Delphi Complete Works of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (Illustrated) (1376 page)

Things were going better, however, with the Eighteenth Division, which held
9000 yards
of front in the centre of the Third Corps. As this great frontage was maintained by only two brigades, the 53rd (Higginson) in the north and the 55th (Wood) in the south, it must have been very thinly held, and even admitting that the pressure was less than on either of the wing divisions, it was none the less a fine achievement to keep a grip on so wide an area. Three battalions were in the forward zone, the 8th Berks on the left, the 7th West Kents in the centre, and the 7th Buffs on the right, all of whom did splendidly, so that the defence of Fort Vendeuil, Cork, Cardiff, Durham, and other redoubts upon this point form a whole series of epics. Besides the infantry, the 79th Company Royal Engineers shared in the peril and the glory of this defence. The wires connecting up these forward garrisons were speedily cut, and no news came back all day, save the rattle of their rifle-fire. The first definite tidings of the German advance came back through the fog about 12 o’clock, when some gunners emerged from its folds and announced that the advanced guns had been overrun by the enemy. Soon after came a runner with a message from Colonel Crosthwaite of the West Kents to say that his headquarters was surrounded, and asking for a barrage on one side of it. A second message arrived from him: “Still holding, 12:30 P.M. Boche all round within fifty The yards except rear. Can only see forty yards, so it is difficult to kill the blighters.” It was the last word.

At 1:30 the enemy had closed in on the battle zone, and the high ground at Cerisy in the area of the 53rd Brigade had been lost. On the front of the 55th Brigade at the same hour strong parties of the enemy who had pushed between the redoubts in the fog had occupied Vendeuil, while a section of guns in Ronquenet Wood had been rushed by them. The reserve company of the Buffs in front of the battle zone fought desperately against these intruders, while near the Dublin redoubt Captain Dennis fought his guns till 5 P.M., inflicting heavy losses upon the Germans, who collected in masses in front of the wire at this point. Eventually his gun-pits were rushed, all the gunners being killed or taken. The main weight of the attack fell upon the 53rd Brigade upon the left, and by the middle of the afternoon all the redoubts upon this front had gone, while the 55th was still well covered. The battle zone, however, was still intact, though the enemy massed heavily in front of Moulin Farm and opposite the switch line from Vendeuil to Ly-Fontaine. They came forward several times, but the mist had risen and the rifle-fire was accurate so that they made no progress. At Caponne Farm there was also a brisk attack, but the 10th Essex, the only battalion left in the brigade, held firmly to its position, though much plagued by low-flying aeroplanes who skimmed their very heads, while the British Headquarters was equally disturbed by a captured anti-tank gun with which the Germans kept up a point-blank fire. To ease the pressure upon this wing, General Lee put in the 8th East Surreys from divisional reserve to thicken the line in the neighbourhood of Remigny.

At 3:30 the covering forts upon the front of the 55th Brigade were still holding out. Fort Vendeuil had made a particularly fine defence and broke up a heavy attack. There was lamp signalling from this fort till 6 P.M., when the lamp went out for ever. The 7th Buffs, who had charge of all this portion of the battle front, did a magnificent day’s work, and the famous regiment to which this battalion belongs has won no prouder laurels in all the centuries. Little is known of their fate save the pregnant facts that the front was screened all day, that repeated messages for help were received up to 8:30 in the evening, and that rifle-fire was heard from their posts till midnight. Bald words — and yet to him who can see they convey a sure picture of fading light, dwindling cartridges, and desperate men, baited from all sides and dying with clenched teeth amid the ever-flowing German hordes.

