, however, Erik was deposed by the Danish aristocracy, even before he was deposed in Sweden, a fact that would seem to support Lönnroth's interpretation. At a meeting in Kalmar in 1436, the Danish council mediated between King Erik and the Swedes and made him accept their demand to rule in cooperation with the council of the realm and according to Swedish law and to respect the privileges of the aristocracy. The councilors also used the opportunity to gain similar rights for themselves as those of their Swedish counterparts. However, the king left for Gotland and did nothing to fulfill his promises, apparently believing that his absence would result in chaos and that he would be invited to return on his own conditions. Rather than trying to placate the councils, he pressured both the Danes and the Swedes to accept his cousin, Duke Boleslaw of Pomerania, as his successor. The principles of
regimen regale
and
regimen politicum
were thus clearly articulated from both sides, and both the Danes and the Swedes wanted to preserve the union. However, the members of the Danish council did not act solely out of solidarity with their Swedish counterparts. They were provoked by Erik's plan for the succession and by his refusal to return to Denmark and deal with the problems there, including a peasant rebellion that broke out in summer 1438. In these circumstances, they found it better to cut their losses, get rid of Erik, and replace
him with someone who could deal with the problems. They invited Christoffer to Denmark late in 1438, elected him protector of the realm in the following year and king in 1440. The fact that the Swedes also elected Christoffer shows that the union had its adherents in both countries, but is not evidence that the aristocracies thought exclusively in constitutional rather than in national terms.

Although the Engelbrekt rebellion was not necessarily directed against the union, which was actually restored after Erik's deposition, Christoffer's death marked the end of the period when all three kingdoms were united for any significant period of time. When Christoffer died childless in 1448, the nobleman Karl Knutsson managed to be elected king in Sweden, whereas the Danes after some searching and negotiation chose Count Christian of Oldenburg, whose successors in the direct line would rule the country until the mid-nineteenth century. The 1448 Swedish election was not necessarily intended as a break with the Kalmar Union, although it was contrary to earlier agreements about a joint election by representatives from all three countries. However, the Danes had broken this agreement previously by electing Christoffer. Although the circumstances are not quite clear, Karl may have hoped that his election in Sweden would lead to his acceptance in the other countries as well, or he may have convinced the Swedish assembly that this would happen. There was no obvious heir, and Karl or his electors may have believed that the fact that he had estates and connections in Denmark might make him acceptable to the Danish aristocracy. Both kings later tried to gain Norway, but Christian won, and a treaty establishing a permanent union between Norway and Denmark was concluded in 1450.

Christian also managed to gain Sweden in 1457, but he lost it again to Karl in 1464. The rebellion against Christian in 1464 marked the start of a chaotic period, during which Karl was
reelected, deposed, and reelected again, without ever managing to take control of the kingdom. His death in 1470 would seem to have presented an opportunity for Christian to get hold of Sweden once more, but he was defeated by Karl's successor Sten Sture in the battle of Brunkeberg outside Stockholm in 1471. Sten Sture turned out to be a more clever politician than Karl and managed to keep the country under his control and outside the union until his death in 1503, with the exception of the period between 1497 and 1501. He was succeeded by Svante Nilsson Sture (1504–1512) and Sten Svantesson Sture (1512–1520). None of these rulers claimed the kingship but used instead the title “protector of the realm.” They based their power on an alliance between a considerable part of the aristocracy and the free peasants and miners in other parts of Sweden, notably Dalarna in the north. The faction held together thanks to skillful propaganda in the form of letters, speeches, and a number of verse chronicles clearly intended for oral performance, which celebrated the Swedish nation, blackened the Danes, and stamped the opponents of the faction as traitors. One piece of their propaganda is still to been seen: the magnificent statue of St. George and the Dragon in the Great Church in Stockholm, which was erected as an allegory of Sten's victory over the Danes at Brunkeberg.

During most of this period, the protectors of the realm managed to hold on to power by skillful maneuvering, but there were tensions within the aristocracy that could be exploited by the Danish kings. In 1497, open conflict broke out between Sten and some other magnates, including his later successor Svante Nilsson, which gave King Hans the opportunity to invade Sweden. After some defeats, Sten decided to come to terms while he still had something to offer in the negotiations. The result was a loose union that left the Swedish council and aristocracy a considerable amount of control and Sten an impressive assembly of
len
.
When in the following period Hans broke his promises and sought to increase his control of Sweden, his former enemies joined in a new rebellion (1501), which led to a prolonged conflict between the two countries, interrupted by periods of armistice. Finally, Hans's son and successor Christian II invaded Sweden with a large army in January 1520 and defeated Sten Sture the Younger in a battle where the protector himself was killed. Once more, the Swedes decided to come to terms. Sten had made many enemies—including the archbishop, Gustaf Trolle—some of whom wanted an agreement with the Danes. Like his father, Christian also promised to respect the council of the realm and the privileges of the Church and the aristocracy. He was crowned in Stockholm in November to great festivities, which, however, were suddenly broken off on the third day. A number of prominent men were accused of heresy because of their support for Sten Sture in his previous conflict with the archbishop, whom he had imprisoned and whose castle he had pulled down. Altogether nearly a hundred men—bishops, noblemen, burghers, and others—were executed in the great square in Stockholm, either beheaded or hanged, depending upon their status. Their blood flooded the streets in the rain and the event came to be known as the “Bloodbath of Stockholm.” Similar massacres took place in other parts of the country.

Christian apparently believed that he had secured his hold of Sweden and prevented a setback such as his father had experienced, but the opposite happened. A new rebellion soon broke out under the leadership of Gustaf Eriksson Vasa, who belonged to one of the wealthiest and most prominent families in the country. Gustaf concluded an alliance with Lübeck and soon conquered most of Sweden. He was elected king on June 6, 1523. Meanwhile, the Danish aristocracy rebelled against Christian and elected his uncle, Duke Frederik of Schleswig-Holstein, to replace him.

Why Was the Union Dissolved?

The brief summary above represents a considerable simplification. It leaves out a bewildering number of people and events—the formation and breaking of alliances, war and peace. Lönnroth managed to create order from this chaos, but at the cost of too great a simplification. His account needs to be supplemented with a least two main observations. The first is that there was a distinction between collective and individual aristocratic interests. The aristocracy was not always united, either nationally or across borders. Nor would it be possible to conduct a monarchic policy without aristocratic support; no other class was strong enough to compete with the aristocracy. Individual interests among the aristocrats are therefore as important as shared class interests. The aristocrats competed for royal favor; and those who succeeded in gaining it had no desire to join their equals in attempts to limit the king's power. Thus, it might be suggested that
regimen politicum
was for hungry aristocrats, while
regimen regale
was suited to well-fed ones. Attitudes also depended on circumstances. It was usually easy to present a common aristocratic front in support of the best possible conditions for the aristocracy during negotiations over election charters, but far more difficult to maintain this front in the daily running of government, when the king was able to secure allies through favors and privileges and play individual aristocrats off against one another.