D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II (18 page)

On the day the battle would be joined, therefore, the mighty

Wehrmacht's armored divisions would be immobilized not so much by the Allied air forces, or by the Allied navies, or by the Resistance, as by the leadership principle of the Third Reich.

But suppose that Rommel had persuaded Hitler to put the armored divisions under his immediate command. Suppose further that he got lucky and stationed one panzer division in Bayeux, another at Carentan (as according to General Bayerlein, commander of the
Panzer Lehr
Division, he wanted to do).
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Then suppose that on D-Day Rommel launched a panzer-led counterattack against the 4th Infantry at Utah and another at Omaha's left flank and Gold's right. That surely would have created a crisis and caused some chaos on the landing beaches, as well as many casualties.

But consider the price to the Wehrmacht. With the Allied communications network, including fire-control parties on shore and in the air in radio contact with the navy gunners, the U.S. and Royal navies, supported by Canadian, Norwegian, Polish, and French warships, would have killed every tank in the assault. In other words, Rommel's most basic idea, to stop the invaders cold on the beach, was flawed. Bringing the panzers down in range of the Allied navies was madness, as Guderian had argued. At Sicily and again at Salerno, German tanks managed to penetrate the Allied lines and get down close to the beach. There they were blasted by Allied destroyers firing point-blank. But Rommel had not been at Sicily or Salerno.

Rundstedt was right; the Germans' best hope was to fall back from the coast (as the Japanese were learning to do in the Pacific islands) and fight the battle out of range of an overwhelming naval barrage. That would have required depth to the defense, a series of strong points, as in World War I, to fall back on. Had the same amount of labor gone into building defensive positions at every choke point, river crossing, and so forth, as went into building the Atlantic Wall, then the Germans might have held on in France until winter weather closed down operations in 1944. Such a delay would not have won the war for Germany, however, because in the spring of 1945 the Allies would have been able to launch a tremendous air and land bombardment on German lines, culminating in August in an atomic bomb over Berlin.

But that would take time, and meanwhile Germany's only hope would have come into play. A long winter along the Seine or Somme would have had a terribly depressing effect on Allied morale, given a boost to the German. A long winter along the Seine

would have caused Stalin to wonder whether he might not be better off reaching a compromise peace. A long winter would give the Germans time to bring in their secret weapons, most notably the ME 262.

Rommel's decision to put as much of his strength on the beaches as possible, behind the strongest fortifications possible, was based on his military judgment. Hitler's decision to approve (partly) Rommel's concept of the Atlantic Wall was based on his political megalomania. His conqueror's mentality forbade him giving up any territory without a fight.

Rommel and Hitler made fundamental errors in planning for D-Day, based on faulty judgments. The old man, Field Marshal Rundstedt, who was there for window dressing, was the one who got it right—get out from under those naval guns.

But Rommel and Hitler were land fighters. They were more afraid of airplanes than they were of ships. They looked overhead, instead of out to sea, for danger. They made a mistake.

Dr. Detlef Vogel of the
Militargeschichtliches Forschung-samt
in Freiburg comments: "It is truly amazing that the senior army commanders, who had once conducted such nimble operations, suddenly wanted to hide behind a rampart."
¹⁸

Equally amazing was the way that Rommel, who had made his reputation as a commander who used brilliant tactics, long-range movements, and lightning strikes, had so completely adopted a defensive posture. On May 11 he visited La Madeleine on Utah Beach. The company commander at the fortification was Lt. Arthur Jahnke, a twenty-three-year-old who had been badly wounded on the Eastern Front. Rommel arrived in-his Horch, with accordions stuffed into the trunk; Rommel's habit was to give an accordion to units that were performing to his satisfaction.

Lieutenant Jahnke and his men did not get an accordion. Rommel was in a bad mood, which got worse as he strode along the dunes, followed by his staff and the hapless Jahnke. His criticism fell like hail: not enough obstacles on the beach, not enough mines around the blockhouse, not enough barbed wire.

Jahnke had enough. He protested, "Marshal sir, I string all the wire I'm sent, but I can't do more than that."

"Your hands, lieutenant! I want to see your hands!" Rommel ordered.