About 4 o’clock the Germans had not only penetrated deeply into the battle zone of the Fourteenth Division to the north, but had also dented that of the Fifty-eighth in the south, so that both wings of the Eighteenth were in a perilous state. The East Surreys were pushed forward, therefore, into the switch line from Gibercourt to Ly-Fontaine. Two regiments of dismounted cavalry from the Second Division were sent also to form a defensive flank upon the right of the 55th Brigade. At 6 P.M. the attack upon the battle zone of the Eighteenth had ceased, but it was being pushed hard upon the two wing divisions, and the Fifty-eighth had lost both Quessy and Fargniers. Orders were then issued to get behind the Crozat Canal after dark, this having always been chosen as the second line of defence. The 64th Brigade, which behaved with great steadiness, was directed to cover the retirement of the Fourteenth Division, and the guns were withdrawn first, so as to cover the infantry at the canal crossings. A few of the outlying posts were gathered up and brought back in safety. The East Surreys covered the withdrawal of the poor remains of the 53rd Brigade, while the 3rd Hussars covered the 55th Brigade on the right. It was a most difficult and delicate operation with a victorious and elated enemy swarming upon the rear, but it was successfully carried out, and by
6 A
.M. the Third Corps were all across the canal, and the bridges in that sector had been destroyed.

The performance of the Eighteenth Division had been a very fine one, and- it was one of the units which could boast that on the evening of that terrible day they still held the main position which they had covered in the morning. The main German attack seems to have been conducted by four divisions, the Thirty-fourth, Thirty-seventh, One hundred and third, and Two hundred and eleventh, while four more were identified as either partly engaged or in immediate reserve. The direction of the attack was mainly from the north and came upon the front and flank of the 53rd Brigade, which could hardly call itself a battalion in the evening. The gunners had to fire by guess until the mist lifted, after which time they did great execution, and stuck to their pieces to the last moment. A particularly notable performance was that of Captain Haybittle of C Battery, 83rd Brigade Royal Field Artillery, whose guns, just south of Benay, were rushed in the mist at noon. He and his crews removed the blocks and held a neighbouring position with their rifles, directing at the same time the fire of two guns in the rear which played upon the German masses as they debouched from Lambay Wood. Afterwards he and his men fell back upon these guns and fought them until late in the evening, when both of them were knocked out. Nineteen hundred rounds were fired, and this stubborn defence did much to hold the northern flank of the battle zone.

It only remains now to give some account of the events upon the front of the 173rd Brigade (Worgan) of the Fifty-eighth London Division (Gator) upon the extreme right, in order to complete this rapid bird’s-eye view of the events of March 21 upon the front of the Fifth Army. This brigade, which filled the space between Travecy on the left and the Oise upon the right, had the 2/1 Londons in the forward zone, the 2/4 Londons in the battle zone opposite La Fère, and the 2/3 Londons in the rear zone upon the Crozat Canal.* The single battalion in front was attacked by the impossible odds of three German divisions, but held out for a long time with great constancy. Their brave Colonel, Richardson, was last seen surrounded by the enemy, but still fighting with his headquarters troops around him.

* When two numbers are given to a Territorial battalion, for instance 2/4 Londons, it means that the 4th Londons have two battalions and that this is the second of them.

The Germans stormed forward to the battle zone, but there on the high ground across the Oise they also met with a very vigorous resistance from the 4th Londons, aided by some sappers and a company of pioneers. It was indeed a great achievement of Colonel Dann and his men to hold up the attack with such disparity of numbers, for according to the official German account several divisions took part in the attack. Finally, as the afternoon wore on the enemy obtained a lodgment in the left of the position, and before evening they occupied Travecy and part of Fargniers, winding up by the capture of Quessy. The 2/3 Londons had been drawn into the fight, and now the 2/8 Londons from the 174th Brigade were brought north and placed in reserve along the line of the Crozat Canal, across which the troops were now ordered to fall back. This battalion with the 18th Entrenching Battalion guarded the whole canal line from Condren Crossing on the right to the junction with the Eighteenth Division on the left. By
5 A
.M. all troops were across and the bridges had been destroyed. The 2/4th Londons succeeded in removing all their stores and munitions, and their remarkable achievement in holding the high ground of La Fère against ten times their numbers for as many hours, during which they inflicted very heavy losses upon their assailants and repulsed six separate attacks, was among the outstanding military feats of that difficult day.

It is needless to say that the losses in men were very heavy on March 21, though it is difficult to separate them from the general losses of the retreat, which will be recorded later. Among senior officers of note who died for their country that day, besides those already mentioned, were Colonels Acklom of the Northumberland Fusiliers, Thorne of the North Staffords, Wrenford of the East Lancashires, and Stewart of the Leicesters.

