DemocracyThe God That Failed (18 page)

But at the same time, and still more importantly, a positive
alternative
to monarchy
and
democracy—the idea of a natural order—must be delineated and understood. On the one hand, this involves the recognition that it is not exploitation, either monarchical or democratic, but private property, production, and voluntary exchange that are the ultimate sources of human civilization. On the other hand, it involves the recognition of a fundamental sociological insight (which incidentally also helps identify precisely where the historic opposition to monarchy went wrong): that the maintenance and preservation of a private property based exchange economy requires as its sociological presupposition the existence of a voluntarily acknowledged natural elite—
a
nobilitas
naturalist

The natural outcome of the voluntary transactions between various private property owners is decidedly nonegalitarian, hierarchical, and elitist. As the result of widely diverse human talents, in every society of any degree of complexity a few individuals quickly acquire the status of an elite. Owing to superior achievements of wealth, wisdom, bravery or a combination thereof, some individuals come to possess "natural authority," and their opinions and judgments enjoy widespread respect. Moreover, because of selective mating and marriage and the laws of civil and genetic inheritance, positions of natural authority are more likely than not passed on within a few noble families. It is to the heads of these families with long-established records of superior achievement, farsightedness, and exemplary personal conduct that men turn with their conflicts and complaints against each other, and it is these very leaders of the natural elite who typically act as judges and peacemakers, often free of charge, out of a sense of obligation required and expected of a person of authority or even out of a principled concern for civil justice, as a privately produced "public good."
⁵¹

⁵⁰
See also Wilhelm Ropke,
A
Humane
Economy
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 1971), pp. 129-36; de Jouvenel,
On
Power,
chap. 17.

⁵¹
See also Marvin Harris,
Cannibals
and
Kings:
The
Origins
of
Culture
(New York: Vintage Books, 1977), pp. 104 ff., on the private provision of public goods by "big men."

In fact, the endogenous origin of a monarchy (as opposed to its exogenous origin
via
conquest)
⁵²
can only be understood against the background of a prior order of natural elites. The small but decisive step in the transition to monarchical rule —the original sin—consisted precisely in the
monopolization
of the function of judge and peacemaker. The step was taken once a single member of the voluntarily acknowledged natural elite—the king—insisted, against the opposition of other members of the social elite, that all conflicts within a specified territory be brought before him and conflicting parties no longer choose any other judge or peacekeeper but him. From this moment on, law and law enforcement became more expensive: instead of being offered free of charge or for a voluntary payment, they were financed with the help of a compulsory tax. At the same time, the quality of law deteriorated: instead of upholding the pre-existing law and applying universal and immutable principles of justice, a monopolistic judge, who did not have to fear losing clients as a result of being less than impartial in his judgments, could successively alter the existing law to his own advantage.

It was to a large extent the inflated price of justice and the perversions of ancient law by the kings which motivated the historical opposition to monarchy. However, confusion as to the causes of this phenomenon prevailed. There were those who recognized correctly that the problem lay with
monopoly,
not with elites or nobility.
⁵³
But they were far outnumbered by those who erroneously blamed it on the elitist character of the rulers instead, and who accordingly strove to maintain the monopoly of law and law enforcement and merely replace the king and the visible royal pomp by the "people" and the presumed modesty and decency of the "common man." Hence the historic success of democracy.

Ironically, the monarchy was then destroye
d by the same social forces that kings had first stimulated when they began to exclu
de competing natural authorities from acting as judges. In order to overcome
their resistance, kings typically aligned themselves with the people, the common man.
⁵⁴
Appealing to the always popular sentiment of envy, kings promised the people cheaper and better justice in exchange and at the expense of taxing—cutting down to size—their own betters (that is, the kings' competitors). When the kings' promises turned out to be empty, as was to be predicted, the same egalitarian sentiments which they had previously courted now focused and turned against them. After all, the king himself was a member of the nobility, and as a result of the exclusion of all other judges, his position had become only more elevated and elitist and his conduct only more arrogant. Accordingly, it appeared only logical then that kings, too, should be brought down and that the egalitarian policies, which monarchs had initiated, be carried through to their ultimate conclusion: the monopolistic control of the judiciary by the common man.

