Death to Tyrants! (3 page)

Another reason to conclude that tyrant-killing legislation was much more popular than it might originally appear is the fact that the literary sources indicate that tyrant killing was praised throughout the Greek world.
¹⁸
Authors as different as Aristotle (
Pol
. 1267a15–16), Xenophon (
Hier
. 4.5, cf. 6.11), Isokrates (8.143), and Polybios (2.56.15) state that general fact.
¹⁹
And there are several particular cases that support such generalities. Xenophon, for example, wrote (
Hell
. 6.4.32) that the assassins of Jason of Pherai were honored in cities specifically because he was a potential tyrant. And the same author wrote (
Hell
. 7.3.10) that, in trial, one of the men involved in the successful conspiracy to kill Euphron, the tyrant of Sikyon, said that he could expect to receive praise for his act of tyrannicide. In addition, the people of Sikyon erected a statue of Aratos (Plut.
Arat
. 14), the famous opponent of tyrants, and, after he died, performed sacrifices annually on the day that he deposed the tyrant Nikokles (Plut.
Arat
. 53). The Achaeans dedicated in Delphi a statue of Philopoimen that depicted him in the act of killing the tyrant Machanidas (Plut.
Phil
. 10.8; cf.
Syll.
³
625).
²⁰
And the people of Syracuse buried Timoleon in their agora at public expense and held annual musical and athletic games “because he overthrew the tyrants” (Plut.
Tim
. 39).
²¹

Scholars have published important work on each of the known tyrant-killing laws and decrees. The work by epigraphers is particularly helpful. Simply put, as a result of their efforts, historians can both read what is on the extant portions of the stones and be reasonably confident about what was written on the lost portions. Epigraphic work on the dossier from Eresos and the laws from Ilion and Eretria is particularly impressive. Progress also has been made on the historical front. Many of the most important dates have been established, a task much more difficult than it might seem. And analyses of the documents' historical contexts have provided a fine initial orientation for further, more extensive inquiries.

As solid as the existing scholarship on tyrant-killing legislation is, it is still incomplete. For example, there is no comprehensive work that studies all of the relevant texts: most studies focus on a particular text, citing the others as parallels. The only attempt to study all tyrant-killing documents in a single monograph was published by Friedel in 1937. But two important inscriptions have been discovered since then (the Eretrian law and the law of Eukrates). And Friedel's analysis of the other texts is rather brief. Much more fundamentally, scholars have not yet explained how the promulgation of a tyrant-killing law might actually have helped pro-democrats defend their regime against a coup d'état in practice—the obvious purpose of such legislation. Such an explanation is essential, of course, simply to understand the nature of this peculiar type of legislation. And that understanding might, in turn, provide important insights into both the nature of ancient Greek democracy and the basis of its persistence within the larger Greek world.

As already noted, this book's overarching thesis is that pro-democrats promulgated tyrant-killing legislation in order to facilitate large-scale mobilization in response to an organized coup d'état. That is, it helped individuals work as a group and take advantage of their numerical superiority. I will fully explain the means by which the promulgation of such legislation achieved that end in
chapter 1
, when we examine the historical and sociopolitical context within which tyrant-killing law was invented in late-fifth-century Athens. But it will be helpful to anticipate the discussion here.

The promulgation of tyrant-killing law facilitated large-scale pro-democracy mobilization by accomplishing two complementary tasks. The first task was to widely publicize the pro-democrats' commitment to defend their democratic regime in the event of a coup d'état. That demonstration of commitment would convince moderately risk-averse individuals that, should they defend the democracy, a sufficient number of individuals would follow them. Those moderately risk-averse individuals would thus require fewer people to act in defense of the democracy
before
they do. Such commitments, however, since they concern actions that are so dangerous, almost certainly would not be fully credible to everybody. But an individual who, before the promulgation of the law, would have required roughly 35 percent of the population to act in defense of the democracy before he thought it safe enough to act, might now—that is, after its promulgation—require only 30 percent of the population to act before he acts. And an individual who would have required 30 percent of the population to act before he did might now require only 25 percent of the population to act first. Again, the reason is that they believe that others will follow them.

