Delphi Complete Works of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (Illustrated) (1366 page)

In the early morning Woolcombe’s Fourth Corps, exhausted in body but triumphant in the knowledge of the terrible losses which they had inflicted upon the enemy, withdrew unmolested and in absolute order to the smaller perimeter which had been marked out for them by General Byng when he had time to realise the exact effect of the German gains upon the south end of his line. Everything portable was carried off by the retiring troops, who made it a point of honour to leave nothing at all to the enemy. Three days later, in conformity with the general plans, the lines were laid down afresh along the Flesquières Ridge, so that the whole salient was smoothed out, and yet Byng’s troops held all the solid advantages gained upon November
20 in
the shape of a long stretch of the Hindenburg Line. This continued to be the permanent position of the Third Army during the winter, and up to the fateful 21st of March 1918, when the great German thunderbolt was hurled. In the movements entailed by this withdrawal there was no molestation from the enemy save that the rearguards of the Forty-seventh Division were strongly engaged. Two companies of the 15th Civil Service Rifles were for a time cut off, but broke their way through all resistance and rejoined the main body.

On the north of that new portion of the line which had been established by the Guards and taken over by the Ninth Division there was a long ridge called Welsh Ridge, running up from La Vacquerie Farm. The enemy was still strong in this quarter where the British artillery was particularly weak — a defect which was partly compensated for by the loyalty of the neighbouring French Commander. The Sixty-first South Midland Territorial Division had taken over from the Twelfth in this area and found themselves involved in several days of hard fighting, in the course of which La Vacquerie Farm was lost to the Badeners, but the general line of the ridge was maintained, consolidated, and turned into the permanent front of the Army.

So ended the swaying fortunes of this hard-fought and dramatic battle, beginning with a surprise attack of the British upon the Germans, and ending by an attack of the Germans upon the British which, if not a surprise to the commanders, at least produced some surprising and untoward results. The balance of these varied actions was greatly in favour of the British, and yet it could not be denied that something of the glory and satisfaction of Byng’s splendid original victory were dimmed by this unsatisfactory epilogue which was only made less disastrous to the British cause by the very heavy losses which their enemy incurred upon the northern sector. On the balance in ground gained the British had a solid grip of
11,000 yards
of the famous Hindenburg Line, as against an unimportant British section between Vendhuille and Gonnelieu. In prisoners the British had 11,000 as against 6000 claimed by the Germans. In guns the British took or destroyed 145 against 100 taken or destroyed by their enemies. In the larger field of strategy the whole episode was fruitful as it stopped all reinforcement of the Germans in Italy during the critical weeks while the Italians were settling down upon the line of the Piave. One result of the action was a reorganisation of the British machine-gun system which was found to have acted in an unequal fashion during the operations, some formations giving excellent results while others were less satisfactory.

The Battle of Cambrai virtually brought the fighting of 1917 to an end, although there were several sharp local actions at different points along the line — actions which would have filled special editions in former wars, and now can hardly be afforded a paragraph if any just proportion be observed. Chief among them was a spirited German attack upon the Sixty-third Naval Division upon December
29 in
the sector of the Canal du Nord, which began by the loss of some trench elements, but ended with little change. There was a sharp fight also early in December at that blood-stained country-house, Polderhoek Château, where the New Zealanders attacking upon a narrow front made an attempt upon one of the most difficult points in the Flanders line. The men of Otago and of Canterbury proved once more what extraordinarily good military material is bred in the great Pacific island, but after a sharp tussle in which both sides lost heavily, there was no substantial change in the position.

Another local fight which was sufficiently serious to demand mention here was upon December 2, when the 26th Brigade of the Eighth Division with part of the Thirty-second Division stirred up the German line in the Flanders area. After two days of fighting matters remained here much as they started.

The year 1917 had been a very glorious one both to the French and to the British Armies, which, pursuing their system of the limited objective, had hardly met with a single repulse in a long campaign. The victories of Arras, Messines, Langemarck, Paschendaale, and Cambrai were added to the great record of Sir Douglas Haig and his men, while the French, save for the losses incurred in their great April attack, had an unbroken record of success. And yet in spite of these results in the West the year was a disappointing one for the Allies, since the Russian defection which involved Rumania in ruin, greatly weakened their position and clearly showed that the year 1918 would find them confronted with the whole force of Germany aided by contingents of her Allies. Storm clouds piled high in the East. Only from over the far Western rim of the Atlantic came a slowly waxing light.

VOLUME V.