⁵²
For a comparative evaluation of theories of the endogenous versus the exogenous origin of government and a historical critique of the latter as incorrect or incomplete see Wilhelm Mtihlmann,
Rassen,
Ethnien,
Kulturen
(Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1964), pp. 248-319, esp. pp. 291-96.

For proponents of theories of the exogenous origin of government see Fried rich Ratzel,
Politische
Geographie
(Munich, 1923); Oppenheimer,
Der
Staat;
Alexander Riistow,
Freedom
and
Domination
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

⁵³
See, for instance, Gustave de Molinari,
The
Production
of
Security
(New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, 1977), published originally in French in 1849.

Predictably, as explained and illustrated in detail above, the democratization of law and law enforcement—the substitution of the people for the king—made matters only worse, however. The price of justice and peace has risen astronomically, and all the while the quality of law has steadily deteriorated to the point where the idea of law as a body of universal and immutable principles of justice has almost disappeared from public opinion and has been replaced by the idea of law as legislation (government-made law). At the same time, democracy has succeeded where monarchy only made a modest beginning: in the ultimate destruction of the natural elites. The fortunes of great families have dissipated, and their tradition of culture and economic independence, intellectual farsightedness, and moral and spiritual leadership has been forgotten. Rich men still exist today, but more frequently than not they
owe their fortune now directly or indirectly to the state. Hence, they are often more dependent on the state's continued favors than people of far lesser wealth. They are typically no longer the heads of long established leading families but
nouveaux
riches.
Their conduct is not marked by special virtue, dignity, or taste but is a reflection of the same proletarian mass-culture of present-orientedness, opportunism, and hedonism that the rich now share with everyone else; consequently, their opinions carry no more weight in public opinion than anyone else's.

⁵⁴
See on this Henri Pirenne,
Medieval
Cities
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974). "The clear interest of the monarchy," writes Pirenne,

was to support the adversaries of high feudalism. Naturally, help was given whenever it was possible to do so without becoming obligated to these [city] middle classes who in arising against their lords fought, to all intents and purposes, in the interests of royal prerogatives. To accept the king as arbitrator of their quarrel was, for the parties in conflict, to recognize his sovereignty. The entry of the burghers upon the political scene had as a consequence the weakening of the contractual principle of the Feudal State to the advantage of the principle of the authority of the Monarchical State. It was impossible that royalty should not take count of this and seize every chance to show its good-will to the communes which, without intending to do so, labored so usefully in its behalf,
(pp. 179-80) See also ibid., p. 227f. and dejouvenel,
On
Power,
chap. 17.

Hence, when democratic rule has finally exhausted its legitimacy the problem faced will be significantly more difficult than when kings lost their legitimacy. Then, it would have been sufficient to abolish the king's monopoly of law and law enforcement and replace it with a natural order of competing jurisdictions, because remnants of natural elites who could have taken on this task still existed. Now, this will no longer suffice. If the monopoly of law and law enforcement of democratic governments is dissolved, there appears to be no other authority to whom one can turn for justice, and chaos would seem to be inevitable. Thus, in addition to advocating the abdication of democracy, it is now of central strategic importance that at the same time ideological support be given to all decentralizing or even secessionist social forces. In other words, the tendency toward political centralization that has characterized the Western world for many centuries, first under monarchical rule and then under democratic auspices, must be systematically reversed.
⁵⁵
Even if as a result of a secessionist tendency a new government, whether democratic or not, should spring up, territorially smaller governments and increased political competition will tend to encourage moderation as regards exploitation. In any case, only in small regions, communities or districts will it be possible again for a few individuals, based on the popular recognition of their economic independence, outstanding professional achievement, morally impeccable personal life, and superior judgment and taste, to rise to the rank of natural, voluntarily acknowledged authorities and lend legitimacy to the idea of a natural order
⁵⁶
of
competing judges and overlapping jurisdictions—an "anarchic" private law society—as the answer to monarchy
and
democracy.