British Battle Line, March 21

V. THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
The Retreat of the Seventh and Nineteenth Corps

Problems before General Gough — His masterful action — Arrival of Thirty-ninth, Twentieth, and Fiftieth Divisions — Retreat of Tudor’s Ninth Scottish Division — Destruction of the South Africans — Defence of the Somme — Arrival of the Eighth Division — Desperate fighting — The Carey line — Death of General Feetham—”
Immer fest daran
” — Advance, Australia! — Great achievement of General Watts

THE reader is now in a position to form some conception of the situation of the Fifth Army upon the evening of March 21, and to understand the problems which confronted its commander. He was of opinion, and the opinion was shared by some at least of his corps commanders, that had he had four or five Fifth divisions of reserves within easy call, he could unquestionably have held the line. He had, however, to deal with the situation as it stood, and no man could have had a more difficult and responsible task. His own reserves were already practically engaged. On the other hand, both his air service and the reports of prisoners assured him that those of the enemy were numerous and near. His line had been deeply dented in four places: in the sector of the Sixteenth Division at Ronssoy, in that of the Twenty-fourth Division at Maissemy, in that of the Fourteenth Division at Essigny, and in that of the Fifty-eighth Division opposite La Fère. These various points are, it will be observed, almost equidistant along the line, which tends to show that the German attack was conducted upon a plan which threw such forces upon limited areas that the result was almost a certainty, whatever troops might be holding them. It was the misfortune and not the fault of these gallant divisions that their thin ranks were in the very places which huge hordes of the enemy had marked in advance as their objectives.

It must have been clear to General Gough and to his corps commanders that a second day of battle, with the German reserves pouring up, would certainly mean a penetration of the line at these various weak points, and that the enemy would then be in a position to cut off large portions of the force. These units, be they divisions or corps, would no doubt fight to the last, but the end must surely be annihilation. In that case the general situation would have been an appalling one. It might indeed have been decisive for the whole war. There was nothing between the Germans and Amiens. Pouring westwards they would have destroyed all reserves almost before they could have alighted from their trains or their motors, and within a few days would have entirely cut off the British from the French, with the estuary of the Somme between the two armies. Any hesitation would have been fatal. An immediate decision was imperative. That decision could only be that the British Army should retard the German advance by an obstinate rearguard action, that it should endeavour to preserve its line, and allow no unit to be cut off, that it should fall back in an orderly fashion upon its reserves, and that when it met them it should turn at bay and prevent the enemy from reaching his objective. This was the plan which General Gough instantly formed, and which he proceeded with firmness and moral courage to carry out. Orders were at once given that the weaker portions of the line should drop back behind the obstacles which had already been marked out as the best defensive lines. At the same time with great foresight he gave orders that the old French Somme trenches, from the river southwards, should be set in order as a last line of defence. He despatched his chief army engineer. General Grant, to carry out this order, and it was eventually a very vital one in ensuring the safety of the army in the last stages of its retreat.

The orders to each corps commander were given in the form of general indications, the details being left to his own judgment, for the position of each corps and the pressure upon it formed a number of independent problems. We shall turn to the north therefore, where, upon the whole, the situation was least critical, and we shall follow first the Seventh and then the Nineteenth Corps in their various movements until a condition of equilibrium was at last safely established. Let it be at once stated that the design was duly carried out along the whole line, and that the operation, which at the time was designated as a disaster, was really a remarkable example of how by the coolness of commanders and the discipline of their men, the most desperate situation may be saved and the most powerful and aggressive foe foiled in his attempts. What complicated the military problem of the Fifth Army was that the German threat was really aimed at Paris as much as at Amiens, and that if they could have got through at Essigny and cut off the Fifty-eighth Division there were hardly any reserves between them and the all-important metropolis.