Bewildered, Jahnke removed his gloves. At the sight of the deep scratches that disfigured his palms, Rommel softened. "Very

well, lieutenant," he said. "The blood you lost building the fortifications is as precious as what you shed in combat." As he got back into his Horch, Rommel counseled Jahnke to "keep an eye on each high tide. They surely will come at high tide."
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The Allies, meanwhile, went ahead with plans that they were sure would work. To them the Atlantic Wall was formidable but by no means impregnable. On April 7, Good Friday, Twenty-first Army Group had completed the overall outline plan and was ready to present it to the division, corps, and army commanders. Montgomery presided over a meeting at his headquarters, St. Paul's School (of which Montgomery was a graduate). "This exercise," he began, "is being held for the purpose of putting all general officers of the field armies in possession of the whole outline plan for Overlord, so as to insure mutual understanding and confidence." He then laid out the plan.

Working from left to right, it called for the British 6th Airborne Division to begin its assault right after midnight, with the objectives of knocking out an enemy battery at Merville, seizing intact the bridges over the Orne River and the Orne Canal, blowing the bridges over the Dives, and generally acting as flank protection. The British 3rd Division, with French and British commandos attached, was to push across Sword Beach, then pass through Ou-istreham to capture Caen and Carpiquet airfield. The Canadian 3rd Division was to push across Juno Beach and continue on until it cut the Caen-Bayeux highway. The British 50th Division at Gold had a similar objective, plus taking the small port of Arromanches and the battery at Longues-sur-Mer from the rear.

At Omaha, the U.S. 1st and 29th divisions were to move up the exits, take the villages of Colleville, St.-Laurent, and Vierville, then push inland. Attached ranger battalions were to capture the battery at Pointe-du-Hoc, either by land or sea or both. At Utah, the 4th Infantry was to cross the beach, establish control of the coast road, and move west along the causeways to the high ground inland, ready to wheel to the right to drive for Cherbourg. The 101st Airborne would land southwest of Ste.-Mere-Eglise to secure the inland side of the causeways and to destroy the bridges in the vicinity of Carentan while seizing others to protect the southern flank at Utah. The 82d Airborne was to land west of St.-Sauveur-le-Vicomte to block the movement of enemy reinforcements into the Cotentin in the western half of the peninsula.

At the briefing, Montgomery acted on the assumption that getting ashore was not the problem. What worried him was staying ashore. He told his subordinates, "Rommel is likely to hold his mobile divisions back from the coast until he is certain where our main effort is being made. He will then concentrate them quickly and strike a hard blow. His static divisions will endeavor to hold on defensively to important ground and act as pivots to the counterattacks. By dusk on D minus 1 the enemy will be certain that the Neptune area [code name for the seaborne portion of Overlord] is to be assaulted in strength. By the evening of D-Day he will know the width of frontage and the approximate number of our assaulting divisions." Montgomery thought that Rommel would bring two panzer divisions against the lodgment on D plus one; by D plus five it would be six panzer divisions. Protecting and expanding the lodgment area would be more difficult than establishing it.
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With their objectives set, the generals and colonels went to work at division, regimental, and battalion levels to develop specific plans for getting ashore. As they and their staffs worked through April and into May, Rommel was building, pouring concrete, setting posts. They could not be so confident as Montgomery that getting ashore was the least of their problems. For them, it was the first of their problems, the one that had to be overcome or there would be no more problems.

The plan that emerged ran as follows:

The first regiments to hit the shore would come in on the heels of a preassault air and naval bombardment. It was designed to neutralize known gun positions and demoralize enemy troops. It would begin at midnight, with an RAF attack against coastal batteries from the mouth of the Seine to Cherbourg (1,333 heavy bombers dropping 5,316 tons of bombs). At first light, the U.S. Eighth Air Force would hit enemy beach defenses in the assault area. Strong points at Omaha were due to get hit by 480 B-24s carrying 1,285 tons of bombs. Troops scheduled to go ashore at Omaha were assured that there would be innumerable craters on the beaches, more than enough to provide protection and shelter.