The second task was to widely publicize the rewards that would be given to an exceptionally brave individual who struck the first blow in defense of the democracy—to the individual, that is, who “killed a tyrant.” Before the promulgation of the law, such an individual might have waited for “one
person” to defend the democracy before he thought it safe enough to do so. But, after the law's ratification, he would conclude that the positive, selective incentives made it worth the risk to go first: like the moderately risk-averse individuals, he would believe that a sufficient number of people will follow him. And should such an individual “kill a tyrant,” another individual who, after the promulgation of the tyrant-killing law, was waiting for only “one person” to act before he did, would join in the defense of the democracy. And then someone who was waiting for “two people” to act would act, and so on. The first person's act of “tyrannicide” would thus have initiated a pro-democratic revolutionary bandwagon; the pro-democrats would overwhelm their opponents.

The promulgation of tyrant-killing legislation thus, in theory, gave the pro-democrats a credible “second strike” capability. Anti-democrats might still conclude that they could stage a well-coordinated coup, perhaps killing prominent pro-democrats and quickly seizing control of the public space. But those anti-democrats also would have to factor into their calculus of decision the likelihood that pro-democrats, nonetheless, would be able to mobilize in defense of their democracy pursuant to a public act of tyrannicide. If the pro-democrats were able to mobilize (i.e., if the act of tyrannicide initiated a revolutionary bandwagon), the resulting conflict would be between two unequally sized factions: minority anti-democrats and majority democrats.
²²
And since anti-democrats would likely lose that battle, they might choose not to defect in the first place. The result of such a successful “unilateral deterrence” scenario would be a stable democracy.
²³

Each of the following six chapters presents a historical and sociopolitical analysis of one tyrant-killing enactment. As would be expected, the chapters exhibit a great deal of variety. The text of the decree of Demophantos and its context, for example, are quite different from the remarkably long law from Hellenistic Ilion. There are, however, three elements that are common to them all.

One common element is the identification of the “tyrannical” threat. It perhaps goes without saying, but pro-democrats promulgated tyrant-killing legislation because they believed that anti-democrats might stage a coup. But why did they feel threatened? Or, perhaps better, what, in particular, were they afraid of? The quantity and quality of evidence available to answer such questions vary from case to case. But, in each instance, it is important to consider both internal and external factors.

Another common element is an explanation of how the promulgation of the law or decree would have addressed the tyrannical threat. Generally speaking, the answer is the same for them all: namely, by facilitating large-scale mobilization in the event of a coup. (And, again, the means by which that end was accomplished is fully described in
chapter 1
.) But each of the texts is different from the others. Thus the task is to explain how the unique elements or provisions contributed to the workings of the law as a whole. To put it in the form of a question, how would the various unique elements of the law—and thus the law as a whole—alter the behavior of individuals to the advantage of the democratic regime?

A final common element is an assessment of the law or decree's effectiveness. The operative question here is straightforward: Did the promulgation of the law or decree help the pro-democrats maintain control of their polis? That is, no doubt, a difficult question to answer: discerning cause is problematic in general, and there are no sources that assert that a particular tyrant-killing law or decree “worked.” But, unless one concludes that the promulgation of tyrant-killing legislation could never contribute to the defense of a democracy, it is worthwhile looking at the evidence in order to determine what sort of circumstantial case can be made.

And, finally, a few minor matters. All three letter dates are BCE. Except when noted otherwise, translations of Greek authors are from the most recent volume of the Loeb Classical Library. And with respect to the English spelling of Greek words, I have not been doctrinaire, but the spelling of any particular word is consistent throughout the book.