PREFACE

THIS fifth volume deals with one of the most tremendous episodes in history, when the vigour of the German attack and the desperate resistance of the British both on the Somme and in Flanders, held an awestruck world in suspense. A million men released from the Russian front, rolled across Europe and, swelling that great tide which was already banked up before the British breakwater, it washed over all the front line barriers and threatened at one time to sweep down to the sea. The account of how the British Army, upon which incomparably the greater pressure fell, rose to the occasion and first slowed and then held the terrific flood is one of the most wonderful of military epics. At the same time every credit must be given to the loyalty of the French commanders who, while guarding their own extended lines, endeavoured to spare all possible help to their hard-pressed Allies. This volume carries the story of the German attack to its close. The next and final one will describe the enormous counter-attack of the Allies leading up to their final victory.

The Chronicler has been faced by many obstacles in endeavouring to preserve both accuracy and historical proportion while writing contemporary history. He would gratefully acknowledge that his critics in the press have shown a kindly indulgence, which arises, no doubt, from an appreciation of these difficulties. There has, however, been one conspicuous exception to which he would desire to call attention, since a large question of literary etiquette is involved. From the beginning a series of unflattering and anonymous articles have appeared in
The Times Literary Supplement
, commenting adversely upon each volume in turn, and picking out the pettiest details for animadversion. Upon enquiry, these articles — in whole or part — are admitted to have been written by the Hon. J.W. Fortescue, who is himself the official historian of the War. On being remonstrated with, this gentleman could not be brought to see that it is not fitting that he should make anonymous attacks, however
bona fide
, upon a brother author who is working upon the same subject and is therefore in the involuntary position of being a humble rival.

Having stated the facts they may be left to the judgment of the public.

ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE.
Crowborough, May 1, 1919.

I.
EVENTS UPON THE BRITISH FRONT
UP TO MARCH 21, 1918

The prospects of the Allies — Great dangers from the Russian collapse — State of the British line — Huge German preparations — Eve of the Great Offensive

THE New Year of 1918, the fourth of the world war, opened with chequered prospects for the Allies. Upon all subsidiary fields of action the developments were good. In Palestine, General Allenby, the victor of Arras, had shown himself to be a fine soldier upon the larger scale, and. had fought his way up the old highway of history which leads from Egypt by Gaza to Jerusalem. Homely crusaders in tattered khaki stood where once Godfrey de Bouillon and his chivalry had worshipped before the shrine of religion, and the cavalry of Australia, the yeomen of the Shires, and the infantry of London won once more the ground which Richard of the Lion Heart with his knights and bowmen had contested in the long ago. Surely in all the strange permutations and combinations of the world war there could be none more striking than that! By April the British force covered all the northern approaches to the city and extended its right wing to the Jordan, where our Arab allies in the land of Moab were pushing the Turks back along the line of the Damascus railway.

On another road of world conquest, that from Bagdad to Nineveh, the British and Indian columns were also both active and victorious. The knightly Maude had perished from cholera contracted by his own courtesy in drinking a proffered cup of village water. His successor, General Marshall, formerly his Chief of Staff, and as such conversant with his aims and his methods, carried on both one and the other, moving his men north until the spectator who compared their numbers with the immensity of the spaces around them, was appalled at the apparent loneliness of their position. By May his raiding cavalry were not far from the Turkish supply depot of Mosul, where the barren mounds, extending over leagues of desert, proclaim both the greatness and the ruin of Nineveh. Salonica continued in its usual condition of uneasy and malarial somnolence, but gratifying reports came of the belated rally of the Greeks, who, acting with the French, won a smart little victory against their Bulgarian enemies upon May 31. German East Africa had at last been cleared of German forces, but General Lettow-Vorbeck, to whom we cannot deny remarkable fortitude and leadership, wandered with his piebald commands in the depths of the forests and marshes of Mozambique, still evading his inevitable capture, and master only of the ground on which he camped.