Naval gunfire would commence at sunrise and continue to H minus five minutes (sunrise was at 0558, H-Hour set for 0630). At Omaha, the battleships
Texas
and
Arkansas
would fire their ten 14-inch and twelve 12-inch guns, respectively, from eighteen kilometers offshore, concentrating on Pointe-du-Hoc and enemy strong

points defending the exits. They would be joined by three cruisers with 6-inch guns and eight destroyers with 5-inch guns.

If that bombardment failed to render the defenders dead, incapacitated, or immobilized by fright, smaller fire-support craft would precede the first wave to add to the Germans' misery. At Omaha, sixteen LCTs carrying four DD tanks each were fitted so that two tanks could fire up to 150 rounds per cannon over the ramp, beginning from a range of three kilometers at about H minus fifteen minutes. Ten LCTs would carry thirty-six 105mm howitzers (selfpropelled) of the 58th and 62nd Armored Field Artillery battalions; the howitzers were mounted so that they could fire 100 rounds per gun from the LCTs at a range of eight kilometers, commencing at H minus thirty minutes. Finally, fourteen LCT(R)s were outfitted as rocket launchers; each LCT(R) fired 1,000 high-explosive rockets simultaneously from three kilometers offshore. Under that cover, the first waves would land.

The plans for the assault landings varied from regiment to regiment, beach to beach. That of the 116th Infantry of the 29th Division on the western (right) flank at Omaha was representative. As the accompanying chart shows, the 116th's plan to penetrate the defenses was complex and detailed down to the seconds. At H minus five minutes, just as the naval and air bombardments lifted, and as the rockets from the LCT(R)s whistled overhead, companies B and C of the 743rd Tank Battalion (thirty-two tanks strong) would touch down on the right. These were DD tanks, which would swim ashore from 6,000 yards out. They would take up firing positions at the water's edge to cover the first wave of infantry.

At H-Hour, 0630, eight LCTs would land to the left, bringing ashore with them Company A of the 743rd Tank Battalion. With Company A there would be eight tank dozers, towing trailers of explosive to be used by combat engineers in demolishing the obstacles before the tide covered them.

At H plus one minute the first wave of infantry would touch down, Company A on the far right at Dog Green, companies E, F, and G at Easy Green, Dog Red, and Dog White. Each company was about 200 men strong; firepower included rifles, machine guns, bangalore torpedoes, bazookas, mortars and grenades. Behind these skirmishers would come engineers, followed by light artillery and antiaircraft batteries, more engineers, then at H plus fifty minutes another wave of infantry (the 116th's L, I, K, and C companies). At

H plus sixty minutes two ranger battalions would come in on the right; at H plus 110 minutes DUKWs would bring in heavy artillery. At H plus three hours, Navy salvage units and truck companies would move in. By then, the beach should be clear, the fighting rifle companies moving inland.

(Brig. Gen. Norman "Dutch" Cota, second in command of the 29th Division, did not like the idea of storming ashore an hour after first light. He had little faith in the accuracy of air and naval bombardment, thought it would do little good, and wanted to land the first wave in total darkness. That way the assault troops could cross the tidal flat safely and would be able to take up firing and attacking positions at the foot of the bluff before the Germans could see them. "The beach is going to be fouled-up in any case," he declared. "Darkness will not substantially alter the percentage of accuracy in beaching—not enough to offset the handicaps of a daylight assault." He was overruled.
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)

Each movement required an exact timing schedule that would begin three and four days before H-Hour at ports in southwestern England that were up to 160 kilometers from Omaha. Men and equipment would load up on LSTs, LCIs, and LCTs. Off the mouths of the harbors the convoys would form up. After crossing the Channel, the ships would anchor off the coast of France. Men would climb down the rope nets to their LCVPs, or descend in the boats as they were lowered by the davits. They would circle, circle, circle until they got clearance to form up line abreast and go in. There was much more to the plan of assault than outlined here, and there were variations at different sectors and beaches, but basically the 116th plan was similar to those elsewhere. The emphasis was on a crescendo of high explosives hitting the beach defenses for a half hour before the tanks arrived, to be immediately followed by the first wave of skirmishers, who should be able to take advantage of the dazed enemy and seize the trenches as well as the exits from the beach. After that it was a question of getting enough transport and firepower ashore quickly enough to take the plateau area and move inland. All this was planned out on a timetable that was exceedingly rigid and complicated—and it was done without a single computer.