1
My factional and power-based understanding of the meaning of ancient Greek
dēmokratia
is based on two points. First,
kratos
connotes bodily strength and thus physical domination (see
LSJ
s.v.
κράτος
). Thucydides, for example, wrote (8.70.1–2) that the Four Hundred ruled
kata kratos
: they had citizens executed, imprisoned, and banished. Second, in addition to referring to the whole citizenry,
dēmos
refers more specifically to the subset of the population that believed that the very poorest citizen should have equal political standing with the very richest citizen. Thus
dēmokratia
was a regime type wherein those who believed that the very poorest citizens should have equal political standing with the very richest are able to physically impose their will on the polis. In support of this conception, note the “Old Oligarch's” direct statement (1.9) about nondemocratic regimes: if “the good” (
hoi chrēstoi
) controlled the city, “the
dēmos
would swiftly fall into slavery.” Many of the incidents explored in this book also provide support. On the meaning of ancient Greek
dēmokratia
, see Ober (2006).

2
Note that both Megara and Herakleia (Pontica) experienced democracy in the first half the sixth century. For democracy outside of Athens, see Robinson (1997 and 2011).

3
See the appendix for a presentation of the data and an explanation of the method.

4
The general presence of anti-democratic forces in democratically governed poleis is certainly implied by Aristotle (
Pol
. 1304b19–1305a36; 1309a15–1310a35). And it is tendentiously asserted by Demosthenes (10.4).

5
Note, for example, Aristotle's suggestion (
Pol
. 1310a5–8) that, in a democracy, political leaders should “pretend to be speaking on behalf of men that are well-to-do.”

6
See Hansen and Nielsen (2004: 124–29). The presence of motivated opposition in most poleis is also strongly implied in Aeneas Tacticus's fourth-century work titled
How to Survive Under Siege
. That work focuses heavily on internal antiregime elements. See Whitehead (1990: 25–33).

7
Note too the description—provided by a scholion to Aischines,
Against Timarchos
(
DK
88A13)—of the relief on Kritias's tombstone: personified Oligarchia setting fire to personified Dēmokratia. (Kritias was the leader of the so-called Thirty Tyrants who ruthlessly dominated Athens for several months after the Peloponnesian War.)

8
Meiggs (1972: 54–55) notes that the Athenians did not always insist that their allies be democratically governed. Individual autocrats in Karia appear in the tribute lists: Meiggs cites
ATL
i. 297 f (
Κᾶρες ὧν Τύμνες ἄρχει
). For this question, see now Brock (2009) and Robinson (2011: 188–200). The Athenians supported several tyrants in Eretria during the fourth century. See
chapter 2
.

9
Gladwell (2000: chap. 5). Josiah Ober (2008: 84–90) addresses this issue and cites the important literature (including Gladwell).

10
A so-called
Normalpolis
(Ruschenbusch 1985) had a few hundred to several thousand citizens and a territory of less than 100 square kilometers.

11
There are no known tyrant-killing laws that were promulgated prior to the decree of Demophantos (for a full discussion of which, see
chapter 1
). The Athenians, as noted immediately below in the introduction, promulgated an anti-tyranny law sometime in the Archaic period (
Ath
.
Pol
. 16.10). But it did not explicitly call for the killing of a tyrant (and, in any case, it was an Athenian law). Also antecedent to the decree of Demophantos is the well-known decree from mid-fifth-century Miletos (
ML
43): it records the banishment of certain named individuals and explicitly incentives individuals to kill them. But that decree does not mention “tyrants,” and the incentives were for the assassination of named individuals, not of potential future revolutionaries.

12
The law reads,
ἐάν τινες τυραννεῖν ἐπανιστῶνται
[
ἐπὶ τυραννίδι
]
ἢ συγκαθιστῇ τὴν τυραννίδα
,
ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γένος
(If any persons rise in insurrection in order to govern tyrannically, or if any person assists in establishing the tyranny, he himself and his family shall be without rights).