But these distant campaigns had only a remote and indirect effect upon the war in Europe. Here the late winter and the early spring of 1918 saw the balance tilted against the British and their comrades in the West; through causes over which they had no control. Russia had completely broken down. In her case, with a rapidity which made it difficult to realise the situation, autocracy had changed to liberty, liberty to license, and license to chaos. The absolute dissolution of all fighting power was partly due to national folly and partly to deliberate treachery. The leaders of the extreme party had arrived from Switzerland with a free pass granted by the German authorities. Instantly they set to work to subvert the comparatively sane government with which the name of Kerensky is chiefly associated. Lenin and his associates seized the reins of power and guided their mad team up to and over the precipice. It was clear to any observer that such a frenzy of insanity must have its reaction, and great pity was felt for those more honourable Russians who were compelled to look on at the degradation of their country. The new super-democracy began its career by repudiating its debts of honour, and by betraying all the other democracies of the world. Such conditions could not last; but meanwhile the Germans overran the country at their pleasure, practically annexed both Finland and the Ukraine, and helped themselves to harvests, warships, or anything else they might desire. Chivalrous little Romania, with the foe in front and the traitor in the rear, was compelled to make such hard terms as she might — surely one of the most bitter tragedies of history.

As a result of this huge defection the whole force of Germany and of Austria, together with a good deal of captured Russian artillery, was available for the Western war, and from November to March an endless succession of troop trains were bearing the divisions which had extended from the Baltic to the southern frontiers of Russia, in order to thicken the formidable array already marshalled across France. A great Austrian army assembled on the line of the Piave, where the Italians had formed their new front, while a second force in the mountains upon their flank seemed to hang suspended like an avalanche, ready at any instant to crash down into the valleys. In spite of this imminent danger the situation was so threatening in France that half of the British and French force in Italy had to be recalled, while the gallant Italians actually sent some divisions of their own best troops to aid the Allies in the more vital theatre of war. It was not only the vast concentration of infantry which formed the immediate menace, but it was the addition to the German gun power, in which the Austrians greatly assisted. The enemy was acting also upon internal lines and with excellent radiating communications, so that by assembling large bodies in certain central points he could hurl them against any portion of a long arc of the Allied line and depend upon several days of battle before the reinforcements could intervene. This, as it proved, was a very great advantage. He had also used his Russian experiences to initiate and improve a new form of attack by which he was confident, with a confidence which proved to be well justified, that he could certainly make a deep impression upon the Allied line, and turn the war, for a time at least, into one of open movement. Such was the very favourable position of the German army at the opening of the tremendous campaign of 1918, which was enhanced by the fact that they had reduced to slavery the population in their rear, and had thus gained a very solid present advantage at the cost of a universal hatred and execration of which no man now living will see the end. In the hope of being a nation of victors they took steps which will brand them as a nation of monsters so long as history is read — a nation with modern minds but with worse than mediaeval souls.

The Allies were not without their consolations, though they lay rather in the future than in the present. Their veteran armies, though somewhat outnumbered, had done so well in the offensive of the year before that they had good reason to believe that, acting upon the defensive, they would either hold the German onslaught, or at worst inflict such losses that they would gradually bring them to an equilibrium. Neither France nor Britain had called upon its last reserves to the same extent as Germany, and behind both was the mighty power of America. Up to date the American forces landed in France had not been sufficiently trained or numerous to influence the course of events, but from the spring onwards there was a steady flow, and hardly a day elapsed without one or more transports laden with troops arriving in the British or French ports. The men were of splendid spirit and physique, and the mere sight of them revived the weary souls of those who had fought the hard fight so long. It was the knowledge of these reinforcements and the constant drafts from Britain which stiffened men’s courage and steeled their breasts in the desperate days to come.

Turning our eyes now from the general prospect and concentrating our attention upon the dispositions of the British army, it may be said that the ranks had been filled once more after the very expensive fighting of the autumn. Divisions were, however, weaker than before for, following the German model, one battalion had been taken out of each brigade, so that in future a division consisted of nine ordinary units and one pioneer. Of the six divisions lent to Italy three had been brought back in view of the German menace. The line still ran from Houthulst Forest and Passchendaele in the north along the familiar curve by La Bassé and Lens to the east of Vimy Ridge, and thence along the first Hindenburg Line, with the one six-mile breach in front of Cambrai. The Third Army, under Sir Julian Byng, covered the ground between Arras and Cambrai, whilst the Fifth, under Sir Hubert Gough, carried it south from that point. His junction with the French was an indeterminate one and was twice moved to the south, the second move on February 15 carrying his right wing across the Oise as far south as Barisis, eight miles beyond La Fère. There is no doubt that in lengthening his line to this extent Sir Douglas Haig took on more ground than his troops could be reasonably expected to hold, and that General Gough was given a hard task. It was done, as was shown in a subsequent debate, against the better judgment of the British at the urgent behest of M. Clemenceau. We must remember, however, that our Allies had frequently taken risks in order to help us, and that it was for us to reciprocate even though it might occasionally, as in this instance, lead to trouble. There was a tendency at the time for soldiers and politicians to put the blame upon each other, whereas all were equally the victims of the real cause, which was the crushing burden placed upon us by the defection of our Ally. It is easy to be wise after the event, but it was impossible to tell with any certainty where the impending blow might fall, and M. Clemenceau was very naturally anxious about the French line in Champagne, which was strengthened by this extension of the British flank. There is in truth no need for mutual reproach, as everyone acted for the best under the almost intolerable circumstances imposed by the new conditions.