55
On the political economy of political centralization, and the rationale of decentralization and secession see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, "The Economic and Political Rational for European Secessionism," in
Secession,
State,
and
Liberty,
David Gordon, ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Jean Baechler,
The
Origins
of
Capitalism
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), esp. chap. 7; see also chap. 5 below.

⁵⁶
"In a sound society," writes Wilhelm Ropke,

leadership, responsibility, and exemplary defense of the society's guiding norms and values must be the exalted duty and unchallengeable right of a minority that forms and is willingly and respectfully recognized as the apex
of a social pyramid hierarchically structured by performance. Mass society ... must be counteracted by individual leadership—not on the part of original geniuses or eccentrics or will-o'-the wisp intellectuals, but, on the contrary, on the part of people with courage to reject eccentric novelty for the sake of the 'old truths' which Goethe admonishes us to hold on to and for the sake of historically proved, indestructible, and simple human values. In other words, we need the leadership of... "ascetics of civilization," secularized saints as it were, who in our age occupy a place which must not for long remain vacant at any time and in any society. That is what those have in mind who say that the "revolt of the masses" must be countered by another revolt, the "revolt of the elite."... What we need is true
nobilitas
naturalis.
No era can do without it, least of all ours, when so much is shaking and crumbling away. We need a natural nobility whose authority is, fortunately, readily accepted by all men, an elite deriving its title solely from supreme performance and peerless moral example and inve
sted with the moral dignity of such a life. Only a few from every stratum of society can ascend into this thin layer of natural nobility. The way to it is an exemplary and slowly maturing life of dedicated endeavor on behalf of all, unimpeachable integrity, constant restraint of our common greed, proved soundness of judgment, a spotless private life, indomitable courage in standing up for truth and law, and generally the highest example. This is how the few, carried upward by the trust of the people, gradually attain to a position above the classes, interests, passions, wickedness, and foolishness of men and finally become the nation's conscience. To belong to this group of moral aristocrats should be the highest and most desirable aim, next to which all the other triumphs of life are pale and insipid No free society, least of all ours, which threatens to degenerate into mass society, can subsist without such a class of censors. The continued existence of our free world will ultimately depend on whether our age can produce a sufficient number of such aristocrats of public spirit.
(A
Humane
Economy,
pp. 130-31)

3

On
Monarchy,
Democracy,
Public
Opinion,
and
Delegitimation

I

It is appropriate to begin with a few observations on Ludwig von Mises, and his idea of a free society.

"The program of liberalism," wrote Mises,

if condensed into a single word, would have to read:
property,
that is, private ownership of the means of production (for in regard to commodities ready for consumption, private property is a matter of course and is not disputed even by the socialists and communists). All the other demands of liberalism result from this fundamental demand.
1

Based on private property, Mises explained, the emergence of society—human cooperation was the result of the natural diversity of people and property and the recognition that work performed under division of labor is more productive than work performed in self-sufficient isolation. He explained:

If and as far as labor under the division of labor is more productive than isolated labor, and if and as far as man is able to realize this fact, human action itself tends toward cooperation and association;... Experience teaches that this condition higher productivity achieved under division of labor is present because its cause the inborn inequality of men and the inequality in the geographical distribution of the natural factors of production is real. Thus we are in a position to comprehend the course of social evolution.
²

If the emergence of society human cooperat
ion under division of labor can be explained as the result of self-interested action, it is also true that, mankind being what it is, murderers, robbers, thieves, thugs, and
con-artists will always exist, and life in society will be intolerable unless they are threatened with physical punishment. "The liberal understands quite well," wrote Mises,

1
Ludwig von Mises,
Liberalism:
In
the
Classical
Tradition
(Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1985), p. 19.

²
Ludwig von Mises,
Human
Action:
A
Treatise
on
Economics
(Chicago: Regnery, 1966), pp. 160-61.