The morning of March 22 again presented those conditions of fog and low visibility which are favourable to the attack. There was no advance in the early hours upon the new positions of the Ninth Division, but the enemy directed his attention entirely to the Chapel Hill front of the Twenty-first Division upon the right, which was still held by the Lincolns. An attempt was made to relieve them by the Scots battalion of the South Africans, who took over some of the northern line. The defence was a splendid one, but by 4 o’clock in the afternoon the Germans had gained most of this high ground by outflanking it, and the South Africans at Revelon Farm, who had been reinforced by the 11th Royal Scots Battalion from the 27th Brigade, were badly enfiladed in consequence by rifle and machine-gun fire from the south. Colonel M’Leod of the South African Scots, and many officers and men, were among the casualties. There was a withdrawal therefore of the right of the Ninth Division, and about 6:30 P.M. the Germans had got as far as Heudicourt, and the brigade staff at Sorel had to line up in order to resist his turning movement to the north. So far round had the Germans penetrated that the Africans were compelled to fall back due north for some distance until their rear was clear, when they retreated with the rest of the division westwards towards Nurlu. By two in the morning of March 23 the new positions had been reached, and the attenuated South African Brigade, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, was taken into divisional reserve.

This difficult retreat was rendered possible by the The desperate resistance offered by the 6th Scots Borderers, who formed a defensive flank south of Sorel and gave the troops to the north time to gain the new position. One company of the 11th Royal Scots was cut off in Revelon Farm, but managed to fight their way back, bringing with them an officer and eighteen other prisoners. No guns were lost by the Ninth Division save ten, which were without teams and were therefore destroyed.

At this period there was some dislocation between the left of the Ninth Division and the right of the Forty-seventh, as is likely to occur where each belongs to a different corps and army. For a time there was a gap between them. This was partly overcome, however, on the evening of the 22nd by means of the Second Division, which lay in reserve behind the Forty-seventh and put its 99th Brigade under the orders of the Ninth Division so as to ensure unity of command in this position of danger.

Turning to the right wing of the Seventh Corps allusion has been made in the last chapter to the severe pressure upon the Sixteenth Division and its determined resistance. It will be remembered that it was reinforced by the 116th Brigade of the Thirty-ninth Division, and all three brigades were involved in the same heavy fighting on the morning of March 22, the German attack being relentless in its vigour. In the course of this severe action the village of St. Emilie was lost, and was afterwards retaken in a very gallant fashion by the 1st Hertfords, a battalion which had greatly distinguished itself already at St. Julien and elsewhere. The orders were to retreat, however, and in this movement the switch line from Saulcourt dug and manned by the 117th and 118th Brigades proved invaluable. The army policy was to fight rearguards and delay the enemy, and this was most efficiently done during the evening of March 22, the flank of the Twenty-first Division being covered in its retirement, and the line held against vigorous attacks. Many of the guns of the Thirty-ninth Divisional artillery were lost through their extreme devotion in covering the retreat of the Sixteenth Division, for they frequently carried on until the infantry were behind them. The enemy was pressing his attacks with great vigour, and every withdrawal was followed up by strong bodies of troops and of field artillery.

During these Operations General Hornby had been in command of the division, but on March 23 General Feetham returned from leave and took over the duties. All day the Thirty-ninth Division was fighting rearguard actions as it fell back upon the Somme. In the course of them General Hornby, now in command of the 116th Brigade, was severely wounded. The roads running westwards to Peronne and Clery were crowded with traffic, but the Thirty-ninth Division turned at bay again and again, giving them time to get clear. By evening the remains of the Sixteenth Division had been practically squeezed out of the line, and the Thirty-ninth had the Sixty-sixth Division on its right and the Twenty-first on its left. At night it held a line from La Maisonnette along the canal to south of Ommiecourt. The enemy appeared to be much exalted by the capture of Peronne, and the 118th Brigade on the right heard them singing lustily during the night.

On March 23 the German attack continued to be very heavy upon the front of the two Scottish brigades of the Ninth Division, which were in touch with the Fifth Corps in the north and with the Twenty-first seventh Division in the south. So close and violent was the fighting that the 6th Scots Borderers were only extricated with difficulty. At 2 P.M. the line was east of Bouchavesnes, but by 4 P.M. the Twenty-first Division on the right had lost ground, and the flank and even the rear of the Ninth was for a time exposed until the Natal Regiment was thrown out south of Bouchavesnes to cover it. The three brigades of the Twenty-first Division were engaged all day as they slowly retreated before the swarming enemy.