Before referring in detail to the tremendous storm which was visibly banking up in the East, and which broke upon March 21 along the British lines from the Scarpe to the Oise, some allusion should be made to one or two sharp German attacks in the extreme north, by which the enemy endeavoured to draw the attention of the Allies away from the district in which their first real attack was planned. In the first of these, delivered upon March 8 to the south of Houthulst Forest, in the area formerly occupied by the Second Army, the German stormers, attacking on a mile of front, gained a footing in the advanced trenches over a space of
500 yards
, but were driven out again and past their own front line by a spirited counter-attack. The losses of the Thirty-sixth Reserve Division, who carried out the operation, were considerable, and their gains were nil. The second attack was made upon the same evening in the neighbourhood of Polderhoek Château, to the south of the Ypres front. Here again some trench elements were secured in the first rush, but were entirely regained by the 10th K.R.R. and 13th Fusiliers of the 111th Brigade, who restored the line. Neither attempt was serious, but they were operations on a considerably larger scale than any others during the winter. These attacks were delivered upon the front of Jacob’s Second Corps, which belonged to Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, but within a few days Plumer had returned from Italy, and he, with the Second British Army, took over this sector once again.

We must now turn to the long stretch from in the north to La Fère in the south, a front of fifty miles, upon which the great German blow was about to fall. It is said that after a tour of the whole line General Ludendorff determined upon this as being the most favourable region for a grand attack. Granting that for general motives of policy the assault should be on the British rather than on the French army, it is clear that he could have come to no other decision since Flanders at that time of year might have been a morass, and the rest of the line was to a large extent upon commanding ground. On the other hand the desolate country which had been already occupied and abandoned by the Germans was in front of their new advance, and it was likely that this would act as a shock-absorber and take the momentum off a victorious advance before it could reach any point of vital strategic importance. The German Staff scepis, however, to have placed great confidence upon their secrecy, their numbers, and their new methods. Their ambitious plan was to break right through to Amiens, to seize the line of the Somme so as to divide the Allied armies, and then to throw their weight to right or to left as might seem best, the one movement threatening the Channel ports and the other Paris. Their actual success, though it was considerable, fell so far short of their real intentions that disappointment rather than triumph must have been their prevailing emotion. Looking first upon their side of the line one can appreciate in a general way the efficient methods which they took to ensure success. The troops had been exercised in the back areas during the whole winter in the new arts of attack, which will be more fully indicated when the battle opens. They were then assembled at various railway junctions, such as Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Wassigny, and Vervins, sufficiently far from the front to escape direct observation. Then for seven nights in successive marches the troops were brought forward, finally reaching the front lines on the night before the attack, while the guns, the mine-throwers, and the munition dumps had already been prepared. The whole affair was upon a gigantic scale, for sixty divisions, or half a million of infantry, were thrown into the battle upon the first day, with half as many in immediate reserve. Secrecy was preserved by every possible precaution, though the British aeroplanes, casting down their flare lights upon crowded roads, gave few hopes that it could be sustained. Three of the most famous generals in the German service were in immediate charge of the operations. General Otto von Below, the victor of the Italian disaster, with the Seventeenth Army in the north; General von Marwitz, who had distinguished himself at Cambrai, with the Second Army in the centre; and General von Hutier, the conqueror of Riga and the inventor of the new tactics, with the Eighteenth Army in the south. It was to the last, which was under the nominal command of the Crown Prince, that the chief attack was allotted. Forty divisions, with large reserves, were placed under his command for an assault upon General Gough’s lines between Cambrai and the Oise, while twenty divisions, with corresponding reserves, were thrown against the British Third Army, especially that section of it opposite Croisilles and Bullecourt. Never in the history of the world had a more formidable force been concentrated upon a fixed and limited objective. The greatest possible expectations were founded upon the battle, which had already been named the “
Kaiser- Schlacht
,” while the day chosen had been called Michael’s day, or the day of Germany’s revenge.