March 23 was a most arduous day for both the Highland and the Lowland brigades, for each of them was attacked again and again with the utmost violence. Though the attacks were repulsed each of them had the effect of weakening still further these units which were already much exhausted by hard fighting and incessant exertion. Gradually they were pushed to the westward until they found themselves lining the eastern edge of St. Pierre Vaast Wood, and manning the ridge which extended from that forest to the ruins of Saillisel. Their left at this period seems to have been in the air, as the 99th Brigade had been returned to its division, and they had failed to make contact with the Seventeenth Division, who were at the time just west of Saillisel. At this period the front of the Ninth Division seems to have covered
11,000 yards
, and to have extended for at least two miles into the area of the Third Army, showing how desperate were the exertions needed to cover the ground and to prevent a break-through.

In the morning of March 24 the Scots could see the German infantry streaming forward over the open ground which had been evacuated upon the evening before. It was clear that a great attack was imminent, and at 9 o’clock, after a very heavy cannonade, it developed along the whole line. For three hours the Germans made repeated efforts to force their way through the Ninth Division, but on each occasion they were repulsed, and their losses at this point were exceedingly heavy. About mid-day, however, they had gained so much ground upon the flanks that the South Africans were almost surrounded, and shot into from north and south. The general British line had fallen back to the ridge east of Combles,
1000 yards
behind, but General Dawson found it impossible to withdraw in daylight, so that his brigade was compelled to defend itself in its isolated position at Marrières Wood as best it could. The result was a disaster, but one of a most glorious kind, for the men fought until their last cartridges had been expended, and a large proportion of the survivors were wounded men. General Dawson was among the prisoners. It was reported afterwards from German sources that he was taken while working a machine-gun with his brigade-major lying dead beside him. The whole defence was said by the Germans to have been one of the finest things in the war. From that time forward the South African Brigade had practically ceased to exist until it was reorganised in Flanders. The supporting parties alone were left, and these were formed at once into a composite battalion under Colonel Young, for no rifle could be spared from the fighting line at such a time, Whilst the South Africans had been engaged in this death struggle the 27th Lowland Brigade had been in a similar plight. All these battalions, the 6th Scots Borderers and the 11th and 12th Royal Scots, were very hard pressed, particularly the former. The seventh Lowlanders extricated themselves from an almost desperate situation and fell back from St. Pierre Vaast to the position covering Combles. So great was the general dislocation of troops that one portion of the 5th Camerons found themselves that evening fighting with the Forty-seventh Division, while another was with the Seventeenth.

The main effort of the enemy upon March 24 was directed against the-Fifth and Seventh Corps in the centre of the British line, though his energy at other points was sufficient to engage the full attention of all the other units. Heavy and fresh masses were poured in at the centre and the pressure was great. For the Seventh Corps it was the fourth day of incessant and desperate fighting. There were few men left, and these were very exhausted. Towards evening the left of the Seventh had been turned, and had been compromised by the occupation of Sailly Saillisel. All attempts at counter-attack, however gallant, were destined to failure, or at the best evanescent success, for there was not the weight to carry them through. At 4:15 the report was: “The enemy is through on the right flank and has occupied Combles, Morval, and Lesboeufs.” The Seventh Corps then fell back to the line Hem — Maurepas and threw out every stray unit it could get together — troops of cavalry, Canadian motor-guns, crews and machine-guns of tanks, and all the powdered debris of broken formations, in the direction of Bernafoy Wood to cover the exposed flank. It was still out of touch with the Fifth Corps. This movement gave the line an awkward angle from Peronne and made it almost impossible to hold the stretch of river. For the time the right of the Third Army was a good five miles behind the left of the Fifth Army — the result, as Sir Douglas Haig has stated, of an unauthorised local withdrawal due to misunderstanding of orders. The line near Peronne was still held by the Thirty-ninth Division. Throughout the morning of the 24th strong enemy forces were seen by them pushing forwards between Clery and Rancourt, where they were harassed by the British fire in enfilade, particularly on the roads, where the artillery of the Sixteenth and Thirty-ninth Divisions caused much havoc and confusion, doing great work at short range over open sights. Many excellent targets were missed, however, owing to that difficulty in liaison between the infantry and the guns, which was one of the greatest problems of the operations. During the day the average number of rounds fired per battery was 3000, most of which were observed fire.